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Abstract
This dissertation explains why and how some militaries are better than others at emulating
the organization and doctrine of foreign armed forces. I define military emulation as the
changes to a pre-existing military organization resulting from an imitation of another mili-
tary’s structure or doctrine. The changes stem from the diffusion of military ideas from one
polity to another. I call those ideas ‘theory of victory’ and ‘theory of corporatism’. The
former explains the next mission a military needs to fight and how to win, while the latter
details how intra-military institutions and their raison d’etres are designed, maintained, and
defended in their relationship with the state and society. I am interested in explaining two
ideal types of military emulation: maximalist and minimalist. In a maximalist emulation, we
should see the transplantation of existing theories of victory and corporatism with foreign-
based ones. The rapid, expansive, and thorough adoption of those theories is the hallmark
of such an emulation. In a minimalist emulation, we should see a small number of changes
to the military’s pre-existing theories of victory and corporatism. The diffusion process is
likely to be slow, limited, and produce few similarities with the original model.
This dissertation develops a new theory arguing the variation of military emulation
depends on the interaction of: (1) the transmission pathway between the foreign model and
the potential emulator supplying new theories of victory and corporatism, and (2) the quality
of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure (career management and education systems) shap-
ing the organizational capacity to interpret, adopt, and implement them. Some pathways
have accelerative properties allowing emulators to obtain consistent and coherent theories of
victory and corporatism while giving them agency to ‘localize’ those theories. The personnel
infrastructure quality determines whether new career trajectories could emerge for officers
trained in foreign theories of victory and corporatism, allowing them to become product
champions, and ensure that the broader learning capacity is boosted. A higher learning ca-
pacity is necessary for senior officers to understand, adopt, and implement the new theories.
A maximalist emulation is likely when there is: 1) an accelerated and coherent transmission
of foreign theories of corporatism and victory, and 2) an organization capable of interpret-
ing and adopting them. A minimalist emulation is likely when there is: 1) a decelerated
and incoherent transmission of foreign theories of corporatism and victory, and 2) and an
organization incapable of interpreting and adopting them.
To assess the new theory’s analytical value, I present a systematic plausibility probe
by comparing Cold War Indonesia (1950–1991) and Meiji Japan (1868–1912). For the former,
I explain why and how the Indonesian military did not become “Americanized” by the end
of the Cold War, despite employing thousands of American-trained officers. For the latter,
I explain why and how Meiji Japan managed to successfully emulate Western theories of
victory and corporatism within a short period of time. I employ a comparative process
tracing design integrating within-case analyses and cross-case comparisons. For each case, I
examine archival materials, organizational documents, and historiographical sources. I also
create two original officer-level datasets on the career patterns of the military elite in Cold
War Indonesia and Meiji Japan. I use the qualitative and quantitative data to evaluate how
well my theory could explain the empirical puzzles of the cases.
I find that the diffusion of US theories of victory and corporatism to Indonesia was
hindered by the fact that Washington viewed military education and training aid as a political
tool to combat communism rather than a method to remodel the Indonesian military over
its own image. Statistical analyses of the Indonesian Army’s career patterns show there was
no significant correlation between ‘professional’ career markers, including US education and
training, with successful retirements. Only around 16% of 677 Indonesian Army generals
had some form of US education or training. The military’s educational institutions also
focused on ideological coherence and non-military duties while officers valued higher-level
education for its political and patronage effects. Consequently, we see a doctrinal stagnation
in the 1960s and the limited and inconsistent application of US theories of victory in major
operations. These findings suggest the Indonesian military achieved a minimalist emulation.
For Meiji Japan, the diffusion of Western theories of victory and corporatism was
facilitated by the commercial contracts the government signed with Western military train-
ers. They allowed the military to control and localize the diffusion process. The profes-
sional, merit-based career management created new career pathways for Western-trained
officers. Statistical analyses of the career patterns show that, compared to other career
markers, Western studies background was a significant predictor of whether officers retired
as three or four-star generals and admirals. Roughly half of 684 Meiji generals and admirals
had some form of Western studies background. The centrality of education as professional
qualifications—the academies and war colleges emphasized military sciences, competitive
examinations, and academic focus—helped senior officers understand, adopt, and implement
Western theories of victory and corporatism. The organization-wide military Westernization
by the Sino-Japanese War (1893-94) demonstrates Meiji Japan’s maximalist emulation.
The arguments and findings have broader theoretical, empirical, and policy impli-
cations. They speak and contribute to the resurgence of diffusion studies across the social
sciences. As military organizational change is rare, understanding when and how it occurs
is important for a wide range of military and political outcomes. Military emulation speaks
to the generation of military power and offers insights into how states respond to different
challenges and opportunities within the international system. How Asian polities in partic-
ular engage in military Westernization speaks to a range of important political outcomes
associated with various state building processes. Finally, understanding how emulation oc-
curs illuminates a wide range of contemporary security policy challenges; from the changing
nature of warfare to military education and training assistance programs.
Imitation Game:
Military Institutions and Westernization in Indonesia and Japan
by
Evan A. Laksmana
M.A. in Political Science, Syracuse University, 2012
M.Sc. in Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009
B.A. in Political Science, Parahyangan Catholic University, 2006
Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Syracuse University
December 2019






This dissertation was a long time coming. I worked on the puzzles surrounding military
change and Westernization since I joined the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies (CSIS) in 2009. Back then, I always wondered why it was so difficult
to reform the Indonesian military and why innovative ideas—including those coming from
dozens of Western-trained officers—never got anywhere. My research activities and policy
engagements over the years with different domestic and foreign military establishments never
quite gave me the answers I was looking for. I kept working on military change and diffusion
on and off since I came to Syracuse in 2011. By the time I complete my dissertation in
December 2019, I have worked on this topic for about a decade and amassed an enormous
amount of debt and gratitude to so many individuals and institutions.
It seems apt for a dissertation on institutions that I thank the organizations that
helped me complete the project. The American Indonesian Exchange Foundation (AMINEF)
and the Fulbright Presidential Scholarship gave me with the financial and institutional sup-
port to embark on my PhD journey in 2011. The scholarship allowed me to focus my energy
and time to complete a grueling three-year coursework and comprehensive examinations. A
Southeast Asia Fulbright Supplemental Grant from the Institute of International Education
in 2012 helped fund my initial summer work in Washington D.C.
I was then fortunate to receive support for my archival research and fieldwork in the
UK, the US, Australia, and Indonesia between 2014 and 2016. This included research grants
and fellowships from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Hoover Institution Library and
Archives at Stanford University, and the Southeast Asia Centre of the University of Syd-
ney. At Syracuse University, the Andrew Berlin Family National Security Research Fund
at the Institute for National Security and Counter-Terrorism, the East Asia Program at the
Moynihan Institute for Global Affairs and the Roscoe Martin Fund of the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs supported two summers of research. A collaboration with the
National University in Singapore under Terence Lee to create a database on the Indonesian
officer corps was extremely helpful the dissertation. The Department of Political Science
was generous to grant me the Betsy and Alan Cohn Award and the Dissertation Writing
Research Assistantship to complete my fieldwork. The National Bureau of Asian Research
in Seattle gave me a home to write my dissertation since 2017.
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At Syracuse University, I am extremely grateful to Colin Elman as my dissertation
chair. He ushered in the project from its inception until completion and helped me navigate
the complexities of grant proposals, research designs, and archival research and fieldwork.
He was also generous in opening many doors and opportunities for me—some of which re-
mains the highlight of my graduate school years. Brian Taylor was my academic advisor
from the moment I came to Syracuse. He helped me countless of times and willingly dis-
cuss and debate the project since my very first research summer. Miriam Elman, Margarita
Estevez-Abe, and Ryan Griffiths were kind enough to be part of my dissertation committee
and helped improved the project. Rene de Nevers chaired my defense and allowed me to
get excellent and constructive feedbacks. Other faculty members helped me become a better
scholar. I thank Anoop Sadanandan, Daniel McDowell, Jon Hanson, Audie Klotz, Seth Jolly
and Matt Cleary for all their help and guidance throughout my time there.
Graduate school would have been impossible without cherished friends and colleagues.
Michael Newell, Franziska Boehme, Bridget Fahey, Eric van der Vort, Brandon Thomas,
Ronit Berger were there with me from the beginning. They have seen me at my best and
worst. My “comrades-in-arms”, Pedram Maghsoud-Nia, Prakhar Sharma, Sinan Chu, Mas-
simo Ramioli, Charles Tuthill, Mike Makara, and Mike Beckstrand, all offered their kind
friendship. Sunghee Cho, Lindsay Burt, and Nneka Eke embody the phrase ”a friend in
need is a friend indeed”. Their friendship in my last few years in Syracuse has kept me on
the level more times than I can count. From the department of political science, Candy
Brooks, Jacquie Meyer, and Sally Greenfield are indispensable. Without their help on so
many occasions—often above and beyond what they’re supposed to do—I’m pretty sure I
wouldn’t survive graduate school.
I would also like to thank CSIS Jakarta for supporting my time away from the office
for so many years. I especially thank Rizal Sukma, Clara Joewono, and Hadi Soesastro who
took a chance on me when I was still fresh from completing my master’s degree back in 2009.
Without their support and trust over the past decade, I wouldn’t have been able to embark
on my PhD in the first place. Philips Vermonte, Lina Alexandra, Fajar Hirawan, Christine
Tjhin, Andrew Mantong, Rocky Intan, and Iis Gindarsah have all been among my trusted
friends over the years. Their friendship and support have always given me an extra layer of
confidence that I can finish my PhD.
My family of course is the reason I can go off to graduate school for over eight years.
They may not always understand why I’m doing all of this, but they always have my back no
matter what. Last but certainly not the least, my partner-in-crime, Jennifer Frentasia. She
has supported me through thick and thin in this journey even as she has to complete her own
PhD. Every good piece of writing I ever produced has her fingerprints all over it. I literally
could not have completed writing the dissertation without her. This dissertation—and my
PhD—is all thanks to her. The journey has been a deeply personal one. But I would’ve
never seen it through without God’s grace. He made all things wonderful in His own time
and His love has always been the constant in my life. Let’s not pretend that I could’ve done
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“If, in warfare, a certain means turns out to be highly effective,
it will be used again; it will be copied by others and become fashionable.”
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Book 2, Ch. 6)
1.1 The puzzles of military change, emulation, and Westernization
Why are some militaries better than others at emulating the organizational system and
doctrinal concepts of others? In other words, why are some militaries capable of changing
how they are organized and how they plan to fight by following the example of foreign armed
forces? This question is puzzling for three reasons. Firstly, militaries are not designed to
be adaptive. They need rigid and structured institutions so that their members — soldiers
and officers — could follow orders during war and perform effectively in the face of danger.
Militaries even create their own educational and training institutions and recruit young men
and women to deliberately and systematically socialize them into their organizations’ way
of life. And yet, from time to time, despite being billed as ‘total institutions’, militaries
do change, albeit in varying degrees. Some changed their tactics during war, while others
transformed their entire organizational structures and practices. Military change happens
but they are rare and puzzling.
1
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Secondly, as if military change is not puzzling enough, some militaries change by
following the example of armed forces. The deliberate imitation of another military’s or-
ganizational structure or doctrine known as ‘military emulation’ (Resende-Santos 2007) is
puzzling because militaries are generally created to fight other (foreign) militaries. Why
would a military then emulate the structure or practices of its potential enemy? Why would
the potential enemy, in turn, share its war-fighting ideas to a potential emulator, who might
use them against it down the line? Why would a military—often the embodiment of national
pride—be seen as learning how to fight from another country? Why would a military re-
nounce its ability to formulate its own war-fighting ideas—and thus ensuring they match its
own strategic situation—and chose instead to borrow from foreign forces which may have dif-
ferent operational demands? Emulation is therefore not a standard, easy, or straight-forward
method of military change. That military emulation occurs at all is puzzling.
Finally, although military emulation should be difficult, it has remained a staple pat-
tern in the international system since the beginning of organized warfare. Following the
Peloponnesian wars, for example, the Spartan practice of hoplite warfare spread throughout
the ancient Greek world and beyond. Colonialism meanwhile diffused European war-making
institutions to most of Africa, Asia, and Latin America with different and enduring conse-
quences. In pre-modern Southeast Asia, a small number of Europeans introduced important
changes into regional warfare during the 16th and 17th centuries, including the greater use of
firearms, the building of permanent stone fortresses, and the use of permanent armies and
foreign mercenaries (Reid 1982, 7). More recently, during the Cold War, Third World mili-
taries were created based on the ‘wholesale transplantation’ of Western military technology
and ‘organizational formats’ (Janowitz 1988, 13).
But underneath these macro-patterns of the diffusion of military knowledge from the
3
West to the rest, some states appear better than others at getting military emulation right.
Imperial Japan or Napoleonic-era Prussia, successfully adopted and employed foreign mili-
tary technologies, concepts, and tactical innovations. Mamluk Egypt and Ottoman Turkey
also adopted some of the best practices of the French, German, and British forces by the 20th
century. But other militaries, such as those in pre-modern Southeast Asia, Latin America, or
Cold War Middle East, tried but ultimately fail to model themselves over the great powers
of their day (Charney 2004; Eisenstadt and Pollack 2001). At best, these militaries could
only copy some of the foreign militaries’ best organizational and operational practices. What
explains the varied successes of military emulation?
To address this broad puzzle, this dissertation examines the historical processes of
military Westernization in Asia. By military Westernization, I mean the degree to which
a military organization interprets, adopts, and implements the concepts or organizational
systems of Western countries.1 As I explain below, I focus on organizational and operational
concepts because significant military emulations should be observed across the organization
and throughout its operational conduct, based on deeper, ideational changes, rather than
a superficially material, technological change. A military can operate Western-made arms
without necessarily adopting Western operational concepts.
I focus on military Westernization in Asia because Western conceptions of warfare—
from organizational structures to war-fighting methods—have diffused throughout the region
since the 17th century onwards. At the heart of this diffusion were the encounters and
contacts—through trade, warfare, or others—between sea-faring Western powers and the
regional polities. The different modes, duration, and intensity of these encounters have
facilitated the diffusion of Western ideas, practices, and technology of warfare with significant
1 I consider ‘Western countries’ to be the United States and Western European countries, primarily
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. These are the Western countries that most Asian
militaries have historically engaged with and borrowed from.
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military and political consequences. These transmission pathways (described below) have
their own distinct logics and mechanisms providing different opportunities and challenges for
regional polities. Some pathways are more effective than others at diffusing Western military
knowledge. And yet, despite the long and rich historical processes of military Westernization
in Asia, these transmissions seldom receive a systematic assessment.
The transmissions alone, however, do not fully explain the variation of military em-
ulation across the region. Take 19th century China and Japan, for example. Both countries
sought to adopt Western military technology and war-fighting concepts by hiring Western
advisers (Hacker 1977). And yet, Japan’s military Westernization was more successful than
China’s, as we can see in the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese (1904-05)
wars. To better explain the variation of emulation we need to understand the extent to
which the emulating military is not only willing but capable of engaging in military Western-
ization. But organizational emulation capacity is more than just a resource problem. Most
major Asian polities from the 13th to the 19th centuries have had the financial wherewithal
to obtain European weaponry to some extent. Capacity is also more than just familiarity.
Many Asian polities had encountered and produced rudimentary European firearms prior
to colonization. Indeed, the historical military technological gap between Asian polities and
European powers may not have been as wide as assumed (Lorge 2008; Charney 2004).
The different capacities of Asian militaries to emulate Western powers are better
understood at the organizational level. The extent to which an emulator’s personnel in-
frastructure in particular is ‘ready to receive’ Western military ideas is an important step.
Specifically, the intra-military power politics that shape and shove the quality of the emu-
lator’s personnel infrastructure are central to the military Westernization efforts. Whether
the military had a merit-based professional career management system, for example, is im-
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portant to ensure that officers trained in foreign ways of warfare can be promoted into senior
positions at the right time. The rise of these foreign-trained officers, in turn, increases the
chances they could promote new, foreign ways of warfare they are trained in across the or-
ganization. In short, the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure determines the
degree of its ‘receptiveness’ and ‘responsiveness’ to foreign military knowledge and ideas.
It should be noted, however, that the importance of personnel infrastructure is not
strictly a European or Western invention. In pre-modern Southeast Asia, for example, Viet-
nam developed a merit-based officer corps. Under the 13th century Tran Dynasty, a regular-
ized military examination system was instituted by emulating China’s civil service examina-
tion. Over time, the military became a separate and complex bureaucracy, headed by the
Board of War which decided not only troop deployments, but officer promotions, demotions,
and assignments as well (Charney 2004, 238). The high-quality personnel infrastructure
allowed Vietnam to be relatively proficient at adopting European military technology and
practices for centuries after (Dutton 2003; Mantienne 2003).
More broadly, variations in how ‘professional’ Asian militaries were developed could
provide important insights into the processes of military change. I focus on the historical
processes of military Westernization in Cold War Indonesia (1950 – 1991) and Meiji Japan
(1868 – 1912). These cases were empirically puzzling. During the Cold War, the US provided
extensive military assistance to Indonesia. Thousands of Indonesian officers were trained
at various US military schools. And yet, by the 1990s, there was hardly any sign of an
“Americanized” Indonesian military. The organization held on to their Japanese-inspired
structure and doctrine while eschewing US notions of democratic civil-military relations.
The Indonesian military also only applied some elements of US tactical concepts. Why did
the Indonesian military only achieved a limited emulation despite having thousands of US-
6
trained officers? Imperial Japan is also puzzling because within the span of two decades,
its army and navy went from being antiquated, feudal-era forces into the most advanced
military power Asia has seen by then. The Japanese military adopted Western military
strategy, doctrine, tactical concepts, and technology to defeat China in 1893 and Russia
in 1904. The Russo-Japanese war was particularly impressive considering that Russia was
among the top Western powers in the early 20th century. Why and how did the Japanese
military overcome its feudal institutions and limitations — not to mention its strong anti-
Western domestic nationalism — and achieved an expansive emulation?
We can locate these empirical puzzles within the broader patterns of military emu-
lation and change. As I discuss below, Cold War Indonesia and Meiji Japan were ‘typical
cases’ of two ideal modes of transmission: cooperative and commercial, respectively. These
transmissions are sub-types of direct diffusion (where the relationship between the model
and emulator is well-established). Within a cooperative relationship, the transmission of
military knowledge is based on bilateral agreements between the model and the emulator.
The agency of both the model and emulator equally determines the manner and method of
military knowledge transmission. A commercial transmission is where the Asian emulator
(receiver) has more agency to determine what it needs from the Western model (donor) and
acquire it through market-provided commercial means (e.g. mercenaries). The Japanese and
Indonesian cases also represents the full range of values of military emulation, maximalist
minimalist, respectively. I discuss the case selection and comparison rationale further below.
In summary, this dissertation seeks to explain why and how some states are better
at achieving a sucessful military emulation than others. This puzzle is rooted in the broader
puzzle of military change and is further examined through the empirical puzzles of military
Westernization in Asia. As I elaborate below, by comparing military Westernization in Cold
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War Indonesia and Meiji Japan, I hope to highlight the centrality and interaction of two
conditions for emulation success: (1) the different facilitative properties between commercial
and cooperative transmissions, and (2) the quality of personnel infrastructure as it pertains
to career management as well as education and training. The first structures the interaction
and power dynamics between the Western and Asian agents, while the second structures
the interaction and power dynamics within the emulator’s military organization. These
conditions are therefore ‘institutions’: humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic, and social interactions (North 1990).
This chapter is divided into several sections. Section 2 describes why the puzzle
of military emulation and Westernization in Asia matters. It highlights the theoretical,
empirical, policy, and normative implications of understanding why and how some militaries
are better than others at achieving emulation. Section 3 summarizes and previews the key
arguments and findings. Section 4 outlines the research design. I describe my ontological,
epistemological and methodological choices as well as my strategy of inquiry. I also provide a
brief summary of the causal process and dataset observational data I use in the dissertation
and how I collected them. Finally, section 5 provides a brief rundown of the overall structure
of the dissertation.
1.2 Why the puzzles matter
Explaining the puzzles of military change, emulation, and Westernization in Asia is important
for several reasons. Firstly, as military organizational change is rare, understanding when and
how it occurs is important for a wide-range of military and political outcomes. There is a rich
and growing research program studying why and how militaries innovate in peacetime and
adapt in wartime (Grissom 2006; Farrell and Terriff 2002; Adamsky 2010; Marcus 2015).
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Studies of security sector reform and post-authoritarian military transformations are also
premised on seeking the best way to ‘change’ a military organization (Sedra 2010; Barany
2013; Cawthra and Luckham 2003). A study of why and how militaries change in the face
of or to follow ‘foreign’ ideas — whether about war-fighting or democratic civil-military
relations — could illuminate how militaries change in general.
Secondly, military emulation speaks to central questions surrounding the generation
of military power. When and how states can “import” military capabilities by borrowing
the doctrines, structures, or war-fighting ideas from major military powers touches on a
wide-range of war-related outcomes, from combat effectiveness to conflict duration, as well
as broader political ones, such as the rise and fall of states. As militaries are comparative
institutions—they calibrate and focus their effectiveness in relation to other militaries (Gold-
man and Eliason 2003)—a study of how ways of warfare spread offers insights into how states
respond to different military challenges and opportunities within the international system.
In short, the success and failure of the diffusion of military ideas have implications for the
frequency of war onset and how effectively armies fight when conflicts occur (Grauer 2015).
Thirdly, how Asian polities engage in military Westernization speaks to a range of
important political and military outcomes associated with various state building processes.
For example, whether and how post-colonial militaries were modeled over their former colo-
nial rulers influences the quality of their civil-military relations and the effectiveness of their
political institutions (Price 1971). Others show how the emulation of ‘capital intensive’
Western military systems helped militarize the Third World during the Cold War (Wendt
and Barnett 1993). Western security assistance also affects the level of internal repression,
the ability to embark on “modernization”, and even the prospects for democratization (Bi-
enen 1971; Janowitz 1988; Ruby and Gibler 2010). Altogether, these studies point to the
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processes in which the importation of foreign war-making institutions affects state build-
ing processes. After all, for much of the developing world, the adoption of complex foreign
military systems entails a different set of state capacity and infrastructure than internally
developed war-making institutions.
Fourthly, an examination of how Asian militaries engage in military Westernization
touches on a range of normative questions in the study of international security. Studies
examining ‘Western vs. Eastern’ ways of warfare, for example, start from the premise of a
‘West’ at war with an ‘East’ conceived as a ‘radically other’ going back over a millennia.2
Scholars argue this growing literature is plagued with ‘Eurocentrism’, the uneven analytical
focus on Europe and the US. For one thing, there is an emphasis on the military history of,
and involving, the West where other states appear only to be defeated (Black 2004, 67–8).
The non-West is seldom given agency let alone proper analysis.3 For another, there is a
long-standing use of Western analytical concepts to describe global military history (Black
2004, 67–8). Western-derived terms like ‘combat decisiveness’ often hinder efforts to properly
assess the peculiarities of non-West military cultures and behaviors.4 The use of Western
concepts also leads to a more general “primitivization” of the non-West.5 These conditions
are indicators of ‘military orientalism’ in the study of international security (Porter 2009).
Fifthly, understanding the different processes surrounding military emulation illumi-
2 Notable examples include the Crusades, European wars with the Ottomans, imperial ‘small wars’ in
Latin America, Asia and Africa, the Cold War and the “humanitarian wars” of the post-Cold War era
(Barkawi and Stanski 2013, 2).
3 Consider how the modern perspective on Asian history views Asian military practices and technology
as primitive and backward because they were considered culturally non-military and racially inferior before
the arrival of the Europeans (Lorge 2008, 2).
4 As military historian John Lynn (2003, 19-20) argues, “We know more about ancient China, but that
understanding does not rival our command of Greek and Roman military history.”
5 Consider, for example, the assumptions underpinning this claim: “Ritualized, anarchic, and transient,
primitive warfare is best classed with feuding, brawling, and other forms of physically expressed hostility
between individuals or small groups, more akin to the antagonistic behavior of non-human species than the
civilized war of organized states” (Hacker 1997, 462). In this view, any non-western ways of warfare in the
past were ‘barbaric’ and ‘not civilized’.
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nates a wide range of contemporary security policy challenges; from the changing nature of
warfare to the global balance of power. In the pre–modern world, for example, the diffusion
of military techniques from ‘advanced’ societies to ‘primitive’ ones was a principal factor in
the rise of new powers (Gilpin 1983, 177). More recently, as China modernizes its military,
understanding military emulation allows us to anticipate when it is capable of dominating
its adversaries and when its threats should be taken seriously. To take another example,
explaining the conditions under which societies adopt foreign military systems illuminates
why military assistance during the Cold War had mixed effects, or why the US have had
trouble creating effective local security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in recent years.
Finally, the diffusion of Western war-fighting concepts to Asia is not neatly or eas-
ily located within traditional research programs in political science; it straddles the divide
between Comparative Politics and International Relations at best. As I anchor the puz-
zle within the broader diffusion studies literature, the dissertation lends itself to build and
draw from a variety of research programs across different disciplinary fields, from Military
History, Strategic Studies, Organizational Sociology, Comparative Politics, International Re-
lations (IR), Business Management, and others. The extant literature, however, remains a
conceptual minefield as different scholars use ‘diffusion’ to describe different phenomenon.
This dissertation develops a theoretical framework that considers diffusion as a process, sepa-
rates the mechanisms and outcomes, and clarifies the terminologies different scholars employ.
The project therefore speaks to the resurgence of diffusion studies across the social sciences
(see e.g. Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013; Solingen 2012).
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1.3 Summary of the argument and findings
This dissertation makes several theoretical arguments. First, the diffusion literature in gen-
eral, and military diffusion in particular, suffers from conceptual ambiguities, from the con-
flation of key terms to the lack of clarity between mechanisms and outcomes. To address the
problem, I provide two conceptual analyses of ‘military diffusion’ and ‘military emulation’.
The first unpacks ‘military diffusion’ using a multi-level structural analysis that breaks down
the concept’s key constitutive elements: the diffusible item, the transmission pathway, and
the adoption of the item. This analysis provides a logical support to my definition of mil-
itary diffusion as the process through which particular military ideas are transferred from
one polity to another. The second conceptual analysis is taxonomic and locates ‘military
emulation’ as a subset of military change. I define military emulation as the changes to a
pre-existing military organization resulting from an imitation of another military’s structure
or doctrine. I focus on military Westernization: the extent to which non-Western militaries
adopt the organization, doctrine, or operational methods of their Western counter-parts.
Second, a general theory of military diffusion must account for the ‘diffusible item’
and the pathway in which it travels. I conceptualize the latter as the transmission pathways
(“communication medium”) between the model and emulator. I further develop ‘theory
of victory’ and ‘theory of corporatism’ as conceptual containers for the diffusible item. A
theory of victory explains what the next mission a military needs to fight and how to win.
A theory of corporatism details how intra-military institutions and their raison d’tres are
designed, maintained, and defended in their relationship with the state and society. I propose
two ideal types of emulation: maximalist and minimalist. In a ‘maximalist emulation’, we
should see the transplantation of existing theories of victory and corporatism with foreign-
based ones. The rapid, expansive, and thorough adoption of those theories is the hallmark of
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such emulation. In a ‘minimalist emulation’, we should see only a small number of changes
to the pre-existing theories of victory and corporatism. The diffusion process is likely to be
slow, limited, and produce few similarities with the original model.
Finally, I develop a nested institutional framework to explain the variation of military
emulation. By nested I mean the argument consists of three elements embedded within
one another: (1) a power-based institutional framework, (2) an institutional theory derived
from the framework, and (3) transmission models derived from the theory. The power-
based framework argues the intra-organizational power dynamics over resources and control
shape the interplay between formal and informal institutions. The interplay leads to a
new institutional structure over time. The structure then further shapes new conflicts and
compromises, which in turn leads to new institutional structures in a feedback loop. As
the power dynamics reproduces institutional structures, they place the organization within
a path-dependent trajectory.
The theory argues that military emulation depends on the interaction between two
sets of institutions during critical junctures: (1) the transmission pathway between the donor
and the emulator and (2) the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. The path-
way provides the ‘supply’ of information on the theories of victory and corporatism, and the
personnel infrastructure determines an emulator’s ‘capacity’ to interpret and adopt them.
As embodiments of the donor-emulator relationship, some pathways have more accelera-
tive properties than others. I argue that a commercial transmission has more facilitative
properties than a cooperative one. Meanwhile, the quality of the emulator’s personnel in-
frastructure focuses on career management and education systems. If a military develops
a professional, merit-based career management (i.e. high-quality), officers trained in new
theories of victory and corporatism are likely become effective ‘product champions’ as they
13
hold key positions. If it also develops a professional education and training system, their
officers are more likely to be capable at interpreting, adopting, and implementing those new
theories. But, if the emulator has a low-quality personnel infrastructure, then we should not
see the rise of product champions nor would the officers be able to understand, adopt, and
implement new theories of victory and corporatism.
To assess the analytical utility of these arguments, this dissertation provides a system-
atic plausibility probe by comparing why and how Cold War Indonesia (1950–1991) and Meiji
Japan (1868–1912) engaged in military Westernization activities. I examine both qualitative
(archival documents, secondary sources, and historiographical materials) and quantitative
data (two original officer-level datasets). The application of the framework to the cases
provides several empirical findings pertaining to Indonesia and Japan.
First, the Indonesian military achieved a minimalist emulation. By the end of the
Cold War, its organizational theories of victory and corporatism did not reflect US ones.
It further suffers from doctrinal stagnation as evidenced by the inability of the New Order
regime under General Suharto (1966-1998) to overhaul the Territorial Warfare doctrine in
the mid-1960s. The conjunction of (1) the inhibitive properties of a cooperative transmission
via US military education and training assistance, and (2) the low-quality of the Indonesian
military’s personnel infrastructure during the critical juncture (1960s–1970s) that prevented
new career pathways for US-trained officers and prevented the rise of US product champions.
On the one hand, Washington’s perception of Jakarta’s geopolitical Cold War im-
portance became the predominant benchmark through which military aid was measured.
Military education and training aid was thus a political tool rather than a mechanism to
genuinely remodel the Indonesian military along the US model. On the other hand, the for-
mal rules governing the behavior and action of Indonesian military officers were not stable or
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predictable, while informal institutions such as patronage prevailed. Under this condition,
US-trained officers did not become organizational leaders or product champions promoting
US theories of victory and corporatism. The military’s education system also lacked coher-
ence and focused on ideological and political indoctrination, rather than professional military
sciences. The organization did not value military education and training as important profes-
sional qualifications; officers value staff and command colleges for their political networking,
rather than intellectual development, opportunities. Statistical analyses of the career pat-
terns of Army officers further reveals no significant correlation between what we consider to
be ‘professional’ career markers with a successful retirement (holding a command appoint-
ment or a general rank). Only around 16% of 677 Indonesian Army Generals had some form
of US education and training. A logistic regression analysis reveals that a higher proportion
of an officer’s foreign education (from his total civilian and military education) was more
likely to lead to a command appointment before retiring. This effect can be attributed to
the pre-foreign education elite status and patronage (i.e. informal institutions).
Second, the Meiji military achieved a maximalist emulation by the Sino-Japanese
(1893-4) and Russo-Japanese (1904-5) wars. Its theories of victory and corporatism largely
reflected those found among the most powerful Western militaries at the time. This out-
come is the result of the interaction between: (1) the transmission of Western theories of
victory and corporatism through commercially-contracted training missions and (2) the Meiji
military’ high-quality personnel infrastructure that facilitated the rise of Western product
champions and boosted the organization’s learning capacity.
Statistical analyses reveal that Western-studies background was a positive and sig-
nificant predictor of whether Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy
(IJN) officers retired as three or four-star generals and admirals. There were thus new
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career pathways for Western-trained officers as they became Western product champions.
From the sample of the Meiji military elite I examine (almost 700 officers), roughly half
of them had some form of Western studies background. Further qualitative analyses show
the institutionalized career management allowed Western-trained officers to collaborate with
Western trainers to drive the military Westernization process. The centrality of education
and training as professional qualifications—and the fact that the Academy and War Col-
lege emphasized military sciences, competitive examinations, and academic focus—boosted
the Japanese military’s learning capacity. When commercially-contracted foreign trainers
worked with Western-trained officers, the officer corps was capable of understanding and
adopting Western theories of victory and corporatism.
1.4 Research design: systematic plausibility probe
This dissertation proposes a new institutional theory to explain the variation of military
emulation. I propose the theory after conducting a systematic review and concept analysis
of the military emulation literature. I further examine whether the theory has analytical
purchase or traction by providing a systematic plausibility probe through a comparative case
study. This dissertation is therefore a blend of theory-proposing, theory-testing, and stock-
taking research projects (van Evera 1997, 89–90). I should note that the theory “testing”
element is preliminary, rather than exhaustive and conclusive.
A plausibility probe, however, is more than just providing an illustrative case study.
As Eckstein (2000, 140) argues, a plausibility probe is a stage of inquiry preliminary to the
rigorous testing of candidate-theories. In essence, a plausibility probe seeks to determine
whether the theory is valid enough to warrant further testing. It is therefore an interme-
diary step between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing and which may include
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“illustrative” case studies (Levy 2008, 3). But many political scientists use such illustrative
plausibility probes loosely without systematic and methodological grounds. Just because
plausibility probes are “less than conclusive tests” does not mean we should be less system-
atic or rigorous in execute such a research design. Indeed, if applied in a methodologically
self-conscious way, plausibility probes can serve an important function in theory development
(Levy 2008, 7).
There are several ways we can consider whether a plausibility probe is useful in “val-
idating” a new theory for future testing: it is can account for the strengths and weaknesses
of the extant relevant or competing arguments; it provides a common foundation for previ-
ously validated but quite discrete and unconnected hypotheses; it extends assumptions found
powerful in some research areas to another; it provides regularity statements that explain
heretofore unexplained data (Eckstein 2000, 141-2). All of these create presumptions in fa-
vor of rigorously testing the new theory further. In this regard, systematic comparative and
minimalist process-tracing of case studies can be considered useful plausibility probe designs
(Eckstein 2000, 141-2; Beach 2017). Provided that we do not overestimate the results as if
they come from a rigorous, exhaustive, and conclusive testing of the theory.
This section presents a systematic and coherent plausibility probe research design,
from ontological foundations to empirical assessments. By employing a “methodologically
self-conscious” plausibility probe, I hope to give more analytical weight to the preliminary
results. Given the under-developed state of the research program examining military dif-
fusion and emulation, a systematic—and analytically stronger—plausibility probe could be
more useful than a weak hypothesis testing exercise. A methodologically-grounded plausi-
bility probe design is particularly important given that the dissertation’s key elements—the
puzzle, theories, and empirics—are not located within a single research program or disci-
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plinary field. As chapter 2 demonstrates, different bits and pieces of the research on military
emulation can be found scattered across the humanities and social sciences.
My systematic plausibility probe research design makes several explicit ontological,
epistemological, methodological, and theoretical choices. Any research designed to provide
inferences or knowledge about the world should be rooted in a commitment (or wager,
depending on one’s perspective) to a particular set of ontology and corresponding epis-
temology.6 I am not engaging in yet another debate within the “philosophical turn” in
international relations theory, nor am I claiming one epistemology is better than the other.7
I simply provide an explicit statement of my ontological and epistemological commitments
so I could develop a coherent plausibility probe architecture — from ontological foundations
to empirical analysis (see Figure 1.1 below) — to address the puzzle at hand. After all, while
a perfect correspondence between ontology, epistemology, and methodology is not clearcut,
each of these constructs do constrain each other (Chatterjee 2013).
1.4.1 Ontology and epistemology
Driven by the necessity for meta-theroretical pluralism to address a real-world problem not
easily located within a single research program, I embrace the ‘scientific realist’ as well as
the ‘pragmatist’ traditions within the philosophy of science as my primary ontological and
epistemological foundations.8 These two traditions, in their various iterations, have been
6 In simple terms, ontology is the nature being or ‘things’ and epistemology is the theory of knowledge,
or ‘how do we know those things are things’. More formally, epistemological questions are concerned with
the nature and derivation of knowledge, the scope of knowledge and the reliability of claims to knowledge—
in short, the grounds we have for accepting or rejecting beliefs (Wight 2006, 231). Hence ontology and
epistemology, although analytically separable, are always linked.
7 For the promises and pitfalls of the philosophical turn in IR theory (see e.g. Wight 2002; Owen 2002).
There are also long-running debates within IR about the relationship between ontology, epistemology, and
methodology deeply intertwined with the nature of ‘agent vs. structure’ debate or whether we should seek
‘explanation’ or ‘understanding’ (see e.g. Wendt 1999; Wight 2006; Hollis and Smith 1991; Jackson 2016). I
do not seek to adjudicate or extend these debates.
8 Some might argue that these two traditions are incompatible. Scientific realists like Wight (2006) would
argue that we need to get our ontology and epistemology clear and explicit before we can go into methodology.
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Figure 1.1: Research design flow from ontology to empirics
closely associated with intellectual pluralism in the social sciences.9 The core of pragmatism
is its rule for clarifying the contents of hypotheses by tracing their “practical consequences”.
In IR theory, pragmatism is defined by four commitments: (1) holism (the coherence of the
But pragmatists such as Hellmann (2009) would argue that questions of ontology and epistemology can be
ignored or “dissolved’ because all that matters is “beliefs as rules for action” and its practical consequences
(and we should therefore focus on methodology). There are also different strands and theorists of pragmatism
that make mutually-exclusive claims on the tradition depending on their conception of what a ‘theory’ is or
should be (see e.g. Franke and Weber 2012). It seems to me, however, that extreme pragmatism would lead us
to do empirical research unencumbered by any epistemological or ontological awareness and considerations.
This would make it difficult for others to judge the knowledge value-added of our research.
9 For pragmatists, the construction of reality in social science cannot be proven superior to anyone else’s
because both the actors’ and the observers’ realities are socially constructed. Warrants for claims rest on
internal consistency, adherence to the broader truth tests of the research program from which a piece of work
emerges, and ultimately, empirical reproduction and confirmation, and possibly even acceptance by critics
from other theoretical camps (Haas and Haas 2002, 587). Consequently, a notion of intellectual progress
must respect the legitimacy of competing ontologies and epistemologies.
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web of belief that is fallible, interconnected and vulnerable to change), (2) anti-skepticism
(doubt requires justification as much as belief), (3) fallibilism (even those beliefs in which we
have the utmost conviction may turn out to be false), and (4) the primacy of practice (inquiry,
while abstract is called into being by and addresses particular ‘problematic situations’ and
thus contains a practical factor) (Festenstein 2002, 551–4). The pragmatists, as we shall
see below, give us “practical methods” to deal with real-world problem questions, including
analytical eclecticism and abduction mode of inference.
Similar to the pragmatist commitment to intellectual pluralism, scientific realists
argue that each science demarcates its own object domain, and as such, each object domain
will entail its methodology apropos its study (Wight 2006, 229). In other words, there is
no one, single unifying scientific method, or epistemology, that is available to be rejected
or accepted in relation to the study of the social world.10 But more importantly, scientific
realists help us ground our search for causal mechanisms that exist in the real world and
explain the outcomes we seek observe (Bennett 2013, 465).11
Mechanisms are unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through
which agents with causal capacities operate (in specific conditions) to transfer energy, in-
formation, or matter to other entities, thereby changing the latter entities’ characteristics,
capacities, or propensities in ways that persist until subsequent mechanisms act upon it
(Bennett 2013, 466).12 But demonstrating the effects of mechanisms requires empirical obser-
vations (Rueschemeyer 2009, 21).13 In short, the core idea behind the mechanism approach
10 Scientific realism entails three commitments: ontological realism (that there is a reality independent
of the mind that would wish to come to know it); epistemological relativism (that all beliefs are socially
produced); and judgmental rationalism (that despite epistemological relativism, it is still possible to choose
between competing theories) (Wight 2006, 26).
11 Scientific realists thus see causal mechanisms as attempts to grasp “real processes”, where causality is
seen in terms of the intrinsic nature of what is being studied, the interactions between that and other things,
and the causal powers and liabilities involved (Wight 2006, 29, 32).
12 Bennet follows the positions of analytical sociologists who argue that mechanisms, in the natural as
well as in the social sciences, are unobserved analytical constructs (Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 13).
13 Particularly in case studies, we need to provide mechanistic evidence: any observable manifestation of
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refers to a constellation of entities and activities linked to one another in such a way that
they produce the outcome we are interested in (Hedström 2005, 2). But there are two dozen
definitions of causal mechanisms with at least nine possible meanings within the social sci-
ences (Gerring 2008; Mahoney 2001b). This lack of consensus led some scholars to formulate
what I call a ‘maximalist’ conception of causal mechanism: they set a very high epistemolog-
ical bar for what ‘counts’ as mechanisms. Waldner (2012), for example, argues that causal
mechanisms embody an invariant property that cannot be directly manipulated and as such,
under some conditions, generate observed correlations (via transmissions of either a physical
force or information that influence the behavior of agents or entities). Mahoney (2016) also
uses a deterministic ‘necessity and sufficiency’ logic to base his view of causal mechanisms
as general processes or law-like principles that generate and explain correlations.
These maximalist conceptions, however, are highly restrictive for the majority of so-
cial science research. I adopt instead a ‘minimalist’ conception of mechanism. By minimalist
I mean a mechanism-based explanation should detail the “cogs and wheels” of the causal
process through which the outcome of interest was brought about (Hedström and Ylikoski
2010, 50). These “cogs and wheels” need to be fleshed out by unpacking the causal processes
linking X and Y into a series of interlocking parties composed of entities engaging in activi-
ties that transmit causal forces from cause to outcome (Beach 2016). Causal mechanisms are
thus generalizing propositions stating how, by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome
follows from a set of initial conditions (Mayntz 2004, 241; Demeulenaere 2011, 12).
Additionally, I adopt a focus on causal mechanisms that go beyond methodological
individualism or individual-level micro-foundational theories (Kaidesoja 2013; Tilly 2001).14
our theorized causal mechanism(s) that has a probative value in determining whether it was present or not
in the case (Beach 2016, 469).
14 There are two core ideas to methodological individualism: (1) social life exists only by virtue of actors
who live it and (2) consequently a social fact of any kind must be explained by direct reference to the
actions of its constituents (Demeulenaere 2011, 4). In its structural form, it argues that all social facts are in
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Instead, my theory develops middle-range causal mechanisms as I am interested in explain-
ing an organizational-level behavior. Scholars argue that for some questions, a broader level
‘above’ the individual may be the easiest means of testing theories and the most powerful pol-
icy instrument (Bennett 2013, 467).15 If there are relatively enduring collective agents with
characteristic emergent capacities and activities—including organizations like the military—
then there is no reason why they could not form parts of social mechanisms (Kaidesoja 2013,
314). Social scientists consider middle-range theories as those combinations of mechanisms
that interact in specified and often recurrent scope conditions to produce outcomes (Bennett
2013, 470).16 In other words, middle-range mechanisms are generalizable (i.e. portable) to
other contexts within a bounded set of scope conditions where certain cause-effect links recur
(Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 415).
As I describe in chapter 3, my theory develops causal mechanisms to explain the
variation in military emulation. The mechanisms are built around two key elements: critical
antecedent and critical juncture. The latter is simply a period of significant change which
typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries and is hypothesized to produce distinct
legacies (Collier and Collier 1991, 29). The former are conditions preceding a critical juncture
that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in
outcomes (Slater and Simmons 2010, 889). My critical antecedent focuses on the emulator
and the degree of its intra-organizational conflict over military Westernization. My critical
juncture focuses on the interaction between the transmission pathway and the quality of
principle explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another (Hedström
and Ylikoski 2010, 60). See McGinley (2014) for the debate on holism and individualism in IR theory as it
relates to social and causal mechanisms.
15 In fact many scholars simply associate causal statements about social mechanisms with middle-range
theories (Mayntz 2004, 239).
16 Initially, sociologists saw middle-range theories as those between the minor but necessary working
hypotheses and the all-inclusive unified theory explaining all the observed uniformities of social behavior,
organization, and change (Merton 1968, 448).
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the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. The relationship between the causal mechanism, its
conceptual elements, and their observable implications are depicted in Figure 1.2 below.
Figure 1.2: Causal mechanism, its conceptual elements and observable implications
1.4.2 Methodology and method
Building of my ontological and epistemological choices, my methodological choices center on:
(1) developing a mechanism-based middle-range theory and providing a plausibility probe
to assess its validity and analytical purchase using (2) Analytical Eclecticism (AE).17 AE is
a problem-driven approach that extracts, adapts, and integrates discrete concepts, mecha-
nisms, or logical principles embedded in different research traditions.18 Military emulation,
after all, is a multi-disciplinary problem located within different fields of the social sciences
and the humanities. AE focuses on the empirical referents used to operationalize concepts to
identify connections and complementarities across substantive arguments initially developed
in separate theoretical frameworks (Sil 2009, 649). AE is characterized by three features: (1)
17 I follow John Gerring (2001, 6) in distinguishing between ‘methodology’ and ‘methods’. Methods refer
to a specific procedure for gathering and/or analyzing data, while methodology is the tasks, strategies, and
criteria governing scientific inquiry, including all facets of the research enterprise. In this sense, methodology
is perhaps closer to what social scientists call strategy of inquiry more broadly.
18 This is similar to the notion of ‘theoretical pluralism’ as an explicit effort to utilize insights and variables
from two or more theoretical approaches to make better sense of a real-world problem (i.e. capture a greater
amount of the analytic/causal complexity in a given puzzle than would be the case if a single theory was
used) (Checkel 2012, 224).
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it proceeds at least implicitly on the basis of a pragmatist ethos, manifested in the search
for middle-range theories that speak to concrete policy issues, (2) it addresses problems that
incorporate the complexity and messiness of real-world situations, and (3) in constructing ar-
guments related to these problems, it generates complex causal stories that forgo parsimony
to capture the interactions among different types of mechanisms normally analyzed within
separate research traditions (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 412). The AE approach therefore
suits to my ontological and epistemological choices and fits my theoretical and empirical
focus that draws from different research programs and use different concepts to explain the
problem-driven puzzle of military emulation.
I further adopt Comparative-Historical Analysis (CHA) as a method (Rohlfing 2013;
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Thelen and Mahoney 2015). First, CHA as a form of
comparative method is closely related to the abduction or retroduction mode of inference
that scientific realists and pragmatists employ.19 In retroduction, events are explained by
postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them (Sayer 2010,
72; Wight 2006, 34). It means moving backwards (from an outcome) and asks “What must
be true in order to make this event possible?”. I structure my case studies (chapter 4 and 5)
by first identifying the military emulation outcomes before explaining how they happened.
In other words, I identify the outcome of interest and then develop a theory that identify
the mechanism responsible for its occurence.
Second, the ‘minimalist’ conception of causal mechanisms fits with CHA’s broader
research agenda of developing and testing explanations; in part by tracing the case-based
processes that link initial events to subsequent outcomes (Thelen and Mahoney 2015, 15).
19 The abduction or retroduction mode is the solution offered by philosophers of science who wish to avoid
imposing abstract theoretical templates (deduction) on messy social realities or inferring propositions from
facts alone (induction); each of which also requires adopting constraining epistemological choices. In short,
retroduction is the “middle ground” between nomothetic and idiographic sciences (Easton 2010, 123; Wight
2006, 34; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009, 719).
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CHA inherently combines within–case and comparative tools of data analysis (Lange 2012,
117). This allows me to examine the different elements of the causal mechanism that require
different types of data. We may need quantitative data in one step of the mechanism, but
a qualitative data in another. The possibility that different types of data are necessary
for different parts of the causal mechanism follows my prior commitment that mechanisms
do not have to be based on individual-level micro-foundations. As my level of analysis is
organizational, CHA provides an appropriate method.
Finally, CHA’s focus on integrating within– and cross–case analyses fits with my goal
of explaining within–case processes of military diffusion as well as cross–case comparisons
of the effectiveness of the different transmission pathways.20 This focus requires that my
middle-range mechanisms should be configurational: how multiple factors combine to form
coherent larger combinations, complexes, and causal packages (Thelen and Mahoney 2015,
7). I apply the configuration to compare the historical processes of military Westernization
in Cold War Indonesia and Meiji Japan using a comparative sequential method: a systematic
comparison of two historical sequences decomposed into sequences of events, and drawing
inferences by comparing those sequences (Falleti and Mahoney 2015).21
Overall, CHA’s combination of within– and cross–case comparison provides a stronger
plausibility probe design. It also follows my ontological, epistemological, and methodological
commitments and provides a logical fit with my theoretical framework and empirical goals.
Unlike some CHA scholars, however, I adopt a probabilistic reasoning where explanatory
20 In this sense, my framework is similar (but not equivalent) to existing systematic narrative–based
analyses. The ‘causal narrative’ method, for example, combines cross-case and within-case analysis by
comparing cases in terms of highly disaggregated sequences of processes and events that lead to outcomes
(Mahoney 2003, 360-1). ‘Strategic narrative’ also focuses on how patterns of events relate to prior theoretical
beliefs about social phenomena (Goldstone 2003, 50).
21 A sequence is a temporally ordered set of events that takes place in a given context. A process is
a particular type of sequence in which the temporally ordered events belong to a single coherent mode of
activity. Within a process, the researcher can identify the component events that unfold over time from the
start to the end of the theoretically relevant period of analysis (Falleti and Mahoney 2015, 213).
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variables are treated as to some degree necessary or sufficient — but not always — for
the occurrence of an outcome. It should be noted that I use ‘probabilistic’ here in an
epistemological sense, not that I am providing specific probability estimates. That said, the
probabilistic perspective also includes the theory’s scope conditions and does not assume that
the same mechanism always produces the same outcome everywhere all the time (Trampusch
and Palier 2016). Mechanisms vary in their operation because they interact with the context
where they operate (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1147). Put differently, specifying the effect of
X on Y in CHA must account for the ‘context’ in which X operates, which means specifying
the other variables that interact with X and that shape the nature of its effect (Thelen and
Mahoney 2015, 7). Context can be seen as the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical,
temporal, spatial, or institutional) in which initial conditions lead (probabilistically) to an
outcome of a defined scope and meaning (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1152).22
As CHA is inherently comparative, I try to meet the principles of systematic controlled
comparisons to strengthen my plausibility probe. Three criteria are salient here (Slater and
Ziblatt 2013):
1. The guiding research puzzle and findings should always be expressed in terms of general
variables or mechanisms, not highly context-specific (i.e. case-specific) terms. Chapters
2 and 3 will demonstrate how I draw from a variety of concepts and theories across
different disciplines rather than employing empirically-bounded terms.
2. To capture representative variation, the comparison should be driven by a desire to
explain puzzling variation in outcomes (than particular cases per se) where variation in
the sample broadly mirrors variation in some broader population of cases. As described
22 This understanding most resembles what Gary Goertz (1994, 3) calls ‘context as cause’ (as opposed
to context as ‘barrier’ or ‘changing meaning’). ‘Context as cause’ means the context is contributing to a
globally sufficient condition for the outcome: the context is neither individually necessary nor sufficient, but
in conjunction with other factors it explains the outcome or makes it more likely.
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above, my puzzles of military change, emulation, and Westernization in Asia are nested
within one another. I elaborate below on how the variation of military emulation are
both puzzling and “typical cases” of the variation.
3. Controlled comparisons need not meet the standard of “natural experiments”, but they
require intense theoretical engagement to generate external validity—the theory should
guide case selection. Chapter 3 will provide the theoretical framework that guides the
case selection and empirical analysis in chapters 4 and 5.
For the within-case element of CHA, I examine the mechanisms associated with orga-
nizational emulation within each case over time. After all, within–case methods constitute
the ‘historical’ in CHA (Lange 2012, 5). To assess the plausibility of the within-case mech-
anism, I employ theory–guided process tracing as the temporal and causal analysis of the
sequences of events that constitute the process of interest (Falleti 2016). But process tracing
is a ‘composite method’ in that it is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of approaches
and variants (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Waldner 2012, 67).23 But most scholars agree that
process tracing is about causal and temporal mechanisms and opening the ‘black box’ of
causality that connects inputs and outputs and studying what happens in between (Tram-
pusch and Palier 2016, 438; Falleti 2016, 455).
In this broad understanding, process tracing is any research that traces processes and
looks at how various social and political outcomes are produced by events that result from
actors’ actions and interactions and various contextual factors (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara
2017, 46). This entails that we analyze a case into a sequence (or several concatenating
sequences) of events and show how those events are plausibly linked given the interests and
23 Some focus on decision-making linking initial conditions to outcomes, the comparison between predicted
and observable processes, the mechanisms linking independent and dependent variables, or how multiple
types of evidence are employed for the verification of a single inference (Gerring 2006; George and Bennett
2005). There are at least 18 different definitions and types of process tracing (Trampusch and Palier 2016).
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situations faced by groups or actors (Goldstone 2003, 43).24 Process tracing, in short, is the
examination of intermediate steps in a process, sequence, and conjuncture of events within a
case to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and
how it generated the outcome of interest (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 6-7).
But process tracing is most powerful when combined with the comparative method.25
In other words, by “breaking apart” the causal mechanism into sequences of disaggregated
events and inter-connected variables and compare them across cases, we might gain signif-
icant analytical leverage and perhaps validate aggregate cross-case associations (Mahoney
2003, 365). In other words, a ‘comparative process tracing’ provides a strong plausibility
probe for a new mechanism-based middle-range theory. In essence, this approach compares
and contrasts mechanisms across cases; not just on the presence or absence of particular
causal factors, alternative explanations, or outcomes, but also on the processes revealed by
in-depth data (Harding and Seefeldt 2013, 94). It combines elements of theory, chronology,
and comparison (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2017). In comparative process tracing, the goal
is to discern the relevance of sequences that temporally structure the causal conditions of an
outcome based on the elaboration of the underlying causal mechanism (Williams and Gem-
perle 2017, 122). In practice, I subject the Cold War Indonesia case to within-case process
tracing of mechanisms and then compare the analysis with the commercial transmission of
Meiji Japan. I elaborate this strategy of inquiry below.
24 Events are seen as instances of more general phenomena that can be compared across units. They
are happenings that have general characteristics that allow for them to apply to multiple cases (Falleti and
Mahoney 2015, 213). Concatenation is the state of being linked together, as in a chain or linked series. In
process tracing, the focus is on the concatenation of causally relevant events (Waldner 2012, 68-9).
25 Assuming the mechanisms are general enough to be portable across different contexts but may produce
different results in analytically non–equivalent contexts (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1145).
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1.4.3 Strategy of inquiry
The analytical leverage of comparative process tracing comes from both within– and cross–
case analyses. Figure 1.3 below depicts the strategy of inquiry and how I integrate qualitative
(causal process observation) and quantitative (dataset observation) data. For the data inte-
gration, I employ what I call a ‘mechanism-based’ nested design. As a form of multi-method
inquiry, this approach differs from two conventionally accepted forms of nested analysis.
Figure 1.3: Comparative process tracing: strategy of inquiry and cases
The first is the regression-based nested analysis. In this approach, one starts with a
preliminary regression or large-N analysis (cross-case) and then proceeds to a small-N anal-
ysis (within-case) (Lieberman 2005). The second is the case study-based nested analysis. In
this approach, one starts with process tracing (within-case) analysis to develop inductively a
model whose explanatory power is subsequently estimated quantitatively (cross-case) (Rohlf-
ing 2008). In both these approaches, the preferred tool drives the research design’s starting
point. Consequently, one is often constrained to adjust the theory to suit the method.
I propose instead that we put the theory (mechanism) as the starting point in a nested
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multi-method inquiry. We can first disaggregate the mechanism into discrete conceptual
elements. How each of these parts weaken or strengthen the causal chain could then be
assessed using either qualitative or quantitative data. Some concepts, as elements of the
causal chain, could then be empirically verified using either quantitative or qualitative data.
In other words, different parts of the mechanism may employ different empirical data to
verify the overall causal chain or mechanism.
I draw the logic for this form of nested analysis from the ‘integrative multi-method’
approach in which two or more methods are carefully combined to support a single, unified
causal inference (Seawright 2016). I specifically rely on case-study methods to produce
a final causal inference where quantitative analysis is used to “test especially important,
sensitive, or elusive steps in the causal chain connecting the initial cause to the outcome
of interest” (Seawright 2016, 8). I therefore embed (or nest) the quantitative analysis into
the within-case mechanism to increase its analytical plausibility. I further compare how
the quantitative element supports the mechanism in one case with the same mechanism in
another case. As Figure 1.3 shows, I use quantitative data and analysis to examine the
military career management system of the emulators; it is only one of four elements in the
overall causal chain. I use qualitative data and analysis for the others: the emulator’s intra-
military conflict over Westernization, the transmission pathway between the model and the
emulator, and the emulator’s education and training system.
I subject the career management system to quantitative analysis because it is the
“important, sensitive, and elusive” step in the causal chain. As Seawright (2016, 178) argues,
we should identify causal steps for which quantitative evidence would strengthen the within-
case analysis by looking at (1) whether they pose difficult challenges for purely qualitative
inference, and (2) whether they are open to well-established quantitative designs. Career
30
management (as part of the mechanism explaining emulation) exhibits these traits. For
one thing, an officer corps consists of thousands of people. It is often difficult to assess
the effects of Western education by providing a qualitative assessment of the role of several
or even dozens of senior officers alone. The presence of several Western-trained officers at
a military high-command does not mean the organization as a whole is Westernized. A
quantitative assessment of the career patterns of the members of the officers corps would
therefore yield better insights than relying on qualitative analysis alone.
For another, career management is a key component of the causal mechanism by virtue
of its role during the critical juncture. Whether the personnel system could facilitate the
rise of Western-trained officers determines whether the organization would witness product
champions promoting Western theories of warfare. The professional qualities of the career
management would also determine the extent to which the organization values education
and training in general. Without the right amount of appreciation of education and training
as a learning benchmark, officers are unlikely to interpret and implement foreign ways of
warfare during the critical juncture. As such, I attach a greater inferential weight on career
career management because it is both uncertain and central to the critical juncture. Thus,
I seek to improve the analytical credibility of the weakest step or element of the within-case
mechanism to increase the credibility of the inference as a whole (Seawright 2016, 181).
Taken together, as Figure 1.3 shows, I integrate qualitative and quantitative anal-
yses in support of a single causal inferential goal: what explains the variation in military
emulation.26 By breaking down the mechanism into components and examining how each
conceptual elements lead to the outcome of interest, I also apply a sequential structure
advocated by CHA scholars.
26 I hope I address one of the fundamental problems plaguing multi-method inquriy: that the qualitative
and quantitative tools are not in fact asking the same question (Seawright 2016, 7).
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Comparative case studies and selection
As a plausibility probe, this dissertation provides a comparison of Meiji Japan (1868 – 1912)
and Cold War Indonesia (1950 – 1991). At the surface, comparing these two countries seems
erroneous. While both countries are located in Asia, the temporal contexts are significantly
different (about a century apart) and both countries have different economic resources, ethnic
diversity, and colonial histories. Not to mention differences in political system, culture, and
threat environment. In fact, both countries seem incomparable. But Meiji Japan and Cold
War Indonesia are not simply compared as two different countries in history. They are com-
pared as case studies serving as a plausibility probe for a new theory explaining the variation
of military emulation.27 The comparison is therefore theoretical and methodological.
Meiji Japan and Cold War Indonesia are representative variations of the theory and
outcome I am interested in explaining. I select these cases by combining typical–case and
diverse–case methods (Gerring 2006, 91-98). A typical case exemplifies what is considered to
be a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon. A typical case
also serves an exploratory role, especially in a plausibility probe like this dissertation. Diverse
case selection meanwhile seeks to achieve maximum variance along relevant dimensions and
helps underpin the typological framework. Based on the deep knowledge of the cases and the
categories scholars use to array them, one can identify the relevant range of outcomes ex ante
using well-accepted typologies that by definition specify mutually exclusive outcomes that
also are exhaustive of all empirical variations.(Slater and Ziblatt 2013, 1312). The maximalist
and minimalist represents the maximum variation of the military emulation outcome.
The Cold War Indonesia case is typical of the cooperative transmission and repre-
27 A case is simply the broader units or research settings within which analysis is conducted (King, Keohane
and Verba 1994). It further connotes a spatially delimited phenomenon observed at a single point in time,
or over some period of time, and comprises the type of phenomenon that an inference attempts to explain
(Gerring 2006, 19).
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sents the minimalist emulation. Using the cooperative model derived from my theoretical
framework, I examine the extent to which US professional military education and training
programs may or may not shape the Indonesian Army’s theories of corporatism and victory.
I use a combination of archival materials, organizational documents, an original officer-level
dataset, and a wide-range of secondary sources to test the plausibility of the model. The
case study provides a within-case analysis of how the causal mechanism associated with the
cooperative model explains the minimalist emulation outcome.
The Meiji Japan case is typical of the commercial transmission and represents the
maximalist emulation. Using the commercial model derived from my theoretical framework,
I examine the extent to which Western military training missions diffused Western theories
of corporatism and victory to the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN). I use a combination of archival materials, an original officer-level dataset, and
a wide-range of secondary sources to test the plausibility of the model. The case study
provides a within-case analysis of how the causal mechanism associated with the commercial
model explains the maximalist emulation outcome.
Taken together, the two comparative cases are: (1) ‘typical’ of each transmission
pathway (i.e. cooperative and commercial) and (2) ‘diverse’ representations of the full range
of emulation variation (i.e. maximalist and minimalist). The causal chains examined in these
two cases are then compared with one another to demonstrate the conditions under which
we should expect to see a successful (maximalist) or failed (minimalist) military emulation.
I also select the cases for their puzzling outcomes: (1) why and how the Indonesian military
did not become ‘Americanized’ despite having thousands of US-trained officers for much
of the Cold War and (2) why and how Meiji Japan overcame its feudal military structure
and institutions to fully emulate Western war-fighting ideas and systems. These puzzles are
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subsets of the broader puzzles of military Westernization, emulation, and change I discuss
above (see Figure 1.4 below). As the case study puzzles are not stand-alone historical
questions, the comparative case studies contribute to broader theoretical development.
Figure 1.4: Puzzles of military change, emulation, and Westernization
1.4.4 Data collection
The data consists of both data-set observations (DSOs) and causal-process observations
(CPOs). The former are collected as an array of scores on specific variables for a designated
sample of cases, while the latter are about context, process, or mechanism that provide
insight into the relationship among the explanatory variables, and between these variables
and the dependent variable (Brady, Collier and Seawright 2004, 24). Both of my empirical
chapters combine inferential statistics of career patterns and qualitative examinations of
doctrinal and organizational documents as well as secondary sources and historiography.
I collected the primary and secondary data between 2012 and 2017 in the United
States (Washington, D.C., Seattle, and Stanford), Australia (Sydney), and Indonesia (Jakarta
and Magelang). Most of the on–site activities were conducted between September 2015 to
December 2016. Aside from these on–site activities, I collected primary data materials from
several online sources: the National Security Archives’s Virtual reading room, US State
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Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, the Freedom of Infor-
mation (FOIA) reading room of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Hathi Trust Digital
Catalogue. I also collected data from the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms
Transfer Database to examine the evolution of US arms transfer to Indonesia.
In the US, I collected archival documents and materials from the Library of Congress,
the National Archives and Records Administration, the National Security Archives at George
Washington University, University of Washington in Seattle, and the Hoover Institution
Library at Stanford University. In total, I spent approximately four months at these sites
where I obtained copies of 75 document collections (totaling around ten thousand pages)
on the evolution of US military assistance to Indonesia. In Australia, I spent roughly one
month at the University of Sydney where I obtain a dozen primary documents pertaining to
Indonesian Army organizational history.
I also spent roughly roughly twelve months in Indonesia where I gathered differ-
ent types of data. First, I collect primary documents on the organizational structure and
history of the Indonesian military along with their personnel and education policies from
the Indonesian Military History Center (in Jakarta) and Indonesian Army Academy (in
Magelang). Second, I helped create the Profile of Indonesian Military Academy Graduates
(INDOMAG) database (developed by the National University of Singapore and the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta). From December 2015 to December 2016,
I managed a team of Jakarta-based researchers in the collection, coding, and analysis of
the educational, professional, and retirement patterns of 6,676 Indonesian army graduates
of the military academy from the 1950s to 1980.28 It tracked and coded their career, educa-
tion and training, and post-retirement activities across seventy different variables spanning
28 The Indonesian Military Academy had several iterations throughout the revolutionary war until the
1970s. The database focused on all officers belonging in the officer corps since the 1950s onwards (post-
revolutionary), even if some of them were technically trained by the Dutch or the Japanese.
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four decades. For the first iteration of INDOMAG, we focused on the Indonesian Army
as the dominant service.29 The Indonesian military did not have a central database for
its personnel records until recently. Most of the contemporary career records, however, are
classified and go back only to the 1990s. Earlier personnel data from were either scattered,
non-existent, or lost in bureaucratic firewalls.30 We decided to collect the data manually.
We went through a dozen academy, staff and command colleges, and National Resilience
Institute alumni yearbooks published between 1960 and 2004. We also relied on information
provided by Cornell University’s Modern Indonesia Project that began tracking the military
elite since the 1960s.31 Finally, we relied on dozens of secondary sources and media reports
as well as internal journals and publications.
For the Japanese data, I collected English-language sources. I spent roughly four
months between December 2018 and March 2019 creating an original officer-level dataset.
Given my language limitations, I draw the initial list of names and basic information from var-
ious published historiographical studies of Meiji Japan in general, including Beasley (1972),
Beasley (1989), Hackett (1965), Jansen (1989b), Sims (2001), Duus (1988), and Yuzo (2000).
I further draw on published biographical studies of IJA and IJN officers, including Fuller
(1992), Dupuy, Johnson and Bongard (1992), Tucker (2003), Perez (2013), Nish, Cortazzi
and Hoare (1994), and Kurita (1913). Additional service-specific and war-specific studies in-
volving Japanese officers supplemented the list, including Evans and Peattie (2015), Kowner
(2017), Schencking (2005), Peattie (2013), and Ravina (2011). From these sources, I obtain
a list of nearly 700 Meiji officers, from the late Tokugawa era to the end of the Meiji era.
29 An expanded version of INDOMAG (currently in preparation) will look at the Air Force and Navy as
well. In addition, we will begin collecting similar data for the Philippines and Thailand.
30 Author conversation with an Indonesian Army major who was a staff officer in the personnel department
of the Army General Headquarters, Jakarta, January 12, 2016.
31 The project publishes the top peer-reviewed journal in Indonesian studies called Indonesia. The journal
has published 28 ‘Current Data on Indonesian Military Elite’ papers since 1967 to 2013. The papers tracks
ethnicity, divisional affiliations, and other personal information of prominent officers.
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The list also focuses on specific career markers like Western-studies background, do-
main origins/birth, final ranks, and education and training. To fill out the information on
the list, I rely on broader studies of the Meiji military establishment and modernization
process, as well as various online sources.32 On the former, I draw bits and pieces of infor-
mation from Butow (1961), Norman (1965), Shin’ichi (1989), Nussbaum and Roth (2002),
Brown (1962), Ion (2010), Kublin (1949), Cobbing (2013a), Farrell (2011), Hoyt (2001), and
Shillony (1973). On the latter, I rely on official Japanese sources and reference sites includ-
ing the National Diet Library of Japan33, Trial International’s Trial Watch Database34, The
International Military Tribunal for the Far East at the University of Virginia35, the CIA
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Collection36, the Pacific War Online Encyclopedia37, and the
Encyclopedia Britannica38. I also rely on several websites managed by historians, librarians,
and students of Imperial Japanese wars. These include the Meiji Portraits Project run by
Bernd Lepach39, Generals of World War II Database run by Steen Ammentorp40, the World
War II Armed Forces Database run by Dr. Leo Niehorster41, Samurai Archives Japanese
History Page run by Romulus Hillsborough42, World War II Database run by Peter Chen43,
and the Imperial Japanese Navy Database run by Hiroshi Nishida44. For some of the sites
in Japanese, I use Google Translate to provide an approximate translation.
32 I access all of the online sources between February 13, 2019 and April 20, 2019.
33 Particularly the Portraits of Modern Japanese Historical Figures site available at https://www.ndl.
go.jp/portrait/e/
34The searchable database is available at https://trialinternational.org/resources/trial-watch/
35 The searchable database is available at http://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/
36 The searchable database is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/
519cd81b993294098d5162dd
37 The searchable database is available at https://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/
38 The site is available at https://www.britannica.com/
39 The searchable database is available at http://meiji-portraits.de/index.html
40 The searchable database is available at http://www.generals.dk/
41 The searchable database is available at http://www.niehorster.org/
42 The searchable database is available at http://www.samurai-archives.com/index.html
43 The searchable database is available at https://ww2db.com/
44 The searchable database is available at http://admiral31.world.coocan.jp/e/p_xcx01.htm
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1.5 Outline and structure of the dissertation
The first chapter outlines the project’s key puzzle and why it matters, summarizes the
key arguments and findings, and describe the research design employed. The second chapter
provides the literature review and concept analyses. It locates my proposed theory within the
broader diffusion studies literature. The chapter also provides a multi-level structural and a
taxonomic concept analyses of ‘military diffusion’ and ‘military emulation’. It also describes
the key outcomes of interests and the operationalization of key concepts. The third chapter
outlines the nested argument. It discusses the key concepts of path dependence, critical
antecedents, and critical juncture as part of the power-based institutional framework. It
then proceeds to outline my theory of emulation based on the interaction of the transmission
pathway between the donor and the emulator and the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. It
also outlines two models — cooperative and commercial — that provide specific hypotheses
on how the interaction unfolds to produce emulation outcomes.
The fourth chapter explains the minimalist emulation and examines why and how
the Indonesian military did not become ‘Americanized’ at the end of the Cold War despite
having thousands of US-trained officers in its ranks. It shows Indonesia’s doctrinal stag-
nation in the 1960s as a key indicator of a minimalist emulation. It further discusses the
nature and origins of the intra-military conflicts over military Westernization as the critical
antecedent condition. The evolution and challenges of US military education and training
assistance are then examined. Finally, the chapter assess the personnel infrastructure quality
of the Indonesian Army and provides qualitative and quantitative assessments of its career
management and education systems.
The fifth chapter explains the maximalist emulation and examines why and how
Meiji Japan could successfully transition from a feudal military structure into a world-class
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military power. It establishes Japan’s maximalist emulation by the Sino-Japanese (1893–94)
and Russo-Japanese (1904–05) Wars. It assess the conceptual, practical, and organizational
precedents in the pre-Meiji era that establishes the absence of intra-military conflicts over
military Westernization as the critical antecedent. The chapter then describes the facilitative
properties of the commercial transmission as exhibited by the French, German, and British
military training missions. Finally, it provides qualitative and quantitative analyses of Meiji
Japan’s personnel infrastructure.
The sixth and final chapter summarizes the key findings, discuss their contributions
and limitations, and draw out the broader theoretical, empirical, and policy implications. It
will also provide several avenues of future research that could remedy some of the limitations
of the current research.
Chapter 2
Literature review and concept analyses
This chapter provides the initial building blocks for the theoretical framework in chapter 3
and consists of two components. First, I review the broader diffusion studies literature across
the social sciences as well as those explaining the puzzle of military emulation within Inter-
national Relations (IR) literature. Three key weaknesses in the diffusion studies literature
are salient: (1) the conflation of the different terminologies used—from emulation to isomor-
phism and diffusion—to describe different processes and outcomes; (2) the inherent biases
within the literature; and (3) the conflation between direct and indirect diffusion processes.
I subsequently review the research program examining military diffusion. This literature
adopts some of the weaknesses of the broader diffusion studies literature. We can see this,
for example, in the conflation between processes and outcomes, between causal mechanisms
and motivational stimulus, and between different levels of military change and/or innova-
tion. The military diffusion literature also emphasizes the emulator’s activities or logic at
the expense of the diffused ‘content’ and the diffuser’s activities and thinking.
Second, to fill the lacunae in the literature, I turn to conceptual analyses of military
emulation. I first unpack and reconstruct the term ’military diffusion’ using the multi-level
structural methods developed by Goertz (2006). The analysis points to which elements
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within the concept of military diffusion that should be incorporated within a full-fledged
theory. It highlights the importance of specifying the ‘content’ of the diffusible item, in
addition to the driving logic and activities of both the diffuser (model) and the adopter
(emulator) as well as the relationship between the two. Subsequently, I describe why I
explain ‘military emulation’ as the primary outcome of interests. I further situate military
emulation and Westernization as subsets of military change. Finally, I provide a way to
measure the variation of military emulation and Westernization in the dissertation.
Building on these two lines of analyses, I specify the content of the diffusible item
from Western states to different Asian polities. I examine why and how ideational constructs
are more important than pieces of technology in the process of military change. I further
develop the notion of a ‘theory of corporatism’ and a ‘theory of victory’ as the “conceptual
package” we should examine when assessing military Westernization. The theory of corpo-
ratism captures the essence of how the internal institutions of the military and their raison
d’tres are designed, maintained, and defended in their relationship with the state and soci-
ety. The theory of victory focuses on what the next mission or war a military needs to fight
and how to win. Overall, the literature review situates the theoretical contribution of my
arguments and findings. As much as a possible, I avoid providing a discursive “he said she
said” review. Instead, I highlight only those parts that could explain the military emulation
puzzle. The concept analyses then provide an additional check on the literature (by pointing
out which conceptual elements existing theories have neglected).
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2.1 Literature review
2.1.1 The diffusion of diffusion studies
Understanding why and how Western theories of victory and corporatism spread to Asia falls
into the broader diffusion studies literature. Scholars from the humanities and social sciences
have studied diffusion in its various forms, from policy innovation, civil wars, to institutional
designs. Anthropologists, for example, have debated how civilization (by stages) occurs
through the invention and diffusion of technological artifacts, which shaped how economists
initially thought of technological innovations (see e.g. Godin 2014). Historians have had long-
standing debates about the spread of military technology and war-fighting practices and their
implications for political transformations (see e.g. Ralston 1996). Political scientists have
also been interested in the diffusion of policy innovations.1 Similar trends can be observed in
other fields as well. But the literature generally suffers from what Sartori (2009, 111) calls
‘collective ambiguity’ (each scholar within the discipline ascribes his/her own meanings to
his/her key terms) and ‘homonymy’ (one word with many meanings).
The first problem stems from the conflation of diffusion as a process and an outcome.
Scholars attach more than a dozen labels to each of these ‘diffusion as process’ and ‘diffu-
sion as outcome’ premises leading to at least thirty distinct types of diffusion (Elkins and
Simmons 2005, 37–8). As an outcome, some scholars consider international policy diffusion
as occurring when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically condi-
tioned by prior policy choices made in other countries (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008,
7). Put another way, a country observes what others have done and conditions its own deci-
1 Between 1958 and 2008, political science journals published nearly 800 articles about the politics of
public policies spreading from one government to another; more than half of these have been published in
the last decade of that period, indicating a dramatic surge in interest in diffusion (Graham, Shipan and
Volden 2013, 673).
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sions on these observations (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013, 675). Similarly, some public
policy scholars define diffusion by the extent of policy ‘convergence’ through the voluntary
transfers of policy models (Knill 2005, 767). In short, diffusion as an outcome is defined by
the adoption of or convergence around a particular social or policy model.
Sociologists, meanwhile, consider diffusion as a process and simply define it as the
spread of something within a social system (Strang and Soule 1998, 266). The ‘spread’ refers
to the flow or movement from a source to an adopter. Some scholars also describe diffusion as
the process of spreading policies across countries, which may or may not lead to convergence
(Knill 2005, 767). Others are more specific and consider diffusion as an interdependent
process conducive to the spread of policies (Gilardi 2012, 454). Recently, some IR scholars
define diffusion as a causal process in which a diffusion mechanism transmits an item from
a point of origin to a point of adoption (Klingler-Vidra and Schleifer 2014, 266). In short,
diffusion as a process does not inherently emphasize convergence but focuses instead on the
ways through which a social or policy model spreads from one entity to another.
These different conceptions lead to different theoretical expectations, mechanisms,
and empirical focus. If we conceive of diffusion as an outcome, emulation could be one
of the pathways through which diffusion happens. In this view, emulation is the process
through which some ideas proliferate. Conversely, if we conceptualize diffusion as process,
then (the variations of) emulation is one of its outcomes. In this construct, diffusion is the
process of spreading and emulation is the end-result (of adoption). These two accounts are
equally plausible. But they also lead to different ways of theorizing the phenomenon. As
Sartori (2009, 75) argues, concepts as ‘data containers’ should be standardized with high
discriminating power to ensure that information becomes cumulative. I use a structural
concept analysis (described below) to clarify this conceptual confusion and take the position
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that diffusion is a process and emulation is an outcome.
The second problem is whether direct contact between the model (donor) and the
emulator (receiver) is necessary for a diffusion process. One review of the political science
literature suggests diffusion happens when one government’s decision to adopt a policy in-
novation is influenced by the choices made by other governments (Graham, Shipan and
Volden 2013, 675). But the direct contact between the adopter and original model is not
necessary in this account. Consider, for example, how China learnt about the Revolution
in Military Affairs by observing the first Gulf war and the Kosovo war (Newmyer 2010), or
when social media transmits images that elicit demonstration effects among actors that are
otherwise unconnected (Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010, 2). Some call this ‘uncoordinated
interdependence’ (Elkins and Simmons 2005, 35) while others call it ‘observational learning’
(Goldsmith 2005, 1) or ‘policy bandwagon’ (Ikenberry 1990, 101). I consider these activities
of uncoordinated interdependence as ‘indirect diffusion’.
But sociologists treat diffusion as ‘relational phenomenon’ (Strang and Meyer 1993,
487). By relational, they mean that ‘repertoires or frames’ are transmitted — borrowed or
adopted — through interpersonal contacts, organizational linkages, or associational networks
(Givan, Roberts and Soule 2010, 2). Economists have also traditionally highlight how “infor-
mation is spread by direct contact between a potential user and an existing user” (emphasis
mine) (Diebolt, Mishra and Parhi 2016, 18). Similarly, earlier IR scholars also consider the
importance of contact when they refer to diffusion as the “process by which institutions,
practices, behaviors, or norms are transmitted between individuals and/or between social
systems” (emphasis mine) (Starr 1991, 359).2 I call these interactions ‘direct diffusion’.
2 This perspective of relational diffusion in the IR literature may have originated from the older “linkage
politics” of international politics. Linkage politics, as popularized by James Rosenau (1969), explicitly
recognize the influence of interdependence and the existence of linkages between phenomena occurring in
national and international systems. In fact, some claim that diffusion research is a “subfield” of linkage
politics (Most and Starr 1990, 392). Other IR scholars, however, follow sociologists in defining diffusion—
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Separating direct and indirect diffusion is important as they rely on different causal
mechanisms, as I discuss in chapter 3. For now, let me note the lack of clarity between direct
and indirect diffusion leads to a third problem: the lack of clarity in the mechanisms or pro-
cesses associated with diffusion. A recent review suggests four main mechanisms of policy
diffusion: learning, competition, coercion, and socialization (Graham, Shipan and Volden
2013, 690), although some IR scholars list emulation as a mechanism as well (Simmons,
Dobbin and Garrett 2006). But others argue diffusion mechanisms consist of imposition,
international harmonization, competition, transnational communication, and independent
problem-solving (Knill and Holzinger 2005, 779). Others still conceptualize three mecha-
nisms: emulation, learning, and competition (Maggetti and Gilardi 2016, 88). It may well
be that different substantive phenomena as well as different theoretical, methodological, and
epistemological foundations lead to different mechanisms (Solingen 2012, 634).
But the fact that scholars conflate causal mechanisms and communication as trans-
mission mediums demonstrates the confusion when direct and indirect diffusion, as well as
process and outcome, are all conflated. Take ‘learning’ and ‘socialization’ for example. If
some adoption of foreign ideas are involved, there is bound to be some elements of both—
they are “generic” micro-foundations. Learning can be simply seen as the effect of previous
experiences and observations on an actor’s subsequent beliefs and preferences (Goldsmith
2005, 23). If so, even when a state is coerced to adopt new war-fighting ideas, it still needs
to be ‘socialized’ and to ‘learn’ those ideas. Thus, learning is present in different degrees
in all situations of diffusion. When, how, and to what extent learning and socialization are
“activated” or salient in a diffusion process is contingent on a whole host of other conditions.
Defining policy learning in a diffusion as one mechanism where governments in one
particularly the conception of Strang and Meyer (1993)—rather than Rosenau’s linkage politics (see e.g.
Solingen 2012).
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country draw lessons from the experiences of others (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett 2008,
25) therefore departs from the conventional usage of the term. Another ambiguity surround-
ing mechanisms is the conflation between diffusion processes and the stimulus (driver or
motivation) that started them. Competition, for example, is not a diffusion mechanism as
much as it is a condition motivating the diffusion: the reasons why some states borrow policy
models to begin with but not how they proceed, what Solingen (2012) calls ‘stimulus’. To
take another example, the need to maintain legitimacy—what Maggetti and Gilardi (2016,
86–7) calls ‘emulation’ as a mechanism—is a motivating driver to borrow a foreign model in
the first place, not the method to do so.
The fourth problem is the normative bias in the study of innovations. Scholars often
assign, even if implicitly, a ‘positive’ value on either the diffusible item—“innovations are a
good”—or the manner in which they are transmitted—“sooner or later every one innovates”
(see e.g. Hall 2006). Indeed, sociologists were initially interested in diffusion processes be-
cause of the intellectual movement that included the role of social science in supporting the
spread of modernizing innovations (Strang and Soule 1998, 268). The classical study on the
diffusion of innovations also considers relative advantage—the degree to which an innovation
is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes—as one of key traits of innovation that
should influence adopters (Rogers 1983, 15). Such positive assumptions are known as the
‘pro-innovation bias’: that an innovation should be diffused and adopted by all members of
a social system, that it should be diffused more rapidly, and that the innovation should be
neither reinvented nor rejected (Karch et al. 2016, 84).
This bias has numerous implications. But for our purposes, two are salient. First,
as we shall see below in the ‘Western ways of warfare’ debate, a pro-innovation bias skews
our focus towards the emulator and away from the content of the diffused item or the
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innovator’s calculations. Second, in the context of military innovations3—of which emulation
is a subset—organizational change is rarely neutral or “positively good”. Often, military
innovations lead to power struggles because new war-fighting ideas dislodge established power
holders. A pro-innovation bias, in other words, takes the politics and contestations of power
out of the discussion surrounding military change. My theoretical framework in chapter 3
brings back power politics in the analysis of military emulation.
So where do I stand in these debates? First, I consider diffusion as a process than an
outcome. I follow Rogers (1983, 5) who sees diffusion as the process by which (1) an innova-
tion is (2) communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of
a social system. These elements allow us to unfold the diffusion process as a series of steps
in a causal mechanism (see chapter 1). Specifically, following Solingen (2012, 632), I dis-
tinguish between: (1) the driving motivation (stimulus or trigger) at the beginning; (2) the
medium, channel, or pathway (as a form of contact and communication between innovator
and emulator) allowing the transmission of ideas; (3) the actors’ calculus when engaged in
a diffusion process; and (4) the variation of the outcomes of the diffusion process. As we
see below, most scholars focus on the first and fourth element without sufficient attention to
the second and third. I thus consider military diffusion as a process: the spread of military
technology, ideas, or practices across different time periods and geographical space.
Second, I define emulation as an outcome: the observable changes to one military’s
organization, operational methods, or doctrine resulting from the imitation of another mili-
tary’s organization, operational methods, or doctrine. As Bennett (1991, 220) argues, emu-
lation is not a synonym for diffusion and should not be inferred from observable convergence
alone. Emulation could involve the conscious and careful search for exemplars, a dissection
3 As Rogers (1983, 1) argues, an innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by
an individual or other unit of adoption. It is not whether an idea is ‘objectively’ new but it is about the
perceived ‘newness’ of the idea for the potential adopter.
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of the reasons for their success, and the application of these lessons to the maximization
of some expected utility (Johnston 2007, 45–6). Or when elites in one country use formal
institutions and practices from abroad to refashion their own rules or organizations (Jacoby
2006, 2). Emulation therefore can be observed by the degree of similarity to the original
model. I discuss the conceptual measurement of emulation below.
Finally, I focus on direct diffusion. Unpacking direct diffusion covers more analytical
ground than indirect diffusion because military Westernization in Asia have largely taken
place through direct diffusion processes. A purely indigenous military innovation in Asia
(where a polity observes or develop lessons after combat with a Western power) is extremely
rare. Great powers after all do not proliferate in Asia. The focus on direct diffusion also stems
from the premise that the most powerful mechanism to transfer knowledge to meaningfully
change an organization comes from direct contacts. I particularly focus on bilateral military
relations as a significant form of military knowledge transmission (Farrell and Terriff 2010,
11).4 Within this context, three kinds of contacts are salient: (1) dispatching attaches to
interact with, observe, and report on foreign militaries; (2) sending officers abroad to attend
educational institutions and/or train with foreign units; (3) contracting missions of military
instructors to teach and assist domestic forces (Grauer 2015, 275). As we see below, why
and how some contacts emerge depends on the type of transmission pathways.
2.1.2 Military diffusion: alternative explanations
This sub-section reviews extant explanations for military emulation within the IR litera-
ture. Their explanations largely fail to account for the full-range of constitutive elements
4 This is the dyadic basis of the direct diffusion perspective adopted in this dissertation. There are of
course non-bilateral forms of direct diffusion, such as how NATO and the Warsaw Pact diffused their war-
fighting concepts and doctrines to their members. But multilateral direct military diffusion is historically
rare in the Asian context.
48
of ‘military diffusion’ as a concept. By which I mean they only incorporate the emulator’s
response, for example, at the expense of the innovator–emulator communication channel or
the diffusible item. I address these challenges in the structural concept analysis below. For
now, by reviewing the extant literature, I hope to clarify the empirical domain for analysis
and strengthen the foundation of my theoretical framework.
The first set of arguments draws from the neo-realist literature in IR and argues
that the systemic nature of anarchy compel states to emulate the best military practices of
others. In other words, external threats and concerns over competitive military effectiveness
motivate states to adopt foreign military innovations (Waltz 1979; Tuck 2008; Elman 1999;
Goldman and Andres 1999; Resende-Santos 2007). War is, after all, a matter of Darwinian
dominance or survival for states (Lynn 1996, 509). In peacetime, the fear of losing out in an
arms race, for example, often drives polities to study, spy, and copy from one another, adapt
desirable features of other militaries, or seek advisors to import military doctrines (Porter
2009, 32). In wartime, when an army confronts new weaponry or practices on the battlefield,
it must adapt to them, which often takes the form of imitation (Lynn 1996, 509).
The premise of these arguments is that competition favors the efficient and that or-
ganizations seek to find the most efficient model to follow (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This
leads to the diffusion of the most efficient or “best performing” models because emulation
is the quickest and most dependable way to increase power in response to external threats
(Resende-Santos 2007). In short, the competitive security environment drives the emula-
tion of the best military practices, and by implication, of military diffusion. It should be
noted, however, that threat-based arguments are about the why of diffusion and less the how
(i.e. method of emulation). Additionally, there is no consensus on how to operationalize
‘threats’ and whether they are perceived at the global, regional, dyadic or even domestic
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levels. Threat-based arguments are also often developed using over-determined case studies
(e.g. states that are engaged in hostilities) that do not account for the range of plausible
variation of emulation or the scope of the diffusion process.
The second set of explanations, associated with security constructivists, focuses on
trans-national or global military norms as ideational drivers of military diffusion (Farrell
2005; Katzenstein 1996; Eyre and Suchman 1996; Demchak 2003). They argue military
emulation is a function of states’ concerns over social legitimacy. This concern leads to either
states seeking to emulate the ‘most popular’ model or they focus on models that ‘naturally fit’
or ’match’ their existing values (Goldsmith 2005, 37). For Checkel (1999, 86–7), the degree
of “cultural match” between global norms and domestic practices is critical in determining
the pattern of diffusion. Diffusion is more rapid when a match exists or resonates with
historically constructed domestic norms. Similarly, sociologists argue that practices which
accord with cultural understandings of appropriate and effective action diffuse more quickly
than those that do not (Strang and Soule 1998, 278). In short, new ideas that do not fit well
with a military’s pre-existing history, skill set, or standard operating procedures are unlikely
to be adopted (Porter 2009, 32).
The norms diffusion literature also points to the role of institutional structures — from
legal regimes, international organizations, to policy networks — in promoting, transmitting,
and sustaining the norms in question (Farrell and Terriff 2010, 10). Social acceptance of a
policy model can happen when: (1) leading countries serve as exemplars or standard-bearer,
(2) specialists make contingent arguments about the model’s ‘appropriateness’, and (3) once
accepted, institutionalization allows them to spread easily (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett
2008). Within the context of military diffusion, when leading countries like the US is seen as
the standard-bearer of professionalism and effectiveness, other countries should emulate the
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US organization, doctrine, or weaponry. A variation of this argument focuses on the linkage
between global norms and domestic military behavior through “norms transplantation”: the
empowerment of transnational norms in new organizational contexts (Farrell 2005). In any
case, policymakers should emulate the most socially acceptable models, even in the absence
of prior evidence of their efficacy (Strang and Macy 2001; Elkins and Simmons 2005). The
benefit here is reputational rather than combat prowess.
Both the threat-based and norms-based arguments help us think about why states
seek to emulate. But the different diffusion processes and their corresponding variation in
emulation are theoretically under-developed. Norms-based arguments are often difficult to
pin down. Assigning causal weight to norms often requires specific and detailed empirical
data that may not always be available when one is studying the military. Not to mention op-
erationalizing “normative match” across different cultures is herculean at best. But perhaps
more importantly, by assigning analytical weight to international structural variables, the
domestic mechanisms that “filter” and shape the variation of emulation are marginalized.
This is why the third set of arguments focuses on unit-level variables. These include
regime type and economic strength (Zarzecki 2002), state structure (Evangelista 1998), and
resource extraction and mobilization capacity (Taliaferro 2009). Others focus on the level of
financial intensity and the amount of organizational capital needed to adopt major military
innovations (Horowitz 2010). Recently, scholars turn to bureaucratic politics. As Grauer
(2015) argues, the nature of the emulator’s bureaucratic politics conditions the selection and
capacity of the communication used to transmit information about foreign military doctrines.
The premise of these arguments is that differences between social, economic, and political
systems as well as organizational capacity often limit a state’s ability to copy another’s
military institutions (Lynn 1996, 511). In short, emulation is more likely when states and
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their militaries have the necessary capacity and infrastructure to adopt foreign systems.
These arguments, however, provide conflicting accounts on which variables matter the
most and how; they also conflate technology, practice, and ideas. These arguments also suffer
from the ‘pro-innovation bias’ discussed above. They assume that military innovations are
“good” and that our task is figuring out why the emulator could not successfully adopt them.
This focus on the unit-level characteristics further sidelines the content of the innovation
(i.e. diffusible item), the channels of communication transmitting it (i.e. innovator-emulator
relations), and the “interaction effects” between the two. A full-fledged theory of military
emulation and diffusion should account for these elements. I explain in the next section why
this is the case and describe how concept analysis can help us.
2.2 Conceptual analyses
Robert Merton argues that “A good part of the work called “theorizing” is taken up with
the clarification of concepts...it is in this matter of clearly defined concepts that social sci-
ence research is not infrequently defective” (cited in Sartori 2009, 97). As we see above, the
collective ambiguity within the literature requires us to engage in a conceptual reconstruc-
tion of the term ‘military diffusion’ based on the collection of definitions cited above and a
multi-level structural analysis below.5 We thus engage in concept formation: the attempt to
mediate between the world of language and the world of things with the general aim to repre-
sent that phenomenal world as accurately as possible (Gerring 2001, 37). Concept formation
is also considered one of the key tools and values of the Comparative-Historical Analysis
method I employ in this dissertation. Concept formation stands “prior to quantification”
and that the process of thinking inevitably begins with a qualitative language (Sartori 1970,
5 The procedure of collecting definitions, extracting their characteristics, and then reorganizing them
more clearly is one of the concept formation rules of Giovanni Sartori (2009, 116-122).
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1038). Concept development is thus more than just defining a term, it is about “deciding
what is important about an entity” (Goertz 2006, 27).
This section provides conceptual analyses of both military diffusion and military emu-
lation. These analyses are necessary to clarify the central terms of the theoretical framework
in chapter 3. The first analysis unpacks the term ‘military diffusion’ using multi-level struc-
tural analysis and breaks down its key constitutive elements. The second analysis locates
‘military emulation’ as a subset of military change. It also measures and operationalizes ‘mil-
itary emulation’ as the primary outcome of interest. The third conceptual analysis examines
the debates surrounding the term ‘ways of warfare’ and proposes theories of corporatism and
victory as the ‘diffusible item’ from Western states to Asian militaries. It also justifies why
I focus on military ideas and concepts rather than technology.
2.2.1 Structural concept analysis
There are different approaches to concepts analysis. One of the more common approaches is
to dissect a concept’s ontological and epistemological foundations as well as its intellectual
history. This often relies on what I call critical discursive analysis (see e.g. Kurki 2008;
Wight 2006). Another approach would be to provide classifications and typologies to guide
the theoretical analysis of an empirical phenomenon. I will use this approach in the next
sub-section to situate military emulation in the literature on military change. Finally, there
is an approach I call ‘structural analysis’ that systematically and logically examines concepts
by: (1) how many levels they have, (2) how many dimensions each level has, and (3) the
substantive content of each of the dimensions at each level (Goertz 2006; Collier and Gerring
2009). I employ this approach in this sub-section.
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Following Goertz, I adopt a three-level framework conceptual analysis.6 This frame-
work takes on three foundations: ontological, causal, and realist. It is ontological because
it views concepts by looking at how the basic and secondary-level dimensions constitute
what the phenomenon is. This entails that we focus on the concept’s internal structure and
its constituent parts, and how they relate to the object as a whole. Further, because the
constituent parts of the concept play a role in causal hypotheses, it is a realist approach
(i.e. follows scientific realist ontological commitments, see chapter 1). This ensures that our
conceptualization is consistent with the theories that use the said (phenomenon) concept.
By adopting this framework, we could distinguish between the causal hypotheses within the
concept and the causal hypotheses at the basic level that use the concept.
The first basic level is the most important because it is usually the concept we use in
theoretical propositions. It is basic in that it is cognitively central and it is the noun to which
we attach adjectives to (Goertz 2006, 6; Collier and Levitsky 1997). As depicted in Figure
2.1 below, our basic level concept is ‘diffusion’ as the process of how a social model, idea,
or item spreads from one polity to another. This definition focuses specifically on direct or
relational diffusion where we can identify the nature and quality of the relationship between
the model (donor) and emulator (receiver).
The secondary level provides the theoretical linkage between the basic and the con-
crete data level. This level gives us the constitutive dimensions of the basic level, and forms
much of the ontological analysis of the concept and plays a central role in causal mecha-
nisms.7 Put differently, the secondary-level dimensions constitute what the phenomenon is,
and because they constitute the basic concept, they can be considered as a “theory” about
6 Unless otherwise stated, the discussion of structural concept analysis draws exclusively from Goertz
(2006, chp. 1–3).
7 Ontological or constitutive theories account for the properties of things by reference to the structures
in virtue of which they exist, although they must be judged against empirics (Wendt 1999, 85).
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Figure 2.1: Three-level structural concept analysis of military diffusion
the inter-relationships of the parts of the conceptual whole. A full-fledged theory of military
diffusion should thus account for all the constitutive elements of the concept.
There are two different concept structures to describe the constitutive relations be-
tween the basic and secondary level: (1) classical or (2) family resemblance.8 While these
two archetypical categories can be found in the secondary and indicator levels, the classical
conditions are often found at the former, while the family resemblance are found at the lat-
ter. The classical understanding has been underpinned or defined by necessary and sufficient
conditions going back to Aristotle. 9 This structure assumes equal weighting of dimensions
(i.e. each of the components at the secondary–level is equally necessary and sufficient to
constitute a basic–level concept). In contrast, family resemblance allows for the absences of
8 This paragraph draws from Goertz (2006, chp. 2) and Collier and Mahon (1993, 845–55).
9 Aristotle considered a definition as “a phrase signifying a thing’s essence”, and saw it as the set of
fundamental attributes which are “the necessary and sufficient conditions for any concrete thing to be a
thing of that type” (Cohen and Nagel 1934, 235). A genealogy and listing of works on concepts and its
necessary and sufficient condition structure is in Gerring (2001, 66, fn. 2). This understanding of concept
also underpins Sartori’s classic treatment of concept formation.
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a given characteristic to be compensated by the presence of another—i.e. a family resem-
blance that allows one to group together many objects under one rubric. Put differently, it is
a rule about sufficiency with no necessary condition requirements. If we consider the neces-
sary and sufficient condition to be expressed as “if and only if n characteristics are present”,
then the family resemblance takes the sufficiency–only form of “if m of n characteristics is
present”. Thus, if the analysis of the concept and phenomenon suggests no substitutability
of dimensions, then the necessary and sufficient condition structure is probably best, but if
there seems to be significant substitutability then family resemblance is better.
Figure 2.1 above shows ‘military diffusion’ as a basic concept has three constitutive
elements: the diffusible item, the transmission process, and the adoption of the item. The
constitutive relation is based on the classical conception because when we consider ‘diffusion’
as a form of communication that transmits certain ideas from one actor to another, these
components are jointly necessary and sufficient for us to observe it.10 We cannot, for example,
observe a diffusion without the presence of some form of adoption, nor can we fully explain
emulation without accounting for the transmission pathways leading to it. So, if we provide a
theoretical argument to explain military diffusion, we must examine the qualities associated
with the particular idea (front), the transmissions (middle), and the adoption (end). This
view not only brings us closer to the conventional usage of the term diffusion, it also allows
to consider how the IR literature only provides partial theories of military diffusion.
For example, by focusing on military emulation as the adoption of major military
innovations, Resende-Santos (2007), Goldman and Andres (1999), and Horowitz (2010) focus
on one of the three constitutive components at the expense of the other. We can call this
the ‘adopter bias’ in the military innovation literature. To take another example, the focus
10 The argument that diffusion can be seen as a process involving the transmission or communication of
an item from the transmitter to the adopter can be seen in Rogers (1983). As we discuss above, scholars
that consider diffusion as a process generally take a similar standpoint.
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on major technological innovations (Zarzecki 2002) allows us to focus on broader changes in
warfare, but at the expense of our understanding of the qualities and complexities of the ideas
in which the weapons could be used by the emulator. The content of the diffusible item also
shapes how well it can “travel” from one actor to another, as Potter (2003) demonstrates for
nuclear technology, for example. Sociologists have made it point to ensure that the ‘diffusible
item’—from policy goals to ideas or instruments—plays a central role in any diffusion analysis
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 350). But within the IR literature, the different qualities and
complexities of military ideas and the transmission pathways are under-theorized.
Finally, the indicator level links the more theoretical analysis in the basic and sec-
ondary levels to the more practical requirements of converting these ideas into the empirical
domain. As such, it should be specific enough that the corresponding data can be collected.
In a cross-national comparative study however, one uses the substitutability relationship as
the central organizing tool: when the occurrence of an attribute A can substitute for the
occurrence of attribute B. This is based on the principle of functional equivalence—various
phenomenon that satisfy the secondary-level dimension. Put differently, the researcher can
formulate different indicators or data that are functionally equivalent across cases. Thus, if
the secondary and basic levels stress the commonalities across diverse contexts (as they are
used in basic-level general theories), it is at the indicator level that the concept structure
accounts for the diversity across geographic spaces and time periods.
For our purposes, the family resemblance concept structure — and the inherent prin-
ciple of substitutability — applies at this indicator level. Going back to Figure 2.1, in one
diffusion process from country X to country Y, for example, it is plausible that an idea is be-
ing transmitted through a cooperative channel that leads to its adoption. But in a diffusion
process between country A to country B, it is equally plausible that a war-fighting concept
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is being transmitted commercially that leads to its adoption. Both of these processes are
equally considered as diffusion processes, even if their indicator-level data is not identical. In
other words, we can ‘substitute’ the indicator or data level for each of the three components
at the secondary-level depending on the cases at hand or the different contexts in a compar-
ative study. Each element in the indicator-level data in Figure 2.1 (for all three components
of diffusible item, transmission, and emulation) is therefore functionally-equivalent for the
purposes of empirical analysis.
To summarize, the structural concept analysis suggests that any general theory of
military diffusion should consider the different constitutive elements of the process. It also
provides a logical support to my definition of military diffusion: the process through which
a particular military practice, ideas, or technology is transferred from one polity to another.
This definition conveys the core meaning of military diffusion, while providing the necessary
and sufficiency criteria needed to separate the defining properties from the accompanying
properties, of which emulation as an adoption outcome is only but one element. Thus,
I fulfill the classical “philosophical logic requirement” of concept formation (Sartori 2009,
126; Gerring 2001, 45). By de-linking the process from the outcome, this definition is
also more in line with the ordinary and scholarly usage of the term ‘diffusion’. Finally,
the conceptual analysis provides an additional literature review check that highlights which
element(s) scholars focused on or neglected in theorizing military diffusion and emulation.
2.2.2 Scope conditions: Level, unit, and measurement
As an adoption outcome resulting from the diffusion process, military emulation is a type
or subset of military change. Military change can be simply defined as the change in the
goals, strategies, and/or structure of a military organization (Farrell and Terriff 2002, 5).
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Military change thus subsumes all other terms such as innovation or adaptation. In this
sense, innovation could be a process (one of the pathways to military change) or an outcome
(a particular type of military change).11 But change is not equivalent to or interchangeable
with innovation. Military innovation involves some form of change, but not all military
change is innovative. Some military change may be retrogressive or counter-productive.
Some innovations can be developed with a foreign model in mind (i.e. emulation) or it can
be purely driven by internal considerations (i.e. reform). Military emulation is thus a form
of innovation. All emulation is innovation but not all innovation is emulation.
Finally, military Westernization — the extent to which non-Western militaries adopt
the organization, doctrine, or operational methods of their Western counter-parts — is a
subset of emulation. All military Westernization is emulation but not all military emulation
is Westernization. For example, the most successful European commanders in 18th century
North America were those who realized that the Indians had much to teach them about
forest warfare and who adopted the Indian way of war as their own (Starkey 2002, 32,
92–103). Modern imperial warfare even pioneered the use of weapons and practices that
were subsequently introduced into the metropoles: machine guns, dum dum bullets, aerial
bombing, special riot policing methods, and waterboarding (Steinmetz 2014, 88). We will
discuss the operationalization and measurement of military emulation and Westernization
below. Suffice to note for now the conceptual linkages from military change to Westernization
as depicted in Figure 2.2 below.12
11 For example, Farrell and Terriff (2002, 6) argues that innovation is one of the pathways whereby military
change occurs. Most scholars, however, consider military innovation as an outcome—major changes in how
a military fights, whether technologically, organizationally, or doctrinally. See the debate in Grissom (2006,
906–7). In either interpretation, we consider innovation as “situationally new” to the potential adopter, and
not whether these are inherently new across different organizations.
12 Figure 2.2 is not the only way to classify military change. One could, for example, create a different
typology based on different disaggregation methods; from technology to doctrine (scope), from wartime to
peacetime (strategic context), or from bottom-up to top-down (source) (Laksmana 2017).
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Figure 2.2: Military change and its subsets
Level and unit of analysis
The level of analysis in this dissertation is organizational. This is primarily because military
emulation, to be meaningful or significant, should be widespread across the organization,
rather than observed at a single combat arm or unit. Organizational-level emulation should
change how the Orders of Battle are structured for deployment and employment, how the sol-
diers and officers are trained and educated, how technologies are used to support tactical and
operational goals, and how the officer corps engage the political leaders and broader society.
In any case, military emulation is an expensive, risky, and politically-charged task. Consider,
for example, how the political leaders in central and eastern European states wanted their
militaries to be ‘reformed’ along the NATO model, even though their organizational cultures
and personnel were inhospitable to such Western ideas (Young 2016). Innovation in this
sense is not ‘inherently good’ or somehow ‘value neutral’. I argue that understanding the
intra-organizational power dynamics surrounding military Westernization—how the process
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changes or dislodges existing power holders—is a necessary part of the diffusion process.
The unit of analysis in this dissertation is ideational. I am interested in examining
how Western theories of victory and corporatism travel from the West to Asian militaries.
Before I describe what these theories are, let me note that I focus on military ideas as
the ‘diffusible item’ based on the premise that successful and significant military emulation
was rarely about technology alone. Indeed, the history of the revolution in military affairs
suggests the diffusion of “social technologies” (e.g. discipline, training, or institutions) is
more significant than the latest weaponry of the day. Think of the importance of the levee
en masse as an ideational system, for example, that led to the diffusion of mass conscripts.
Or consider the importance of the professional personnel management system in the long
Austro-Ottoman wars of the late 17th and early 18th centuries as well as in the success small
European colonial forces all over Asia (Zürcher 2013, 37).
Importing arms alone is meaningless unless you change how to organize, train, and
employ them in battle. Military historians often emphasize the importance of ‘conceptual’
organizational traits—recruitment policies, motivation, command, or administration. At
best, technological change, as opposed to ideational or conceptual change, presents a menu
of (technical or operational) possibilities (Lynn 1996, 509). In fact, new ideas have permitted
inferior forces to overcome larger ones (Dupuy 1984, 316). As one historian quips, “Machine
guns may kill, but ideas decide where to place them, how to man them, and when the most
effective moment is to begin firing them” (Lee 2011b, 1).
Clearing up the level and unit of analysis is important because the extant literature
conflates the different levels of outcome of interest. Scholars examining US military edu-
cation aid during the Cold War, for example, refer to different levels of ‘change’ we should
see when assessing its effectiveness: (1) individual soldiers, (2) organization-wide, or (3)
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nation-wide (Childress 1995, 13–4). Some consider such aid to be influential in shaping the
trainees’ positive attitude towards the US (e.g. Cope 1995), while others seriously question
if US-trained officers have in fact led their respective countries towards progressive political
change (e.g. Lefever 1980). In early Cold War Latin America, for example, there were con-
flicting claims about the ‘indoctrination’ effect of US military aid on the political attitudes
of individual officers (Fitch 1979, 361).
This dissertation is less concerned with individual- or national-level changes than
with organizational-level ones. I am interested in the degree to which the emulator’s mil-
itary adopts Western theories of corporatism and victory. In examining military aid, for
example, I am more concerned with its organizational impact (e.g. doctrinal change), rather
than if an officer holds favorable views of the trainer country. To use a different analogy,
the socialization of states as corporate actors of some norms does not require personal in-
ternalization of those norms, if the beliefs and practices are sufficiently institutionalized in
domestic decision-making processes (Schimmelfennig 2000, 112). In other words, one can
reasonably examine the adoption of new organizational norms—as indicators of ideational
change—without examining individual members’ beliefs. The focus on military concepts
and organizational-level changes does not negate the possibility that emulation could be
stimulated by technological requirements.
Measurement and operationalization
Organizational-level military emulation varies by: (1) the degree of faithfulness of the ob-
served changes (how similar the end-result is with the original model); (2) the scope and
depth of the observed changes (how wide ranging the changes are); (3) the speed and scale
of the transmission (how quick and how much of the model is emulated).13 These measures
13 I develop these measures from Jacoby (2006, 5) and Jacoby (2001, 34).
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capture the degree of changes observed and convey how much, how similar, and how well a
military achieves emulation outcomes. I am particularly interested in examining the varia-
tion of emulation with regards to Western theories of victory and corporatism. By which I
mean how similar, how wide-ranging, and how quick a military changee its own theory of
victory and theory corporatism to follow a Western model.
Let me note that scholars often implicitly subsume military theories of victory and
corporatism in their discussion of ‘doctrine’. Some define doctrine as an expressed set of
institutionalized principles, knowledge, and “belief system” about how to fight — or rather,
how, for what, and why military resources should be utilized (Posen 2016, 159; Angstrom
and Widen 2016, 198; Jackson 2013, 1). It is, in other words, a frame of reference on how
to fight. But others consider doctrine more broadly to include the preparations for war (i.e.
education and training), the military’s relationship with the political leaders and society (i.e.
civil-military relations), and conception of force management (i.e. defense administration and
standard operating procedures) (Snyder 1989, 27). Under this expansive definition, doctrine
performs a wide-ranging task, from preparing the military to fight, convincing the society
to contribute people and money, to educating its members and managing the organization
(Posen 2016, 160; Posen 1986, 44; Høiback 2011).
There are limitations to the focus on formal military doctrines.14 But as embodiments
of the military’s worldview, a doctrine is important to understand military change. Indeed,
doctrinal change would be a good indicator of an organization-wide emulation. Doctrine
is thus a site of internal contestation of power among members who seek to (re)define the
14 First, doctrinal documents may be less useful if the organization has no doctrinal tradition. Even if there
is one, a doctrine has a different meaning, function, and relative importance for different militaries. Second,
observing changes in doctrinal documents alone may skew our analysis as changes in a formal doctrine may
leave the essential workings of the organization unaltered. Finally, given the wide gap between doctrine
and the policies actually implemented, the notion of military doctrine is not as universal as many analysts
assume. See more at Farrell (1996, 125) and Vennesson (1995, 40).
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organization. Dislodging a military structure constructed with a particular doctrine in mind
— and sideline officers well-versed in its repertoire — to make way for a new doctrine and
differently-trained officers (as would happen in a military emulation) is a contentious task.
While I look for organizational changes in doctrinal documents, I operationalize the
‘diffusible item’ as the theories of victory and corporatism. A theory of victory explains
what the next mission or war a military needs to fight and how to win (Rosen 1988, 142).
This includes both ‘conventional’ operations (e.g. expeditionary assaults) as well as ‘non-
conventional’ ones (e.g. civic action). Whether the new theory leads to a genuine victory
is less important than the fact that the emulator sees it as an important goal to meet.15 In
other words, what matters for the diffusion process is the perception that there is a theory to
guide the emulator to ‘success’. Sometimes the theory of victory is codified in field manuals
or doctrinal documents. Other times, it is informally part of the military leaders’ vernacular
or thinking. Regardless, a successful emulation of a foreign theory of victory should be
reflected in doctrine, training, structure, theoretical literature, and stated policies.
A theory of victory is closely related (but not synonymous) to the idea of ‘force
employment’: the way in which armed forces plan to use their men and materiel in combat
(Biddle 2004). Another closely related concept is the notion of ‘operational art’: the theory
and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and operations aimed at accomplishing
strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre (Olsen and Van Creveld 2010, 1).
But these terms are designed to examine battlefield combat performance and not emulation
outcomes. I am less interested in battlefield outcomes per se, although emulation has combat
implications. It is also unlikely that all militaries all the time everywhere only have combat
operations to deal with. Non-combat operations (e.g. civic action or humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief) often occupy the time and energy of many armed forces (Story and
15 I draw this distinction of a theory of victory as an outcome and an aspiration from Martel (2011, 18).
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Gottlieb 1995; Bonn and Baker 2000).
Meanwhile, a theory of corporatism details how intra-military institutions, from per-
sonnel management to culture, and their raison d’tres are designed, maintained, and de-
fended in their relationship with the state and society. In general, ‘corporatism’ is a system
of self-regulation by autonomous groups (Winkler 1976, 101). Military corporatism refers to
both the degree of military “corporateness” and the corporate interests its leaders seek to
defend (Laksmana 2019, 810). The former is the degree to which the military’s corporate
character and identity are developed and institutionalized, while the latter is the extent to
which the military can control key policies and interests (e.g. promotions, budget) in its
relationship with the political leaders.16 The theory of corporatism is thus about the nature
of civil-military relations as well as the military’s internal management.
Taken together, the theories of victory and corporatism are the “essence” of a military
organization. Military emulation is what happens when a military’s existing theories of
victory and corporatism are remodeled or altered based on foreign (i.e. another military’s)
theories of victory and corporatism. As an ideational construct, these transmitted theories
can change pre-existing ones in different ways; hence the variation of emulation. Chapter 3
outlines why and how we see the variation happens. For now, let me note the conceptual
measurement of the outcomes I am interested in. Returning to our categories above, the
faithfulness and speed & scale measurements are operationalized in an ordinal way: high
and low. High faithfulness is seen when the observed changes comes closest to the original
emulated model. Low faithfulness is when the end-result of emulation is far apart from the
original transmitted model. High speed & scale is seen when an emulator could quickly
adopt as much as possible of the original model. Low speed & scale is seen when it takes an
16 The military’s ‘corporateness’ stems from the joint and long period of educational and professional expe-
riences among officers and from the formalization and application of the standards of professional competence
and responsibility (Huntington 1957, 10; Abrahamsson 1971, 12).
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emulator long periods of time to adopt very small numbers of the original model.
From these measurements, I conceptualize two ideal types of military emulation: max-
imalist and minimalist. In a ‘maximalist emulation’, we expect to see norms ‘displacement’,
the removal of existing institutions and the introduction of new ones (Farrell 2001). In other
words, when existing theories of victory and corporatism are fundamentally supplanted by
new, foreign-based ones. The rapid, expansive, and thorough adoption of foreign theories of
victory and corporatism is thus the hallmark of a maximalist emulation. What this means
in practice is that the emulator plans to fight and organize itself along the lines of a foreign
model. The Chilean army in the early 1900s emulated Prussian military technology, struc-
ture, doctrine, education, and even uniforms and military music so much that they were
known as a “miniature edition” of the Prussian military (Sater 2008, 31).
In a ‘minimalist emulation’, we should see only a small number of changes to the pre-
existing theories of victory and corporatism. Sometimes we see bits and pieces of ‘layering’,
the introduction of new institutions on top of or alongside existing ones (Mahoney and Thelen
2010, 15). Layering involves amendments, revisions, or additions to existing institutions.17
In practice, this means that rather than adopting an entirely new organization-wide doctrine,
the emulator changes its tactical precepts for one or a few of its combat arms. Partial and
limited selection — or “selective adaptation” (Lynn 2003, 305) — of the different elements of
the foreign theories of victory and corporatism is thus the hallmark of a minimalist emulation.
Consider, for example, how post-Soviet militaries adopted a plethora of Western concepts
and models atop their contradictory corresponding legacy concepts, which hindered their
ability to function fully as Western-oriented defense institutions should (Young 2016, 9).
Adopting the theories of victory and corporatism as the conceptual containers for
17 In many ways, layering is the grafting of new institutional elements onto an otherwise stable institutional
framework (Thelen 2004, 35). Norms ‘grafting’ is a tactic norm entrepreneurs employ to institutionalize a
new norm by associating it with a preexisting norm in the same issue area (Acharya 2004, 244).
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the ‘diffusible item’ sidesteps the fact that different scholars of military diffusion examines
different “traveling items”: major innovations, technologies, or practices. As we observe the
two theories at the organizational level, they allow us to maintain coherence and consistency
with the unit and level of analysis. Finally, the two theories allow us to examine the broader
ideational changes beyond combat and formal documents. It should be noted, however, that
the theories of victory or corporatism may not always be wholly transmitted to the emulator
(for reasons I will explore in the next section). I supplement this operationalization of
emulation with an analysis of military Westernization below.
2.2.3 Military westernization and ways of warfare
This section anchors the debate surrounding ‘military Westernization’ in Asia in the larger
debates surrounding ‘ways of warfare’. I concede that this discussion will lean towards the
theory of victory than the theory of corporatism. Nonetheless, examining these debates is
important because the nature of trans-cultural emulation is fraught with conceptual pitfalls
and normative contradictions. I hope to provide the context in which I define military West-
ernization as the extent to which non-Western militaries adopt the organization, doctrine,
or operational methods of their Western counterparts.
The premise of military Westernization is about how a particular set of ideas ideas
crafted in one culture (Western) is diffused (transmitted) into another (non-Western). In
this regard, there is nothing inherently ‘innovative’ or ‘superior’ about the ‘added value’ of
military Westernization. The varied reaction to the diffusion of firearms in the non-Western
world, for example, is better understood not in terms of progress or superiority, but rather
as a response to the different tasks and possibilities facing their armies (Black 2004, 3). The
term ‘trans-cultural’ captures the essence of the contact between ‘old’ and ‘new’ military
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ideas which poses challenges and opportunities (Morillo 2006, 30).18
The first challenge is ‘cultural lag’, or ideational ‘mismatch’ between the model and
the emulator. This lag may stem from the differences in which a theory of victory is crafted
in one organizational context but then transported into another.19 The second challenge is
defining the “West” and the “non-West” with any precision to be applicable across different
periods. Do we define the term geographically, politically, economically, or culturally? After
all, what it means to be a ‘Westernized’ military has evolved significantly over centuries.
More broadly, the literature assigns normative weight to the ‘contact’ between Western and
Eastern ways of warfare. This is based on the premise that there is a (coherently singular)
‘West’ at war with a (coherently singular) ‘East’, often conceived as a ‘radically other’ going
back over a millennia.20 The “primitivization” of the non-West—the epitomy of ‘military
orientalism’—has persisted in the literature.21
These biases lead us to the third challenge: the prevalence of Eurocentrism, the
uneven analytical emphasis on Europe (and the US) over the rest of the world. For one
thing, there seems to a particular line of the military history of, and involving, the West
where other states appear only to be “to be defeated” (Black 2004, 67–8). Some also view
Asian military practices as primitive and backward because they were considered culturally
“non-military” as a society and racially inferior before the arrival of the Europeans (Lorge
2008, 2). The non-West is seldom given agency let alone proper analysis. For another, there
18 Trans-cultural emulation is a two-way street, where the non-West could shape the West. For example,
during the three centuries of Spanish expansion into the Americas, both Indians and Spanish engaged in
mutual adoption of each other’s way of warfare (Lee 2011a, 7).
19 We can see this for example in how most Western-designed advanced weapons systems include their
designers’ culturally-based expectations about the behavioral norms of the user (Hinkle et al. 1999, 6–7).
20 Notable examples include the Crusades, imperial ‘small wars’ in Latin America, Asia and Africa, and
the idea of the Soviet Union as an “oriental despotism” (Barkawi and Stanski 2013, 2).
21 Military orientalism—the fascination for Eastern Ways of war—involves the dynamics of cultural per-
ception within a complex set of relationships, contain themes that are both time-bound and distinctive in
their historical contexts, and reflected in abstract ideas of warfare as well policy (Porter 2009, 14).
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is a long-standing use of Western analytical concepts to describe global military history
(Black 2004, 67–8). Western-derived military terms like ‘combat decisiveness’ often hinders
a better assessment of the peculiarities of non-West military cultures. As Lynn (2003, 19-
20) argues, “We know more about ancient China, but that understanding does not rival our
command of Greek and Roman military history.”
Western-centrism assumes the primacy of the west. As Hanson (2001; 1989) argues,
there is a unique and continuous military culture dependent on a societal and political culture
that is equally unique and continuous; the conjunction of the two created the Western way
of warfare. To this list, others add an ideological justification for war as sanctioned by
Christianity and an openness to new technology (Keegan 1994, 387; Thompson 2006, 499).
Finally, military discipline, drill, and the ability to suffer losses without losing cohesion
may be another unique (though perhaps not exclusively) feature (Parker 2005; Lynn 1996,
508). The Western military trajectory may thus be distinctive, but it has also been open to
outside influences (Thompson 2006, 474, 501). For example, Europeans began to exploit the
possibilities of gunpowder technology when their armies began to resemble Chinese armies
in the 16th century (Lorge 2008, 9).
These arguments may imply that military Westernization is the process by which
non-Western militaries “got better” because their methods of warfare had been primitive
or backwards. Some describe the “Asian way of war”, for example, as de-emphasizing the
holding of territory and focus instead on other forms of military, economic and cultural
hegemony (Ball 1993, 46). Others see it as embodying indirect attacks. Keegan (1994, 387)
calls this ‘oriental war-making’ characterized by evasion, delay, and indirectness. But others
consider the ‘Eastern way of war’ of the ‘Orientals’—especially those rooted in the ideal
philosophies of Sun-Tzu—to be more sophisticated, all-encompassing, and full of stratagems
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(Cassidy 2008). This oscillation between contempt and admiration of non-Western warfare
epitomizes military orientalism. But ultimately there is no consistent and coherent mono-
lithic ‘Asian way of warfare’. Different states responded to the gunpowder revolution, for
example, in their own ways.22 In short, non-western militaries have their own unique history,
culture, and capabilities to respond the West.
The final challenge goes beyond the battlefield. Given that Western victories are
associated with Western political and social systems, Eurocentrism has built-in assumptions
about whether particular regimes types have been particularly suited for war. This is known
as ‘democratic triumphalism’, where scholars argue democracies win more wars because they
produce better militaries and soldiers, choose the ‘best wars to fight’, and have the economic
wherewithal to engage in mass mobilization (see e.g. Reiter and Stam 2002).23 As we see in
chapter 3, the inherent biases of Eurocentrism also re-appear in the assumptions underpin-
ning American military assistance programs designed to develop ‘modern and professional’
armed forces across the non-West. Not only does this bias skews the analysis by assuming
Western primacy, it also compounds the level of analysis problem discussed above.
2.3 Summary
This chapter establishes the following. First, the diffusion studies literature suffers from
various conceptual ambiguities, from the conflation of key terms to the lack of clarity between
mechanisms and outcomes. The existing explanations to the military diffusion and emulation
puzzles are therefore under-developed. Using two modes of concept analysis: structural and
22 In some cases, guns were paired effectively with cavalry, as the Mughals did, and in others, they enhanced
the infantry to the point of nearly rendering the cavalry obsolete, as in pre-Meiji Japan (Lorge 2008, 6, 10).
By the 19th century, numerous non-western militaries had also developed elements of close order drill and
controlled volley fire (MacDonald 2014, 35).
23 There is an extensive debate and pushback against this democratic triumphalism literature, see for
example Biddle and Long (2004), Desch (2010), Brooks and Stanley (2007), Talmadge (2015).
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categorical, I address some of these gaps. Second, I clarify the key terms and elements of
a theory of military diffusion and I argue for the importance of the ‘diffusible item’ and
the nature of the relationship between the model and the emulator. I conceptualize the
latter as the different transmission pathways between the model and emulator with different
facilitative properties. I further develop the theories of victory and corporatism as the
conceptual containers for the diffusible item.
Third, I define military diffusion as the process through which military ideas are is
transmitted from one polity to another. As an endpoint to the process, emulation is an adop-
tion outcome where we see the changes to a pre-existing organization, operational method, or
doctrine resulting from the imitation of another military’s organization, operational method,
or doctrine. This dissertation focuses on explaining two variations in military emulation as
part of the diffusion process: maximalist and minimalist. In a ‘maximalist emulation’, we
should see the removal of existing theories of victory and warfare with foreign-based ones.
In a ‘minimalist emulation’, we should see a small number of changes to the pre-existing
theories of victory and corporatism. The emulator in this regard only selectively chooses a
small number elements of foreign theories of victory and corporatism.
Finally, I highlight the normative challenges associated with examining military West-
ernization in Asia. The analysis also establishes the importance of focusing on conceptual
constructs rather than technology as drivers of change. I focus on military Westernization
in Asia because Asian polities have not historically been ‘first movers’ of conceptual inno-
vation and that their development have been shaped and shoved by their interaction with
Western powers. And yet, the Asian cases offer puzzling trajectories that reveal the different
challenges associated with diffusion and emulation.
Chapter 3
An institutional theory of military emulation
This chapter explains the variation of military emulation—the changes to a pre-existing mil-
itary organization resulting from an imitation of another military’s technology, structure,
or doctrine. I focus on explaining two variations in particular: maximalist and minimal-
ist. These outcomes vary in how fast and how expansive the diffusion processes are and
how similar the adoption outcomes are compared to the original model. In a maximalist
emulation, we should see the emulators adopt fundamentally new theories of victory and
corporatism that mirror the foreign model closely. In a minimalist emulation, we would
hardly see any new theories of victory and corporatism built from the foreign model. I
develop a nested institutional framework to explain this variation. By nested I mean that
the argument consists of three elements embedded within one another: (1) a power-based
institutional framework, (2) a theory built around around two conceptual grids: the donor-
emulator transmission pathway and the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure,
and (3) transmission models: cooperative and commercial. These components are integrated
within and operationalized by one another, as Figure 3.1 below depicts.
This nested logic builds on the distinction Ostrom (2011) proposes between frame-
works, theories, and models. Each construct is ‘nested’ within one another: models are
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Figure 3.1: A nested institutional argument of military emulation
derived from theories which in turn are derived from frameworks. Frameworks identify the
general relationships among broad theoretical elements — the relevant causal conditions
and process patterns for a given range of issues — and offer broad concepts corresponding to
these identifications (Rueschemeyer 2009, 1). I adopt an institutional framework that em-
ploys broad concepts (path-dependence and critical juncture) to understand why and how
humanly-devised constraints channel people into certain actions. As a subset of a framework,
a theory specifies salient elements and assumptions necessary to diagnose a phenomenon and
explain its processes. Finally, models make precise assumptions about a limited set of vari-
ables and parameters provided by the theory and how their combination lead to empirically
verifiable hypotheses.
The nested argument claims that the variation of emulation depends on the inter-
action between two sets of institutions during critical junctures: the transmission pathway
between the donor and the emulator and the quality of the emulator’s personnel infras-
tructure. The transmission pathway provides the ‘supply’ of information on the theories of
victory and corporatism, and the emulator’s personnel infrastructure determines its ‘capac-
ity’ to interpret and adopt them. A maximalist emulation is a likely outcome when there
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is a ‘matching conjunction’ between an accelerated flow of information on new theories of
corporatism and victory and when there is a military organization capable of interpreting
and adopting them. As embodiments of the donor-emulator relationship, some pathways
have more accelerative properties than others. The more the pathway exhibits accelerative
properties, the better facilitated the diffusion process will be. Conversely, the more the
pathway exhibits inhibitive properties, the harder the diffusion process will be. I argue that
the cooperative pathway is more inhibitive than the commercial one.
Meanwhile, the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure is operationalized
by its career management and education systems. A high-quality personnel infrastructure de-
velops a professional, merit-based career management system. Under this condition, officers
trained in new theories of victory and corporatism are likely become ‘product champions’ as
they hold key positions. If a military further develops a professional education and training
system — courses are oriented towards military sciences and military schools are valued for
their learning qualifications — the organization is likely to have a higher learning capacity.
Officers then are likely capable at understanding and adopting foreign theories of victory
and corporatism. Conversely, if the emulator has a low-quality career management and ed-
ucation systems, the chances that the organization would adopt new theories of victory and
corporatism are small. The operationalization of theory, however, relies on the institutional
framework and the specification of models derived from the theory.
This chapter elaborates the nested argument in four sections. The first discusses the
framework that draws from the institutional analysis and organizational theory literature and
highlights the key tenets of a power-based framework. It also builds on recent conceptual
developments in path dependence, critical juncture, and critical antecedents. The second
describes the theory I built from the institutional framework. It discusses the interaction
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between the transmission pathways and the quality of the emulator’s military personnel
infrastructure. The third derives and elaborates two transmission models from the theory:
cooperative and commercial. The models specify the mid-range causal mechanisms that will
guide the empirical analysis in chapters 4 and 5. Finally, I will conclude by summarizing
the key arguments and describe its broader implications. Throughout the sections, I provide
historical illustrations from different time periods and geographical spaces to illustrate the
observable implications of the key concepts and mechanisms.
3.1 An institutional framework of military emulation
The framework draws from the distributional approach to institutions (Knight 1992; Ma-
honey 2000) and the natural systems perspective in organizational theory (Scott 2003). It
focuses on how intra-organizational power dynamics between competing groups shape the
interaction between formal and informal institutions and drive the reproduction of institu-
tional structures. These structures, in turn, provide the parameters through which intra-
organizational power dynamics evolve over time. I explain this feedback loop below.
I start with the premise that organizations are different from institutions; organiza-
tions require some degree of institutionalization to function, but not all institutions require
an organization (Scott 2003; North 1990). Organizations are collective actors who might be
subject to institutional constraints in how they operate or behave within their environment.
But they also have internal structures, a set of rules governing the interactions of those per-
sons who constitute the organization (Knight 1992, 3). As such, some collective actors are
both an organization and an institution, depending on the unit of analysis in question. The
military is an actor in the domestic and international arena and is subjected to (external)
institutional constraints (e.g. international law). But the military also has a set of (inter-
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nal) governing rules for its members (e.g. chain of command). Militaries are organizations
because they were intentionally set up with some guarantee of personnel and resources, rules
to regulate internal behavior and ensure control, and driven by functionally defined goals
(Norden 2001). The degree to which these internal rules are institutionalized is better under-
stood, I argue, as ‘behavioral routinization’: the process in which organizational “rules of the
game” and behaviors become regularized, routinized or made predictable (Levitsky 1998).1
The framework focuses on the inward-looking face: the institutions governing the members
of the armed forces. I submit that one could not fully explain the process of organizational
change—of which emulation is a subset of—without accounting for such institutions.
Many social scientists generally agree that institutions are a set of rules or humanly
devised constraints that shape and structure human interactions in particular ways and are
shared by the members of the relevant community (Knight 1992, 2; North 1990, 3). These
institutions are likely to consist of formal or informal rules (Mahoney 2010, 15). But scholars
disagree on what causes institutional change and their consequences. One way out of the
debate is to disaggregate institutions and specify the unit and level of analysis.2
This view is congruent with the distributional or ‘discriminatory effect’ approach in
institutional analysis. In this approach, institutions are the objects of contestation among
actors differentially implicated in their resource allocations. Institutions, in other words,
are distributional instruments that allocate resources unevenly and thereby help constitute
1 This is related but not equivalent to the Huntingtonian idea of military professionalism, which is closer to
institutionalization as ‘value infusion’ (Huntington 1957). I concede that my definition of institutionalization
has an inherent normative ‘good content’ (i.e. meritocratic professionalism). This may not always hold across
different contexts, however, as it is possible that some militaries may institutionalize ‘bad’ behavior (e.g.
abusive practices). But for the purposes of my theoretical framework, I assume the institutionalization is
about the stabilization of behavior and practices in general.
2 Some scholars see institutions as nested with different degrees of complexity. Ostrom (1990, 52), for ex-
ample, offers a three-level typology of institutional rules: operational (rules affecting daily decisions or behav-
iors), collective-choice (rules governing the process by which operational rules are made), and constitutional-
choice (rules determining who is eligible and used in crafting collective-choice rules). Others simply see
institutions as consisting of a macro and micro level (e.g. Boas 2007).
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asymmetrical collective actors (Mahoney 2010, 15). The asymmetries of power and resources
may or may not be endogenous to an institution; some actors are empowered by institutional
rules while others build their clout from non-institutional sources (Rixen and Viola 2015,
316). Regardless, any set of rules, constraints, or expectations that patterns or shapes human
action and interaction will benefit some but not other members of a group through some
allocation of resources, power, or both (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 8; Knight 1992, 8).
Under this power-based framework, the military is not a coherent organizational
actor. The military is a complex political community consisting of shifting coalitions and
groups vying for power, control, and resources (Rosen 1991). This view also follows the
natural systems perspective in organizational theory. Group members attempt to survive
by imposing their preferences—and thus compete with one another—upon the organization,
which they view as a major asset and a source of power, resource, or prestige (Scott 2003,
58). Members seek allies whose interests are related and they negotiate with those whose
interests are divergent but whose participation is necessary (Scott 2003, 296). The military
therefore inherently contains conflictual interest groups; resources are allocated and policies
produced through the building of coalitions among and between these groups (Zisk 1993,
20). In other words, intra-organizational politics produce shifting hierarchies of competing
interests that shape and define organizational activities and institutions (Farrell 1996, 124).
The power-based framework also suggests we should not only focus on the stated
organizational goals. There is often a disparity between the stated and ‘real’ goals pursued—
the actual or operative goals governing activities and behaviors (Scott 2003, 57). We should
instead examine the interplay and power dynamics between key groups and consider the gap
between the stated and real goals. Examining the gap also helps us understand the extent to
which institutional rules reflect the preferences of the powerful group and how its dominance
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may be reproduced over time. As I describe below, the process of institutional change is
inherently linked to whether dominant power structures are reproduced and how.
The gap between real and stated goals also underscores the distinction between formal
and informal institutions. The former are designed to operate independently of the charac-
teristics of the individual members and to constrain the actions of others through a third
party (Scott 2003, 59; Knight 1992, 188). This possibility of a third party enforcement indi-
cates whether a formal rule has legitimacy (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 11). Formal rules are
therefore almost always written down and communicated to members. Informal institutions,
meanwhile, are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels—they could either complement, accommo-
date, substitute, or compete with formal rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). Informal
institutions can nevertheless influence the distribution of resources, which in turn affect the
power asymmetries in the conflict or compromise over formal institutions (Knight 1992, 172).
The power dynamics between competing groups underpin the process of institutional
change and involve the interplay of formal and informal institutions. On the one hand, the
rules governing members’ behavior and activities can either be formal or informal—and so
would the ensuing new arrangements following conflict or compromise. On the other hand,
formal and informal institutions could also become tools used by different groups within
an organization as they compete with one another. In the military context, one group
might use the formal chain of command, for example, to sideline a competing group while
another might use informal patronage to place its members in leadership positions. Formal
and informal institutions thus provide the parameters within which power relationships are
exercised (Vennesson 1995, 40)—and whether change is possible and to what extent. We
observe these formal and informal institutions, as the next section details, in the donor-
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emulator relationship as well as in the emulator’s military personnel infrastructure.
In institutional analysis, to exercise power over some group is to affect by some means
the alternatives available to that group in such a way as to get it to act in a way that it
would not otherwise choose to do (Knight 1992, 41-2). In other words, how group A within
an organization could get group B to adopt an institution that distributionally favors A
(when other alternatives would be better for B). Different groups with different resources
are likely to create different institutions. Institutions thus reflect the efforts by one group to
dominate or gain advantage over another or the compromise between them. Some institutions
are stable because they disproportionately distribute resources to already powerful actors,
reinforcing their position, and enabling them to uphold previous arrangements. Shifts in
power resources could weaken or strengthen these arrangements, resulting in either conflict
or compromise, and thus some sort of institutional change.
How and to what extent institutions change depends on the key actors exercising their
power to build and shape coalitions, to persuade other members, and the specific substance of
new designs. If successful, new institutions create new power advantages and disadvantages,
but over time, they are likely to reproduce patterns of power (Rueschemeyer 2009, 224).3
Significant institutional change is thus difficult and requires transformations in the balance
of power between advantaged and disadvantaged actors. Two conditions are often necessary
in this regard: (1) changes in the asymmetries of power among the actors and (2) changes
in the distributional consequences of the institutions (Knight 1992, 183). Military change
such as emulation thus requires organizational power holders to design new institutions to
accommodate detractors of change. Unless opponents were weak to begin with, radically
3 This approach does not assume that all members have equal powers. By definition, organizations have
some sort of hierarchy. Members in a position to compete with another to change existing institutions are
usually located within the the upper echelons of the leadership structure. A power-based approach is thus
elitist in that it focuses on how organizational leaders—not all members—compete for resources and control.
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weakened subsequently, or afforded some protection in the new situation, they are likely
to encourage non-compliance (Rueschemeyer 2009, 226). How and to what extent weaker
groups are accommodated is thus a major source of institutional change.
The power-based framework fundamentally argues that institutional structures re-
flect power dynamics rather than efficiency or effectiveness. As Knight (1992, 40) argues,
whether an institution is efficient depends on whether the institutional form that distri-
butionally favors the actors capable of asserting their power is socially efficient. In some
instances, institutions that might appear dysfunctional persist because elites are prepared to
sacrifice efficiency when their interests are threatened (Rodan, Hewison and Robison 2006, 7;
Mahoney 2000, 521). In the military, the central power and distributional conflict revolves
around the question of who should rule and how the ‘citizens’ should live (Rosen 1991,
19). The fight over personnel infrastructure — from education and training to promotions
and appointments — are often intertwined with these questions. They are at the heart of
intra-organizational fights over military emulation and Westernization because new theories
of victory and corporatism could upend existing power structures. As we discussed in the
previous chapter, these two theories embody the military’s outlook, and thus its power and
resources—who defines them control the organization.
As the intra-organizational power dynamics reflect, shape, and reproduce institutional
development, sequential analysis is central to the power-based framework. Making sequence
explicit allows us to ‘endogenize’ the explanatory variables, i.e. incorporate into the model
some variation of causal feedback loops from the explanandum at one point in time to the
explanatory variables at a later point in time (Büthe 2002, 485). Sequence analysis also
corresponds to the comparative process tracing strategy of inquiry I adopt. It further helps
us unpack how power dynamics reproduce institutional structures, as the next part shows.
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3.1.1 Path-dependence and change
This sub-section focuses on path dependence as a mechanism for either organizational change
or persistence. Unlike most institutional analyses that equate path dependence with decay
or stagnation (i.e. an outcome), I argue that path dependence is a process facilitating
organizational development along a particular ‘locked-in’ path over time. In other words,
I consider the concept of path dependence as more about the ‘stickiness’ of organizational
development than the resulting end-point. Under this view, path dependence can lead to
organizational innovation in some instances but stagnation in others.
Military studies scholars employ path dependence to explain the absence of innovation
or the persistence of some detrimental behaviors (e.g. Zisk 1993; Rosen 1991). And yet,
in some instances, path dependence could lead to military innovation. In Singapore, for
example, the path-dependent civil-military relations, underpinned by the dominance of the
People’s Action Party since the 1960s, has led to a “trickle down” military innovation, where
the government has continually guided the armed forces to innovate (Laksmana 2017). In
other instances, a series of failures accumulated in a path-dependent trajectory could also
lead to change and innovation (Palier 2005, 134). This suggests that some locked-in set of
institutions could be favorable to adaptation and change while other sets are more amenable
to stagnation. Path dependence is less an outcome than a process.
What matters for our analysis is the power dynamics underpinning the process of
path dependence. As mentioned above, powerful groups could agree to stay in or move off
an existing path if their power and interests are at stake. Their considerations have to do less
with organizational efficiency than with the balance of power and the accompanying resource
allocation. In a power-based framework, path dependence captures a particular dynamic
of institutional reproduction over time in which the equilibrium is reinforced through the
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reproduction of power. As an institution reproduces itself, it becomes increasingly locked-in
and resistant to reversal. Path dependence is thus a process of power reproduction.
Path dependence is further characterized by: (1) a stochastic relationship between
outcomes and initial conditions, (2) increasing returns and self-reinforcement of power, and
(3) endogenous process of change. I detail the first feature as I describe critical junctures in
the next sub-section. Let me note for now that path dependence is a ‘system property’ in
which outcomes are related stochastically to initial conditions, and the particular outcome
that obtains in any given ‘run’ of the system depends on the choices or outcomes of inter-
mediate events between the initial conditions and the outcome (Goldstone 1998, 834). The
intermediate events set into motion institutional patterns that have deterministic proper-
ties. Under the power-based framework, path dependence focuses on how these intermediate
events follows a certain power dynamic: the institution initially empowers a certain group
at the expense of others; the advantaged group uses its additional power to expand the in-
stitution; the expansion of the institution increases the power of the advantaged group; and
the advantaged group encourages additional expansion (Mahoney 2000, 521).
Such power dynamic embodies path dependence because it creates increasing re-
turns of power. This second feature follows—but is not identical to—the concept of self-
reinforcement in economics (Arthur 1994; David 1994). Economists consider increasing
returns as a production process that exhibits increasing returns to scale (a reduction in the
cost per unit resulting from increased production). In institutional change, this means that
the more a choice is made or an action is taken, the greater its benefit and thus its persis-
tence. In other words, self-producing sequences are those in which a given outcome is stably
reinforced over time (Mahoney and Schensul 2006, 465). In the power-based framework,
self-reinforcing patterns originate from political processes among competing groups and fol-
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lows the power dynamics discussed above. Under this condition, actors may use political
authority to generate changes in the rules of the game (both formal and informal) designed
to enhance their power (Pierson 2000, 259).
The third feature, endogeneity, underpins self-reinforcement processes: a closed ‘cause
and effect’ circuit or feedback loop (Greif and Laitin 2004). The endogeneity is defined by
the relationship to the institution in question. A variable is endogenous when its value is
determined or influenced by an institution, and it in turn affects that institution’s develop-
ment.4 Endogeneity is why the notion of “history matters”—where cause and effect amplify
each other—is different from a time series notion of causality (Rixen and Viola 2015, 307).
The idea is that institutions have effects which then become the causes of subsequent ef-
fects on the same institutions, which in turn become causes once again (Büthe 2002). The
power-based framework makes endogeneity an integral part of the analysis, as the two models
described in the penultimate section of this chapter show.
Taken together, the three features above embody a path-dependent organizational
development as viewed by the power-based framework. That intra-organizational power
dynamics shape military behavior should not be surprising. Scholars working on military
cohesion have made the case for decades. Recently, some scholars argue that military bureau-
cratic politics shapes the likelihood of military emulation (Grauer 2015). But such argument
sidelines the long term and path-dependent institutional parameters through which power
dynamics are exercised. One cannot simply extricate power from any discussion of group pol-
itics to begin with. But more importantly, the argument tells us little about the antecedent
condition or context underpinning the rise and fall of the salient power dynamics.
4 An exogenous variable, in contrast, is one whose value is itself causally independent of the institution
but may nevertheless affect its development. Any given variable at any given point in time can be either
exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous and endogenous variables may both be at work simultaneously and
may interact to produce a change, or a variable may change from being exogenous to endogenous. See details
in Rixen and Viola (2015, 308-9) and Greif and Laitin (2004).
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3.1.2 Critical junctures and antecedents
The power dynamics that sustain institutional reproduction do not emerge in a vacuum.
They are more likely to arise during critical junctures. In general, a critical juncture is a
period of significant change which produces distinct legacies (Collier and Collier 1991, 29).
It has two key features: (1) relaxed institutional constraints, where the range of plausible
choices open to powerful actors expands substantially, and (2) consequential choices, where
the actions or arrangements key actors make channels future movement in a specific direc-
tion that becomes increasingly more difficult to reverse to the initial point when there were
multiple alternatives (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 343; Mahoney 2000, 513). These fea-
tures allow for two conditions at work (Soifer 2012, 1573). First, the permissive conditions
that represent the easing of the constraints. Second, the productive conditions that, in the
presence of the permissive conditions, produce the set of institutional choices that are then
reproduced after the permissive conditions disappear.
Under these conditions, critical junctures open up the possibility of contestation and
compromise among competing groups, which in turn have profound consequences for resource
allocation and the intra-organizational balance of power. Temporally, critical junctures could
be short-lived or they could last for years. What matters is not the length of time, but the
period in which the permissive conditions are present. Those conditions are also associated
with the notion of contingency. Scholars argue that a critical juncture represents a random
happening, an accident, a small occurrence, or an event coming “out of left field” that
cannot be explained or predicted by a particular theory (Mahoney and Schensul 2006, 460;
Bennett and Elman 2006, 254). This implies that the permissive condition is a function of
exogenous variables. But since organizations are social systems and not markets or natural
entities, triggering events and permissive conditions are unlikely to be completely random
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or unpredicted (Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch 2009, 693).
Thus, the rise of permissive conditions is likely to be endogenous. Specifically, per-
missive conditions operating during critical junctures are likely to be shaped by ‘critical
antecedents: conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces during
a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes (Slater and Simmons 2010,
889). Critical antecedents can directly or indirectly affect the causal mechanism that emerges
during the critical juncture and predispose the independent variable to have different effects
across cases (Slater and Simmons 2010, 891). The degree to which critical antecedents shape
the choices of key actors during critical junctures varies depending on their relationship with
the key mechanism. The choices could range from those characterized by a high degree of
discretion to those that are more deeply embedded in earlier occurrences (Mahoney 2001a, 7).
In the next section, I detail how the degree of intra-military conflict is the critical antecedent
affecting the power dynamic during a critical juncture of a military diffusion process.
To summarize, the power-based framework argues that the power dynamics between
groups within an organization competing for resources and control shape the interplay be-
tween formal and informal institutions. The interplay leads to a new institutional structure
over time. The structure then further shapes new conflicts and compromises, which in
turn leads to a new institutional structure in a feedback loop. As the power dynamics
reproduce institutional structures, they place the organization within a path-dependent tra-
jectory. Critical antecedents further drive the salient power dynamics that emerge during
critical junctures. Taken together, Figure 3.2 below depicts the power-based institutional
framework under which I operationalize the theory I present in the next section.
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Figure 3.2: The power-based institutional framework
3.2 A theory of military emulation
The theory argues whether a military achieves a minimalist or maximalist emulation depends
on the interaction between two sets of institutions during critical junctures. First, the
nature of the transmission pathway between the model and the emulator. The pathway
is a mechanism to convey information about the new theories of victory and corporatism.
As embodiments of the donor-emulator relationship, some pathways have more accelerative
properties than others. The more a pathway exhibits accelerative properties, the better
facilitated the diffusion process will be. Conversely, the more a pathway exhibits inhibitive
properties, the harder the diffusion process will be. The pathways become institutionalized
as donor-recipient power dynamics evolved in a path-dependent trajectory over time.
Second, the quality of the military’s personnel infrastructure: career management as
well as education and training. The quality determines whether the organization would be
receptive or resistant to foreign theories of corporatism and victory as they provide the pa-
rameters through which intra-organizational power dynamics unfold. The higher the quality
of the personnel infrastructure, the more likely the organization would be receptive, and the
lower the quality, the more likely it would be resistant. This is because the higher the qual-
ity, the more likely new career pathways could emerge for officers trained in foreign theories
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of victory and corporatism, allowing them to become product champions, and ensure that
broader learning capacity is boosted. A higher learning capacity is necessary for officers
understand, adopt, and implement the new concepts.
Figure 3.3. depicts how the interactions between these institutions during critical
junctures shape the variation of military emulation. The pathway provides the ‘supply’
of information on the theories of victory and corporatism and the emulator’s personnel
infrastructure determines its ‘capacity’ to interpret and adopt them. A maximalist emulation
ensues when there is a ‘matching conjunction’ between an accelerated flow of information
and when there is an organization capable of interpreting and adopting it. We are likely to
see a maximalist emulation in a commercial transmission and when the emulator exhibits a
high-quality personnel infrastructure. We should see a minimalist emulation in a cooperative
transmission and when the emulator personnel infrastructure is of low-quality.
Figure 3.3: A theory of military emulation
Figure 3.3 also notes the possible outcome of ‘half-hearted’ emulation, which we
should logically see when a cooperative transmission interacts with a high-quality personnel
infrastructure and when a commercial transmission interacts with a low-quality personnel
infrastructure. I do not examine this outcome for two reasons. First, a half-hearted emulation
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is under-specified because it merely sits between the maximalist and minimalist emulation.
Contrasting two ideal types of emulation (maximalist and minimalist) therefore yields more
analytical leverage. Second, as I describe below, the coercive transmission (which I do
not examine in this project) where the original model imposes its theories of victory and
corporatism better explains the half-hearted emulation outcome. Half-hearted emulation is
more likely to emerge when the agency of the diffusion process almost exclusively lies within
the donor—and thus falls outside of this project’s scope.
The interaction depicted in Figure 3.3 takes place during critical junctures, where we
see relaxed institutional constraints and consequential choices. The intensity of intra-military
conflicts as critical antecedents (described below) provides the permissive conditions under
which: (1) key groups within the military could strike a bargain, intensify their conflict,
or reach a stalemate, and (2) the relationship between the model and emulator just began.
These conditions allow for both the model and emulator to shape the diffusion process, albeit
not equally, and for intra-military groups to ‘decide’ on how to handle the incoming transfer
of new theories of victory and corporatism. The critical juncture then is defined by the
options available to military leaders pertaining to military Westernization. Once decisions
are taken, it is likely the emulator would be on a path-dependent trajectory as the power
dynamics reproduce the institutions over time. I elaborate the causal mechanisms under
which these dynamics unfold in the two transmission models below.
3.2.1 Transmission pathways
In general, the transmission pathway in a diffusion process is the medium of communication
that transmits new information to the emulator. At the broadest level, we can identify four
distinct pathways as depicted in Table 3.1 below. Due to space and time constraints, I only
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focus on two transmissions — cooperative and commercial — as the two voluntary dyadic
direct military diffusions. The combative transmission is not only historically rare but is
also indeterminate on how the diffusion occurs without a relationship between the model
and emulator.5 The coercive transmission meanwhile robs the emulator’s agency as the
diffusion process often starts with a strong coercion or invasion. Focusing on the cooperative
and commercial transmissions thus gives us the analytical space to examine the agency of
the emulator in different diffusion processes.
5 For example, during the patchy diffusion of the “Musket revolution” in Europe during the 16th and
17th century, states imported these weapons and the tactics by hiring their enemies’ former officers. The use
of freelance instructors associated with the innovators are rare during war, however, and the mechanisms in
which such diffusion takes place seems better encapsulated within the commercial transmission. Furthermore,
learning about an enemy’s best practices can be done without direct contact.
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Empirical mechanisms Historical examples







Voluntary learning from friends
Voluntarily and mutually agreed upon arrangement, includ-
ing through joint-development programs, information and
intelligence sharing, military assistance and training pro-
grams, joint exercises, and/or other activities
US and Soviet military as-
sistance programs during
Cold War




Voluntary shopping in the marketplace
Voluntarily and contractual agreement, incl. the use of ad-
visory teams, mercenaries, “purchase” of military training,
and could use state or non-state agents.
Imperial Japan (1868–







Direct imposition or involuntary adoption
External inducements by powerful actors/ patrons, ranging
from overt coercion to the loose structuring of incentives
and sanctions, and often preceded by an invasion.
British India, Colonial






Competitive pressure to survive
Learn enemies’ best practices through: battlefield successes
and defeat, intelligence gathering, or third party agents.
The “Musket revolution”
in Europe during the 16th
and 17th century.
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In a direct dyadic diffusion, the pathways serve as the primary channel between the
model and the emulator. They facilitate the transfer of information and provide different
opportunities and challenges for the emulators (Grauer 2015, 275). I start from the premise
that the quality and nature of the donor-emulator relationship determines the nature of
communication—and by implication, the quality of the transmission. I argue that whether
the pathway accelerates or decelerates the transmission of information about new theories of
victory and corporatism is the most salient trait. The more a pathway exhibits accelerative
rather than inhibitive properties, the more likely that the diffusion of new ideas proceed
faster, more smoothly, and more expansive.6
Whether a transmission pathway is accelerative or inhibitive depends on the chal-
lenges to the diffusion process. I argue that while both the cooperative and commercial
pathways are based on the same voluntary logic, they pose different challenges to the diffu-
sion process. By voluntary I mean the model and emulator are assumed to have the “luxury”
to choose, free from direct and immediate coercion (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 346). The
key differences between these two pathways with regards to their facilitative properties are:
(1) whether the diffusion process is determined by one side (the emulator) or by both sides
(the emulator and the model), and (2) whether the interaction between the model and the
emulator allows the latter to not only obtain specific military knowledge it needs, but also
‘localize’ and made it into its own.
In a cooperative transmission, theories of corporatism and victory should diffuse be-
tween allies or partners based on voluntary agreements. This partnership almost always
involves government-to-government negotiations. As such, both the model and emulator
are equally in control of the diffusion process. Meanwhile, in a commercial transmission,
6 I should note that the facilitative properties are not absolute terms. One transmission pathway is more
accelerative or inhibitive only in relation to another.
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the diffusion is between two voluntary actors, but market mechanisms, rather than part-
nership needs, often drive the process. The diffusion process therefore does not rely on a
government-to-government relationship. Emulators in fact ouse non-government actors to
provide military information or knowledge. The emulator, by the time it has gone to the
marketplace, should also have the necessary capacity—political, financial, or otherwise—to
pick and choose specific models it wants to borrow from.
I discuss the benefits and challenges of these transmissions in the models below. I
want to note here that a cooperative transmission is more likely to lead to a minimalist
emulation while a commercial transmission is more likely to lead to a maximalist one. As
a set of institutions, these pathways are also likely to generate path-dependent effects. For
analytical purposes, I consider these pathways to be exogenous to the emulator’s intra-
military institutions (although over time they might become gradually endogenous to it).
Further, the facilitative properties of each transmission alone do not explain the variation
of emulation. I describe their interactions with the emulator’s personnel infrastructure in
producing emulation outcomes in the next sub-section.
3.2.2 Personnel infrastructure
A military diffusion process is costly. Militaries must anticipate wars that may or may not
occur, which means that their leaders may not know ahead of time whether foreign theories
of victory and corporatism would be the best ‘fit’. Senior officers must also account for the
intra-organizational power dynamics because new ideas are likely to change existing power
structures. New missions, for example, must be redefined so that officers could know how they
would be evaluated, rewarded, or punished (Rosen 1991, 20). The more new missions diverge
from pre-existing ones, the more reticent officers are to accept them as they could hinder their
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advancement or reduce their power (Avant and Lebovic 2002). These are the power dynamics
that reflect and further shape the intra-military institutions that shape the organization’s
receptivity to new ideas. Two institutions are particularly salient: (1) career management
and (2) education and training. The quality of these systems determines the emulator’s
capacity to exploit the opportunities and information provided by the transmission pathways.
Career management
The quality of the career management is essential to the military’s capacity to engage in the
diffusion process. By quality, I mean the extent to which the career system is professional and
institutionalized.7 A high-quality career management system should have established paths
of advancement and recruitment under a common standard of authority and a stable agree-
ment on personnel qualifications. Ideally, officers are admitted through a competitive system
of examinations, given extensive training, and evaluated using an elaborate merit-based pro-
cedure to determine who may rise through the ranks and command others. Personnel are
then assigned to limited domains, responsible to those directly above them in the chain of
command. Discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and a strict
enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy. This system allows the military to be rule-governed,
predictable, meritocratic, and its officers should develop ‘Weberian’ integrated patterns of
behavior and attitudes.8 Conversely, in a low-quality career management system, organiza-
tional borders are “permeable” and vulnerable to social or political influences. We see this
when the system is organized arbitrarily, politically, or patrimonially and when discipline is
maintained through the political intervention of extra-organizational actors. In other words,
7 I draw the description in this paragraph on military career institutionalization from Pion-Berlin (1992,
87), Norden (2001, 111), Belkin (2005, 145), Moore and Trout (1978), and Bellin (2004, 145).
8 By Weberian, I mean the division of labor based upon laws and regulations, a clear hierarchy, manage-
ment based upon written documents, specialization based on training, the full involvement of the official,
and acceptance of general rules. For details, see Norden (2001); Segal and Segal (1983).
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when the career management is governed more by informal institutions (e.g. patronage)
than formal ones (e.g. chain of command).
A career management system also indicates and provides the ‘legitimacy’ of a par-
ticular group’s rule or domination within an organization. As our framework suggests, the
institutional designs and contents of an organization reflects the ruling group’s preferences.
As such, competing groups consider career management as a “resource to be captured”.
Indeed, more often than not, political power in military organizations is won through the
influence over who is promoted to senior or command positions. Control over the promotion
of officers is a source of power (Rosen 1991, 20). The fight over leadership positions thus
reflects and further shapes the power dynamics within military organizations.
The quality of career management have implications for the diffusion process in two
ways. First, whether the military is prone to intense and disruptive factional conflicts dur-
ing critical junctures. These conflicts are often carried over from critical antecedent period
(discussed below). A conflict-ridden military is unlikely to have the resources or willingness
to engage in a full-scale adoption of foreign theories of victory and corporatism. A new set
of foreign theories could empower other groups at their expense. But if officers could rely on
a set of routinized and stabilized professional rules and practices, they could manage their
differences and focus on organizational tasks. Indeed, studies show that military innovation
is more likely when organizational actors with different responsibilities converge on a com-
mon understanding about an innovative ‘product’ (Stulberg 2005, 505). In short, a divided
military is unlikely to be capable or willing to fully engage in a diffusion process.
Second, whether ‘product champions’ are likely to emerge. These are strategically
placed actors, trained in the new theories of victory and corporatism, who could use their
position to promote these ideas. They are thus central to an organization-wide emulation
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outcome, especially if they could get senior leaders to commit and invest in the new ideas.9
Innovation theorists call them ‘opinion leaders’ or ‘change agents’. Others refer to them as
policy or norms ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘subversives’, or even ’insurrectionaries’: key actors seeking
to change particular policies, norms, or institutions and facilitate the spread of innovative
practices from within the organization.10 While these product champions often emerge
informally (Howell, Shea and Higgins 2005, 644), their rise does not begin with the first
contact with the foreign model. If anything, very few officers will be enthusiastic about
embracing ideas that contravenes pre-existing theories of victory and corporatism.
Instead, the rise of product champions depends on who controls the mechanisms of
leadership selection, which is subject to existing power dynamics and institutions.11 Whether
product champions emerge therefore depends on whether new promotion pathways to the
senior ranks could be created for them (Rosen 1991, 20). Generating new theories of victory
thus starts with increasing the diversity of voices “circulating the corridors of power” (Jensen
2016, 217). Such career pathways are important not only ensure that the new ideas could be
institutionalized—and thus have a longer shelf life. They also signal to the rest of the officer
corps that the ideas reflect a legitimate conception of what the military should care about.
New career pathways for foreign-trained officers are likely to emerge when the career
management system is of high quality. When professional procedures are well-developed,
officers who spent time overseas could be appreciated and thus rise through the ranks. An
institutionalized promotion policy also signals to the wider organization that if the diffusion
9 I borrow the label ‘product champions’ from the business management literature. A champion is “an
individual who is intensely interested and involved with the overall objectives and goals of the project”
and who plays a dominant role in overcoming technical and organizational obstacles and pulling the effort
through its final achievement (Chakrabarti 1974, 58).
10 For more details on these different labels, see Mintrom (1997, 739), Strang and Soule (1998, 271),
Mahoney and Thelen (2010, 24–25), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), and Farrell (2001, 83).
11 In wartime, the urgency sharply accelerates and clarifies leadership selection in a way that reduces
intra-military power dynamics. This is particularly the case as the wartime high command often includes
senior civilian and military leaders hard-pressed to find officers for operational goals.
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process is executed professionally, the officers promoting new ideas will be rewarded. But
for these product champions to be successful, they need to be ‘protected’ by the most senior
leaders (or they need to replace them) (Jensen 2016, 218). The closer they are to the
decision-making apparatus, the better they will be to push through new ideas (Farrell 2001,
83). Innovative thinking is likely to be institutionalized only if innovative thinkers can back
up their ideas with organizational power (Zisk 1993, 25).
To sum up, in a high-quality career management system, we should see transparent,
clear, and well-developed formal institutions governing personnel advancement and opera-
tional duties underpinned by a professional and merit-based chain of command. Under this
condition, there should be new career pathways for product champions. In a low-quality
career management system, informal institutions (e.g. patronage) are more powerful career
markers than merit, hierarchy, or professional qualifications. We should then see the pow-
erful force of informal institutions, the prevalence of intra-military contestations as career
patterns become political and haphazard, and the absence of product champions pushing for
new theories of victory and corporatism.
Education and training
Education and training policies tell us whether the emulator has the learning capacity to
interpret, adopt, and implement new theories of victory and corporatism. By learning ca-
pacity I mean the capacity to maintain and improve performance based on new experience,
knowledge, or information and to subsequently adjust existing doctrines or procedures to
minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future success (Davidson 2010, 19;
Bijlsma, Bogenrieder and van Baalen 2010, 228–9). In other words, learning capacity is
about the ability to learn as much as the ability to implement new insights. A higher learn-
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ing capacity increases the chance that product champions could push for the adoption of
new theories of victory and corporatism. The organization could, for example, correctly
recognize the ideas advocated by product champions as particularly useful. A military with
a high learning capacity would also be in a better position to facilitate the adoption and
implementation of the new knowledge. A military with a low learning capacity, conversely,
would have difficulties in identifying a new theory of victory as a suitable response to its
strategic challenges. It is also unlikely that the organization could adopt and implement the
new ideas as quickly and as effectively as possible.
How do we know a military with a high learning capacity when we see one? It
should have an institutionalized learning system that maintains and accumulates the lessons
of experience, combat or otherwise, within formal routines that serves as ‘vehicles’ for the
learning process, despite the turnover of personnel and the passage of time (Levitt and
March 1988, 326; Bijlsma, Bogenrieder and van Baalen 2010, 231; Davidson 2010, 20–1). I
assume learning processes should be structured and institutionalized as much as possible.
One could not allow the military that needs to deal with pressing daily challenges to figure
out learning activities on their own. But formal structures alone do not predict or indicate
learning capacity in a linear manner. Intra-organizational power plays, and the persistent
effects of informal institutions, often interacts in different ways with formal routines.
Nonetheless, a high organizational learning capacity means that the emulator should
have a well-developed formal structures sufficiently institutionalized to correctly recognize
the challenges it faces and the possible changes it needs to address them. Additionally, the
education and training system should be geared towards building intellectual capital. Edu-
cation and training assignments should be valued as professional qualifications and required
for advancement, not for their political or economic benefits. If such assignments are under-
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valued or politicized, the system either becomes devoid of intellectual capital or they be-
come career impediments—further reducing the military’s learning capacity. Consequently,
the military would have trouble interpreting, adopting, and implementing foreign theories
of victory and corporatism. Overall, a military’s learning capacity should be measured by:
(1) formalized and institutionalized learning system and (2) the valuation of education and
training as professional qualifications. If the military relies on ad-hoc, informal learning
mechanisms and if the high command under-rates the education and training qualifications,
the military is likely to experience more challenges in the diffusion process.
3.2.3 How the theory works under the framework
The theory argues the interaction between the transmission pathways and the quality of
the emulator’s personnel infrastructure during critical junctures determines the variation of
military emulation. How the theory operates is further is dependent on the key concepts of
the institutional framework presented above. Intra-military conflicts as critical antecedents
also affect the interacting mechanisms present during the critical juncture. In essence, the
interaction of transmission pathways and personnel infrastructure during a critical juncture,
as shaped by the critical antecedent, leads to different emulation outcomes. Figure 3.4 below
depicts the causal chain of how the institutional framework operationalizes the theory.
The level and intensity of intra-military conflicts prior to the critical juncture is an
important critical antecedent. Whether and how the military is divided over key elements
of pre-existing theories of victory and corporatism and the likely effects of incoming foreign
ones affect the causal mechanism during critical junctures in two ways.
First, the conflicts affect the contestation between powerful competing groups within
the military and the choices they make during critical junctures on how to respond to the
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Figure 3.4: An institutional theory of military emulation
incoming transmission of knowledge. A new doctrine, for example, could favor one group
over another. If the military was bitterly divided, then it is likely that incoming new theories
of corporatism or victory could be politicized as part of the internal rivalries. Senior leaders
could intensify their competition with one another, which would prevent the organization
from learning about and implementing new ideas. Conversely, if there is no bitter internal
conflict within the military before the critical juncture, senior leaders could focus and decide
on how to best interpret, adopt, and implement new ideas. In short, factional conflicts as
critical antecedents shape the power dynamics within the military during critical junctures.
Second, the intra-military conflicts prior to critical junctures also determine how the
military deals with the foreign model. If there is an intense internal conflict over theories
of victory or corporatism, it is unlikely the emulator could engage the donor in a coherent
and thoughtful manner. Without a well-developed position and plan on how to engage
the foreign model, the military could not take advantage of the incoming transmission of
knowledge during critical junctures. Conversely, if the military experienced less factional
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conflicts over theories of victory and corporatism prior to critical junctures, it is more likely
they can better engage the foreign model during the diffusion process. In short, factional
conflicts as critical antecedents shape the power dynamics between the donor and recipient
during critical junctures. Taken together, intra-military conflicts as critical antecedents
shape critical junctures that in turn shape the outcome of military emulation.
When and how the interaction between the transmission pathways and the emulator’s
personnel infrastructure leads to certain trajectories depends on the power dynamics. This is
because both the pathway and personnel infrastructure are institutions. The former consist
of the institutionalized relationship between the model and the emulator that gets reproduced
over time over knowledge transmissions. In a cooperative transmission, the complexities and
challenges surrounding the donor-recipient relationship are likely to be path-dependent so
long as the legitimate agency of both sides remain on the status quo. In a commercial
transmission, the diffusion process is path-dependent so long as the ability and willingness
of the emulator to pick and choose voluntarily from the marketplace of ideas do not change.
If these traits do not change during the critical juncture, the institutionalized transmission
pathway will (continue to) be path-dependent.
Meanwhile, the career management and education systems are institutionalized within
the military as the leadership issues, implements, and enforces formal rules and policies over
those areas. During the critical juncture, the extent to which these internal features are
of high-quality determines whether the organization could interpret, adopt, and implement
new theories of victory and corporatism. If the quality does not change during the critical
juncture, the interaction with the transmission pathway will lead to either a minimalist or
maximalist emulation. The specific mechanisms underpinning these arguments are elabo-
rated in the transmission models below.
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3.3 Models of military emulation
This section outlines two models derived from the theory: cooperative and commercial. The
preference for using the pathways as the starting point is deliberate. The model prioritizes
identifying the transmission pathway first before examining the emulator’s personnel infras-
tructure. The models assume that the transmission is path-dependent and therefore not
easily changed within a case over a short-period time. The models below unpack the interac-
tion between transmission pathways and personnel infrastructure and how they produce the
variation of military emulation. I also provide illustrations drawn from different historical
periods and geographical spaces.
3.3.1 Cooperative model
The cooperative model relies on the inhibitive properties of the transmission pathway and
the variation in the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. Figure 3.5 depicts
the causal mechanism the model proposes. The inhibitive properties suggest the ‘best’
outcome would not be a maximalist emulation. Under the best case scenario, a cooperative
transmission leads to a half-hearted emulation (which I do not examine in this project). A
half-hearted emulation is likely to emerge in a cooperative transmission where the emulator
has a high-quality personnel infrastructure before the transfer of knowledge. Conversely, a
minimalist emulation is likely to emerge in a cooperative transmission when the emulator
has a low-quality personnel infrastructure. The model assumes the inhibitive nature of
the transmission will be constant while the quality of the personnel infrastructure varies.
The interaction between the transmission pathway and the personnel infrastructure during
critical juncture will nonetheless put the military on a path-dependent trajectory. It is likely
that a minimalist or half-hearted emulation outcome will persist over time.
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Figure 3.5: A cooperative model of military emulation
Historically, armies learn from their friends: when fighting alongside one another,
when they exchange officers, or when one ally is recognized as being clearly superior in
ability (Lynn 1996, 510). Today, there are many forms of cooperative transmission, from
bilateral partnerships to multilateral institutions. These transmissions also vary from highly-
institutionalized relationships such as formal alliances to ad-hoc military-to-military engage-
ments. Alliances like NATO or Warsaw Pact, for example, ensure a steady stream of trans-
mitted war-fighting concepts from the key ‘paradigmatic militaries’ (Lynn 1996) to the rest.
I focus on one type of cooperative transmission: military education and training assis-
tance.12 Such assistance programs come with a few potential military benefits but plenty of
challenges. The potential benefits come from the fact that education and training assistance
12 By now, there are different types of security cooperation as a form of friendly military-to-military en-
gagements, including contacts, educational and training assistance, training and exercises, and arms transfer
as well as treaty monitoring activities (Reveron 2016, 105). The cooperative military socialization often
takes place more intensely in education and training programs rather than arms sales.
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relies on positive inducement and persuasive socialization through direct officer-to-officer
contact and mutual learning (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 289-90).13 The socialization
begins with the familiarization of the donor’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, which
provides opportunities for the recipient to rethink the way it organizes, trains, and equips
for war (Frazier and Hutto 2017, 382). Over time, the repeated interactions can socialize
the recipients as “epistemic communities” of like-minded military professionals grow.14 If
the process is successful, recipient officers should internalize newly transmitted ideas and
perhaps redefine their collective identity (Mendee 2013, 307).
These are generally peaceful methods to ‘socialize and change’ another military. The
model and emulator could simply negotiate how much cost they are willing to spend—
political, financial, or otherwise—on the transfer of knowledge and to what extent. There
is no need for costly wars or to depend on the unreliable marketplace of ideas and services.
Another benefit is the possibility of professional learning that cuts across cultural differences
(Harkavy and Neuman 2001, 237). Officers enrolled in foreign military schools, for example,
are subject to systematic instruction in the host’s way of war; from general theories of war
to specific instructions such as complex operations to the minutiae of staff service (Grauer
2015, 276–7). Such programs could, in theory, provide foreign officers with the knowledge
necessary to initiate and implement new ideas upon their return.15
But cooperative transmissions remain inhibitive. First, it is more likely the broader
bilateral relationship overshadows the narrow military-to-military relationship; political lead-
13 At its broadest, socialization is simply a process in which people are exposed to new information and
then incorporate this knowledge into how they see themselves, their world, and their place within that world
(Atkinson 2014, 19). This process should lead novices to endorse new or expected ways of thinking, feeling,
and acting (Johnston 2007, 20).
14 An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and and an authoritative
claim to policy relevant knowledge within a domain or issue-area (Haas 1992, 3).
15 These programs also provide inducements such as monetary assistance used to promote structural
changes in personnel systems, for example, or equipment choices and upgrades (Atkinson 2006, 516).
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ers may not prioritize defense-related outcomes over bilateral goals. Consequently, both sides
may not necessarily define ‘transmission success’ in the same way — especially as military
and political leaders are likely to diverge as well. Donors may be more interested in gaining
access and influence over key members of the emulator. In the early post-Cold War era, for
example, practitioners of US military education and training programs focused on building
access, rapport, and ease of communication—‘subjective ties’—with trainees they consider
to be with future military leaders (Cope 1995, 25-6).
Donor interests are also rarely consistent long enough for any meaningful organiza-
tional changes to take place for the recipient. In the 20th century, US policymakers’ views
of the the local armed forces they supported and tasked with fighting local wars vary sig-
nificantly.16 On the other hand, recipients may need a token military assistance to solidify
their international reputation or to solidify their ties with the donors. For example, in the
mid-1920s, the Finns employed a British military mission, not for their military advice but
to strengthen their political relationship with London (Stoker 2008, 1). The presence of such
missions is more important than the content of the assistance.
Second, as the donor and emulator may have different interests at different times,
the negotiations are complex and subject to change from both sides. Consequently, the
transmitted knowledge maybe limited, inconsistent, and incoherent. With two actors driving
the process, there are more veto players and points. Under this condition, organization-wide
institutionalization of new ideas would be difficult. Furthermore, a persuasive socialization
of new ideas does not happen in a vacuum. The sociological legacies of previous socialization
processes often dilute potential new socialization effects. For example, Eastern European
countries seemed like a fertile ground for professional cooperative socialization; given their
16 The locals were sometimes ‘racial inferiors’ and ‘partisans’ during an era of scientific racism and pro-
gressivism (e.g. Philippines insurgency), ‘underdeveloped nationalists’ during decolonization (e.g. Cold War
anti-communist insurgencies), or ‘human rights abusers’ (e.g. post-Cold War) (Rittinger 2017).
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European culture and the allure of NATO and EU membership (Porch and Muller 2008,
169). But the Soviets left strong legacies of command and control philosophies and concepts
which hinders the westernization process while ensuring that old thinking and ways of doing
business remains (Young 2017; 2016).
Third, as the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the diffusion process grows, so
does the cost of emulation-driven reforms. Not only is the cost of such reforms high in general,
but the price emulators pay seldom corresponds to the rewards they obtain. The reforms were
necessary in the first place because donor-recipient mismatches (organizational, cultural, or
operational) are likely to exert significant effects. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for
example, Latin American officers sent to the US Command and General Staff College were
taught the principles of AirLand Battle, a doctrine suitable for large armies engaged in
combined-arms-maneuver warfare but had little applicability to the Latin American context
(Childress 1995, 70). If mismatches are severe, a cooperative transmission might lead to
regressive unintended consequences, such as intra-military conflicts and even coups.17
Finally, as both donor and emulator have legitimate ‘agency’ in the diffusion process,
both sides may not always get what they want. As cooperative transmissions rely on persua-
sive socialization, the donor could not ‘insist’ that the emulator adopt its theories of victory
and corporatism. Donors also want to avoid being painted as ‘violating the sovereignty’ of
the emulator. They could also selectively offer parts of its theories of victory and corpo-
ratism, an ‘export version’ if you will. The US’ military aid programs, for example, rarely
touched on higher-order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel—issues
that profoundly affect military capacity but are often considered too sensitive by recipients
(Karlin 2017, 112). And yet, studies show that donors need larger military footprints in the
17 During the Cold War, the propensity of Third World military officers to politically intervene was
significantly increased by their time studying in US military schools (Wolpin 1973, 6–8).
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recipient’s homeland along with intrusive policies designed to radically change and monitor
the recipient’s policies and behavior (Biddle 2017).18
Emulators on the other hand are prone to selective adaptation. After all, many
militaries consider internal policies like doctrine to be ‘sensitive’. Under this condition,
the length of the socialization process—and thus organizational uncertainty—increases over
time. The emulator would also find it hard to fulfill its specific needs; it may be seeking
some theory of victory (e.g. expeditionary operation) but the donor is offering another (e.g.
counter-insurgency). As such, the emulator is unlikely to ‘localize’ foreign theories of victory
and corporatism. A recent study shows that for defense capacity building, education and
training programs should “find the right ladder, find the right rung”: when the capacity
being built meets the interests of both the provider and recipient (“right ladder”) and when
the activities or transmitted concepts are a good match for the recipient’s baseline capability
and its capacity to absorb new materiel, training, and so on (“right rung”) (Paul et al. 2013).
Finding this perfect balance is an extremely difficult task under the best of circumstance,
especially in the trans-cultural emulation context between Western and Asian armed forces.
To summarize, cooperative transmissions have inhibitive properties or ‘brake effects’:
(1) broader bilateral relations overshadowing the narrow military-to-military relations or
defense-related goals; (2) both the model and emulator have to rely on complex and prolonged
negotiations, resulting in incoherent and inconsistent transmission; (3) the emulator has to
pay a higher cost to engage in emulation-related reforms, which are likely to increase the
longer uncertainty remains; and (4) even though both the donor and recipient have legitimate
‘agency’ in the diffusion process, they may not always get what they want. These inhibitive
traits mean that a cooperative transmission will often lead to either a half-hearted or a
18 For example, during the early Cold War, US advisers trained the Greek forces, provided tactical and
strategic advice, planned operations, and made organizational and personnel changes. They oversaw a
complete overhaul of military personnel and appointed a new military leadership (Karlin 2017, 118).
106
minimalist emulation. This is where the emulator’s personnel infrastructure comes in.
When the emulator has a high-quality personnel infrastructure, it is in a better posi-
tion to take advantage of the transfer of knowledge during the critical juncture. But given
the inhibitive properties of the cooperative transmission, the emulator is unlikely to fully
adopt the donor’s theories of victory and corporatism. A few product champions may arise
under new career pathways and can still advocate selective adaptations of those ideas. A
higher learning capacity might also allow the emulator to appreciate and interpret selective
parts of those new ideas. But an organization-wide emulation is unlikely. The information
transmitted would be inconsistent and incoherent and the emulator would avoid paying a
higher organizational and political cost to engage in an all-out diffusion. Any successful
emulation would be limited to some combat arm while the process might take a long time
and the final changes less similar to the original model. In short, a half-hearted emulation
is the likely outcome when an emulator with a high-quality personnel infrastructure engages
in a cooperative transmission. Again, I am not examining this particular outcome.
When the emulator has a low-quality personnel infrastructure, it is unlikely to take
advantage of the transfer of knowledge during the critical juncture. Instead, the emulator is
likely to be embroiled in intra-military conflicts over the best way to ‘respond’ to the new
theories of victory and corporatism. For example, despite the historically deep US-Colombia
military ties, Colombians cling to a culture that works against many US-sponsored reforms,
which were seen as introducing concepts alien to that culture and touched off intra-military
conflicts (Porch and Muller 2008, 182). Such a scenario is particularly likely when the critical
antecedent demonstrates a high-level intra-military conflict over the pre-existing theories of
victory and corporatism. Under these conditions, new career pathways for officers trained
in the donor’s way of warfare are unlikely to emerge, which hinders the rise of product
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champions. The lack of appreciation of education and training is likely to exacerbate the
inability to interpret the significance of the donor’s theories of victory and corporatism.
Consequently, a minimalist emulation is the likely outcome.
3.3.2 Commercial model
The commercial model relies on the accelerative properties of the transmission and the vari-
ation in the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. Figure 3.6 below depicts the
causal mechanisms leading to two outcomes: a maximalist or a half-hearted emulation. A
maximalist emulation is likely during a commercial transmission when the emulator has a
high-quality personnel infrastructure. A half-hearted emulation is likely when the emulator
has a low-quality set of personnel infrastructure. The model assumes that given the acceler-
ative nature of the transmission, a minimalist emulation is unlikely. The commercial model
also relies on the the marketplace mechanisms for arms and labor. The benefits of relying
on the market outweighs the drawbacks and give commercial transmissions their accelera-
tive properties. The interaction between the transmission pathway and the quality of the
emulator’s personnel infrastructure will put the military organization on a path-dependent
trajectory. This means that it is likely that the emulation outcomes will persist over time.
By and large, a commercial transmission provides more opportunities than its co-
operative counterparts. The accelerative properties come from the fact that emulators are
concerned with improving their military power to begin with and are endowed the will and
resources to do so. The emulator’s leaders act as ‘rational shoppers’ who carefully search the
globe for institutions ‘appropriate’ to their character and needs (Jacoby 2001, 24). While
emulators have to rely on the marketplace, they are likely to drive the diffusion process and
should be more concerned with achieving military-related goals over political ones (unlike
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Figure 3.6: A cooperative model of military emulation
cooperative transmissions). The marketplace of military ideas is not historically limited to
governmental actors; non-state actors like mercenaries have been around for centuries. Once
the emulator finds the best foreign model, the ensuing relationship is likely to be transac-
tional where the former ‘commissions’ its requirements to the latter. The emulator’s military
needs are thus more analytically salient.
Let me first note the nature of the marketplace for theories of corporatism and victory.
Historically, the market for force began with the commercialization of war going back to the
period between the 15th and the 17th centuries. This period also saw the rise the global arms
transfer and production systems which made mercenaries and weapons available to any ruler
with sufficient resources (Krause 1995, 35–6). Two markets are salient for our purposes:
arms and labor. These two markets have been historically tied to trans-cultural military
emulation. In some cases, arms came first and labors second, in others the reverse would be
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true.19 Regardless, the rapid diffusion of weapons was not always accompanied by a rapid
diffusion of personnel needed to innovate (Krause 1995, 64).
The arms market is generally characterized by the privatization of the production of
inputs used in producing defense services whereby private firms were under contract to the
government (Fredland and Kendry 1999, 150). But the line between private companies and
governments selling arms has not always been clear cut. In the 18th century Indian Ocean
arms market, for example, private interlopers from Europe worked alongside a conglomer-
ation of large European intermediaries, the imperial powers, whether acting as government
representatives or through the use of chartered companies such as East India Company
(Chew 2012, 138). Meanwhile, the military labor market—from ‘mercenary troops’ to advi-
sory teams—has historically been more diverse. I focus in particular on the foreign advisory
labor market as one of the prominent mechanisms in Asia at facilitating the commercial
transmission of Western theories of victory and corporatism.
Before the rise of the state, market allocation of forces prevailed and virtually all force
was contracted.20 It was simpler back then to hire armed men (as commodified labor) to fight
or build an armed force; personnel contracts were easier to draw than arms deals (Fredland
and Kendry 1999, 160; Zürcher 2013, 18).21 Nationality mattered less than combat prowess,
the economic desperation of the soldiers, and the economic interests of rulers (Thomson
1996, 31). Severe manpower shortages also drove potential emulators to the trans-national
military labor market.22 But after the rise of the modern state, force privatization meant
19 For example, Indian mercenaries who served Burmese rulers in the 16th century brought their own
cannon and muskets (Charney 2004, 56).
20 From the 12th century through Westphalia, ‘military enterprisers’ would put together forces to meet
diverse security needs, from war-fighting to taxation and administration. See details in Avant (2005, 27).
21 Remuneration or compensation for the troops could be wages or prize-money, booty, or non-material
gains such as secular or religious honor (Lucassen and Zürcher 1998, 409–410).
22 Ancient Egypt, for example, outsourced its war-making to mercenaries from North Africa and tribes in
the Aegean Islands and along the Anatolian Coast because Egyptian citizens avoided the battlefield while
and large numbers of poor and displaced tribes were available (Dunigan 2011, 3).
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receiving a foreign mission to instruct or advise in the development of local forces (Stoker
2008, 1). Over time, privately-contracted officers became one of the pervasive means to
adopt new military ideas. Commercial transmissions therefore have been closely tied to the
idea of ‘mercenarism’: the enlisting in and recruiting for a foreign army or buying an army
from the international system (Thomson 1996, 27, 54).23
Different relationships between the emulator (contracting party) and the foreign
model (contractor), provide different degrees of ‘privateness’ in the contracted missions
(Brauer 1999, 134). Foreign military advisors can be a single or a few officers or they
can be large missions sent to revamp the broader military structures.24 These officers were
often placed in key positions to ensure that the knowledge and information of the new theo-
ries of victory and corporatism could be dispersed widely (Grauer 2015, 277). For example,
in 1885 the Chilean government appointed Captain Emil Korner of the Imperial German
Army to train its officers and “Prussianized” the Army through the reorganization of the
officer corps, the rewriting of salary and promotion regulations, and the restructuring of
educational programs, among others (Nunn 1970; Sater 2008).25 But potential emulators
were also often interested in the advanced weaponry that foreign advisors bring from their
home countries. This was the case when the Marathas in India incorporated commercially-
obtained Western technologies and skills to wage destructive battles against British forces
in the Second Maratha War (1803-05) (Strachan 2006, 92).
Relying on the marketplace for military needs has its drawbacks. The first potential
23 ‘Mercenarism’ is broader than the original use of the term mercenary. A mercenary was a soldier in the
service of a foreign power whose primary motivation is some sort of material gain (Latzko 1997). Traditional
conceptions of mercenaries have had a profit motivation and/or a foreign component and exist to differing
degrees within a historical spectrum of private violence (Dunigan 2011, 19).
24 The variation in the expected roles of these teams depends on the specific needs potential emulators
requested. They could be asked to become broader tools of modernization and nation building, counter-
insurgency, or simply for profit (Stoker 2008, 1-2).
25 The motivation appeared to have been largely financial, at least initially. Korner agreed to 12,000 marks
payable in Chilean gold in return for his services as instructor (Nunn 1983, 101).
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downside is the reliability of the supplier of arms and labor, especially if they have monopoly
over the market. Many polities in pre-modern Southeast Asia, for example, were dependent
on European suppliers for their firearms by the 18th century. This allowed the Europeans
to control the technology and even expressly prohibited the transfer of gun manufacturing
techniques (Lorge 2008, 89–90; Andaya 1993, 394; Charney 2004, 244).
The second downside is quality and reliability. In some cases, contractors or mer-
cenaries were plagued with the “loyalty to the size of the paycheck” problem (Brauer and
Van Tuyll 2008, 316). Foreign mercenaries and trainers in Southeast Asia during the 16th
and 17th centuries, like the Portuguese and Muslim officers in Myanmar, were politically
fickle and expensive (Lieberman 1993, 228). But in others, foreign officers were reliable and
loyal because they were in a foreign land amidst a hostile population (Latzko 1997). Finally,
the marketplace can be unstable and may not produce the best ‘product’. In 19th century
Egypt, for example, Mehmed Ali had turned to the Ottomans for help to reform their mili-
tary. Although they were available, many were poorly prepared to direct a modern army, as
most only had a superficial knowledge of modern strategy (Dunn 2008, 12).
Despite these potential drawbacks, the commercial transmission is largely facilitative
for the diffusion of ntheories of victory and corporatism. First, as the emulator is the
ultimate agency and driver of the diffusion process, it is more likely to be committed to the
best possible approximation—and as fast and expansive as possible—of the foreign model.
The emulator’s leaders are also likely to have convergent views on the need to obtain specific
theories of victory and corporatism they need. Second, as the emulator could pick and choose,
it is likely to obtain the best possible model to follow and ensure that the transmission process
would be consistent and coherent. Consequently, the emulator is more likely able to localize
and legitimize new theories of victory and corporatism. These traits are the reason why,
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despite the inherent risks, many polities hire foreign military advisory teams anyway.
The third benefit is simply economics. Established great powers could afford the cost
of major military innovations (Krause 1995). But many could not afford either the monetary
or the time cost of waiting for decades. Hiring foreign advisory teams to transmit the best
contemporary innovation should speed things up. The fourth benefit is the fact that the
market allows an emulator to ‘buy the latest model’ while avoiding being overly dependent
on one supplier. Military advisors could be contracted for a single campaign and an be
disbanded after, thus creating additional savings.26 Bottom line, the potential emulator
could purchase the best and latest war-fighting concepts without the necessary burden of
transforming their societies. Finally, the market gives the emulator the luxury to choose the
theories of victory and corporatism most suitable to their needs. This is the ‘custom made’
benefits of the commercial transmission.
These benefits outweigh the drawbacks and give commercial transmissions their ac-
celerative properties. If a match is successfully found and a mission contract is successfully
negotiated, the transfer of knowledge should be smoother, quicker, and better than coopera-
tive transmissions. It is also more likely that emulators would want a ‘full package’ from the
foreign model. When and how we should observe fundamentally new or partially developed
theories of victory and corporatism depends on the quality of emulator’s personnel infrastruc-
ture. When the emulator has a high-quality personnel infrastructure, it could take advantage
of the transfer of knowledge. As emulators are motivated to adopt new war-fighting con-
cepts, senior leaders will create new career pathways and support product champions. The
organization should also have a higher learning capacity and therefore be in a better position
to adopt and implement the new ideas. As these changes are further institutionalized, the
26 This seems to have been the practice in India and Europe as early as the 14th century but also in the
Middle East from the 17th century until the 20th (Zürcher 2013, 30).
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emulator should develop fundamentally new theories of victory and corporatism that closely
mirrors the original foreign model. In short, we are likely to see a maximalist emulation.
But when the emulator has a low-quality personnel infrastructure, it is unlikely to take
advantage of the transfer of knowledge. The organization will slowly interpret, adopt, and
implement the new theories of victory and corporatism. While senior leaders might support
the creation of new pathways for officers trained in those theories, product champions are
likely to only emerge slowly or in smaller numbers. As organizational resistance is likely
to be larger, we should only see some modified version of the new theories of victory and
corporatism. The organization, in other words, would engage in military diffusion but the
process is unlikely to be smooth, quick, or better than if the organization had a high-quality
infrastructure. In short, we are likely to see a half-hearted emulation.
3.4 Summary
This chapter presents a nested argument to explain the variation in military emulation.
It consist of: (1) a power-based institutional framework, (2) a theory of emulation based
on the interaction between the transmission pathway between donors and recipients and
the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure, and (3) two models of transmissions:
cooperative and commercial. Each of these components are nested in and operationalized
with one another. The institutional framework explains how the power dynamics between
groups competing for resources and control shapes the interplay between formal and informal
institutions. As the power dynamics reproduces institutions, they place the organization on
a path-dependent trajectory. The salient power dynamics initially emerges during critical
junctures and are driven by critical antecedents. I argue that the level of intra-military
conflict over theories of victory and corporatism is an important critical antecedent condition.
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Meanwhile, the theory argues that whether a military achieves a minimalist or a max-
imalist emulation depends on the interaction between two sets of institutions during critical
junctures: the transmission pathway between the donor and the emulator and the quality
of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. The former provides the ‘supply’ of information
on the new theories of victory and corporatism and the latter determines the ‘capacity’ to
interpret and adopt these new ideas. As embodiments of the donor-emulator relationship,
some pathways have more accelerative properties than others. The cooperative transmission
is more inhibitive than the commercial. The higher the quality of the personnel infrastruc-
ture, the more likely the organization would be receptive to foreign theories of victory and
corporatism. Thus, we are more likely to see a maximalist emulation in a commercial trans-
mission and when the emulator possess a high-quality personnel infrastructure. A minimalist
emulation is likely to emerge in a cooperative transmission and when the emulator possesses
a low-quality personnel infrastructure.
Finally, the two models operationalize the theory. The cooperative model relies on
the inhibitive properties of the transmission and the variation in the quality of the emulator’s
personnel infrastructure. The inhibitive properties suggest that we are likely to see either
a half-hearted or a minimalist emulation. A half-hearted emulation is likely to emerge in
a cooperative transmission where the emulator has a high-quality personnel infrastructure
before the transfer of knowledge or information. A minimalist emulation is likely to emerge
in a cooperative transmission when the emulator has a low-quality personnel infrastructure.
I apply this mechanism to examine the Cold War Indonesia case in chapter 4.
The commercial model relies on the accelerative properties of the transmission and
the variation in the quality of the emulator’s personnel infrastructure. The commercial model
also relies on the marketplace mechanisms for arms and labor. The benefits of relying on the
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market outweighs the drawbacks and give commercial transmissions their accelerative prop-
erties. These properties suggest that there are two possible emulation outcomes: maximalist
or half-hearted. A half-hearted emulation is likely when the emulator has a low-quality per-
sonnel infrastructure. A maximalist emulation is likely during a commercial transmission
when the emulator has a high-quality personnel infrastructure. I apply this mechanism to
examine the Meiji Japan case in chapter 5.
Chapter 4
Minimalist emulation: Cold War Indonesia
This chapter explains why and how the Indonesian Army did not become ‘Americanized’ by
the end of the Cold War, despite employing thousands of US-trained officers. I argue that the
conjunction between the inhibitive properties of the cooperative transmission and the army’s
low-quality personnel infrastructure during the critical juncture led a minimalist emulation.
Specifically, US Cold War considerations de-prioritized diffusion-related goals and created a
limited, incoherent, and inconsistent transmission of US theories of victory and corporatism.
Military aid was geared to assist with internal security and civic actions, which ran counter
to the conventional military Westernization plans Indonesian army leaders had in mind. But
the Indonesian army also did not have the personnel infrastructure to interpret, adopt, and
implement US theories of victory and corporatism. Its career management was politicized
and under-developed — which blocked new career pathways for US-trained officers and hin-
dered US product champions. Furthermore, its education and training system was skewed
towards ideological indoctrination and socio-political duties. Finally, the intra-military con-
flicts in the 1950s shaped how US military assistance programs interacted with the army’s
low-quality personnel infrastructure during the critical juncture.
I examine causal-process (qualitative) and dataset observational (quantitative) data.
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I draw on archival materials, organizational documents, and secondary sources for the for-
mer. For the latter, I develop an original dataset of Indonesian Army officers as part of a
larger Profile of Indonesian Military Academy Graduates (INDOMAG) database (see chap-
ter 1). Statistical analyses of the data shows that US military education and training had
no significant effect on the successful career trajectory of Indonesian Army officers during
the Cold War. More broadly, there was no strong correlation between what we consider to
be ‘professional’ career markers with successful retirements. Descriptive statistics show that
around 16% of 677 Indonesian Army generals had some form of US education and training.
I also provide evidence for doctrinal stagnation during the critical juncture that indicates a
low-level organizational learning capacity.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first examines the minimalist emula-
tion of the Indonesian military. It describes the organization’s doctrinal stagnation during
the critical juncture as well as the inconsistent and limited application of US theories of
victory. The second discusses the contours of intra-military conflicts between the 1940s and
1950s as the critical antecedent condition. The third examines the cooperative transmission
between the US and the Indonesian military. It assesses the evolution of US military aid
programs and the extent to which Jakarta bargained and hedged its security relationship
with Washington. The fourth examines the personnel infrastructure of the Indonesian mili-
tary. It provides a statistical analysis of the career patterns of the Army elite and the extent
to which US training mattered. It also describes the evolution and under-development of
the military’s personnel infrastructure and how it hindered the adoption of US theories of
victory and corporatism. The final section summarizes the findings and examines how well
the cooperative model holds up against alternative explanations.
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Figure 4.1: Timeline of key events and conceptual markers for Indonesia case
4.1 Minimalist emulation
As chapter 2 notes, in a ‘minimalist emulation’, we should see a small number of changes
to the pre-existing theories of victory and corporatism. Sometimes we see bits and pieces of
ideational layering, where the emulator changes the tactical precepts of one or a few of its
combat arms rather than adopting a new organization-wide doctrine. This section demon-
strates that during the critical juncture, the military failed to overhaul its doctrine along the
US model. This failure subsequently created path-dependent minimalist emulation effects
by the end of the Cold War. In other words, once the momentum during the critical juncture
to develop and implement a new organization-wide US-inspired doctrine had passed, the In-
donesian army’s outdated, Japanese-inspired theories of victory and corporatism persisted.
Figure 4.1 above presents the timeline of the key events and conceptual markers.
I define the critical juncture as the period between the late 1950s and the early 1970s
based on three permissive conditions. First, the Indonesian military by then had brought
back dozens of officers from US military schools. Under the staunchly anti-communist New
Order regime (1966–1998) led by President Suharto (an Army General), these US-trained
officers should have led the organization. They were unlikely to be seen as “communists” and
would have been among the best trained officers in the organization. In theory, they should
have been capable of drafting a new doctrine based on US concepts. Second, US military
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aid — from arms transfer to education and training — to Indonesia reached its peak in the
same period. The New Order regime could have relied on those programs to develop a new
US-based doctrine. Finally, the New Order had unprecedented power as all intra-military
factions rallied around the government. Suharto could have ordered the fundamental revision
of existing doctrines to reflect US concepts without serious resistance.
Within a year since the attempted coup of 1965 that brought Suharto to power, the
military convened a series of seminars to revise its doctrinal precepts. But no organization-
wide US-inspired doctrines emerged. Instead, the ‘revised’ doctrine kept many of the old
theories of victory and corporatism that could be traced back to the Japanese occupation in
the 1940s. This doctrinal stagnation is one conceptual indicator of a minimalist emulation.
Another indicator was the limited and inconsistent application of US theories of victory in
major Indonesian military operations. Taken together, the analyses suggest the Indonesian
military only achieved a minimalist emulation. The US influence was limited while the
organizational legacy of the Japanese occupation casted a longer shadow.
4.1.1 Indonesian theories of victory and corporatism
The Indonesian theories of victory and corporatism were hybrid products of: (1) the colonial
rule under the Dutch and the Japanese in the early 20th century, (2) the Revolutionary
War (1945-49), and (3) the informal legacies of Javanese culture and local politics. Table
4.1 below summarizes the key features of those theories for much of the Cold War, drawn
from secondary and primary doctrinal sources (cited and discussed below). The Japanese
occupation and the Revolutionary War in particular (when the military fought the Dutch
and internal rebellions) were formative periods. Japanese authorities created militias and
para-military groups to prepare for the Allied invasion. The most prominent of these was
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the Defenders of the Homeland (Pembela Tanah Air or PETA). Thousands of PETA-trained
men became the nucleus of the new Indonesian officer corps after the country’s independence
in 1945.1 Japanese theories of victory and corporatism thus shaped Indonesian theories as
well. In many ways, the Indonesian military was the “intellectual captives of the training
they received from the Japanese” (Pauker 1961, 21).
Several concepts were enduring. First, the Army relied on and was highly influenced
by the Japanese doctrine of the ‘fighting spirit’ (seishin) or ‘semangat juang ’ in Indonesian.
The Japanese imparted the idea through their training of PETA recruits, including translated
Japanese training manuals (Lee 2013, 26–7). In this approach, the warrior’s elan was more
important than any other aspect of warfare including technology or ‘technical’ training.2
As the Japanese PETA trainers told their recruits, they could “destroy enemies’ tanks and
aircrafts with bamboo spears if they had virtue” (Mrázek 1978a, 24). PETA’s training
structure varied from class to class, but they consistently focused on fighting spirit, basic
skills, and physical training, rather than administration or professionalism.3
Second, the IJA laid the foundation for the military’s theory of corporatism: the
claim to a ‘special’ position in civil-military relations. This role rested on the claim that the
Indonesian military “created itself” prior to any working government and that it fought for
independence while politicians were ready to surrender (Said 1991). This claim was partially
1 The Japanese set up at least one PETA battalion in each residency through out Java, Madura, and Bali.
At the end of the occupation, PETA consisted of 69 battalions with 37,812 men plus some guerrilla units with
922 officers. Some 70 Indonesians may have been trained as battalion commanders, some 200 as company
commanders, some 620 as platoon commanders and perhaps 2,000 as section commanders. The Japanese
also created other non-PETA militias, including Heiho, Suishintai, Jibakutai, and others that placed the
overall number of Japanese-trained Indonesians to be roughly around two million men. Details are from
Kilcullen (2000, 38), Pauker (1961, 8–9), and Sato (2010, 201).
2 The PETA’s Japanese trainers conveyed an romantic and mystical martial image, emphasizing that
victory was to be had not by calculation but by the iron exercise of will, and that the essential soldierly
ingredient was the possession of a “flaming spirit” (McVey 1971, 140).
3 The curriculum included general subjects (e.g. tactics, communication), special subjects (e.g. stratagem,
counter-intelligence, propaganda), practical courses (e.g. drill, gymnastics), technical courses (e.g. shooting,
reconnaissance), field study, and extracurricular activities like martial singing (Lee 2013, 27).
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Table 4.1: Elements of Indonesian theories of victory and corporatism during the Cold War
Level Concepts and characteristics
Strategic
• Total People’s Warfare (Perang Rakyat Semesta or PERATA) and Territorial
Warfare (Perang Wilayah)
• Against external enemies: defensive in nature through ‘layered defense’ (i.e. as
an insurgent)
• Against internal enemies: offensive in nature through territorial operations (i.e.
as a counter-insurgent)
• Warfare happens most likely within Indonesian territory, whether against inter-
nal or external threats
• Assume that invading enemies technologically superior while internal threats
require better counter-insurgency approaches rather than advanced weaponry
Organizational
• Territorial Command (Komando Teritorial or KOTER)
• Country divided into multiple independent ‘Strategic Compartments’ following
the Revolutionary War era (1945-49)
• Requires close relationship and engagement with local population
• Military administration more about centralized command and control and intra-
organizational political management, rather than operational support
Operational
• Defense Operations: defensive strategic and offensive strategic (air, sea, linear,
amphibious, mobile, airborne, and covert/special warfare)
• Internal Security Operations: intelligence, combat, and territorial operations
• Karya Operations (non-military): secondment of military officers to non-
military posts and civic action programs
Tactical
• Use of militias, armed civilians, or other para-military groups in counter-
insurgency, territorial operations, and civil-military conflicts
• Use of civilians as a protective boundary behind which army troops could safely
move into rebel territory in counter-insurgency operations (dubbed ‘fence of
legs’ or pagar betis)
Civil-military
relations • ‘Dual Function’ (Dwi Fungsi): the military plays both a defense-security and a
socio-economic-political role
• ‘Middle Way’ (Jalan Tengah): the military will not be a ‘dead tool’ of the
government nor will it be a dictatorial ruler
• Tentative civil-military coordination and understanding, rather than humani-
tarian norms or liberalism, provide operational constraints
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boosted by what the Japanese PETA trainers taught the Indonesians: the Emperor’s ‘pre-
rogative of supreme command’ (Tosui Taiken) where the military’s absolute loyalty was to
the Emperor and not to the political government (Tomoko 1991).4 Thus, the nucleus of the
Indonesian officer corps, by virtue of their Japanese training and revolutionary experience,
believed the military had a special role in governing the country.
Third, Japanese concepts became the leading principles of military structure and
strategy. The Japanese scattered PETA in small units to function in the ‘ideological and
social’ fields, rather than as a professional force.5 PETA recruits were basically trained
to be foot soldiers—drilled in tactics rather than strategy—manning a ‘territorial army’:
smaller battalions and companies permanently stationed in and supported by their locales.6
Their effectiveness was measured by their ability to penetrate society as they have to be
administratively independent from one another. This was why most PETA commanders
were influential local figures, which created a highly-personalized (i.e. patronage-based)
organization. That these groups had no loyalty to a single, central command exacerbated
the prominence of informal institutions rather than formal chains of command.7
Taken together, the Japanese laid the foundations for a highly decentralized command
structure with hundreds of thousands of young men contained in small units, trained to mo-
bilize the people, and were indoctrinated with “fighting spirit”. These legacies underpinned
Indonesian theories of victory and corporatism. But they also created the intra-military
4 Chapter 5 discusses this concept further as I examine the conceptual ‘match’ between Japanese and
Prussian monarchical civil-military relations.
5 The logic was that any operations against the Allies were to be led by the Japanese, while Indonesian
militias were to mobilize the masses. This was also why, as we see above, the educational focus was on
basic training, rather than staff and administration above the battalion level. For more details on Japanese
strategy in Indonesia, see Lebra (2010).
6 PETA units were stationed in the rural areas as close to the hamlets as possible and had strictly limited
geographical areas of activity (Mrázek 1975, 4–5). The division of the battalions into territorial and mobile
battalions was influenced by Japanese army policy. PETA battalions were given territorial duty, whereas
regular Japanese army units had mobile duty (Gregory 1976, 246, fn. 51).
7 The PETA had no general staff or even formal liaison among the various units (Gregory 1976, 233).
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conflicts over those same theories in the 1950s that acted as a critical antecedent (discussed
below). That said, these foundations — and many of the elements listed in Table 4.1 —
were codified in Indonesia’s doctrine of Territorial Warfare.
4.1.2 The path-dependence of Total’s People’s Warfare
‘Territorial Warfare’ was codified as the military’s first doctrinal document following an Army
Staff and Command College seminar in 1962. The concept was supposed to be “modern
warfare in its operations, logistical system, and the use of total national power” (TNI 2000c,
64). Indonesia’s Territorial Warfare was a variation of the ‘people’s war’ doctrine common
during the Cold War. Indonesia’s concept was designed with external and internal enemies
in mind, rather than an all-out resistance against an invasion. This “duality of threats”
outlook was born out of the Revolutionary era which provided the experience of being an
insurgent (against the Dutch) and a counter-insurgent (against internal rebellions). Two
rebellions were noteworthy: the Darul Islam (DI/TII) rebellion (1949–1962) and regional
rebellions known as Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta or PERMESTA (1957–1961). The former
was Indonesia’s first major counter-insurgency campaign while the latter was its first major
‘conventional’ campaign.8 These campaigns shaped the Territorial Warfare’s precepts.
The doctrinal formulation process started in the mid 1950s and had included foreign-
trained officers as well as a study visit to Hanoi to examine the Vietnamese total warfare
concept (TNI 2000c, 64). Some also argue that Indonesia’s doctrinal articulation had Chinese
and Yugoslavian influences.9 But it was important that military leaders did not publicly
8 As an archipelago of more than 13,000 islands, non-Java internal rebellions required the Java-based
government to launch “conventional” airborne or amphibious operations.
9 Indonesian military leaders referred to the Yugoslav experience in World War II in resisting the Germans
when they discussed the role of moral and ideological factors in national defense. When the Army established
economic mobilization plans in Central Java during the Revolutionary War, it was apparently inspired by
the Chinese concept of ‘industrial cooperatives’ to sustain the war effort. See details in Pauker (1963, 34).
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acknowledge such foreign influences. Given the tense intra-military conflicts over foreign
models (discussed below), such an admission would have rendered a new doctrine inoperable
as it would polarize the organization. Military leaders then chose to highlight the country’s
unique history as the roots of the doctrine. According General Ahmad Yani, then Army
Commander, the Territorial Warfare document was,
“our own doctrine found in our own history of warfare. It is not just a conven-
tional warfare according to Western soldiers and not partisan or guerrilla warfare
in a narrow sense. It is a combination of all that.”10
As we see above, there is some truth to these claims. But by highlighting the unique
revolutionary roots, the Army made it ‘sacred’ and harder to change; lest one would be
accused of ‘betraying the country’s founding history’ and denying the military’s role in it.
This underscores how the military’s theory of victory and corporatism was path-dependent
as shaped by intra-military power dynamics.
The high command nonetheless formulated Territorial Warfare based on assumptions
the Japanese made during World War 2. For starters, the invading enemy was assumed to
be highly superior. But Indonesia’s geography and “fighting spirit” should allow the military
to wage an all-out guerrilla war until it can push back. As General A. H. Nasution, one of
the chief architects of Indonesia’s revolutionary war strategy, then argued,
“any enemy who attacks us will have an organization more modern than ours,
that in our geographic position as an island nation we are very weak, and that
we will be unable to develop completely modern armed forces within the next
ten years. Then, with spirit as our main asset we will tire out any aggressor in a
long and widespread guerrilla war, a war which will finally reach a stage at which
we will be stronger than they. Then we will be able to assume the offensive and
expel them.” (cited in Pauker 1963, 13)
10 Tjeramah Umum Menteri/PANGAD MAJDJEN A. Jani pada Dies Natalis AKMIL 1962 [General
Lecture of Major General Ahmad Yani, Minister/Commander of the Army at the anniversary of the Military
Academy in 1962], Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat, 6–7
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Such a theory of victory required a corresponding theory of corporatism, particularly
about the relationship between the military and the people. As the success of both counter-
insurgency and external defense depends on ‘popular support’, the military believed it must
be involved in civilian affairs to the extent necessary for mobilization (Pauker 1963, 21).
Territorial Warfare, in other words, inherently blurred the civil-military distinction. The
“close ties with the people” acted as a sort of fulcrum between an inward-looking (i.e. towards
internal threats) and an outward-looking defense posture (i.e. towards external threats).11
First, against an external enemy, the doctrine demanded an all-out mobilization. Ac-
cording to Yani, this was based on the principle of “no surrender whatsoever” and called
for the “total mobilization of all available military and non-military potential in a given
area/territory to absorb the shock of an enemy attack, to tie and wear down his forces in a
protracted war, while creating the conditions to defeat them in a final counter-offensive.”12
This would be implemented in a three-phased approach: frontal warfare, containment, chal-
lenge, and consolidation, and counter-offensive.13 This approach assumes a geographic lay-
ering where, for example, an invasion could be blocked as far back as 200nm from the coast
lines.14 In other words, Indonesia sought a war of attrition.
11 Unless otherwise stated, the next two paragraphs on Territorial Warfare draw from a speech given by
then Defense Minister General Poniman at the National Resilience Institute (LEMHANNAS). See Pokok-
pokok Pikiran tentang Kebijaksanaan dan Strategi Pertahanan Keamanan Negara, 1989–1993 (Jakarta: De-
partemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 1988), 29-30 as well as Pauker (1963) who translated the 1962 manual
on Territorial Warfare produced by the Army’s Staff and Command College. The original document is Dok-
trin Perang Wilajah, (Departemen Angkatan Darat, Sekolah Staf dan Komando, March 1962). To ensure
accuracy, I checked Pauker’s translation with the original document.
12 Cited from The Indonesian Army’s Doctrine of War, Speech by Minister/Commander of the Indonesian
Army, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan, 9. Indonesian
Army Information Service Papers, Indonesian Military History Center.
13 The first focuses on the destruction of and/or defense against attacks launched from the sea and air
by means of interception and interdiction, opposition to naval landings, and delaying actions. The second
contains and challenges the enemy and to consolidate existing forces (strategically defensive but tactically
offensive). Finally, depending on the balance of forces, the counter-offensive commences.
14 Indonesia did not expect to launch an expeditionary war beyond its borders without being attacked
first. Officially, Indonesia adhered to a policy of ‘active defense’. Extract from Appendix A of the Provisional
People’s Consultative Congress Edict No. II of 1960, “Basis for the Development of the Armed Forces and
State Police”, cited from Pauker (1963, 203–4).
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This strategy, and the corresponding decentralized command structure, was rooted
in the Japanese strategy for the defense of Java.15 The influence is hardly surprising since
many PETA-trained officers became the architects of Indonesia’s doctrine. The Japanese
strategy for defending Java was based on their costly experience of fighting superior allied
forces on the beachheads. The strategy called for local units to sustain a three-tiered coastal
defense. The outer ring, nearest the coast, and including the major cities, was to consist
largely of auxiliary forces who would bear the brunt of the opening onslaught. A secondary
line of Japanese troops would be located behind those forces, placed to control the units in
front of them and prevent defection. Finally, high up in the hills, there would be a group
of Japanese and Indonesians trained in sabotage and prolonged guerrilla warfare. As we
see above, this three-phased plan, in combination with the “territoriality” of the battalions,
became the essence of Territorial Warfare.
Second, for internal threats, the doctrine focused on ‘active prevention’ to tackle
domestic threats through early detection and ‘territorial management’ (discussed below).
As Indonesia’s geography was fractured by seas and straits dividing thousands of islands,
and given its under-developed infrastructure, economy, and communications, the military
adhered to a ‘compartment system’. During the Revolutionary War, the military initially
relied on a linear defense strategy (like the Maginot line) based on the assumption of an
‘enemy area’ and ‘our area’. But as Dutch capabilities increased, the military relied on the
compartment system to allow independent units to survive if others were defeated.16 Under
this system, the boundaries and bases of the civilian administrative regions and the military’s
15 The Japanese concepts in this paragraph are from Lee (2013, 31) and Anderson (1961, 38).
16 The military developed the Wehrkreis (‘military district’) system used by Germany in World War
II. This system essentially divided the war zone into ‘encirclements’ that allowed independent units to
defend their ‘compartments’. The 1st Division/Siliwangi in West Java, led by A. H. Nasution, and the 2nd
Division/Sunan Gunung Jati in Central Java, led by Gatot Subroto, first used this system. Armed Forces
Commander General Sudirman then adopted the concept for the entire war. See Widjajanto (2013).
128
regional divisions ideally overlap to allow close cooperation.17 As Territorial Warfare would
be decentralized, and the Military Regional Commands would be the lowest-level region,
they should be as self-sufficient as possible. This structure underpinned one of the key
tenets Indonesia’s theory of corporatism: a close relationship with the local population and
involvement in local social, economic, and political affairs.
Territorial Warfare shaped Indonesian military outlook and policies for decades to
come. The doctrine allowed the military to oscillate between a counter-insurgent (against
internal enemies) or an insurgent force (against external enemies). But as the number
and severity of rebellions increased during the Cold War, the military tilted towards the
former. The stagnation of the Indonesian Army’s doctrine further demonstrates the path
dependence of antiquated theories of victory and corporatism. As the Army dominated the
military under the New Order, its outdated and Japanese-inspired doctrinal precepts in turn
permeated throughout the organization.
Stagnation of Army doctrine
The Army developed its first foundational Tri Ubaya Cakti (“three sacred vows”) service
doctrine in April 1965, which were translated into operational and organizational doctrines
(see Figure 4.3).18 Significantly, the ideological zeal of President Sukarno and the Indonesian
Communist Party’s influence within the military shaped this document (TNI 2000c, 65–71).
Following the attempted coup of 1965 and the subsequent purge of the military (discussed
17 Local cooperative engagements would facilitate the implementation of martial law (particularly with re-
gards to manpower and materiel mobilization) and the integration of planning and building the war potential
of the region. See more details in Pauker (1963, 109–110).
18 The “three sacred vows” is a liberal translation of the sanskrit Tri Ubaya Cakti (literally, three sacred
clarities). The “three” (Tri) refers to the three operational doctrine (see Figure 4.3 below) as well as the
dedication to the Motherland, Nation, and Unitary State. The “vows” (Ubaya) refers to the promise to fight
despite dangers under the guidance of The Almighty. The “sacred” (Cakti) refers to “clear, powerful, and
sacred weapon” of the Revolution. For more details, see TNI (2000c, 71).
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below), the Army revised this doctrine between August and November 1966.19 Figure 4.3
compares the 1965 and 1966 versions of the doctrine. In the 1965 version, the doctrine
contains: (1) the consolidation, development, and security of the Indonesian ‘State and Na-
tion’ as part of the New Emerging Forces (NEFO) to create a new World Order, and (2) an
offensive–revolutionary element to destroy, alongside other NEFO elements, the domination
of the Old Established Forces (OLDEFO). These two elements formed the ‘Indonesian Rev-
olutionary War’ concept.20 The 1965 version also maintains that the military has been and
will be a socio-political force as much as a defense force.
In both doctrines, we can see the elements of the Japanese-inspired theories of
victory and corporatism. But the key distinguishing feature of the 1965 version was its
‘offensive–revolutionary’ elements.21 On the one hand, it considered the placement of offen-
sive weaponry and the creation of bases surrounding Indonesia as an ‘act of aggression’.22
But on the other hand, Indonesian military leaders interpreted the doctrine as Indonesia’s
bid to facilitate the departure of Western powers so that Indonesia could fill the ensuing vac-
uum.23 The doctrine, in other words, was concerned with both external security as well as a
19 The Staff and Command College conducted a series of seminars to this effect. See TNI (2000c, 1–3).
20 Cited from Buku Induk Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI Tri Ubaya Cakti, Departemen Angkatan Darat, April
1965, 12. Sukarno propagated the NEFO/OLDEFO rhetoric following the likely independence of Malaysia
in the late 1950s. See details in Angel (1970).
21 Sukarno’s ideological foothold within the military was so powerful before the September 1965 attempted
coup that the so-called ‘Sukarno–Macapagal’ doctrine (along with his other pet slogans like NEFO/OLDEFO)
formed the official principles of the Revolutionary War concept. Sukarno’s speech at the SESKOAD seminar
that formulated the doctrine in 1965 was also officially included in its Principal Book. See Buku Induk
Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI Tri Ubaya Cakti [Principal Book of TNI Fighting Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti],
Departemen Angkatan Darat, April 1965, 23, 30–36.
22 Speech by General Ahmad Yani, Commander of the Army, given at the opening of the SESKOAD
seminar, Bandung, April 3, 1965. Appendix II of Buku Induk Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI Tri Ubaya Cakti
[Principal Book of TNI Fighting Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti], Departemen Angkatan Darat, April 1965, 41.
23 The perception that Indonesia could fill the regional vacuum persisted into the 1970s. In conversations
with US officials, Indonesian generals considered it as the country’s ‘defense philosophy’ that if US forces were
reduced, “Indonesia as the largest country in Southeast Asia would want to play a bigger role as its forces
were modernized”. The White House Conversation Memorandum between Sumitro, Latif, Henry Kissinger,
Laurence Lynn, and John Holdridge, Washington, July 10, 1970. Library of Congress Collection. Available
at CIA Freedom of Information Act electronic reading room https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/





































































































































































bid for regional hegemony. The 1965 version also encouraged independent service doctrines
with their own unique “history, tradition, and personality”.24
The 1966 version removed Sukarno’s pet slogans; the Revolutionary War doctrine was
erased, for example. Instead, the document emphasized ‘good friendship’ based on ‘mutual
respect and cooperation’.25 It also placed ‘active–defense’ as Indonesia’s ‘defense outlook’,
which disavowed ‘aggression’ and ‘territorial expansion’. This seemingly peaceful external
outlook allowed the military to solidify its internal security and domestic roles and tone
down its hegemonic rhetoric, which was necessary to restore the crumbling economy.26 The
turn towards internal security was institutionalized by the document’s focus on the National
Land Defense and Kekaryaan Doctrines. These concepts sought to distinguish, for example,
Military Defense from Domestic Security operations, as Figure 4.3 depicts.
But as the 1966 doctrine revived the 1962 Territorial Warfare as the implementing
‘framework’27, the Kekaryaan doctrine (the first broad foundation for the military’s broader
socio-political-economic role) dominated the day-to-day duties of the Army. Even the Land
Defense Doctrine emphasized internal security operations more than it prepares the orga-
nization for conventional land battles. The 1966 doctrine also explicitly theorized future
contingencies and possible responses based on the Revolutionary War and the PERMESTA
rebellion (discussed below).28 By November 1966 — the middle of the critical juncture — the
24 Paper presented by Air Chief Marshall Omar Dhani at the SESKOAD Seminar, April 1965, cited in
TNI (2000c, 66). The Navy developed the Eka Sasana Jaya (‘One Victorious Path’) doctrine, and the Air
Force developed the Swa Bhuwana Paksa (‘Wings of the Homeland’) doctrine. As discussed below, Sukarno
encouraged inter-service rivalries to prevent the military from becoming an independent political force.
25 Buku Induk Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI–AD Tri Ubaya Cakti [Principal Book of Army Fighting Doctrine
Tri Ubaya Cakti], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, December 1966, Second Printing, 28.
26 The doctrine identified the primary threat to be internal in nature (i.e. subversion, infiltration, and
rebellions); ‘external threats’ were viewed less for their invasion potential but for their potential ‘ideological
dominance’, ‘economic exploitation’, ‘cultural penetration’. See Ibid., 34, 38.
27 It also codified the logistical system built around the 1962 Territorial Warfare.
28 The doctrine did not explicitly name these conflicts but the detailed operational planning built on the
situation observed there. See Buku Induk Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI–AD Tri Ubaya Cakti [Principal Book
of Army Fighting Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, December 1966,
Second Printing, particularly 79–82.
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New Order formulated a new joint National Defense and Security Doctrine Catur Dharma
Eka Karma (“Four Mission One Purpose”) or CADEK that bridged the different outlooks
of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police into a single Total People’s Defense framework.29
CADEK was essentially a re-iteration and combination of the 1962 Territorial Warfare doc-
trine (for the broad framework) and the 1966 Tri Ubaya Cakti (for the operational concepts).
Under this organization-wide doctrine, independent service doctrines were kept but heavily
de-emphasized, save for the Army’s.
29 Doktrin Hankamnas dan Doktrin Perdjuangan ABRI “Catur Dharma Eka Karma”, Hasil Seminar





























































































































The military-backed regime could have revised the 1965 doctrine to reflect US theories
of victory and corporatism. But instead, it went back to the 1962 Territorial Warfare. In fact,
sans its ideological slogans, the 1965 doctrine was perhaps more amenable to US theories
of victory. An externally-oriented doctrine geared towards a regional security role would
have required conventional modernization and offensive war-fighting concepts (e.g. joint
operations, strike mobility, or naval projection). Instead, the New Order kept most of the
Territorial Warfare’s conservative, domestically-oriented precepts. The post-1966 doctrines
further institutionalized the Japanese inspired precepts and placed them on a path-dependent
trajectory.30 The absence of an alternative doctrine proposed by the military also indicated
the lack of learning capacity to better assess the broader strategic challenges and consider
new concepts suited to address them. Taken together, we see an organization-wide doctrinal
stagnation that sustained Japanese legacies rather than innovative US concepts.
American influence?
American influence on Indonesian doctrinal concepts is often asserted or assumed but rarely
specified or proven. In the 1950s, analysts note that the Indonesian Army used translated
training manuals from Fort Leavenworth, among others, and that their officers were “Western
oriented in military tactics” (Kalb 1957, 2; Mrázek 1978a, 121). According to one CIA report,
US military manuals and texts were widely used and the various courses in the Indonesian
Army branch schools were nearly identical with their US counterparts.31 Even the Army
acknowledged the influence, as one Indonesian Army journal noted in 1961:
“We [learned] the doctrine of the United States Army, because we have no doc-
trine of our own. And also the staff system we [learned] in our educational
30 The doctrinal ideas above were repeated almost verbatim in the teaching manuals of the SESKOAD
until the 1980s. See Vademecum Pengetahuan Pertahanan dan Keamanan [Vademecum of Defense and
Security Knowledge], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1982, 331.
31 CIA Report ‘Communist Military Assistance to Indonesia’, October 1966, cited in Evans (1989, 40).
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institutions [was] the staff system of the U.S. Army”.32
Others also conflate US influence on Indonesian doctrinal concepts with influence over na-
tional or political strategy. That the US influenced Indonesia’s modernization ideology under
the New Order (Simpson 2009), for example, does not mean that the US influenced the mil-
itary’s organization-wide doctrine.
Official records, however, indicate that the US influence may be more localized and
limited. The 1962 Territorial Warfare, for example, acknowledged the influence of US mili-
tary documents in its views on logistics.33 The US education and training assistance at best
enhanced the technical skills of some Indonesian military units or branch (Evans 1989, 44).
That doctrinal records show Indonesian officers borrowed from other countries other than
the US suggests that the US influence was not exclusive. Given that the Indonesian army’s
learning capacity was under-developed, the organization also could not innovate beyond
cherry-picking concepts from different countries. Such cherry-picking produced incoherent
and inconsistent views of Western theories of victory and corporatism and contributed to
the doctrinal stagnation we see above.
As the stagnation took place during the critical juncture, the under-development
of the military’s learning capacity had a path-dependent effect. Most notably, the 1966
doctrine became a staple of all subsequent New Order iterations of its war-fighting concepts.
Joint operations doctrine and operational guidelines, for example, were not codified until
1985. American influence was only explicit in some parts of these documents. The joint
staff planning document, for example, referenced the US’ Joint and Combined Staff Officers’
32 Sari Attensia, Vol. 5 (1961): 436, cited in Mrázek (1978a, 125).
33 The doctrine borrowed the terms used by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Doktrin Perang Wilajah,
Departemen Angkatan Darat, Sekolah Staf dan Komando, March 1962, book 1, part 3, 25. This was the
footnote to the explanation of the Army’s basic territorial logistical concept. But the document also provided
an appendix that examined the lessons from Yugoslavia’s territorial war concept and borrowed Liddel Hart’s
argument about fire power and mobility (Pauker 1963, 99).
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Manual, the Armed Forces Staff College’s Joint Staff Official Guide, and the Naval War
College’s naval planning document.34 But the same document also referred to Malaysia’s
Joint Services Publication on joint staff planning. In another example, the US influence was
recognized in the manual for inter-service fire support coordination which used five US field
manuals.35 But the document listed more Indonesian-published manuals than US ones in
their references (31 out 40) and used three other British manuals.
Even within the Army, the largest recipient of US military aid, US military influ-
ence was limited. In the operational reference handbook of the Indonesian Army Staff and
Command College—dubbed ‘Vademecum’—the discussion of US theories of victory in some
parts was juxtaposed or compared to those of the Soviets, the British, the Canadians, and
the Germans.36 The comparison highlights how Indonesian theories of victory were either
more ‘comprehensive’ than those foreign ideas or that they had ‘mixed and matched’ them
into the country’s own strategic thought. Bottom line, US theories of victory only had a
limited effect on the Indonesian military doctrinal precepts. We can further see this in the
various Indonesian military operations in that era.
34 See the reference section (page 117) of Petunjuk Operasi Gabungan ABRI tentang Staf Gabungan
[ABRI Joint Operations Guidelines on Joint Staff], Surat Keputusan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata No.
SKEP/265/V/1985, Mei 15, 1985, Markas Besar, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia.
35 These are: fire support in combined arms operations (FM 6-20), US Army/Air Force doctrine for
airborne operations (FM 57-1), fire support coordination (FM 7-1), naval gunfire support (FM 7-2), and
communications (FM 10-1). See the reference section (page 214) of Petunjuk Operasi Gabungan ABRI
tentang Koordinasi Bantuan Tembakan antar Angkatan[ABRI Joint Operations Guidelines for Inter-Service
Fire Support Coordination], Surat Keputusan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata No. SKEP/265/V/1985, 15
Mei 1985, Markas Besar, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia.
36 The discussion revolved around US conceptions of operations, military history, principles of warfare,
and geopolitics. American management and public administration textbooks were also explicitly referenced
as the foundation of some of the military’s administrative frameworks. See Vademecum Pengetahuan Perta-
hanan dan Keamanan [Vademecum of Defense and Security Knowledge], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Tentara
Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1982, 167, 429–431, 538, 546, 550.
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4.1.3 Operationalizing Total People’s Warfare
The Territorial Warfare precepts above were applied and re-adjusted during the first two
decades of Indonesia’s independence. Abdul Haris Nasution, commander of the Siliwangi
division in West Java and later Army Chief of Staff, was particularly influential in shaping
Indonesia’s theory of victory in that period. He helped formulate Territorial Warfare as
well as concepts like the Middle Way and Dual Function (see Table 4.1) (Cribb 2001).37
He also helped create local militia units mobilized to crush the DI/TII rebellion. In 1959,
officers from the Siliwangi division devised a pacification plan called the ‘Planning Guidance
for Perfecting Peace and Security’ (P4K). The idea was to disrupt and defeat the rebels’
maneuverability until they were restricted into certain areas, which would be ‘cleared’ one
by one.38 Army-controlled militias provided local forces, security patrols, intelligence, and
asset protection.39 Along with a code of conduct based on the observance of Islamic principles
designed to sway the population, the P4K deployed a cordon and search technique known
‘fence of legs’ (pagar betis), where civilians and militias were made to form a protective
boundary behind which army troops could safely move into rebel territory (Robinson 2001,
290). These concepts became mainstays of the Army’s theory of victory since then.
37 In 1958, Nasution set up the Committee on Army Doctrine, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Suwarto
and Colonel Mokoginta, which would result in the conceptualization of Territorial Warfare (Fakih 2014,
93). Nasution’s ideas drew partly from global counter-insurgency practices. His ideas also showed an
understanding of World War partisan and resistance movements and embodied several tactical innovations
later applied in suppressing post-independence insurgencies (Kilcullen 2006, 48).
38 The rebel’s stronghold of West Java was classified into zones: A (government controlled), B (contested),
and C (rebel strongholds or ‘destruction areas’). The P4K strategy consolidated control in A areas through a
combination of civic action and psychological activities. A series of large-scale cordon and search operations
then cleared the C areas. The ‘B’ areas were to be cleared in follow-up operations. The rebellion collapsed
on June 1962. This system seems superficially similar to the ‘black’ and ‘white’ areas applied in the Malayan
Emergency, but it was more likely based on Dutch methods during the Revolutionary War (Kilcullen 2006,
49). For more details, see van Dijk (1981) and Soebardi (1983).
39 The use of militias was also part of the army’s relationship with the civilian political leaders and in
various civil-military conflicts for much of the 1950s and 1960s. Dissident military groups usually called on
‘the people’ through these militias. The tactic was popular because civilian groups provided psychological
legitimacy and they could be risked in ways which military personnel could not. If things go south, the
military could argue that it was the civilians who breached the public order. Militias were, in short, a kind
of insurance in a possible coup or crisis situation (McVey 1971, 166–7).
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The military also developed the practice of kekaryaan (the use of military units or
officers for non-military roles). It came in two forms: (1) the secondment or posting of
officers and NCOs to political, economic, and social organizations and bureaucracies, and
(2) the use of military units in ‘development’ projects across the country known as civic
action.40 In the 1960s, civic action focused on the development of farming techniques and
small infrastructure projects (Evans 1989, 37). As part of Territorial Warfare, these efforts
were designed to challenge the rural stronghold of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
(Pauker 1963, 38). The Army then codified civic action through a Presidential Decision
in 1962. New structures and career patterns were subsequently created.41 Civic action
programs were thus central to career management. They also helped the army employ
excess manpower as the conflicts over West New Guinea and Malaysia were winding down
in the 1960s and the Army was facing budgetary cuts and demobilization problems.42 Put
differently, civic action programs helped the Army justify keeping a large number of men who
would other wise be uprooted and unemployed.43 By the late 1960s, civic action programs
were absorbing around 40 percent of the Indonesia Army’s manpower (Fakih 2014, 108).
These domestic-oriented theories corporatism fundamentally differs from US precepts.
Indonesia’s broader ideas of civil-military relations were also far from their American coun-
40 Karya literally means “product” or “opus” (kekaryaan is the noun form). As the use of military assets
and units for non-military purposes fell outside of the organization’s fighting mission, kekaryaan activities
were deemed military “products” dedicated to the people. See TNI (2000c, 83).
41 These included, for example, new civic action training schools and courses for the expanded Army
Engineer Corps (Korps Zeni Angkatan Darat). A new Civic Action Command under the Air Force Second
Deputy and the Civic Action Command under the Navy Commander for the Navy were also created. See
details in TNI (2000c, 85–6).
42 The anticipated number of personnel to be demobilized by 1970 was approximately 150,000 men;
servicemen to be demobilized and trained for civilian life numbered around 20 to 25 thousand per year. See
Plan of Action for Indonesia: Response to NSAM 179, Secret, Department of State, dated October 8, 1962
p, 12, Enclosure No. 10. Digital National Security Archives collection; Presidential Directives.
43 Nasution deemed it necessary that disbanded officers be employed so that they did not “fall prey to
exploitation by the communists”. See Memorandum for Record, Major General Russell Vittrup, Visit with
General Nasution, Top Secret, August 25, 1958. Office of the Chief of Military Technical Advisory Group,
Indonesia, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65,
Box No. 2, Entry 115, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA).
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terparts. General Benny Moerdani (Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, 1983–1988) de-
clared by the end of the Cold War that Indonesia “does not recognize the concept of either
civilian supremacy or military supremacy [because] all we know is that all components of
the Indonesian society are actors in Pancasila democracy” (Bersenjata 1992).44
Meanwhile, the Indonesian military’s application of US theories of victory was limited,
sporadic, and inconsistent. Consider how the Indonesian military dealt with the PERME-
STA rebellion of the 1950s. Several US-trained officers led the government forces in the
campaign.45 The rebels were local military commanders from Indonesia’s Outer Islands
(particularly from Sulawesi and Sumatera) and had covert US assistance (Kahin and Kahin
1997). The US-trained central government commanders used contemporary doctrines of
combined air-land-naval task forces they learned in the US to successfully plan and execute
a modern campaign.46 But in the military’s next operations—Operation Trikora to ‘recover’
West New Guinea from the Dutch (1961–1962) and the ‘confrontation’ campaign against
Malaysia and the UK (1963–1966)—US war-fighting concepts were largely absent from mili-
tary planning.47 In fact, during the fight over Papua, Soviet assistance and ideas were more
influential.48 In the confrontation against Malaysia, the core of the campaign consisted of
44 Pancasila or the Five Principles is Indonesia’s official state ideology. The principles are: belief in the
One and Only God, a just and civilized humanity, a unified Indonesia, democracy, led by the wisdom of the
representatives of the People, and social justice for all Indonesians.
45 US-trained officers were in charge of the amphibious landing of 20,000 government troops on Sumatra.
The operation in West Sumatra was planned and commanded by Ahmad Yani, a Command and General
Staff College graduate. Meanwhile, Rukminto Hendraningrat, who had just returned from Fort Benning,
led the campaign in Sulawesi and another US-trained officer, Huhnholz, led the Marine Corps units. See the
details in Mrázek (1978a, 174).
46 The central government’s expeditionary amphibious forces along with the Air Force’s air-borne units,
the Army’s Special Forces and the Marine’s seaborne commandos as well as the police’s Mobile Brigade were
the principal executors of that strategy (Mrázek 1978a, 173).
47 Both of these operations never got off the ground as diplomatic solutions prevailed in both instances.
The military nevertheless seriously planned for large-scale assaults, and eventual invasions, of these areas
and managed to execute some of the early phases of their plan (e.g. infiltration) and various skirmishes.
48 By 1962, the Soviets secretly provided Indonesia with submarines and Tu-16 bombers manned by Soviet
crews and assigned them to take part in a large scale Indonesian attack on West New Guinea and helped
the Indonesians prepare operational plans (Easter 2015).
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an extended series of Indonesian cross-border raids from Kalimantan into East Malaysia and
were augmented by subversion, terrorism, and military posturing (Tuck 2018, 876–7). By
most accounts, the Indonesian military’s operational performance was lackluster.49
Consider also the invasion of East Timor in 1975, which was a complex joint operation
involving some 15,000 troops. Much like the campaign against PERMESTA, the high com-
mand planned airborne assaults, coordinated with marine amphibious landings, and joined
by several ground units supported by the navy and air force. But by most accounts, the
invasion was a disaster.50 The invasion plan was also based on political rather than military
intelligence like terrain, weather, and enemy strengths—which would have been covered by
US manuals the officers should have been familiar with. During the occupation, the military
also tried to implement “resettlement camps” designed to separate the guerrilla from his
support with little success (Kilcullen 2000).51
Bottom line, the Indonesian military from the 1960s onwards exhibited a minimalist
emulation. Given the almost diametrical theories of victory and corporatism between the
US and Indonesia, the challenges to a successful diffusion were considerable. But so was the
effort by the US to socialize the Indonesian military. At a conceptual level, the doctrinal
stagnation during the critical juncture helped create the path-dependence of the domination
of internal security and domestic political operations. At a practical level, Indonesia’s day-to-
day practices of kekaryaan, internal security, and inconsistent campaign planning underscores
the minimalist emulation by the end of the Cold War.
49 Both the concentration of troops on the borders and the infiltration into Malaysian territory “proved
largely unsuccessful” (Mrázek 1978b, 145). By the end of confrontation in 1966, Indonesia lost 1,600 troops
(killed, wounded, or captured), while the Commonwealth only had 300 casualties (Tuck 2018, 877).
50 The invasion plan disintegrated almost from the start, resulting in ad hoc execution the ground, and
soldiers without command and control (Lee 2013, 76). According Moerdani, “These troops had no discipline
at all. They shot one another. Ah, over all it was totally embarrassing” (cited in Lee 2013, 75).
51 The military likely learned the program from the British Malayan Emergency and perhaps from the
strategic hamlets in Vietnam. Moerdani, one of the chief architects of the invasion, made several discreet
visits to South Vietnam in 1968 to review US counter-insurgency operations (Conboy 2003, 194).
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4.2 Critical antecedent
As chapter 3 notes, critical antecedents are conditions preceding a critical juncture that
combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in
outcomes. I argue that the level and intensity of intra-military conflicts is a critical an-
tecedent. For one thing, the conflicts affected the contestation between powerful competing
groups within the military and the choices they make during the critical juncture on how to
respond to the incoming transmission of military knowledge. For another, the intra-military
conflicts determined how the military deals with the foreign model. I argue that there was
intense intra-organizational conflicts over the army’s theories of victory and corporatism
from the Revolutionary War up to the late-1950s.
4.2.1 Foundation of intra-military conflicts
By the Revolutionary War, the military was stacked by two distinct groups.52 On one side,
there was a small number but professionally-trained and politically-connected Dutch-trained
officers. Most of them went through the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (Koninklijk
Nederlands Indisch Leger or KNIL).53 KNIL-trained officers claimed leadership in the new
military because of their higher education and training.54 But many saw them as colonial
proxies—‘the brown lackeys of the Dutch’—and ‘cosmopolitan-intellectuals’ who resided in
52 Unless cited otherwise, the details in the next two paragraphs are from Gregory (1976, 230-48), Fakih
(2014, 72), Pauker (1961, 4–5), and Mrázek (1978a, 3–16). See also the longer analyses of the post-
revolutionary divides within the army in McVey (1971) and Said (1991).
53 When it was established in 1830, the KNIL had 600 Europeans, 37 Indonesian officers, and 12,905
non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Indonesians consisted only less than six percent of its officer corps;
most of them were ‘minorities’ from the Christian parts of East Indonesia and hardly achieved field rank.
This composition did not change much by World War II, when it became a force of 1,345 officers and 37,583
troops. By then, the highest ranked Indonesian officers were majors.
54 Most of the Dutch education included both military and civilian institutions, such as the Meester Cor-
nelis Military School, Royal Military Academy (Koninklijke Militaire Academie or KMA), Reserve Officers
Training Corp (Corps Opleiding Voor Reserve Officieren or CORO), and the Advanced Teacher’s School
(Hogere Kweekschool or HKS). Some of these schools were located in the Netherlands and some of them
were established in Indonesia, or what was then known as the Netherlands East Indies.
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big cities and came from middle-class backgrounds. Finally, many of their key leaders and
officers coalesced around the Nasution-led Siliwangi Division in West Java.
On another side, there was a large number of men who received Japanese training
and were influential local figures. These men were indoctrinated in the revolutionary zeal
and nurtured in the Japanese ‘fighting spirit’ tradition. The PETA-trained men—mostly
Javanese—were affiliated with the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. Much like the
KNIL-trained group, the group’s highest-ranked members were Majors trained as battalion
commanders (daidancho). They were trained in tactics and deployed as militias, while the
KNIL recruits went through formal education at the KMA, for example.55 But the relatively
‘equal’ rank and age meant that each group believed one should not be subordinated to the
other. Also, by the nature of their ‘territorial-ness’, PETA-trained officers were ‘closer to the
masses’. Finally, while the PETA group’s key leaders were from aristocratic or professional
background, most of the rank and file were from the lower strata of society.56
These two groups had cross-cutting cleavages which re-emerged after the Revolution-
ary War. As the following shows, the Japanese-trained group dominated the organization
and its theories of victory and corporatism, even though the Dutch-trained group led the
central command. The intensity of intra-military contestations shaped and shoved how the
military defined its membership, how it viewed its relationship to the political leaders, and
how it prepared to fight. The efforts to determine who was to lead the military and how power
should be divided consumed much of the high command’s energy up until the 1960s. Con-
55 Both groups were trained to command small units, making them equally versed in tactics than strategy
and administration (Mrázek 1975, 12). While their operational experience was tactical, the KNIL group had
more understanding of professional military management.
56 There were differences, however, in the social background of Japanese or PETA-trained recruits based
on their expected roles as battalion commander (daidancho), company commander (chudancho, and platoon
commander (shodancho). The daidancho were influential social figures and civil servants, the chudancho
were chosen from among lesser-ranking government officials or school teachers, while the shodancho were
high-school students (Notosusanto 1971, 39).
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sequently, by the time that US education and training assistance reached its peak from the
mid-1960s to the 1970s, the military’s personnel infrastructure was under-developed.57 Bot-
tom line, the intra-military dynamics between the KNIL-trained and PETA-trained groups
became the critical antecedent shaping the critical juncture.
4.2.2 Contestation over theories of victory and corporatism
There were numerous intra-military contestations between the KNIL-trained and the PETA-
trained groups up until the 1960s. As the institutional framework tells us, I focus only on
the salient power dynamics that touched on the military’s theories of victory and corpo-
ratism. These include fights related to the military’s professional and organizational out-
look, command and control, foreign war-fighting models, the role of informal institutions,
and personnel appointments.
Organizational outlook
The KNIL-trained and the PETA-trained groups fought over organizational outlook. The
former’ preferred a rational, technical, and Weberian administration and the latter insisted
on ‘close ties to the people’, revolutionary zeal, and ‘fighting spirit’. These two world-views
clashed in particular over the government’s demobilization and re-organization plans (ini-
tiated in 1948). The plan was all-encompassing, from the creation of slimmer and more
effective structures to the disbandment of local militias and the creation of modern educa-
tional infrastructures. These plans would have demobilized around 300,000 men.58
57 For a brief period from 1963 to 1965, there was a precipitous drop in US education and training
programs over the increasingly hostile Sukarno regime, especially against the UK and Malaysia. But, as I
discuss further in the next section, there was still over a thousand Indonesian officers trained in the US right
before the drop and the education and training programs were immediately restored in 1966.
58 By the end of the Revolution, the military only had arms and equipment for 69 battalions, even though
there were about 400 of them. The plan was to gradually reduce the number of personnel: from 400,000 to
150,000 and eventually somewhere between 52,000 and 57,000 men. Part of the plan was to place veterans
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The KNIL-trained officers supported and assisted the government’s plans. If profes-
sional training and qualifications were to be promotional benchmarks, they would be in a
better position than their PETA-trained brethren.59 But the PETA-trained men resented
the idea that fighting spirit, close ties with the people, and morale were being questioned by
the ‘Westernizing’ orientation of their (Dutch-trained) leaders. Unsurprisingly, the PETA
group opposed the remodeling of the military based on international standards, resented the
demands for professional and scholastic qualifications, and condemned the KNIL group’s at-
tempted emulation of Western practices (Feith 1958, 111–2). As the power dynamic touched
on organizational policies, various high profile intra-military conflicts were often intertwined
with the debate over the reorganization plans.60
The fight over organizational outlook also spilled into the fight over the best for-
eign ‘role model’ to emulate, as seen in the debate over the Netherlands Military Mission
(NMM).61 The mission highlights the mismatch between the ‘rational technical’ training and
education and the dominant ‘fighting spirit’ outlook. To be fair, not all KNIL-trained officers
backed the NMM.62 Initially, however, the Army relied on the NMM to provide technical
into local and national government institutions. See details in Pauker (1961, 29), Mrázek (1978a, 45),
Djamhari (1995, 40–55), TNI (2014, 54) and TNI (2000a, 62–3).
59 The plan was in the interests of both the KNIL-trained group and the government. The former was
keen to improve operational efficiency and the latter wanted to reduce the heavy economic and fiscal burdens
of the wartime military establishment and to eliminate sections of the military suspected of supporting the
opposition. See Anderson (1976, 1–2).
60 One of the first intra-army crises in the 1950s was sparked when Bambang Supeno, a senior officer and
the formulator of the military code of principles, criticized the high command’s plan to create a small, highly-
equipped, and mobile ‘cadre army’. After heated public exchanges, he was suspended but still engineered a
series intra-military crises, which spilled to civil-military conflicts. According to Supeno, the military should
have concentrated on its people rather than technology and remained a ‘mass force’ oriented toward local
defense. After all, manpower was cheap while heavy equipment was expansive and require skills the society
could not provide. This increased Indonesia’s debt and dependence. See details of this affair in McVey (1971,
145) and Feith (1958, 111-2).
61 By the terms of the Round Table Conference agreement which ended the war with the Dutch, Indonesia
accepted a 600-man mission and received into their army all Indonesian KNIL members who wanted to
enlist. The mission was the main source for technical and tactical training but only provided several pieces
of artillery, cavalry and engineering equipment. The NMM was repatriated early in 1953. See Fakih (2014,
80), McVey (1972, 170), and Mrázek (1978a, 86).
62 Early in 1951, KNIL–trained Chief of Staff T.B. Simatupang thought the NMM was a bad fit because
there were psychological barriers plaguing Indonesian-Dutch relations and that Indonesia’s Total People’s
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training, including many of the teachers of its Staff and Command College.63 The PETA-
trained officers were naturally suspicious.“Education based on technology, such as those the
NMM brought to Indonesia”, the military’s official history recalls, “was showing our soldiers
problems only from the point of view of rationalism and technology, ignoring...moral and
spirit” (cited in Mrázek 1978a, 88). They also feared that the NMM was a pretext to oust
them. The PETA group’s attacks were eventually successful as they aligned themselves with
opposition groups to bring down the mission and tagged the KNIL-group alongside.64
This episode highlights the precarious nature of the Western-educated group. Because
of the social connotations of advanced education, and because of its scarcity and value, the
position of KNIL-trained officers was both powerful and delicate. Their ability to manage
the military elevated their positions. But since they were ‘minorities’—ethnically, socially,
and professionally—compared to their Japanese-trained counterparts, they formed a small,
well-knit faction as they tried to consolidate their leadership by placing more members
into key positions.65 Such moves made them vulnerable to political attacks. ‘Professional
modernization’ then became synonymous with the politically contentious ‘Westernization’.
Under this condition, it was extremely difficult for the high command to resolve the basic
problems of organizational development—from personnel, education, to administration—
because it invited intra-military and civil-military conflicts. Intra-military conflicts over
organizational outlook then became one of the defining critical antecedents.
Warfare did not match the Dutch’s conventional warfare doctrine (Fakih 2014, 80, fn. 73). Also, the NMM
provided inadequate and obsolete equipment. See the details in Mrázek (1978a, 86).
63 Before 1953, the NMM supplied the largest number of teachers for the College. Of 24 teachers, six
Dutchmen were permanent employees and 12 were NMM temporary employees, with only three teachers
from the Indonesian army and three civilian lecturers (Fakih 2014, 80).
64 The politics surrounding the termination of the NMM illustrated the entanglement between intra-
military and civil-military relations. See Penders (2002, 224) and Turner (2017, 128-130).
65 One way in which the Dutch-educated army leaders sought to increase the expertise of their forces and
to reduce their own isolation was to allow the judicious promotion of elements from the large body of KNIL
members that the Republic was obliged to employ under the Round Table treaty (about 33,000 soldiers and
30 army officers). Details are in TNI (2014).
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Command and control
The KNIL-trained and PETA-trained groups also fought over command and control. The
former represented the Java-based high-command while the latter embodied the local com-
manders dispersed throughout the country. One of the major difficulties during and after
the Revolutionary War was the relative weakness of the central command in comparison to
the regional units.66 The latter—where many PETA-trained commanders resided—viewed
centralization, hierarchy, and discipline as formalistic and ineffective. As we see above, they
opposed professional modernization. They argued that a centralized command would under-
mine their ties to the rural communities (Anderson 1976, 1–2). In other words, they would
be cut off from their local power source.
The Western-oriented central command was thus at odds with the decentralized, ‘rev-
olutionary spirit’ of the PETA territorial group. By the early 1950s neither had unquestioned
legitimacy—and full command—over the military. And yet, central authority was required
to function as a modern military. As there were no easily acceptable solutions, the high
command relied on the promise of massive promotions for mid-rank officers accompanied
by large scale purchases of arms and equipment as well as cushy positions in various SOEs
and national and local bureaucracies to centralize command and control (McVey 1971, 175).
The high command thus tried to use personnel policies to sideline the PETA group and
professionalize the officer corps. After all, given the absence of a formal career management
system (discussed below), promotion promises were easier to make, in that only a central
fiat from the high command was required, and they were relatively ‘cheap’, to satisfy the
officers’ demands (McVey 1972, 154).
66 One of the first attempts to create a ‘national’ military before the war failed as the local commands and
units in Java refused the general staff’s appointed commanders (Gregory 1976, 243). Throughout the war,
there were times when even the personal leadership of Sudirman as the Supreme War Commander could not
peacefully persuade the local units to accept the high command’s appointments (TNI 2000a, 64).
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But the KNIL-trained Nasution as Army Chief of Staff in 1955 saw the need to bring
order and ‘regularity’ (i.e. institutionalization) into the career pattern. It was thus necessary
to introduce impersonal (i.e. professional) qualifications and merit into the career ladder; if
promotion was nothing more than a function of patronage or power plays, officers will cling
to personalistic approaches in their duties (McVey 1972, 154). The following year, Nasu-
tion created a special commission (headed by Gatot Subroto) to standardize and ‘elevate’
the ranking system; compared to other militaries, Indonesian officers held one or two ranks
lower than their counterparts (Waspada 1956, 1). The commission’s deliberations were ac-
companied by assurances that the military would expand. But in return, the high command
wanted to eliminate informal veteran groups and soldier unions.67 It also wanted to central-
ize the education and training system and abolish efforts to establish local training units or
interfere with central command prerogatives (McVey 1972, 154–5). The intra-military power
dynamics therefore shaped the interplay between formal and informal institutions.
The high command managed to obtain some concessions (e.g. the reduced role of
extra-military groups) but not others (e.g. educational centralization). Sukarno’s personal
intervention into intra-military politics, however, halted any progress on centralizing com-
mand and control. He ‘coup–proofed’ his rule by encouraging inter-service rivalries.68 In the
early 1960s, he also divided the command and control by creating a separate Principal Com-
mand (Komando Tertinggi or KOTI) under his authority.69 These interventions hindered
67 In the early 1950s, the high command had to account for the Indonesian Officers’ Union (IPRI) in
making major decisions. IPRI was outside of the military structure but served as a union and a representative
assembly. As IPRI had arisen from the revolutionary practices of electing commanders and making collective
decisions as peers, it included veterans and made no distinction between active and non-active duty officers.
Consequently, mid-rank officers and veterans had too much influence in intra-military decisions. See details
in McVey (1971, 155–7).
68 Each service was elevated to a ministerial level answering directly to him. The service Chiefs of
Staff became Ministers/Service Commanders with direct command and control. In essence, the service
headquarters became ministerial posts. See details in TNI (2000c, 3–5).
69 The KOTI consisted of five joint staff and four sections effectively housed in the presidential palace; each
of which controlled different functions of the armed forces. See TNI (2000c, 32). Overall, under Sukarno,
there were six defense and security command and control institutions with overlapping functions: (1) KOTI,
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the high command’s efforts to follow through on the Subroto commission’s recommendations.
Sukarno’s foreign adventurism further led to a massive mobilization of another 150,000 men
(Mrázek 1978b, 142), which effectively threw the reorganization plans out the window. In
any case, the intra-military conflicts over command and control prevented the formalization
of stable rules governing career management.
Competing informal institutions
There was a deeper “fight” between formal and informal institutions. One could argue that
had the KNIL group won, it seemed likely that a high-quality personnel infrastructure (gov-
erned by discipline, hierarchy, and professional merit-based) would emerge. But the PETA
group instead entrenched competing informal institutions as the governing rule. Compet-
ing informal institutions occur when the existing formal rules are ineffective while following
the informal institutions would produce a different outcome expected by the formal ones.70
These informal institutions include the ‘father-son’ patron-client relationship, the importance
of ideological zeal, and blurred civil-military boundaries.
The prevalence of informal institutions was partially a Japanese legacy, particularly its
creation independent units that relied on the individual commander’s personal authority.71
An Indonesian commander then had a much broader role than his Western counterparts. As
a ‘father figure’, he was the apex of a small world or family consisting of ‘subordinate children’
(anak buah), rather than a representative of a higher impersonal and formal hierarchy. He
was not only the soldiers’ superior, but their adviser and leader in all matters of life (Mrázek
(2) Department of Defense and Security, (3) Department of the Army, (4) Department of the Navy, (5)
Department of the Air Force, (6) Department of the Police.
70 In other words, competing informal institutions structure incentives in ways that are incompatible with
formal ones: to follow one rule, actors must violate another (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 729).
71 A PETA battalion was located in the area of the commander’s local influence. Recruits were taken from
‘his area’, assuming that his prestige would attract young men to enlist. See details in Notosusanto (1971).
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1978a, 35). This patronage meant that throughout their careers, officers cultivate personal
loyalty and support by mentoring ‘juniors’, whose personal obligation to the ‘father’ (bapak)
was deep and long lasting (Lowry 1996, 125), and often subvert the chain of command. Under
some conditions, this patronage provided social capital and private goods that the military
could not provide. In the 1950s, such informal institutions resonated with the rank-and-file
because it was a reflection of the broader society.72
As patronage cut across hierarchy and induced favoritism, informal institutions un-
dermined formal ones.73 The power of informal institutions then became another point of
contention between the KNIL–trained and the PETA–trained groups; the latter relying and
supporting them and the former attempting to abolish them. Patronage was nonetheless
required to allow competing factions to stabilize their relationship for much of the 1950s.
The high command also had to deal with a range of influential extra-military groups such
as the officer’s union discussed above.74 Over time, an extremely complex system of fac-
tional alliances criss-crossing intra-military and civil-military boundaries was developed on
the basis of patronage and informal institutions (McVey 1971, 153).
The powerful effects of informal institutions were compounded by the local commands’
engagement of their respective locales. The success of the compartment system depended
on good, mutually trustworthy relations between soldiers and local civilians (Kanahele 1967,
126). Once created, a battalion would remain almost permanently in its area to ensure
its integration with the locale. This pushed local units to deal with surrounding socio,
72 It was a typical feature of patron-client relations in patriarchal rural communities as well as of the
autocratic rule of the nobility and colonial officials (Mrázek 1978a, 26).
73 Over time, this ‘bapak -ism’ would be established in official documents. As recent as six years ago, the
Army Staff and Command College sought to train officers to be military leaders in the broadest sense of the
word: as a “commander, teacher, trainer, and father” (SESKOAD 2012, 7).
74 Aside from IPRI, there were also informal “reunion groups” where active and non-active duty officers
from different local units voiced their concerns (Waspada 1957, 1-2). These groups included large and
powerful veterans associations, including those with close affiliations with major political parties. By the
1960s, there were between 500,000 and one million veterans (Pauker 1961, 16).
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Figure 4.4: The Army Territorial Command and its civilian counterpart
Source: adapted and modified from Rinakit (2013, 79).
economic, and political affairs—further blurring civil-military boundaries. Over time, local
units played larger roles in society beyond their prescribed duties. This was particularly
conducted through the Territorial Command structure which paralleled the civilian bureau-
cracy (see Figure 4.4 below).75 In the 1950s, some of the local commanders became ‘local
warlords’ and contributed to the rebellions discussed above.
The blurring civil-military boundaries further strengthened the patrimonial founda-
tion of civil-military relations (Crouch 1979). The KNIL vs. PETA conflicts thus hindered
the institutionalization of personnel infrastructure. The Subroto Commission mentioned
above stalled and was replaced by a Central Advisory Council on Offices and Ranks. But as
the intra-military conflicts persisted, the council was split into the Council on Assignments
and Ranks (for senior officers) and the Advisory Council on Assignments and Ranks (for
75 The size and number of the local units and their geographic coverage ebbed and flowed but the logic of
creating local units to ‘shadow’ their civilian counterparts has been relatively constant since the 1950s.
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mid-ranks). By the early 1960s, on the eve of the critical juncture, these councils became
secretive and powerful (McVey 1972, 156). But in an effort to keep their proceedings ‘im-
partial’, their secret deliberations morphed into a sort of ‘perverse incentive’ where officers
could ‘lobby’ the council for key positions.76 The contest over informal institutions was thus
another defining element of the critical antecedent.
Leadership appointments
The final intra-military contention was over promotions. The conflict was rooted in the
different understandings of “appointment” between the political and military leaders during
the Revolutionary War. Civilian leaders believed they had the right to command the military
and appoint officers. According to Sukarno, “I looked for young men whom I could control
and who could eventually become the heroes of our Revolution. I singlehandedly proposed
the future colonels and generals of our Republican Army back in the fall of 1943” (cited
in Mrázek 1978a, 30). But senior officers believed they created the military before there
was a government. Nasution claims, “We elected our Commander-in-Chief from below and
from among ourselves...our commanders [were] products of [our own] election...[Indeed], our
Army was born before the political parties...the battalions, regiments and divisions...and its
general staff existed before there was a Minister of Defense. Our army headquarters were
operating before there was a Ministry of Defense” (cited in Mrázek 1978a, 48).77
These divergent civil-military premises spilled over into intra-military politics. Civil-
ian leaders during and after the revolution spent considerable energy cultivating supporters
within the military to control its appointments and ‘ideological orientation’.78 The high
76 Such practices continued until today. Personal conversations with a mid-rank Army officer in Jakarta,
March 12, 2016 and a mid-rank Army officer, in Magelang, February 18, 2016.
77 This method of self-selecting the military’s own leaders was also a Japanese legacy.
78 This was instituted, for example, through the Political Education Staff created in 1946 to indoctrinate
and control the Army. The government also created ‘Struggle Bureau’ inside the Ministry of Defense as a
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command, in return, defined its corporate interests in terms of its ability to appoint its
own leaders. But as we see above, the prevalence of informal institutions and the contesta-
tion over organizational outlook as well as command & control meant that any formal rule
to select leaders would be bitterly contested. Intra-military political compromises between
competing groups became the ad hoc solution, which would then be reflected in the force
structure discussed below.
Over time, the intra-military power dynamics gave way to a politicized career pat-
tern underpinned by patronage and avoidance of professional competence. In a culture
where personal relations were highly valued, patronage was considered of equal importance
(if not more) with professional qualifications.79 Taken together, the above analyses show the
contestations between competing groups over the theories of victory and corporatism. The
contests over organizational outlook, command & control, informal institutions, and senior
appointments also demonstrate how the power dynamics reflect the conflicts and compro-
mises between these groups. They also show the interplay between formal and informal
institutions—and how the latter won over the former.
4.3 Cooperative transmission
This section focuses on the efforts to transmit US theories of victory and corporatism through
military education and training assistance programs. These programs were part of the coop-
erative security relationship between the US and Indonesia crafted since the early 1950s. As
chapter 2 notes, a cooperative transmission has few benefits but many challenges. As we shall
see, the US’ limited and patchy military aid was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it
center of civilian influence. Government leaders apparently modeled this intervention over the Soviet Red
Army. See the discussion in McVey (1971, 136) and Djamhari (1995, 48).
79 Indeed, during and after the revolution, an officer’s standing rested on his ability to attract and maintain
a following of soldiers (McVey 1971, 142).
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allowed Washington to keep a good relationship with the Indonesian military without raising
domestic political tensions in Jakarta. On the other hand, a successful diffusion requires a
heavy footprint and pervasive interference into the recipient’s organizational policies. But
the US only provided limited and incoherent assistance to help with internal security and
civic actions, even though the Indonesian army was seeking an externally-oriented military
Westernization. Furthermore, the US was the predominant but not the exclusive provider
of military education and training for the Indonesian military. Taken together, there was a
lack of coherence and consistency in US military aid to Indonesia as well as a lack of clarity
on the programs’ goals and measurement.
4.3.1 Evolution US military aid policy
The policy of providing military assistance to Indonesia stemmed from Washington’s percep-
tion of Jakarta’s geopolitical, geo-strategic, and geo-economic importance: a bulwark against
communism in Asia, a source strategic resources and materials, and gateway between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. These interests were the predominant benchmarks through which
Washington measured its military aid, even if policymakers implied they had a successful
emulation in mind. According to US officials, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), for
example, was in fact “political and economic in nature, rather than strictly military...[They
were] primarily an instrument of American foreign policy and only secondarily of defense pol-
icy.”80 Political considerations were thus more pronounced sans a coherent and consistent
policy on the military-related goals of military aid.
That different US bureaucracies had different ideas on how to provide military aid
exacerbated the problem. The State and Defense Departments took the ‘political’ viewpoint,
80 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reports of the Special Study Mission to Latin America on Military
Assistance Training and Developmental Television, Sub-committee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments, 91st Congress, May 7, 1970, 31, cited in Wolpin (1972, 16).
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arguing for the importance of such programs for the bilateral relationship and the fight
against Communist forces. However, the Pacific Command, and to some extent, the US Army
and Air Force and the Navy-Marine Corps, took the ‘military’ viewpoint, where they judged
the MAP for Indonesia through criteria such as “military necessity”.81 As a consequence,
the delivery of military assistance was patchy and inconsistent.
Detailing the evolution of US military aid policy helps us demonstrate its inconsisten-
cies and incoherence over time, although the US-Indonesia military relations were relatively
stable in the post-1965 era. But as the New Order’s legitimacy was grounded in economic
performance, Jakarta was more interested in Washington’s economic rather than military
assistance. Indeed, the value of US military aid to Indonesia up until the critical juncture
period was relatively small (see Table 4.2 below). As such, the level of military assistance
was never as high as the 1950s or sufficiently large to make the US the only supplier. By the
1970s, the permissive conditions that defined the critical juncture were eroding.
Table 4.2: Total U.S. Military Assistance to Indonesia, 1946-1976 ($ Millions)
MAP grants FMS credits Excess items IMET grants SS assistance Total
(1950–1976) (1950–1976) (1950–1976) (1950–1976) (1946–1976)
165.7 31.6 35.9 21.1 63.0 317.3
Notes: MAP: Military Assistance Programs FMS: Foreign Military Sales IMET: International Mili-
tary Education and Training SS Assistance: Security Supplementary Assistance
Source: figures are calculated from Klare (1977, 31).
81 Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia 1958 - 1963, Secret, 7.
Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified Historical
Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA. If we dig deeper, different US services also saw Indonesia’s
military value in differently. The Navy valued Indonesia’s importance for its movements across the Indo-
Pacific. The Army was more interested in maintaining warm ties with the Indonesian army leadership.
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Truman administration
Under Truman, military assistance was initially a means to dispose surplus weaponry after
World War 2. But as the Philippines were becoming independent, as Europe needed a quick
economic recovery, and as Britain was beginning to lose its grip on Greece and Turkey,
military assistance became tools for reconstruction, recovery, and relief. It was also a way to
boost Western alliance credibility. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 established
the MAP. The program was the lynchpin of the US global military aid during the early
decades of the Cold War.82 Indonesia was a critical part of the program.
By 1948, a senior US official describes Indonesia as “the world’s richest island em-
pire...a region of political, economic, and strategic importance to the whole world” (Hornbeck
1948, 124-5). A National Security Council report adds, “Indonesia commands the routes be-
tween the Pacific and Indian Oceans and between Asia and Australia...and [an important]
world supplier of rubber, tin, copra, and petroleum.”83 But soon, Indonesia’s potential as
an anti-communist bulwark increased its strategic value. According to George Kennan, In-
donesia was “the most crucial issue...in our struggle with the Kremlin” and that it was the
“anchor in that chain of islands...we should develop as a politico-economic counterforce to
communism in the Asian land mass” (cited in Roadnight 2002, 42). As Secretary Acheson
argues in a memo for Truman:
“This vast archipelago...lies athwart the principal lines of communication between
the Pacific and Indian Oceans...Because of the dynamic character of Indonesia’s
nationalist movement, because of its great wealth and because it is the second
largest Muslim country in the world, its political orientation has profound effect
upon the political orientation of the rest of Asia. As the Communist gains on
82 Although it was a series of country and regional programs created from piecemeal planning and reflected
a variety of purposes. See details in Pach (1991) and Trachtenberg (1999).
83 U.S. Policy on Indonesia, National Security Council Report, May 3, 1955, 20, from Digital National
Security Archives Collection, Presidential directives on national security. Part I. From Truman to Clinton,
PD00457. By 1950, Indonesia supplied 35% of US tin imports and 30% of its natural rubber and was critical
to US efforts to stockpile these raw materials (Roadnight 2002, 90).
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the Asiatic mainland increase, the importance of keeping Indonesia the anti-
communist camp is of greater and greater importance.”84
American principal objective in Indonesia was thus set as early as 1950. According
to the NSC, the key objectives of US policy should be:
“To prevent Indonesia from passing into the Communist orbit; to persuade In-
donesia that its best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations
with the rest of the free world; and to assist Indonesia to develop toward a stable,
free government with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and
without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.”85
One of the methods to achieve these objectives was military assistance. Under Truman,
the MAP provided for the loan or grant of equipment, materials, and services to: pro-
mote stability within and among participating states and enhance their capacity to defend
themselves, and strengthen the bonds of mutual understanding through person-to-person
programs (Lefever 1976, 88). US officials further believed that providing education and
training to Indonesian officers could enhance their effectiveness and reinforce their hostility
towards the PKI (Bunnell 1969, 144). What ‘effectiveness’ meant was never consistently
clear. Nevertheless, the military aid developed in this period institutionalized military-to-
military relationship between the US (as a donor) and Indonesia (as a potential emulator).
The Pentagon established links with the Indonesian military as early as 1948. Truman
authorized the first grant (around $5 million) on January 1950 to strengthen the Indonesian
constabulary.86 By August, the US was training the fledgling police force (Simpson 2008,
32). Soon Indonesia was sending “as many officers as it can spare” for training in Western
84 Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, Washington, January 9, 1950, in FRUS,
Vol. VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), 965
85 United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Indonesia, Top Secret, Executive
Secretary National Security Council Report, November 20, 1953, 3. Digital National Security Archives
Collection; Presidential Directives.
86 The US believed “the mobile civil police constabulary would benefit greatly from projected receipt of
US equipment and through the training of intelligence officers in the US.” Telegram from the Ambassador
in Indonesia to the Secretary of State, Jakarta, April 3, 1950, in FRUS 1950, Vol. VI: East Asia and the
Pacific (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), 1004.
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Europe and the US.87 This was not accompanied, however, by the stationing of US advisory
teams common among other states receiving military grants.88 As the State Department
acknowledges, Indonesian domestic politics was a major hurdle.89 Administration officials
realized there was not much that Washington could do to overturn Indonesian domestic per-
ceptions.90 Nevertheless, Truman laid the groundwork of US military assistance to Indonesia
based on the country’s significance to the anti-communist front.
Eisenhower administration
Eisenhower expanded US containment policy: militarily by embracing internal security and
counter-insurgency missions, economically by including civic action and nation building, and
politically by providing protection to various areas throughout the world.91 Washington ex-
pected its military aid to create recipient forces that could fend off or check a communist
aggression. Countering internal security threats became more pronounced in US military
aid outlook.92 Eisenhower issued the NSC 1290-D initiative (and its successor, the Over-
seas Internal Security Program) as the first systematic program to support foreign police
and paramilitary forces (Rempe 1999, 34). He also ensured that the support became an
87 United States Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to Indonesia, A Report to the National
Security Council by the NSC Planning Board, November 10, 1953, 19, Digital National Security Archives
Collection.
88 After the MDAA was issued, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 consolidated major security assistance
programs and authorities.
89 US officials listed several possible negative domestic reactions and concerns, from ‘hypersensitivity’ to
foreign interventions to decolonization efforts. See details in Policy Statement on Indonesia, Department of
State, July 27, 1950, in FRUS 1950, Vol. VI: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1976), 1042.
90 As one NSC report admits, “The capacity of the United States to influence Indonesian leaders for the
attainment of its objectives has been limited by the lack of effective US response on issues which the Indone-
sians consider most important in their relations with the United States.” See United States Objectives and
Courses of Action with respect to Indonesia, A Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning
Board, November 10, 1953, 20, Digital National Security Archives Collection; Presidential Directives.
91 The internal security assistance was part and parcel of Eisenhower’s foreign aid policy to: contribute
to the stability of non-communist regimes, strengthen their domestic economic and political conditions, and
convince them of the utility and superiority of the US model (Statler and Johns 2006).
92 By the late 1950s, the US had trained more than 12,000 foreign internal security personnel and U.S.
arms transfers were close to $1 billion annually (Mott 2002, 20).
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established staple of US national security policy (Rosenau 2001).
But Washington’s views of Third World states became increasingly narrow and con-
tradictory. The administration, on the one hand, used one yardstick to measure the effec-
tiveness of its assistance: has the Indonesian military been willing and capable to act against
communism? But US officials also held negative views of the rhetoric of Indonesian national-
ism.93 So, as Sukarno’s rhetoric against the Netherlands, a key NATO ally, grew belligerent
over West New Guinea, the US reduced its military aid to Indonesia (Mrázek 1978a, 117–9).
As Dulles notes, “The big stake in the area is Indonesia itself rather than the problem of West
New Guinea...if West New Guinea and all of Indonesia goes under Communist control, the
situation will be very bad.”94 The dilemma was how to calibrate military aid in a way that
would maintain good relations with the military but not too significant that the weapons
could be used against the Dutch.95 In other words, Washington wanted to ‘minimize’ its
military aid and hinder the Indonesian military’s conventional modernization.96
The solution was to provide sufficient aid to take on the PKI. The State Department
thought the promise of a future sizable aid might also act as an incentive for Jakarta to
finally eliminate the Communist threat.97 The focus on education and training was particu-
93 The distrust of Sukarno reached the point where Secretary Dulles was willing to see Indonesia break
apart to ensure the US would still have a ‘fulcrum’ to eliminate communism (Roadnight 2002, 106).
94 Cited in Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting, ANZ MC-1, Washington, October 1, 1958, Document No.
156, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XVII, edited by Robert J. McMahon and Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 284-5.
95 According to the Pacific Command, a “limited U.S. military aid to Indonesia has been based on the
premise that it does not generate Indonesian military threat to Dutch position in the West New Guinea.”
Cited in Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Honolulu,
February 24, 1959, Document No. 183, FRUS, 1958-1960, 351.
96 Washington even refused Indonesian requests for parachutes for fear that they “could be used offen-
sively”. Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia 1958 - 1963, Secret,
December 1963, 2. Office of the Chief, Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, RG 334 Records of
Interservice Agencies, Security Classified Historical Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA.
97 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, Washington, June 27, 1958.
Document No. 128, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XVII, edited by Robert J. McMahon and Glenn W. LaFantasie
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 23. A National Intelligence Estimate
concurred. Special National Intelligence Estimate, “The Outlook of Indonesia”, Washington, August 12,
1958, SNIE 65-58, Document No. 141, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XVII, edited by Robert J. McMahon and
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larly crucial. As the CIA notes, “the training of Indonesian...officers in US military schools
appears to be the best available means of favorably influencing and strengthening the In-
donesian armed forces.”98 The Defense Department concurred that military aid to Indonesia
should be geared towards strengthening ties with the Army, increase its capability to main-
tain internal security and combat communist activities, and eventually curtail Sino-Soviet
training programs.99 In short, the Eisenhower administration thought it should reduce aid
in general to signal its displeasure with Sukarno, but keep training the military and remodel
it along US lines. An NSC report captures this logic:
“The Indonesian Army...[is] the principal obstacle to the continued growth of
Communist strength in Indonesia. This situation derives to a considerable degree
from the favorable impressions made on the several hundred Indonesian officers
trained in U.S. service schools...These officers have accepted U.S. organization,
equipment, and training methods and, upon return to their homeland, have ex-
erted a strong influence in orienting the Army toward the West and toward the
United States in particular.”100 (emphasis mine)
These goals, however, contradicted what Jakarta wanted: a conventional military
modernization. But according to the US Ambassador to Jakarta, Washington’s main mili-
tary aid was based on whatever it decided was the “best for Indonesia to have.”101 These
conflicting goals came to a head in the PERMESTA rebellion. Increasingly intolerant of
Sukarno’s promotion of links with the Sino-Soviet bloc and his failure to curb the PKI, the
Eisenhower administration sanctioned covert support for the rebellion (Kahin and Kahin
Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 259.
98 Operations Coordinating Board, Progress Report on NSC 171/1, United States Objectives and Courses
of Action with Respect to Indonesia, July 1, 1954, Central Intelligence Agency, 3, Digital National Security
Archives Collection.
99 These guidelines are from Letter from the Assistance Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, March
28, 1959, Document No. 190, FRUS,1958-1960, 363
100 National Security Council Report NSC 6023, Draft Statement of U.S. Policy on Indonesia, December
19, 1960, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS hereafter), 1958-1960, Indonesia, Vol. 17. Available
from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d293 (last accessed on June
1, 2017).
101 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, December 4, 1958,
Document No. 167, FRUS, 1958-1960, 311.
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1997). When the rebellion collapsed, US policy switched back to Jakarta. The US ambas-
sador further recommended that certain items of defense and training equipment should be
made available and the educational quotas be increased for Indonesian officers.102 He argues,
“There is no question...that the Army is determined to obtain the arms it requires. Pro-US
Army leaders want equipment to come from the US but if we will not supply it others will.
Thus, our decision will not determine whether the Indonesian Army gets the equipment or
not, but simply whether the source of supply is US or Soviet bloc”.103
A token of military assistance was then authorized.104 But the Joint Chiefs made
it clear that any aid should not “enhance to a significant extent the mobility [of the In-
donesian armed] forces under the control of the central government with respect to their
possible employment in the outlying islands.”105 The US also settled on a token program
because officials reviewed the list of arms and equipment Jakarta requested and found it
was “neither feasible nor desirable to supply the quantity of equipment listed, as it [was]
considerably in excess of the ability of Indonesia to pay for and [appear] to be in excess of
the actual requirements of the country.”106 The “token aid” however masked the true size of
102 Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia 1958 - 1963, 2 from
Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified Historical
Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA.
103 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 24, 1958, Document
No. 137 in FRUS, 1958-1960, 250
104 See Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 1, 1958, Document No. 139, and Memorandum
from the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington,
July 30, 1958, Document No. 138, in FRUS, 1958-1960, 252-56.
The aid was delivered in two increments: (1) ‘Token Aid Program’ included approximately $7 million
worth of military vehicles, machine guns, rifles, ammunition and tactical radios sufficient to equip 6 Infantry
Battalions and (2) ‘Augmentation Program’, tailored to equip 20 austere Infantry Battalions. See Military
Assistance Plan for Indonesia, Secret, 7. Office of the Chief of Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia,
RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box No. 2,
Entry 115, NARA.
105 Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Enclosure A, Joint Military Assistance Affairs Com-
mittee Report on ‘Indonesian Request for Military Assistance under the Provisions of Section 106 of the
Mutual Security Act of 1954, As Amended’, Top Secret, 6034. Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG
218, Central Decimal File, 1957, Box No. 5. NARA.
106 The submitted arms and equipment listings were estimated to cost in the general order of $500 million
for the Army, $140 million on for the Navy, and $40 million for the Air Force. Ibid., 6033 and Enclosure
C., 6036. The 69-page full list of equipment Indonesia requested can be viewed in Records of the U.S. Joint
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Washington’s efforts to assist the Indonesian military.107 Ambassador Jones underlined the
political primacy of challenging the PKI in this regard:
“Our military aid has been predicated on the proposition of first things first. The
immediate threat is not Sukarno’s leftist bent, third force ambitions or flirtations
with both sides at once, but the PKI, which may even now be strong enough
to capture Indonesia with or without the President. There is today only one
effective force in opposition—the Indonesian Army.”108
Administration officials also thought that providing advanced weaponry could de-
crease Indonesia’s dependence on the Soviet Union. As Dulles argues,
“Of course, in fact, the nation which supplies military equipment does get a
certain control over the country that receives it, because of the dependence upon
replacements and spare parts and the like. And it is far better, we think, that
Indonesia should be dependent upon us in that respect than dependent upon the
Soviet Union or the Soviet Bloc.”109
The US Ambassador to Jakarta concurred that the provision of “modern, complex” equip-
ment would “lock Indonesia into long-term training and maintenance relationships” (cited
in Simpson 2008, 70). This line of thinking contradicted the warning from the Joint Chiefs
mentioned above that supporting the military’s conventional modernization could be counter-
productive. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower period saw hundreds of officers going to the US by
the late 1950s. But the administration’s flip-flop during the PERMESTA rebellion instilled
a deep sense of distrust.
Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Central Decimal File 1957, Box No. 7, NARA.
107 In absolute terms, US military assistance to Indonesia tripled between 1958 and 1959, from $5.4 million
to $16.9 million. In addition, using all possible accounting tricks to essentially “cook the books”, the real
value of US military assistance was closer to the nearly $300 million the Soviets gave in the same period,
although the on-the-book value was only $42 million (Simpson 2008, 47).
108 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, August 20, 1958, Docu-
ment No. 147, FRUS, 1958-1960, 268




Kennedy built on and extended Eisenhower’s focus on internal security assistance. The
difference was the urgency with which the US pursued its objectives, the truly global nature of
US efforts, and the new role for the US Special Forces in training local forces (Rosenau 2003;
Kuzmarov 2009). Two additional features characterized Kennedy’s approach: the various
bureaucratic restructuring and the rise of ‘modernization theory’ as the administration’s
conceptual lens (Mcmahon 2010). Kennedy’s ‘flexible response’ strategy that sought to
develop various means to respond to all levels of aggression, from guerrilla war to nuclear
attack, drove these changes. Security assistance was, in essence, a way to provide greater
strategic maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviets (Michaels 2012; McClintock 1992).
The administration, for example, pushed for the creation of the Office of Public Safety
(OPS) in 1962 under USAID, which trained more than a million foreign police over its 13-
year tenure.110 The rise of OPS coincided with the decline in MAP funding as Congress
increasingly emphasized economic aid. The Vietnam war, however, reversed this trend.111
The administration’s modernization theory further framed these developments.112 According
to Walt Rostow, one of the theory’s chief architects, developing nations were vulnerable to
subversive communist elements. Foreign aid could thus hasten the transition to modernity
and reduce that vulnerability. This ‘high modernism’ theory had a military variety: boosting
Third World militaries to ‘modernize’ their societies.113
110 The OPS also helped local security and police to modernize their communications, administration, and
command and control centers. See details in Rosenau (2003) and Kuzmarov (2009).
111 From 1963 to 1973, East Asia and the Pacific ranked first in regular MAP at over $ 3.8 billion. This
was in addition to the $15 billion provided to Vietnam, Laos, South Korea and Thailand through a special
Military Assistance Service Funds. See details in Grimmett (1985, 23).
112 In its broad outlines, modernization theory dominated American social scientific thought regarding
economic, political, and social change from the late 1950s through the 1960s. See detailed analyses of the
theory in Packenham (1975), Gilman (2003) and Latham (2011).
113 See the discussion on ‘high modernism’ in Scott (1998). For the military variation of modernization
theory, see Lerner and Robinson (1960) and Johnson (2015).
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The argument was the military could be a modernizing force championing middle-class
aspirations (where they came from) and provide administrative and technological skills to the
civilian sector. Western military technology and education, in particular, could strengthen
their ‘rational’ outlook and ‘professional’ responsibility. After all, military-to-military ties
were ‘easier’ to establish due to a common trans-national ‘bond’ across the armed services
(Pye 1962, 166-7). Military modernization through education and training assistance thus
became a staple of Kennedy’s approach, particularly through his Overseas Internal Defense
Policy (although its success record was mixed).114
The administration believed the theory could work in Indonesia but officials kept the
Eisenhower-era ‘minimum effort’ military assistance.115 Officials thought a ‘maximum’ pro-
gram would have required a fundamental re-channeling of Sukarno’s energies into domestic
economic reforms. The minimum effort had a modest goal instead: “strengthening those
Indonesian elements, institutions and conditions which will resist Communism internally”
(Bunnell 1969, 113). The Indonesian military was the centerpiece here. According to the
US Ambassador, the minimum effort was, “an application of [a] carrot technique. If [the In-
donesian] armed forces [were] effectively anti-Communist, we would reward this by a limited
amount of assistance, then stand back to observe results. A little more anti-Communism, a
little more aid, etc., holding out promise of full cooperation in the distant future.”116
114 The policy called for an ‘activist’ role for the State Department, USAID, the US Information Agency, the
CIA and the Pentagon under a coordinated program of economic aid, military assistance, internal security
training, and covert intelligence operations (Rosenau 2003, 75). But Third World elites were rarely passive
recipients of modernizing models. While they were attracted to the promise of accelerated development,
post-colonial leaders were fond of selecting and blending diverse elements of military or economic aid to
serve their interests (Latham 2010, 268-9).
115 The minimum effort essentially entailed economic grants for technical assistance, agricultural commodi-
ties under the Food for Peace Program, and modest military assistance. These programs provided sufficient
material and political support to strengthen those likely to oppose the left, although the MAP probably had
a bigger political return of investment. See the discussion in Bunnell (1969, 113–136).
116 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State by Howard Jones, March
7, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 23, Southeast Asia, 320. Available at https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d152 (last accessed on May 13, 2017).
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Kennedy essentially provided military assistance to Indonesia through installments.
This did not bode well for the diffusion of US theories of corporatism and victory, although
his administration sought “the injection of Western orientation into Indonesian thinking”.117
A maximalist military emulation was therefore a key goal of US military aid to Indonesia,
even if it was not publicly expressed as such.118 And yet, the US ramped up its internal
security aid which would have taken the Indonesian military further away from US theories
of victory and corporatism. The US assisted Indonesia’s civic action programs to boost
military activities in rural areas (Simpson 2009, 473). The Pentagon in particular pushed
for such programs as part of the OPS and Special Group for Counter-Insurgency policies.119
The State Department recommended supplementing military training for Indonesian officers
with special instructions in civil administration, including public safety, welfare, education,
economics, property control, and public communications.120
The Indonesia Army under Nasution embraced this development as he had developed
a warm relationship with General Taylor (Bunnell 1969, 147). This internal focus also coin-
cided with the Army’s counter-insurgency requirements and Territorial Warfare (discussed
above).121 A closer Army-to-Army relationship thus drove the civic action assistance. For
one thing, Nasution did not trust Indonesian and American politicians and diplomats to
handle the Army’s aid programs.122 For another, the US Army and the US Embassy in
117 Plan of Action for Indonesia: Response to NSAM 179, Secret, Department of State, October 8, 1962,
Enclosure No. 11, 1. Digital National Security Archives collection; Presidential Directives.
118 Indonesia was not unique, of course, as the broader MAP was geared towards “Americanizing doctrine,
organization, language, tactics, and equipment in other countries” (Wolpin 1972, 16).
119 The administration’s chief counter-insurgency guru Edward Landsdale proposed a Civic Action Program
for Indonesia to bring the Army closer to the people through rural reconstruction and development projects.
Details of US assistance to Indonesia’s civic action program are in Evans (1989, 34-7).
120 Telegram 3439 from State to Jakarta, July 14, 1961, RG 285, Records of the AID, Office of Public
Safety, Operations Division, East Asia Branch, Indonesia, cited in Simpson (2008, 70).
121 By 1958, the Indonesian Army had already concluded that it needed to develop greater grassroots
support and involvement to defend the country from internal subversion (Sebastian 2006, 67-86).
122 Nasution harbored distrust of the US government after his experience during the PERMESTA Rebellion
and was concerned that Sukarno or the PKI might intervene (Evans 1989, 35, fn. 64).
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Jakarta benefited immensely from the role of Lieutenant Colonel George Benson.123 By July
1963, fifty US military-engineering personnel arrived to train Indonesian soldiers to use US
equipment.124 At around the same time, the first group of Indonesian officers came to the
US Army Engineer Training Centers at Fort Belvoir and Fort Leonardwood. By September,
the Indonesian Army officially opened the first US-led civic action course in Indonesia.125
The US civic action assistance should not be over-estimated, however. The Indonesian
army, after all, had already developed its own civic action doctrine, tactics, and experience
and did not want a large contingent of US advisers (Evans 1989, 34–5). That said, both
Washington and Jakarta wanted to prevent the further domination by the PKI of the vil-
lages.126 As Ambassador Jones remarks,
“The next important initiative in keeping close to the Indonesian Army was in
the field of civic action. The Indonesian Army recognized it had a political role
to play and that assistance in rural reconstruction and development was one way
to endear itself to the people. We ought to do all possible to assist the Army in
this task.”127
Similarly, Nasution thought it was important to keep training Indonesian officers in US-
backed civic action programs, even though he was concerned with the broader conventional
123 Benson first came to Indonesia from 1956 to 1959 as an assistant military attache. He eventually became
the only US Army officer in Indonesia from 1957 until late 1958. He developed close ties with the Indonesian
military leadership. Prior to his posting, he attended the CGSC in 1954-1955, where he met and knew
key Indonesian officers, including Ahmad Yani. At the request of Nasution and Yani, Benson returned to
Indonesia from 1962 to 1965 as Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Civic Action. On Benson’s career,
see Evans (1989, 28) and Bunnell (1969, 92).
124 The US supplied light tools to equip 35 to 50 infantry battalions and heavy engineering construction
equipment for around 10 engineering battalions and 13 construction battalions (Bunnell 1969, 148).
125 Its graduates became instructors in the civic action Army Centers all over the country, assigned to the
newly established units of the Army, or departed for further study in the US (Mrázek 1978b, 78).
126 In fact, during difficult moments in US-Indonesia ties under the Johnson administration, civic action
programs were one of the key engagements that both sides kept. See Memorandum from James C. Thom-
son, Jr. of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy), Washington, August 25, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. 26, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore;
Philippines. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d64 (last
accessed on March 1, 2017).
127 Memorandum of Conversation, The President, Howard P. Jones, and Michael V. Forrestal, Washington,
October 11, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol 23, Southeast Asia. Available at https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d293 (last accessed September 13, 2017)
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military modernization at the time.128
Altogether, Kennedy’s civic action as well as education and training aid allowed the
Indonesian Army to undertake new missions and activities in the villages. While there was a
temporary ‘match’ between what the US was prepared to give and what Indonesia wanted,
the transmission of US theories of victory and corporatism was partial. Civic action, as we
see in the previous section, only constituted a small part of the overall organization-wide
doctrine. Cold War political interests also continued to shape US military engagements,
rather than the need to ‘remodel’ the Indonesian military along US lines. In short, the
inhibitive properties of the cooperative transmission remained under Kennedy.
Johnson, Nixon, and beyond
The US–Indonesia military relations reached a low point during Johnson’s early days. His
administration was more sympathetic to Britain’s predicament in the Indonesia-Malaysia
confrontation and had largely accepted that the minimum aid program could not moderate
Sukarno’s behavior. Washington offered unequivocal support for Malaysia (McMahon 1981,
325), while Congress sought to suspend all aid to Indonesia (Rakove 2008, 383-7). Johnson
was also personally less engaged with Indonesian affairs amidst deteriorating conditions
in the US and the Vietnam War.129 Administration officials were generally recommending
reductions in Indonesia’s aid programs and that a presidential determination should be made
before civic action and military assistance could proceed (Jones 2002, 263).
Officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department, and the CIA, how-
128 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State (Embtel 1854), Jakarta, March
19, 1964, FRUS, 1964–968, Vol. 26, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines. Available at https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d40 (last accessed on October 1, 2017).
129 According to U.S. officials, while Kennedy had cared for and was willing to spend political capital on
Indonesia, Johnson personally decided early on that “he was not going to bear any political burdens on
behalf of Indonesia” (Simpson 2008, 126).
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ever, argued against a total end of military aid.130 They saw those programs as a way to
build ‘social capital’ to be used during crisis situations. During the height of the Malaysian
‘confrontation’, the State Department believed it should,
“...try to build up pressures on Sukarno from Indonesian military sources in favor
of rational settlement with Malaysia and decent relations with free world....this
would seem to require “educational” program aimed at military leaders...who
have some ability [to] effect course of events...[Thus, the] time has come to draw
on relationship we have built up with Indonesian military in [an] effort [to] head
off [the Government of Indonesia] before it’s too late. This should be done to
maximum extent possible in [the] context [of] this “educational” campaign, since
our capital with them will be completely expended in any event should Indo
actions force us side openly against them.” (emphasis mine)131
The deteriorating trend was reversed following the September 1965 attempted coup.132
The US secretly helped the Indonesian Army by providing intelligence, arms, medicines, and
radios and by giving assurances that Britain would not attack while it was suppressing the
PKI (Easter 2005). The Army’s subsequent rise as the dominant force profoundly altered
Indonesian political and economic life. The “new political order” in Indonesia, Ambassador
Green commented as he argues for the resumption of military aid, “will be army planned,
army built and army sponsored...it is the army which will remain the dominant political force
in Indonesia for a long time to come” (Simpson 2009, 475). As if Kennedy’s modernization
theory lived on, a National Intelligence Estimate after the birth of the New Order argues,
“The army is the most cohesive and nationally-oriented institution within In-
donesia; hence, it is the best available instrument for the gigantic task of mod-
ernization. After more than 20 years of active involvement in civil affairs, the
army leadership has a sense of national mission which generally transcends the
130 Having spent years cultivating close personal and intelligence ties, they were reluctant to sever ties that
could be meaningful in terms of “continuing contact and future influence” (Simpson 2008, 126).
131 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, Washington, March 3, 1964,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Vol. 26, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines,
66. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d33 (last accessed
January 3, 2018)
132 The best historical accounts the attempted coup and its aftermath are Roosa (2006), Robinson (2018),
and Melvin (2018).
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ethnic, religious, and geographic divisions that have made it so difficult to mold
together the Indonesian nation. The officer corps is relatively well-educated and,
under strong direction, could become an effective force for modernization and
reform. The army would perhaps be more favorably disposed to a US-supported
regional security arrangement than would various civilian elements.”133
Once again, the US threw its weight behind the Army. After 1965, approximately 100
Indonesian personnel were sent to the US for training in courses that support civic action,
including supply, civil engineering, maintenance, logistics, and salvage.134 The US also
financed the training of Indonesian officers at US civilian academic institutions in programs
related to the management of civilian enterprises.135 RAND’s Guy Pauker also promoted the
modernizing role of the Indonesian military and helped boost Southeast Asian and Indonesian
studies centers in the US (Budiawan 2006). The US even helped create smaller versions of
its defense policy think tanks and their methods.136 The military-to-military relationship
was then stable from the mid-1960s onwards.
Nixon boosted military assistance to selected Indonesian combat units.137 After Viet-
nam, the administration also considered encouraging a broader regional role for Indonesia.138
Indonesia’s centrality in Southeast Asia was reiterated up until the 1990s. President Ford’s
133 National Intelligence Estimate, December 31, 1968,NIE 55-68. FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXVI, Indonesia;
Malaysia-Singapore, Philippines, 569Available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1964-68v26/d262 (last accessed June 12, 2017)
134 See CINCPAC FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10, 1970, 43. Records of the
United States Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box No. 175, NARA.
135 For example, hundreds of visiting Indonesian officers at Harvard and Syracuse from the early 1960s
to the mid-1970s gained various skills—from business administration and personnel management to air
photography and shipping (Ransom 1975, 102–3). See also the discussion in Evans (1989, 37).
136 Guy Pauker brought Col. Suwarto, then deputy commander of the Army Staff and Command College
and a Fort Leavenworth graduate, to RAND in 1962. Upon returning, Suwarto tried to emulate the RAND
model by bringing economists and social scientists to lecture about and do research on Indonesia’s future
problems. According to the US defense attache at the time, Suwarto’s ‘mini RAND’ also ran courses on
major contingency planning (Ransom 1975, 102).
137 The aid included equipment for two elite air transportable brigades, jet trainers, combat jets, com-
munication equipment, one additional destroyer-type vessel, and the upgrading of maintenance facilities.
See National Security Decision Memorandum 107, May 5, 1971, 1, from Digital National Security Archive
Collection, U.S. policy in the Vietnam War. Part II. 1969-1975.
138 National Security Decision Memorandum 205, July 20, 1974, 1, Digital National Security Archive
Collection, Presidential directives on national security. Part II. From Truman to George W. Bush.
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“approval” of Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, for example, was grounded in such a
logic.139 In fact, five months before the invasion, his administration wanted to increase mili-
tary aid.140 The Reagan Administration also strongly signaled Indonesia’s value to its East
Asian and global military strategy in the early 1980s.141
Overall, while military assistance remained a key component of US-Indonesia military
ties after 1965, its value — and the number of students Indonesia sent — declined over time
(discussed below). Jakarta was also more interested in economic assistance to restore its
badly damaged economy under Sukarno’s rule. The inconsistencies of US military aid policies
since Truman further left a patchy and incoherent transmission of US theories of victory
and corporatism for much of the Cold War. The analyses above also show the occasional
‘mismatches’ between what the US was prepared to give and what Indonesia wanted. These
obstacles underline the inhibitive nature of the cooperative transmission between the US (as
a donor) and Indonesia (as a receiver).
4.3.2 Education and training
The centerpiece of US military assistance to Indonesia was its education and training pro-
grams. Officials and scholars often note the large numbers of US-trained officers during
the Cold War, even though different studies cite different sources covering different pro-
grams.142 One US official boasted in the mid-1960s that “one-third of the [Indonesian] army
139 See the archival documents provided in Burr and Evans (2001).
140 Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto, The White House, Secret, July
5, 1975, 2. Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, July
5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto. Available at the National Security Archives at
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/ (last accessed September 15, 2015).
141 In 1983, Under-Secretary of State James L. Buckley noted Indonesia’s strategic location on important
trade routes, and its possession of resources, although the focus of the professional education and training
aid was more narrow and geared towards technical ‘professionalism’, including skills to maintain US-made
aircrafts. See details in Kifer (2008, 264–5).
142 Official US military aid figures for Indonesia were classified until 1963. Up until then, Indonesia did
not meet the statutory requirements for participation in the official Military Assistance Program; it was a
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general staff” and “almost half of the officer corps” had some sort of US training.143 My
own calculation (see Figure 4.5 below) shows that 7,012 Indonesian military officers were
officially trained in the US between 1950 and 1989 in various US schools. In the mid-1960s,
US-trained officers were the principal teaching staff at over a hundred Indonesian training
centers teaching US training doctrine and methods.144 These activities may have given the
impression that the US ‘remodeled’ the Indonesian military over its own image. But as we
see above, Washington viewed education and training assistance for the military as a political
tool rather than a mechanism to professionally modernize the organization and improve its
(external) combat effectiveness. The US was nonetheless the dominant, though by no means
the only, provider of military education and training.
Figure 4.5 also shows that the critical juncture period saw the highest peak of the
number of US-trained officers. These officers were potential US product champions that
could have led the formulation of new US-inspired theories of victory and corporatism.
But as I discuss below, when these US-trained officers returned to Indonesia, the military’s
personnel infrastructure was of low-quality. In fact, it was not until the 1980s, after the
critical juncture has passed, that the military under the New Order started to institutionalize
its personnel policies. But by then, as Figure 4.5 shows, the US military education and
training programs were already in decline. Furthermore, the sheer diversity of the US courses
as well as the absence of an academy-level education allocated for Indonesian cadets (the
foundational building block to any officer corps) suggests coherence and consistency would
‘presidential determination’ country. For more details, see Mrázek (1978a, 120) and Mrázek (1978b, 75).
143 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, William Bundy to Congress in House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 174, cited in Bunnell (1969, 161). He
did not provide any substantial data to back this claim however.
144 Military Assistance Plan FY 1964–68, Explanatory Sheet for Format MAP E-1, Project A6 Internal
Security, Secret, May 10, 1962. Office of the Chief of Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, RG 334
Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box No. 2, Entry
115, NARA.
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Figure 4.5: US-funded Indonesian military students and trainees (1950–1990)
Note: N = 7,012
Source: Author calculation based on various issues of Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts
published by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
be challenging. The absence of a systematic and appropriate measurement framework to
analyze the organizational effects of US education and training did not help as well.
Course and supplier diversity
Initially, the US was not the Indonesian military’s first choice as a provider of education and
training. The Netherlands Military Mission’s demise in 1953 (discussed above) was followed
by overtures to Australia, Switzerland, West Germany, Sweden and Norway to provide train-
ing and education (Fakih 2014, 80). When they declined, Indonesia approached ‘less neutral’
countries such as the UK, Australia, and the US.145 While the US eventually became the
145 See United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Indonesia, Top Secret, Executive
Secretary National Security Council Report, November 20, 1953, 3. Digital National Security Archives
Collection; Presidential Directives.
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dominant supplier, the training mission sent to Indonesia faced various difficulties, includ-
ing flawed aid measurement frameworks. That the Indonesian military insisted on ‘course
diversity’ (different US-based programs) as well as ‘supplier diversity’ (other countries pro-
viding education and training) exacerbated the problems. The deliberate “diversification”
preference was designed less with learning potential in mind than organizational autonomy.
The more diverse the courses and suppliers, the less likely the military would be dependent
on just one country for its education and training.
Indonesian officers were enrolled in dozens of specialized training courses and educa-
tional programs, as Table 4.3 below depicts. It also shows the domination of Army-related
courses compared to the other services. It is noteworthy that academy-level education was
never afforded to the military; the focus was either technical training or mid- or senior-
rank education. Sending mid-level or senior officers made sense from a network or influence
standpoint but these men would have been harder to socialize into new theories of victory
or corporatism. The courses would also be more narrow and limited than would be required
for an organization-wide emulation. The numerous training in civic action and economic
development in civilian schools exacerbated the problem.
The diversity of courses thus hindered a coherent, consistent, and organization-wide
socialization of US theories of victory and corporatism. Immersive socialization would have
been difficult in the first place given that most officers by then had built their outlook
under Japanese training or during the Revolution. The period spent in the US, however
intensive, was too short to fully ‘supplant’ those experiences. At best, Indonesian trainees
were impressed by US military techniques and the highly sophisticated equipment they were
taught to handle (Mrázek 1978a, 128). There was also a lack consistency in the course offer-
ings. Prior to 1965, for example, the US provided combat training courses (e.g. Pathfinder,
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Table 4.3: US military education and training courses provided to Indonesia
Time Service Level Courses/Schools
1940 –
1950s
Army Staff and Command
College









Signal Officer and Signal Company Officer Schools,
US Army Financial Management School, Medical Ad-
vanced Course (Fort Sam), Adjutant General Regular
Advanced Course and Adjutant General Manpower Of-
ficers Course (Fort Benjamin), Associate Infantry Offi-
cers Advanced Course and Airborne Course (Fort Ben-
ning), Rifle Marksmanship Infantry Officers Advanced
Course, Air-Ground Operation School (Biloxi), Artillery
Advanced Course, Ordnance Officers Advanced Course,
Modem Weapon Familiarization Course (Fort Bliss),
Preventive Maintenance Course, Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, Regular Officers Advanced Course,
Counter Political Intelligence Course (Honolulu)
1940 –
1950s
Navy Staff and Command
College





Junior Naval Amphibious Course, Torpedo Anti Sub-
marine School (Plymouth), USMC Junior School and
Senior School (Quantico), Engineer Equipment Main-
tenance Course, US Navy General Line School, Senior
Officer Amphibious Warfare Course, Naval Civil Engi-






Pilot training school Taloa Academy of Aeronautics (Oakland, CA
Source: Author summary of information from Djamhari (1995), TNI (2000a), TNI
(2000b), TNI (2000c).
174
Ranger, Airborne, “On-the-Job Training” Combat Operations). But due to the confrontation
with Malaysia, the US curtailed some of the amphibious and counterinsurgency training.146
The programs were also designed too closely for US tactical, logistical and material
needs or too focused on anti-communist indoctrination. US-based training courses especially
modified for Third World needs were uncommon because of fears they might prompt ‘re-
sentment’ by foreign officers (Wolpin 1972, 72-3). Consider the example of the Pentomic
division. In the 1950s, the US Army briefly experimented with a divisional design grouped
around nominally self-contained independent battle groups—the ‘Pentomic’ division—which
included many elements found in a regimental combat team.147 Indonesian officers study-
ing at Fort Leavenworth at the time found the idea of a ground force broken into small
self-contained units, widely dispersed, fast moving, yet capable of coordinated action, ap-
pealing.148 After all, its own Territorial Command envisioned the creation of independent
‘compartments’ across the country (discussed above). But the Pentomic concepts were never
intended for Indonesia. If anything, US officials believed that militaries in the developing
world should focus on internal-security.149
‘Political indoctrination’ further diluted US theories of victory and corporatism. The
US-based ‘orientation tours’—foreign officers visiting military installations, governmental
centers, and tourist attractions—were designed to affect the political attitude of foreign of-
ficers.150 The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) also provided foreign students
with reading materials and instructions in American government, judicial system, economic
146 CINCPAC FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10, 1970, 51. Records of the
United States Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box No. 175, NARA
147 The US Army then needed a ‘dual-capable’ force which could fight both tactical nuclear engagements
and conventional war. See details in Doughty (1979) and Davis (2010).
148 Fifty-three Indonesian officers attended the CGSC in 1953-1965 (Evans 1989, 44).
149 The operational unit of those forces was supposed to be numerous, light, constabulary forces, not large
infantry divisions with expeditionary combat capabilities (Mrázek 1978b, 53).
150 In 1967, 4,254 foreign participants (including 39 Indonesians) came to the US under this program
(Wolpin 1972, 36).
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policies, and a variety of anti-communist materials (Wolpin 1972, 60-1).151 These exam-
ples are not unique. At the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning and the US Army
Psychological Warfare School at Fort Bragg, foreigns students were exposed to a mix of
skill development and political indoctrination. This was particularly salient in the counter-
insurgency training programs the US provided to Third World militaries like Indonesia.152
There were also exceptions to some courses that may contain classified materials. According
to a senior US military official in 1963, classified materials were denied to foreign officers
from countries with “questionable ideologies”.153
This was perhaps one of the reasons why the Indonesian military wanted to diversify
its education and training supplier, as Table 4.4 below lists. Taken together, Table 4.3
and Table 4.4 suggest another reason why US theories of victory and corporatism could
take hold in some combat arms but not others. Aside from the tactical concepts related to
civic action and mobil strike divisions mentioned above, the US model was also influential
within the Indonesian Marines.154 In other words, the diffusion of US theories of victory and
corporatism was limited and incoherent.
151 The CGSC’s 10-month regular course included various subjects on geopolitics, although two-thirds
were devoted to intelligence and operations. Between 1954 and 1966 (when most Indonesian officers went
there), the CGSC curriculum was roughly divided into: operations (44.39%), intelligence (14.07%), logistics
(22.96%), personnel (9.3%), and others (8.28%). I calculate these figures from Evans (1989, 40).
152 The defense department directed the integration of anti-communism and US foreign policies into counter-
insurgency courses inaugurated in 1962 (Wolpin 1972, 87).
153 Statement by BG. Stephen Fuqua, Director, Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, at Hearings on H.R. 5490, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, May 13, 1963
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), 728
154 By the mid-1960s, US officials were convinced that the Marines were strongly-oriented toward the West
and that by the end of the decade it would be the only combat unit to be “completely supported by US arms
and equipment”. FY 63–67 Military Assistance Plan for Indonesia, Secret, February 20, 1961, Explanatory
remarks format E-1. Office of the Chief of Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, RG 334 Records of
Interservice Agencies, Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box No. 2, Entry 115, NARA.
By the 1970s, US training curricula was the basis of the Marine Corps Education and Training Center. See
CINCPAC FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10, 1970, 68. Records of the United
States Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box No. 175, NARA.
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Table 4.4: Indonesia’s foreign suppliers of military education and training
Time Service Country Courses/Schools
1940 –
1950s
Army The Netherlands, America, Aus-
tralia, India, Germany, Pakistan,
France, Yugoslavia
Academy and reserve schools (Netherlands),




Navy America, Soviet Union, United
Kingdom, The Netherlands, In-
dia
Royal Naval College (KIM), Naval War Col-
lege, Command and Staff School (Leningrad),
Defence Service Staff College, Royal Naval
Staff College, Torpedo Anti-Submarine





America, India, United King-
dom, Soviet Union, Czechoslo-
vakia, Yugoslavia
Taloa Academy of Aeronautics (Oakland,
CA), Royal Air Force Staff College (Andover),
Staff College (Kiev), Flying School of United
Province, Royal Air Force Technician College,
Jet Flight Training School, RAF Swinderby,
RAF Instructor School
1960s Navy America, Australia, West Ger-
many, Sweden, Japan, United
Kingdom, India
Advanced and specialized training and
courses, Royal Naval Staff College, Defence
Service Staff College, Naval War College
Note: The information largely draws from the Indonesian military’s official history textbooks but they
provide inconsistent figures on the number of trainees and students. As such, I leave them out as the
table is meant to illustrate the diversity of foreign military training suppliers.
Source: Author summary of information from Djamhari (1995), TNI (2000a), TNI (2000b), TNI (2000c)
Mission and assessment clarity
In 1953, Indonesia requested that the US provide about 200 officers to train Indonesian
soldiers at Indonesian expense.155 The Joint Chiefs, however, thought that a 200-men mission
would be too large but agreed in principle such as mission was,
“feasible and desirable...[as it would] contribute materially to the organization
and development of the Indonesian military, strengthen and enhance the prestige
of the non-communist Indonesian government and facilitate the establishment of
a more comprehensive military liaison than had existed.”156
Some Indonesian military leaders also saw the US training program could be “modern with-
155 Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Mission to Indonesia,
JCS 1975/11, Top Secret, July 31, 1953, 62. Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Geographic
File 1948–50, Box No. 28, NARA.
156 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense by F. F. Everest, Director, Joint Staff, on ‘Mission to
Indonesia’, Top Secret, August 6, 1953. Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Geographic File
1948–50, Box No. 28, NARA.
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out being Dutch” (Mrázek 1978a, 121). But a foreign mission would be politically problem-
atic if it looked like the NMM.157
The solution was to establish a semi-formal mission small enough to avoid political
backlash. The Military Technical Assistance Group, Indonesia (or MILTAG Indonesia) was
set up by the end of 1958. It was created as “an ad hoc organization with purely political
objectives...[It was] a non-entity...[and] has no official status and no formal basis of existence
in Indonesia.”158 The MILTAG sought to “strengthen military and political influence and
motivation of non-communist elements of the Indonesian armed forces...to the point where
they can take positive action to reduce Communist influences within the government and
within Indonesia at large”.159 It also wanted to “promote US influence through encourage-
ment and support of pro-Western attitudes within the Indonesian military.”160 Finally, it
was expected to plan and deliver military assistance to move Indonesia to “terminate its
procurement from the Soviet bloc and rely solely on US and Allied equipment.”161
Overall, the mission was less about improving Indonesian capabilities than about
strengthening US influence within the officer corps. To that effect, MILTAG and subsequent
157 Even Nasution was opposed to a formal in-country US mission as it would invite political attacks.
Indonesian Army leaders then wanted more space for Indonesian officers at US schools. See Message from
U.S. Army Attache in Jakarta to Chief of Staff of U.S. Army, Top Secret, April 28, 1954. Records of the
United States Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box No. 308, NARA.
158 The only basis was a verbal concurrence between Generals Nasution and Vitrupp on October 23,
1958. By September 1959, the foreign and defense ministries buck-passed each other on MILTAG’s protocol
arrangements. To maintain the status quo, the protocol bureau claimed the arrangements but kept the
process slowly. Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia 1958 - 1963,
7, Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified Historical
Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA
159 Memorandum from Commander in Chief, Pacific to Major General Russell L. Vittrup, August 6, 1958, 1,
RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, Security Classified,
General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box 2, Entry 115, NARA.
160 Approved Terms of Reference for the Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, enclosed in Memo-
randum from Commander in Chief, Pacific to Chief, Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, Novem-
ber 13, 1959, 1, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia,
Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box 2, Entry 115, NARA
161 Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia 1958 - 1963, 5 from
’Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified Historical
Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA
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US defense missions162 worked to: (1) increase the number of qualified instructors in the mil-
itary school system, (2) provide training in skills in which deficiencies cannot be overcome
through local training, (3) provide training in leadership, command, and staff operations of
US military doctrines, and (4) provide field manuals, films, books, and periodicals to con-
tinue the “indoctrination and maintenance of pro-western support” of key officers.163 These
goals suggest that in the early part of the critical juncture, the US did not seek an Indone-
sian organization-wide emulation. At best, we see a mix of emulation-related goals (“train
commanders in US military doctrine”) as well as political ones (“indoctrination”). Even
Indonesia-based US military advisers believed the US military has ‘’wisely not attempted to
pattern the Indonesian Armed Forces along US Army lines.”164
However, the US defense establishment did not or could not properly assess the value
of its military education assistance to Indonesia. Table 4.5 below describes the Defense De-
partment’s annual Military Assistance Appraisal Checklist in the 1950s. As we can see, the
framework to measure the impact of US education and training is unsuited for Indonesia.
It focuses, for example, on ‘jointness’ and ‘industrial mobilization’. Most post–colonial mili-
taries like Indonesia struggled with basic organizational challenges like establishing central-
ized command and control (discussed above). Jointness and industrialization were unlikely
to be salient goals for the Indonesian military back then.
Consider also the assessment for the Army in Table 4.6 below. The checklist looks
more like an intelligence assessment than specific organizational elements the education or
162 MILTAG lasted for a few years as the deterioration of US-Indonesia ties led to its closure by 1964. The
‘Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia’ was created in its stead.
163 Military Assistance Plan FY 1964–68 prepared by U.S. MILTAG Indonesia, Explanatory Sheet for
Format MAP E-1, Project A6 Internal Security, Secret, May 10, 1962. Office of the Chief of Military
Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified, General
Correspondence, 1958-65, Box No. 2, Entry 115, NARA.
164 Draft repot on Indonesia for the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee, The Presidents Committee to
Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee), Privileged Information, February
27, 1959, 2. Edward G. Lansdale Papers, Box No. 42, Hoover Institution Archives.
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Table 4.5: Military Assistance Program (MAP) appraisal checklist (general)
Key criteria/category Notes/components
Summary evaluation of effectiveness Where possible, the comments should be on a joint basis,
rather than from a single-service viewpoint.
Major equipment deficiencies Summarize applicable paragraphs of Service sections.
Effect of MAP deliveries Summarize applicable paragraphs of Service sections
Country military performance and
progress from MAP start
Indicate improvements in military posture, increases in
number of units and personnel.
Estimated effectiveness of forces 6
months prior to reporting data
Overall estimate of all units and may be made on a joint
basis if possible
Industrial mobilization What the Army, Navy, and Air Force industrial mobi-
lization planning is conducted to prepare the country
to assume the industrial burden of supporting forces in
peace and war.
Source: Summarized from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Report-
ing Media for Data Required to Appraise Foreign Military Forces, JCS 2099/747, Confidential, November 8, 1957,
Appendix. Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Central Decimal File 1957, Box No. 5, NARA.
training programs could improve. The one section on training and education measures the
effects of the programs by how much US-trained trainers shape jointness. Counting the
number of trainers does not account for the potential changes in the recipient’s doctrinal
documents or training manuals. It is also unclear if US assistance could improve the opera-
tional performance of the recipient beyond the number of equipments provided. Again, for
a post-colonial army like Indonesia, operational performance could not always be measured
by combat against an external enemy. Bottom line, the US did not have an appropriate
framework to assess its education and training assistance to the Indonesian military.
4.4 Personnel infrastructure
The low-quality personnel infrastructure of the Indonesian military — its career manage-
ment and education systems — during the critical juncture hindered the organization’s
capacity to understand, adopt, and implement US theories of victory and corporatism. The
under-developed career management system de-valued professional qualifications and made
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Include structure, staff, components, arms, services, and units.
Distribution of active duty
personnel by branch
Indicate balance or imbalance and corrective action needed
Mobilization procedures The system and procedure to mobilize personnel in an emergency
Logistical support system
• Organization and operation for logistical support, including stock con-
trol system and tables of equipment
• end-item utilization from units and installations observations.
Training and school sys-
tem
• Training system and MAP current and projected training program
(inc. training and schools for regular, reserve, and para-military).
• Extent to which MAP training programs were utilized to form an
effective nucleus of qualified instructor-type personnel
• Extent and effectiveness of country utilization of MAP-funded mobile
training teams, technical representatives, training aids and publication
• Effectiveness and critical deficiencies of overall unit and individual
training programs, especially combined arms and joint training
• What joint training has been undertaken and the effectiveness in joint
operations
Signal communication
Signal communication systems for command and administrative control
(internal organizational operations).
Morale
Moral, general attitude, susceptibility to subversion and the communist
trend (that can detract from force effectiveness)
Effectiveness of forces
Effectiveness to carry out military objectives. Estimate the number of
days MAP–supported units can conduct sustained combat operations.
Major equipment deficien-
cies
Assessment and forecast of equipment deficiencies that could affect: unit
activation, minimum essential training in schools and training centers,
and combat effectiveness.
Effect of MAP deliveries
• Whether MAP delivery in the previous 6 months have been in phase
with the country’s programs and schedules (activation, organization,
and training)
• Whether equipment furnished under the grant assistance program is
properly utilized
Country military perfor-
mance and progress from
MAP start
What has MAP done in general, military posture improvement, unit
number increases, personnel, etc.
Ability of country to ab-
sorb MAP equipment
Summarize overall ability to absorb MAP equipments
Source: Summarized from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Reporting
Media for Data Required to Appraise Foreign Military Forces, JCS 2099/747, Confidential, November 8, 1957, Appendix.
Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Central Decimal File 1957, Box No. 5, NARA.
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it unlikely that US-trained officers would rise to the top and become product champions.
I provide a statistical analysis of the career patterns of the Indonesian Army elite to sup-
port this claim. I also provide additional qualitative analyses of the evolution of the career
management policies showing informal institutions were more important for officer’s career
trajectory. Finally, I demonstrate how the military’s low-quality education and training
system reduced the army’s learning capacity.
4.4.1 Career management: statistical and organizational analyses
Analysts of Indonesian politics claim that the US was influential in shaping the Indonesian
military. Some believe that Indonesian officers with “American diplomas” were placed in
“extremely influential positions” in the educational and command structure of the Army
(Mrázek 1978a, 122). An officer returning from the US training would be assigned as an
instructor in Indonesian educational or training units for at least one year.165 Others claim
that Indonesian officers deemed US training and education to be prestigious, particularly
schools like Fort Leavenworth (Evans 1989, 40).166 But these claims are based on anecdotes
without any consistent measurement of what military aid ‘effectiveness’ or ’success’ meant.167
Organization-wide emulation was either partly acknowledged or implicitly assumed. As our
theory argues, a successful emulation requires new career pathways for the officers trained
in the theories of victory and corporatism.
165 This information was provided in a correspondence between George Benson and Bryan Evans on January
11, 1988 (cited in Evans 1989, 38, fn. 88). But there was no documentary evidence provided.
166 After Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning was second in popularity among 1960s-era officers, followed by
Fort Harrison, Fort Sill, Fort Gordon, Fort Bliss, and the National War College. The ranking is from Mrázek
(1978a, 122), which did not provide further empirical support.
167 The previous section demonstrates that Washington viewed ‘success’ based on its close ties to key Army
officers and their willingness to challenge the PKI. But how did the Indonesian military view the effectiveness
of sending its officers to partake in US education and training?
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Statistical analysis
I use an original dataset to statistically test the effects of US education or training for the
career trajectory of Indonesian Army officers. More broadly, I seek to understand which
features of an officer’s education and career were more likely to lead to a successful career:
whether he retired a general or held a command appointment. The tests suggest two key
findings. First, there is no strong correlation between what we consider as a professional
career trajectory and a successful retirement. Second, the effects of US education and training
programs were indirect; by themselves, they were poor career predictors. Instead, a higher
proportion of an officer’s foreign education (from his total civilian and military education)
likely led to a command appointment before retiring. As I discuss below, this effect could be
attributed to the importance of pre-foreign training elite status and patronage (i.e. informal
institutions). Only those who were groomed or part of an elite faction before their departure
could afford to spend more time overseas. If US education and training could not directly
boost an officer’s career, then new career pathways for US-trained officers were unlikely to
emerge and they were unlikely to be product champions.
I would like note that the data was originally designed to understand why retired
officers had entered politics. The data thus suffers from two limitations. First, there is
an inherent selection bias. As we had to rely on published information, we could only code
publicly prominent officers. In other words, we only have detailed information on public ‘elite’
officers but may not be representative of the officer corps as a whole. We estimate that we
have relatively complete information on roughly 10 to 15 % of each Army academy cohort
until the 1980s (around 20–30 % of each class became generals). By complete information, I
mean we were fairly confident that we recorded the majority of an officer’s education, career,
and post-retirement activities. So, while we have a roster list of 6,676 officers, we only have
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good information on about 1,000 of them. The selection bias is unfortunate but unavoidable
given the nature of the data and the purpose of its creation. It is also acceptable given that
I am interested in the Western product champions within the military elite.
Second, the baseline data was spotty and suffers from multi-collinearity problems
across seventy different variables. For example, there were more data points on one officer’s
career than his education while another might have the opposite. Some of the information
were also under-specified; an officer could claim to have attended a ‘training course’ without
detailing the duration. Thus, as the summary statistics below suggests, I had to recode
the key variables into dummy and count variables for an officer’s education or career. To
address some of the multi-collinearity problems, I ran a dozen different tests for different
models (accounting for the empirical requirements of the hypothesis testing). I settled on
the dozen variables presented below. This is also why I chose ‘command appointment’ as the
better dependent variable to test, rather than ‘flag-rank’ (which was almost perfectly linearly
correlated with too many of the possible independent variables). As a test of a ‘successful
career’, a last command appointment should also be harder to achieve than a general rank.
I will describe the variable measurements below.
To understand the possible effects of US education and training programs, I seek to
answer: what explains an Indonesian Army officer’s successful career? I measure a successful
career by: (1) whether an officer retired with a flag-rank (general) and (2) whether he held
a command post before retiring. These two outcomes are commonly accepted markers of
a successful military career; assuming a successful professional career is the ultimate goal
of any officer.168 There are several possible hypotheses to explain the outcomes. I focus
168 This assumption may not always hold for many officers under authoritarian rule. They may be interested,
for example, in developing business or political ties. But it is a useful assumption to make as we seek to
understand whether professional ‘markers’ predict career patterns. Arguably, if professional markers define
an officer’s successful career, then it is safe to argue that the military’s career management is of high quality.
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on arguments salient to the Indonesian Army context, such as assignments to Territorial
Command structure. I also focus on the different ways foreign education and training may
affect career patterns.
1. Foreign education: participation in foreign education and training courses in general.
The premise is that a modern officer requires international education and training to
improve his professionalism and stay abreast of the latest concepts or technology. A
foreign education also provides a wider-range of network and experience necessary to
function in a globalized strategic environment (Scoppio 2003; Atkinson 2014). The
more ‘internationalized’ an officer becomes, the more his career should improve. But
there are different ways to measure foreign education and training, from the number
of years spent abroad to types of courses taken.
• Hypothesis 1A: The more an Indonesian officer spent time overseas to study or
train, the more likely he retired as a general or holding a command appointment.
• Hypothesis 1B: The more an Indonesian officer spent time overseas to study or
train, in proportion to his overall education and training, the more likely he retired
as a general or holding a command appointment.169
• Hypothesis 1C: The more an Indonesian officer spent time at civilian educational
institutions overseas, in proportion to its overall foreign education and training,
the more likely he retired as a general or holding a command appointment.
• Hypothesis 1D: If an Indonesian officer obtained a foreign graduate degree, he
was more likely to retire as a general or holding a command appointment.
• Hypothesis 1E: If an Indonesian officer attended a foreign Staff and Command
College, he was more likely to retire as a general or holding a command appoint-
ment.
2. US education and training : participation in US-based military and/or civilian edu-
cation and/or training courses. As mentioned above, scholars of Indonesian politics
claim that the US influenced the Indonesian military because US-trained officers were
169 The proportion of foreign education would be ‘foreign education and training’ divided by civilian and
post-academy military education and training (total years).
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placed in ‘influential positions’. By implication, we should observe US training and
education programs to be positively contributing to or correlated with the successful
career trajectory of their recipients.
• Hypothesis 2: If an Indonesian officer participated in US military and/or civilian
education or training programs, he was more likely to retire as a general or holding
a command appointment.
3. Power proximity : whether an officer was close to the political center of power. This
could be proxied by a tour with the different Jakarta-based military headquarters (both
the Army HQ and General Staff HQ) and the Ministry of Defense and Security. Given
the prevalence of informal institutions in personnel policies, a close proximity to the
New Order power center should improve an officer’s career.
• Hypothesis 3: If an Indonesian officer was assigned to the military headquarters
or defense ministry, then he was more likely to retire as a general or holding a
command appointment.
4. Local power : whether an officer has a ‘territorial’ career, by which I mean he has been
assigned to or had tours with (at least five times, regardless of rank or positions) the
Army’s Territorial Command (KOTER).170 Under the New Order, the high command
gradually tolerated a local commander’s ability to harness and maintain local political,
social, and economic stability—which solidified the regime’s legitimacy. As long as
the KOTER remained the source of political power and legitimacy (Rinakit 2013), a
territorial officer should have a brighter career than his non-territorial counterparts.
170 All positions within the KOTER except for intelligence and combat. The use of 5 as a frequency marker
is based on the calculation that an officer’s post-academy career before he reaches a flag-rank (i.e. from 2nd
Lieutenant to Colonel) should include between 8 to 10 assignments or tours. This calculation is further
based on the following assumptions: (1) total length of military career: 36-38 years; (2) flag-rank duration:
5-6 years; (3) total education & training length: 4-5 years; (4) each command/staff post length: 2-3 years.
Thus, 5 tours should qualify an officer as possessing a particular ‘career type’.
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• Hypothesis 4: If an Indonesian officer had a territorial career, then he was more
likely to retire as a general or holding a command appointment.
5. Combat campaign: whether an officer was officially part of a military campaign. Gener-
ally, combat experience should be a marker of both professionalism and regime loyalty.
For example, officers who have had tours in East Timor and Aceh tended to be pro-
moted faster than those who never served there (Kammen 2012). In the 1980s, majors
and lieutenant colonels with tours in East Timor were ‘automatically’ selected into
the Army Staff and Command College.171 In short, an officer with combat experience
should have a brighter career.
• Hypothesis 5: If an Indonesian officer had participated in a military campaign,
then he was more likely to retire as a general or holding a command appointment.
6. Personal traits : whether an officer was Javanese or Muslim. The argument comes from
the numerous editions of Cornell University’s ‘Current Data on the Indonesian Military
Elite’ published in the Indonesia journal, where ethnicity and religion were cited as
important indicators of career advancement. As most members of the military under
the New Order were Javanese, non-Javanese officers who aspired to senior positions
had to ‘re-socialize’ themselves as Javanese to survive intra-military politics (Gregory
1980, 267). In short, being a Javanese or a Muslim should improve an Indonesian
Army officer’s career.
• Hypothesis 6: If an Indonesian officer was either a Javanese or a Muslim, then he
was more likely to retire as a general or holding a command appointment.
These hypotheses should help us understand what personal and professional traits
171 This policy assumed officers serving there did not have the opportunity for self-study and preparation
that other officers had (McFetridge 1983, 89).
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would be correlated with a successful career in the Indonesian Army. The hypothesis of
interest is Hypothesis 2, whether having a US education or training improves an officer’s
career. If the hypothesis is supported, then it is likely that there were new career pathways
for US-trained officers. Conversely, if the hypothesis is not supported, then it is unlikely
that there were new career pathways for US-trained officers. The presence or absence of new
career pathways anticipates the likely organizational resistance or acceptance of US theories
of victory and corporatism.
Statistical tests I examine the hypotheses in two steps. First, I examine whether an
officer retired with a general-rank. Given the aforementioned problems of multi-collinearity
and spotty data, I could not present a reliable logistic regression with this dependent variable.
After running different tests that gave unreliable results, I decided to provide a descriptive
statistic instead. It simply looks at the portion of Army generals who received some form
of US education and training.172 From the INDOMAG database, I draw a sample of 677
generals with relatively complete career and education information.
Table 4.7 below presents a cross-tabulation of the data. It shows less than 16% of
Army generals had prior US education or training. The results independently confirms the
earlier findings of Evans (1989, 37) who estimated that between 17 and 25% of Indonesian
Army generals received training in the US.173 That only a small number of Army generals
were US-trained suggests that US training programs may not be as coveted as many claims.
If the majority of officers could become generals without a US education or training, it
seemed unlikely that those programs were significant career boosters. It was also unlikely
172 These US programs ranged from short courses or training stints to year-long staff and command college
programs. See Table 4.3 above for the different programs and courses.
173 He never provided the data or the method for his claims. He only noted he calculated them from
the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project’s ‘Current Military Data’ files and The Indonesian Military Leaders:
Biographical and Other Background Data. See Evans (1989, 37, fn. 77).
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that new career pathways were created for US-trained officers. If there were such pathways,
we should have seen at least more US-trained officers promoted to generals. The descriptive
statistic, however, could not tell us which of the six hypotheses above is more probable than
the other. It only shows that Hypothesis 2 is unlikely to be supported when it comes to one
of the dependent variables (flag-rank).
Table 4.7: Cross-tabulation of US-trained Indonesian Army generals











Second, I focus on the other dependent variable: whether an officer retired holding
a command appointment. I draw a smaller sample of 100 foreign-trained officers (from the
677 noted above). This smaller sample represents a higher confidence in the data coverage.
Unfortunately, this sample also reflects the selection bias and problems discussed above.
These generals however were among the most publicly known and elite members of the
officer corps. As the arguments regarding the value of US military education hinge on the
recipients’ ‘brighter’ careers, it is reasonable to examine these prominent officers. I will
discuss the sample and the officers’ characteristics below. I translate the hypotheses and
outcome into Table 4.8 while Table 4.9 provides the summary statistics.
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Table 4.8: Variable measurement and coding
Variable Measurement Type
Command appointment Command over a branch/unit/combat arm at last rank Dummy
(pre-retirement)
Flag-rank General rank as last rank (pre-retirement) Dummy
US edu. & train. Participated in a US education and/or training courses Dummy
or programs (at least once)
Military Headquarters Assigned to Service HQ, General HQ, or Ministry of Dummy
Defense and Security (at least once)
Territorial career Staff and/or command positions within the Territorial Dummy
Command (KOTER) structure (min. 5 tours)
Combat campaigns Number of military campaigns Count
Muslim Whether an officer is Muslim or not Dummy
Javanese Whether an officer is Javanese or not Dummy
Foreign edu. & train. Total number of years (both civilian and military) Continuous
Proportion of foreign edu. Foreign edu. & train divided by civilian and Continuous
post-academy military education (total years)
Proportion of civilian foreign
edu.
Foreign civilian education (total years) divided by for-
eign edu & train
Continuous
Master’s degree (foreign) Obtained a foreign graduate degree (MA/MSC) Dummy
Staff & Command College Attended a foreign Staff & Command College Dummy
(foreign)
As the dependent variable is categorical, I use a logistic regression model:
CommandAppointment = α + β1USEdu+ β2MilitaryHQ+ β3Territorial
+β4Combat+ β5Muslim+ β6Java+ β7ForeignEdu+ ε
(4.1)
I test seven models in the regression presented in Table 4.10 below. The variation in
the models reflect the different conceptualization of ‘foreign education & training’ (Hypothe-
ses 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, and 1E above). These variables help us understand whether there was a
different effect between ‘US education and training’ and ‘foreign education and training’; the
presence or absence of a significant correlation between one or the other with the likelihood
of holding a pre-retirement command appointment. This also helps us infer whether there
was an organizational resistance or acceptance of foreign theories of victory and corporatism
in general or just specific to the US.
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Table 4.9: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Command appointment 90 .267 .447 0 1
Flag-rank 90 .967 .180 0 1
US edu. & train. 90 .656 .478 0 1
Military Headquarters 90 .378 .488 0 1
Territorial career 90 .578 .497 0 1
Combat campaigns 90 .944 1.539 0 7
Muslim 90 .822 .385 0 1
Javanese 90 .589 .495 0 1
Foreign edu. & train. 90 1.514 1.427 0 8
Proportion of foreign edu. 90 .440 .325 0 1
Proportion of civ. foreign edu 89 .172 .355 0 1
Master’s degree (foreign) 88 .171 .379 0 1
Staff & Command College (foreign) 90 .456 .501 0 1
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Table 4.10: Logistic regression of Indonesian Army officer career trajectory
DV = Command appointment at retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
US education & training 0.0915 0.101 0.0923 -0.141 0.0723 0.256 -0.139
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (-0.25) (0.13) (0.46) (-0.21)
Military Headquarters -1.010 -1.001 -1.192∗ -0.983 -1.014 -1.065 -1.169
(-1.75) (-1.72) (-1.96) (-1.69) (-1.75) (-1.81) (-1.81)
Territorial career 0.572 0.561 0.447 0.230 0.444 0.450 0.000586
(1.07) (1.04) (0.80) (0.41) (0.81) (0.82) (0.00)
Combat campaigns 0.242 0.240 0.327 0.195 0.226 0.308 0.269
(1.45) (1.42) (1.80) (1.11) (1.32) (1.74) (1.26)
Muslim 0.0441 0.0411 0.0697 -0.0814 -0.173 -0.161 0.0259
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (-0.11) (-0.24) (-0.23) (0.03)
Javanese -0.126 -0.142 -0.296 -0.393 -0.206 0.0000781 -0.755
(-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.51) (-0.68) (-0.36) (0.00) (-1.12)
Foreign education & training -0.0290 0.00141
(-0.15) (0.00)
Proportion of foreign education & mil edu 1.904∗ 2.503∗
(2.23) (2.10)
Proportion of civilian foreign education -2.193 -2.212
(-1.83) (-1.02)
Foreign Master’s degree -1.040 -0.179
(-1.26) (-0.11)
Foreign Staff and Command College 0.836 -0.430
(1.54) (-0.54)
Cons. -1.294 -1.240 -2.083∗ -0.430 -0.789 -1.699∗ -1.168
(-1.59) (-1.40) (-2.30) (-0.49) (-0.92) (-1.96) (-1.10)
N 90 90 90 89 88 90 87
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
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Analysis and implications First and foremost, there is no support for Hypothesis 2:
that participating in a US education and training program would be correlated with holding
a command appointment before retiring. In other words, participating in a US education
and training program did not have any significant effect for or correlation with an Indonesian
officer’s successful career. When accounting for other variables, participation inUS education
or training programs was not significant across all models. This finding tracks with our
descriptive statistics on the low percentage of US-trained Army generals. As Hypothesis 2
does not appear to hold across two different measurements of a successful career, it is safe
to argue that US education did not have a significantly positive effect.
The lack of significant effects could be reflected in or driven by the absence of new
career pathways for US-trained officers. For one thing, if officers were assigned an educational
or training post upon returning from the US, then those posts did not guarantee a subsequent
senior or command post. As I discuss below, educational postings were often used as ‘exiles’
under the New Order. For another, being out of the country for extended periods of time may
harm an officer’s career prospects as his domestically-located fellow officers advanced. This
was more likely when an officer was part of a large academy cohort size, or when promotional
logjams were prevalent. Another possibility is that graduates of US programs were rarely
assigned command positions, which signaled their lack of readiness for higher responsibilities.
Finally, “home-grown” officers might suspiciously view returnees as ‘socialized’ in foreign
ways. In any case, there is little evidence to support the claim that US education had a
positive effect for the careers of Indonesian Army officers.
Second, there is no support for Hypothesis 4: that having a territorial career was
correlated with holding a command appointment before retiring. Across all models, the
territorial career had no significant effects. This finding is counter-intuitive to what we
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know about Indonesian military politics, where KOTER commanders tended to be successful
generals (Jenkins 1984). The lack of significant territorial effects can be explained in several
ways. For one thing, most KOTER officers who became successful commanders or generals
had multiple tours of duty outside of KOTER. Becoming ‘too localized’ undermined an
officer’s chances to navigate broader intra-military politics. For another, territorial officers
could become too comfortable in managing local affairs. As such, they tend to “set up their
retirement” to take advantage of their local knowledge and network. Officers with multiple
KOTER tours likely realized that they would be better off in local politics. Put differently,
having the occasional KOTER tour helped an officer’s career, but having a territorial career
(more than half of pre-general rank postings in KOTER) did not boost the chances to hold
command appointments before retiring.
Third, there is no support for Hypothesis 5: that participating in a combat campaign
was correlated with holding a command appointment before retiring. Across all models,
combat campaigns had no significant effects. This is another counter-intuitive finding. In a
professional military, combat-tested officers should have brighter careers. But as I describe
below, informal institutions governed officers’ behaviors and expectations. In the Army, a
combat campaign was neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful career. For one thing,
given the nature of KOTER and kekaryaan duties, many officers made their marks without
combat. For another, the prevalence of patronage means that career trajectories depended
on personal ties. Some leaders like Moerdani valued combat operations and expected his
officers to do the same. But others focused on regime support (e.g. ‘securing’ elections),
where combat was less valuable. Put it differently, when competing informal institutions
rule, combat campaigns were not be clear career boosters.
Fourth, there is no support for Hypothesis 6—that being Javanese or Muslim was
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correlated with holding a command appointment before retiring. Across all the models, both
the Javanese and Muslim variables had no significant effects.174 For the high command, it
may be that ethnicity and religion played no significant factor in promotions. This does not
mean the military’s personnel policies were institutionalized or that appointments were made
based on merit. Informal institutions such as patronage still prevailed. It is also likely the
Javanese or Muslim variables simply mirror the societal demographic structure. As Javanese
and Muslims were the dominant groups in society, it is reasonable to assume that they would
become the dominant groups (by size) within the military. Lastly, under the New Order,
Suharto preferred non-Javanese generals as key leaders in the 1970s and 1980s to prevent
the rise of potential challengers from the military.175
Fifth, there is limited support for Hypothesis 3: that assignments to the military
headquarters or defense ministry were correlated with holding a command appointment
before retiring. The support comes from the significance of the military headquarters variable
in model 3 (where the foreign education measure is the proportion of foreign education and
training) but not in others. Model 3 also suggests the significant correlation was negative:
appointments to military headquarters made an officer less likely to finish his career holding
a command appointment. Controlling for other variables, the odds ratio between the group
appointed to the military headquarters and the group not appointed to have command
appointments at retirement is 0.305 (log odds -1.192 exponentiated). This means that the
odds of holding a command appointment before retiring were lower for officers appointed to
174 Initially, I ran a test with the same model using a Javanese-Muslim combination as a single variable.
While the population was smaller, the result was the same, i.e. no significant effects. I decided to separate
the Javanese and Muslim components into two separate variables with the expectation that individually one
might have an effect the other does not.
175 After Suharto relinquished the post of ABRI Commander in 1973, his next three successors were
‘minorities’ (non-Javanese and/or non-Muslims): General Maraden Panggabean (1973–78), General M. Yusuf
(1978–1983), and General Benny Moerdani (1983–1988). Panggabean (Christian) and Yusuf (Muslim) were
from Sumatra and Sulawesi, respectively, while Moerdani was a Javanese Catholic.
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the military headquarters than those who were not.
This is another counter-intuitive finding as many assume Jakarta appointments boosted
careers. One interpretation is that Jakarta appointments at the staff level signaled the lack
of leadership qualities, the lack of local ties and experience, or the lack of critical patronage.
In this interpretation, Army HQ, General Staff HQ, and Ministry of Defense and Secu-
rity were not ‘prestigious’ posts, but quasi ‘exiles’. This was likely given the promotional
logjams—too many officers for too few positions—discussed below. In other words, these
Jakarta posts were ‘placeholders’ for officers who needed or wanted to be promoted but there
were no positions available. Another interpretation is that assignments to the Jakarta-based
headquarters increased the likelihood of involvement in national political, social, or business
activities. This in turn decreased the likelihood of developing the organizational qualifi-
cations necessary to hold command appointments. Put differently, Jakarta appointments
turned officers into domestic political players not organizational ones.
Finally, there is some support for Hypothesis 1: foreign education and training in
general (not just US specific) was correlated with holding a command appointment before
retiring. As discussed above, I use different measurements of ‘foreign education and training’.
Out of the five measures, only the proportion of foreign education and training (Hypothesis
1B) shows significant correlation with holding a command appointment. Specifically, the
higher the proportion of an officer’s time spent overseas for education and training (compared
to his total post-academy education and training), the more likely he held a command
appointment before retiring. Specifically, for one unit increase in an officer’s proportion of
his foreign education, the expected change in log odds for reaching a command appointment
before retiring is 2.503 (or change in odds ratio of 12.23). This means that officers who
had a higher proportion of foreign education had a higher probability of retiring holding a
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command appointment than those who had a lower proportion.
What explains the paradox that ‘US education and training’ did not have a significant
effect but ‘foreign education and training’ did? If foreign education and training includes the
US, why would the US have no significant effect? There are two inter-related explanations.
First, extended overseas assignments (or studies) were a function of patronage. Foreign
education was not a ‘mandatory’ requirement; they were ‘opportunities’ granted to officers.
As an ‘assigned duty’, foreign education and training could also act as an ‘exile’ or ‘off-
ramp’ for officers deemed politically or professionally unreliable, or they simply could not
be posted within the structure.176 But overseas education and training could also provide
specific capability development for the military.177
Overseas study tours as off-ramps tended to be short-lived; officers could ‘repent’,
leave the military, or fill a domestic opening. But overseas assignments as capability devel-
opment tended to be longer as officers could be sent multiple times to different countries to
study some skills the military required. Officers with extended overseas tours could not have
done so without powerful patrons who selected and supported them. As such, it was likely
upon their return that these officers were promoted to key positions (Gregory 1976, 225).
But the overseas tours in themselves did not ‘cause’ or gave these officers brighter careers.
It was the powerful patronage network that allowed them to depart for longer periods in
the first place—and provided ‘selection effects’ to elite status. Thus, an officer who had a
successful career despite extended overseas assignments signifies the powerful effect of infor-
mal institutions (discussed below). In short, those who could ‘afford’ to spend more time
176 Suharto was known to send officers to study overseas or take embassy posts if he deemed them politically
unreliable (see e.g. Jenkins 1984). Over time, overseas assignments became a way to temporarily ‘park’
officers outside the current structure if they could not find a domestic opening commensurable to their rank,
qualification, or service length. See more details in Gregory (1976, 310).
177 Powerful patrons sent their men to study overseas for long durations to learn a required skill, as General
Yani did in the 1950s when he needed to build the Army’s mobile striking capability (Mrázek 1978a).
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of the time spent on foreign training & education (US and Non-US)
(a) By percentage (%) (b) By frequency
overseas were more likely to be part of a powerful patronage network before they departed.
Second, the location of foreign education and training mattered less than the propor-
tion of the duration. As Figure 4.8 below shows, the distribution of time spent on foreign
education and training between the US and non-US countries was similar. Only a few officers
who studied overseas had a high proportion of foreign education and training. Among those
who have studied overseas (both in the US and non-US countries), between 15 and 25% of
them spent more than 80% of their education and training outside of Indonesia. Thus, one
of the reasons why foreign education and training was significantly correlated to command
appointments, but US education and training did not, was because many of those who went
to the US only went for shorter durations. A smaller number of US-trained officers who
went for multiple tours outside of the US—and had a higher proportion of foreign education
and training—went on to hold command appointments. In short, the location mattered less
than the proportion of duration relative to an officer’s education and training.
One might question, however, if the high ‘proportion of foreign education’ was filled
by officers who only had one overseas education in their whole career. The value of ‘pro-
portion of foreign education’ might be high for these officers, but their foreign experience
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was not extensive, which is what the measurement is trying to capture. If so, interpreting
the significance of the ‘proportion of foreign education’ variable will be problematic. To
check whether the high ‘proportion of foreign education’ is filled by officers with little for-
eign education or training, I plotted the variable ‘proportion of foreign education’ against
the variable ‘years of foreign education’ in Figure 4.9 below. The high ‘proportion of foreign
education’ group (0.6 to 1 in proportion) is made up of officers who spent plenty of time for
foreign education (between 2 and 8 years)—and not just officers whose ‘proportion of foreign
education’ is high because their short-lived education and training program happened to be
overseas. Most officers had roughly between 1 to 4 years of foreign education and training
(roughly between 10 to 30% of their total education and training).
Figure 4.7: Time spent overseas plotted against proportion of education overseas
These findings suggest that most of the usual predictors of a professional military
career did not have significant effects in shaping the career pattern of Indonesian Army
officers. Overall, attendance at a US education or training program in itself did not have a
strong correlation with a command appointment before retiring and only around 15 percent of
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the Army’s top 677 generals from the 1950s were US-trained. The next sub-section examines
the career management policies to explain these findings further.
Career management
This sub-section demonstrates how the Indonesian Army’s career management system pre-
vented new career pathways for US-trained officers. The number of such officers, presumably
socialized to US theories of victory and corporatism to varying degrees, reached its peak dur-
ing the critical juncture (discussed above). But upon their return, very few of them were
promoted to key positions. The US-trained officers thus could not became product cham-
pions pushing for an organization-wide emulation. The military under the New Order only
institutionalize its career management system by the 1980s, after the critical juncture has
passed.178 But during the critical juncture, the Indonesian military had an “antiquated per-
sonnel management system”, according to US officials administering military aid.179 The
Department of Defense and Security overseeing the military had a similar problem:
“The personnel system for all services was a manual operation and extremely
decentralized. Smaller units maintained their own personnel records and had full
control over personnel within the unit. A personnel skills identifier system did
not exist, nor was there a requirements table.”180
As noted above, the intra-military conflicts acted as critical antecedents shaping the under-
development of the career management system.
178 The Indonesian military did not likely produce a coherent, detailed, and centralized personnel manage-
ment regulation until 1991. See Buku Petunjuk Dasar tentang Pembinaan Prajurit ABRI [Basic Guidebook
on ABRI Soldier Management], Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Surat Keputusan
Panglima ABRI (PANGAB) No. Kep/06/X/1991 (dated October 5, 1991).
179 CINCPAC FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10, 1970, 3. Records of the United




Evolving formal structures One of the consequences of intra-military conflicts was an
ever-changing organizational structure; often coming out of compromises among competing
groups. Senior military leaders understood they could not easily develop an organizational
structure that excluded one faction over the other, as the Subroto commission’s problems
discussed above shows. Military leaders then crafted broad, formal structures that were then
tinkered with at the margins as intra-organizational power balances evolved. In essence, they
kept the basic foundational posture of the Territorial Command but tinkered with its size
and area coverage as well as the command and control structure, personnel appointment,
and specific posts. Initially, the need to ‘unify and integrate’ the military drove these fluid
organizational boundaries. But by constantly shifting formal structures, competing informal
institutions like patronage became entrenched. The prevalence of informal institutions, in
turn, led to new factional conflicts and compromises which were reflected in another round
of tinkering of the formal structures. Thus, as our framework argues, the interplay between
formal and informal institutions created a feedback loop and reflected the intra-military
power dynamics. As Table 4.11 below shows, the formal structures changed almost once
every two or three years; they changed at least three times during the critical juncture.
The tinkering suggests formal institutions were not stable. If officers were not con-
fident in how they could be promoted, why shouldn’t they fear that Western theories of
victory and corporatism would make things worse? For much of the Cold War therefore, in-
cluding during the critical juncture, senior Indonesian officers relied on informal institutions
to govern their men. The structural tinkering meanwhile reflected the ‘compromises’ between
competing groups especially over integration plans. Up until the 1980s, ‘integration’ meant
the reduction of intra-military conflicts as well as a centralized ‘command and control’. This
was why the high command could only implement integrative policies after they defeated the
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Table 4.11: Formal Indonesian military organizational and personnel rules
Year Official document No. Subject/focus
1954 Law (Undang-Undang or UU) 29 State defense structure, authority, organization, and
procedure
1962 Presidential Decision (Keppres) 225 Armed Forces leadership, structure, and organiza-
tion
1967 Presidential Decision 132 Changes to national defense and security organiza-
tion and procedures
1969 Presidential Decision 79 Refinements to previous defense reorganization de-
cision (Keppres No. 132/1969)
1970 Minister of Defense/Armed
Forces Commander Decision
157 Organization and procedure of the Army
1974 Presidential Decision 7 Refinements to previous defense reorganization de-
cision (Keppres No. 79/1969)
1982 Law 20 Structure and organization of state defense and se-
curity
1983 Presidential Decision 46 Department of Defense & Security organization and
structure
1983 Presidential Decision 60 Organization and structure of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI)
1988 Law 2 Soldiery of the Armed Forces of the Republic of In-
donesia (ABRI)
1990 Government Regulation (PP) 6 ABRI soldier administration
1991 ABRI Commander Regulation 6 Basic guidebook on ABRI soldier management
1992 ABRI Commander Decision 8 Refinements to Army organization and procedure
1992 ABRI Commander Decision 9 Refinements to Navy organization and procedure
1998 Minister of Defense/Armed
Forces Commander Decision
9 Refinements to ABRI general staff, social-political
offices
1999 ABRI Commander Decision 16 Organization and structure of the military command
and control center
1999 Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 2 Separation of National Police from ABRI and the
formation of Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI)
2000 TNI Commander Decision 2 Organization and structure of TNI general staff
2002 Law 3 State Defense
2004 Law 34 Indonesian National Defense Forces
2009 Presidential Regulation 10 TNI organizational structure
2010 Governmental Regulation (PP) 39 TNI soldier administration
2016 Presidential Regulation 62 Refinements to previous document on TNI organi-
zational structure (PP No. 39 of 2010)
Note: The number refers to the formally assigned number of the regulations (e.g. Law No. 29), not how many documents
were produced. These are the documents I have collected. There might be other internal documents that regulate
personnel policies I am unaware of.
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PERMESTA rebellion, and by implication, the powerful local commanders. By 1962, the
first integration of the armed services happened when the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia (ABRI) was formed. This took place just as the critical juncture period started.
But before the consequences of a new structure could kick-in, civil-military dynamics
interfered. Sukarno sought to centralize the military under his personal authority while en-
couraging inter-service rivalries. The civil-military tensions eventually led to one of the most
devastating intra-military conflicts in Indonesian history, the aforementioned attempted coup
of 1965.181 Thus, the New Order’s first decade focused on consolidating the military organi-
zation, including through military purges.182 The New Order also re-engineered the military
structure, education & training, and doctrinal concepts as well as operational functions to
‘unify’ the military (McGregor 2007; Rinakit 2005). During the critical juncture therefore,
the Indonesian military’s career management, and the organization in general, was in flux.
But the New Order paid careful attention to the intra-military power dynamics. This
was why the tinkering of formal rules persisted. The changes were spread for over a decade;
they lasted for much of the critical juncture (until the 1970s) and was roughly completed
by the mid-1980s (after the critical juncture). Initially, Suharto centralized all national
security decision-making and command and control under the Department of Defense and
Security headed by a Minister (MENHANKAM). The most senior officer was designated as
both MENHANKAM as well as Armed Forces Commander (PANGAB). He was the chief
assistant to the President. Service commanders were ‘downgraded’ from their Sukarno-
181 The surviving army leadership insisted that the movement had been masterminded by the PKI, and
began a campaign aimed at destroying the party. But see Anderson, Bunnell and McVey (1971) for one of
the first arguments claiming that the affair was more of an intra-military coup.
182 Army leaders knew, for example, that up to “one-third of the battalions in Central Java were of
dubious loyalty” before 1965. But the post-coup investigation found that the PKI infiltration may have been
worse. See The Indonesian Army: Objectives and Problems, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, OCI No. 3041/65, November 12, 1965, 6, Kathy Kadane
Indonesia Collection, Box No. 2, National Security Archives.
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era authority and made Chief of Staff without operational command and responsible to
MENHANKAM/PANGAB.183 Suharto also created several Primary Operational Commands
(Komando Utama Operasionil) as the direct arm of the MENHANKAM/PANGAB outside
of the three services. These commands were designed as suppliers of rapid reaction forces.184
Unsurprisingly, Suharto was the first MENHANKAM/PANGAB in the post-1965 era.
These changes took place during the critical juncture. So, after hundreds of US-
trained officers were returning to Indonesia, Suharto was changing the military structure.
And yet, he did not promote them; partially because he preferred a small number of
personally-groomed confidantes and partially because he did not want to be seen favor-
ing a group of officers who might be associated with some of the coup-plotters.185 But more
importantly, Suharto needed to unify the military and keep the high command in check.
Aside from the changes above, he also created the Operational Command for Security and
Order (KOPKAMTIB), a separate unit much like a secret police, that answered directly to
him. Even as he downgraded the service commanders’ authority, he expanded the territo-
rial structure by ensuring that all four services would have relatively similar local units and
offices across the country.186 Consequently, the more technologically-driven Navy and Air
Force—and theoretically the most capable to adopt US theories of victory—had to conform
183 Details of these powers can be seen in Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 132 tahun 1967
tentang Perubahan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur bidang Pertahanan-Keamanan. Department of
Information Papers, Indonesian Military History Center.
184 The commands include: (1) Inter-area Defense Command, overseeing more than 2 services and forms a
separate strategic compartment, (2) National Air Defense Command, overseeing more than 2 services with
strategic-defense purposes over the air space, (3) National Maritime Defense Command, overseeing more than
2 services with strategic-defense purposes over Indonesian waters and coasts, (4) Special Forces Command
drawn from all the special force units, (5) Strategic Reserve Command, a mobile striking force. Two more
commands could be established if necessary: Outer Area Command and Joint Task Force
185 Several high ranking members of the alleged plotters were apparently US-trained (Mrázek 1978b, 170–2).
186 Wherever there was an Army Regional Command, there would also be an Air Force Regional Command,
Naval Regional Command, and Police Regional Command (Tempo 1983, 13). High-ranking posts were also
‘replicated’ across the services to reduce inter-service rivalry. See Staff Study by the Deputy Army Chief of
Staff I, “Basic Thoughts on the Development of the Armed Services”, cited in Pauker (1963, 229).
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to the Army’s expansive vision of national security.187
These changes—especially the ‘domestication’ of the Navy and Air Force—made it
harder for the military to be technically-proficient to adopt US theories of victory. They
also sustained the under-development of the personnel infrastructure as Suharto kept tin-
kering with the organizational structure. As such, there was no stable career management
system during the critical juncture. Furthermore, as competing informal institutions such
as Suharto’s patronage exerted significant influence in officer appointments, the absence of a
stable and consistent career management system blocked new career pathways for US-trained
officers. In fact, the persistent organizational tinkering and the prevalence of informal insti-
tutions politicized the career patterns that we see above.
Politicized career pattern and promotional logjams As the career patterns depended
on and reflected the intra-military power dynamics, the ‘value’ of a given post often followed
the informal logics of patronage rather than professional merits. During and immediately
after the Revolutionary War, command positions were more ‘valuable’ than staff positions
as they controlled local troops and resources. But from the late 1950s until the late 1970s
(during the critical juncture), staff positions became valuable as the military expanded its
role in SOEs as well as local and national bureaucracies (Gregory 1976, 255). The New
Order patronage logic, however, determined who would distribute those lucrative positions.
After 1965, officers basically needed the good graces of and personal affiliations with Suharto
and his closest circle to be promoted into and survive in key positions.188
Senior officers did not even consider the selection of Army Chief of Staff and PANGAB—
187 For the Air Force, as their offices and units were replicated to follow the Army, more people were
recruited and promoted at a time when their preexisting human capital was not yet capable of maintaining
and operating sophisticated weaponry (Tempo 1983, 14).
188 Many of the military elite members, for example, served under Suharto when he was commander of the
Mandala campaign to ‘liberate’ West New Guinea or when he was commander of of the Strategic Reserve
Command (or both). See details in Gregory (1976, 220-1).
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the two most powerful posts then—to be institutionalized under the New Order. As General
Edi Sudrajat (Army Chief of Staff, 1988-1993) admits, “the past and existing patterns of
promotion for the Army Chief of Staff were more of an informal guidance with no fixed
[career] progressions” (Hidayat 1991, 23). After all, as General Rudini (Army Chief of Staff,
1983-1986) acknowledges, “The Army chief has been a political position and a presidential
prerogative” (Nasution 1991, 29). Each service also seemed to have its own ‘tradition’ in
selecting its senior leaders. For example, Army chiefs should have held a KODAM post, Air
Force chiefs should have piloted a fighter jet, and Navy chiefs should have commanded a
battle ship.189 Finally, rather than allowing an institutionalized career system to ‘generate’
the next group of leaders, incumbent command holders ‘groomed’ their own replacements—
often their academy classmates (Hidayat 1991, 24). In short, informal rather than formal
institutions governed career patterns at the highest level.
Consequently, the military experienced promotional logjams—too few positions for
too many officers—since the 1950s onwards and during the critical juncture. Given the
relative young age of the post-revolutionary officers, they quickly ‘filled and clogged’ the
lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks. With few prospects for an equally lucrative career
outside of the military, most of them remained in the service as the retirement age was
high.190 These were also officers who could not benefit from foreign education. They were
too senior when the opportunities opened in the 1950s and most did not have the linguistic
or educational skills necessary (Lee 2013, 45). Promotional logjams of domestically-educated
officers resulted in a further stagnation of new blood and ideas.191 As we discussed above,
189 But a presidential intervention could break this pattern, as Suharto did when he appointed Benny
Moerdani as PANGAB without ever holding a KODAM Commander post.
190 By 1968, the official retirement ages were: 42 for NCOs, 45 for junior officers (lieutenants and captains),
48 for mid-rank officers, and 55 for senior (general) officers (McVey 1972, 148, fn. 2).
191 The promotional logjams persisted all the way through the New Order until today. See Chandra and
Kammen (2002) and Laksmana (2019) for details.
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the demobilization plans that would have addressed the problem were stalled by the intra-
military conflicts. The logjams in turn, sustained informal institutions like patronage, and
led to more tinkering of the formal structure. As tinkering required new compromises, the
cycle of low-quality and under-institutionalized career management continued.
It was only in 1986 that for the first time, all of ABRI’s senior leaders were not from
the revolutionary generation.192 The promotional logjams and politicized career management
thus lasted for much of the critical juncture (when the revolutionary generation was in
power). The lack of personnel welfare and budgetary support exacerbated the problem.
In the 1950s, the high command could not give enough arms, uniform, and money to the
local commands.193 The defense budget under the New Order declined from the late 1960s
onwards.194 By the 1970s, the high command was alarmed by the lack of personnel welfare
and the over-bearing cost of unnecessary duties.195 The regime’s solution was to allow
each unit, service, or local commands to be ‘creative’ in providing for themselves through
business enterprises. This further sustained the prevalence of informal institutions, from local
patronage, blurred civil-military boundaries to excessive engagement in business activities.
In fact, many New Order officers became “middle-aged militarists, enjoying the perquisites
of office and benefits of power” (Pauker 1961, 222-3). It was only in the late 1970s, after the
critical juncture has passed, that the military tried to regulate its business activities.196
192 These were Lieutenants General Try Sutrisno as Army Chief of Staff and Mohammad Sanoesi as Police
Chief as well Vice Admiral Rudolf Kasena and Vice Air Marshall Oetomo as the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy
and Air Force, respectively. But it was not until 1991 that the entire ABRI senior leadership came from the
post-revolutionary generation and it was not until 1993 that the first graduate of the 1960 National Military
Academy became ABRI Commander (General Edi Sudrajat).
193 At the time, a soldier’s pay was as small as half of the amount the KNIL soldiers had gotten from the
Dutch. Financial constraints were so bad that in 1953 and 1954, the purchase of new uniforms had to be
stopped (Mrázek 1978a, 106).
194 The defense budget share of the GDP went from 3.47% in 1969 to 1.9 % in 1991 while its share of
the national budget went from 24.5% to 7.02%. Out of a IDR 2.8 trillion (around 1.2 billion in 1995 USD)
budget in 1990, around 72.5% went to personnel expenditure. See the details in Hadad (1991).
195 By then, an Army Brigadier General’s official salary was roughly $10 a month while a soldier’s salary
was about $1 a month (Mrázek 1978b, 183).
196 Senior military leaders thought that deep involvement in non-essential military matters led to the
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US-trained career pathways? This part discusses the examples of a few senior officers
who were influential before and during the critical juncture and had some US education and
training. These generals illustrate the lack of decisive effect or influence of US education and
training for the career trajectory of senior Army officers. Instead, they show the key roles of
patronage and other informal institutions.
Analysts cite General Ahmad Yani, the Army Chief of Staff (1963-65) as the case
par excellence for US influence within the Indonesian military (Bunnell 1969, 142; Mrázek
1978a, 122; Evans 1989, 38). Upon his return from Fort Leavenworth in 1956, he not only
mentored the next generation of US-trained officers but also modernized the military. He
used his influential positions to promote US military tactical concepts and training into the
Army (Bunnell 1969, 143).197 He also relied on US-trained officers to revamp the military’s
educational system (Evans 1989, 38). But Yani’s private and public statements hardly
suggested an explicit attempt to fully model the military along the US lines. At best, he
wanted a selected adaptation of some US concepts as well as its arms and equipment. For
example, Yani told the officers preparing to attend CGSC to pay attention to the courses
on Operations and Intelligence, but ignore those dealing with Logistics and Administration
(Evans 1989, 39, fn. 88). In his speech as Army Chief in 1962, Yani remarks:
“Our nation has determined its personality and so has our armed forces. Our
officer corps should also adjust to that personality...[which] we will not find in
the officers’ guide and manuals of foreign armed forces...not in West Point not in
Sandhurst or any other foreign academies. We must seek first in the history and
development of our own Armed Forces. We must keep all factors that won our
wars and are suited to our personality, even if they are absent from or contradict
the officers’ guide from other armed forces” (emphasis added).198
“neglect of the soldier skills, readiness, and equipment provision”. Professional re-development was urgent
if Indonesia wanted to maintain its “immediate offensive response” posture where it could address internal
challenges anywhere in the country within 24 hours. Quotes are from Tempo (1979, 9-10)
197 After his return, he was assigned to the Army’s General Staff. He subsequently became Second Assistant
to the Army Chief of Staff and Second Deputy of the Army Chief of Staff.
198 Tjeramah Umum Menteri/PANGAD MAJDJEN A. Jani pada Dies Natalis AKMIL 1962 [General
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Yani thus advocated for selective adaptation of some US theories of victory but not
its theory of corporatism. More importantly, Yani’s US training did not “cause” his rise
to the top. He had the rarity of being both a decorated soldier, officer, and commander
and a member of an elite group of Javanese officers that dominated national politics in the
1950s and 1960s. Amidst the PETA vs. KNIL group rivalries, he was uniquely positioned
as having been Dutch-educated as a teenager and Japanese-trained as a young adult. In
many ways, Yani had already distinguished himself before he went to the US.199 When the
Japanese invaded, he was studying military topography with the Dutch administration. He
joined PETA and graduated the top of his class in the elite Renseitai officer training center
in Malang. During the War, he commanded a battalion in Central Java where he successfully
disarmed Japanese and British troops and further fought various rebellions in the 1940s and
1950s. He also created Indonesia’s first ranger companies as part of the Diponegoro Division
and led its first raider battalion. By the time he went to the US, he had commanded troops
and distinguished himself in combat.
The US courses were also not his only foreign training; he took a two-month Land and
Air Warfare course at Old Sarum, England. Yani was therefore one of Indonesia’s most well-
educated officers with a distinguished list of accomplishments. But his ability to navigate
Jakarta politics further boosted his career.200 He was part of the elite Diponegoro division
which dominated the Army leadership. While Yani was in Jakarta, he mentored other US-
trained Diponegoro men at the General Staff. His detractors portrayed him as corrupt (he
had palatial homes, several cars, and two wives). But his intelligence and deft political
Lecture of Major General Ahmad Jani, Minister/Commander of the Army at the anniversary of the Military
Academy in 1962], Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat, 4.
199 The details of Yani’s career in the next two paragraphs are from Yani (1988), Mrázek (1978a, 122),
Evans (1989, 38), Fakih (2014, 98), and Bunnell (1969, 143).
200 The details of Yani’s network are from Anderson, Bunnell and McVey (1971, 20) and McVey (1972,
152-160).
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wheeling and dealing allowed him to become Army Commander ahead of his seniors.201
That said, Yani was highly impressed by his time in the US and that he was influential
upon his return. He also wanted to borrow parts of US theories of victory and arms to
modernize the military. But this does not mean that: (1) his US education and training
caused his rise upon his return, (2) the US concepts were the only considerations that shaped
his policies or world-views, (3) or he wanted the military to follow the US model exclusively.
Instead, his standing and influence before and after his time in the US was a function of his
professional combat experience and his elite political network. He also continued to express
the need for the officer corps to pick and choose from different foreign models to help with
the military’s modernization plans.
Other senior officers had their careers decided by Suharto and his inner circle.202
Consider Major General Sunggoro, the Army’s chief logistician during the New Order, who
went to Fort Benning (1956) and Fort Leavenworth (1958). His rise was attributed to the
fact he was Suharto’s instructor at the Army Staff and Command College in 1959 and his
logistics officer at the Strategic Reserve Command and during the campaign in West New
Guinea. To take another example, General Sudjono Humardhani, a Fort Harrison (1963)
alumni, became one of the key generals under the New Order. He rose to the top, not because
of his US training, but because he was Suharto’s “spiritual adviser”. In a somewhat different
network, consider General Suherdiman, a Fort Benning (1954) alumni who formed various
military foundations and business activities and was the principal secretary of the national
stabilization agency. His US training mattered less than the fact that he was a protege of
Yani who encouraged and supported his activities in Jakarta.
These anecdotes illustrate one of the key findings from the statistical tests above,
201 In fact, Yani was known as Sukarno’s ‘golden boy’ and was the first Army Commander Sukarno per-
sonally selected and appointed.
202 The following details on the generals are from Gregory (1976, 262–7) and Fakih (2014, 85).
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that informal institutions shape career patterns than formal ones. They also suggest why
the dozens of influential US-trained officers never became US product champions. In fact,
both the ‘Yani model’ and ‘New Order model’ illustrate the consequences of an under-
institutionalized career management system. The gravitational pull of powerful patrons like
Suharto increased the scope of intra-military politics (Jenkins 1984), which in turn, created
a feedback loop that further undermined efforts to institutionalize personnel policies. Again,
the institutions reflect the intra-military power dynamics during the critical juncture.
Other career pathways Aside from the absence of US product champions, that the Army
had other career pathways to the top undermined the diffusion of US theories of victory and
corporatism. After all, a structure modeled over the US military—highly educated officers
managing a complex organization equipped with sophisticated weaponry—would not have
solved Indonesia’s pressing challenges, particularly promotional logjams. A US-modeled
career pathway would have required a massive financial investment to acquire arms, which
Jakarta could not provide. It would have also required the re-education and re-training of
thousands of under-qualified officers during the critical juncture, sideline those who could
not pass, and settled on only one foreign model. But the critical antecedent discussed above
suggests such an outcome would have required violent intra-military conflicts. Instead, the
high command opted to develop and institutionalize career pathways rooted in civic action
and kekaryaan. Under the New Order, the dual function doctrine absorbed these activities.
As the Army was the source of personnel problems, such ‘low-tech’ and ‘land-based’ activities
were the path of least resistance.
The kekaryaan activities began in the 1950s when the Army ‘nationalized’ Dutch
businesses and filled positions in civil administration and mass organizations. While these
activities were conducted with different goals in mind, the high command found that they
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provided a peaceful way to demobilize thousands of under-qualified officers (McVey 1971,
141). That kekaryaan could be presented as yet another public service for revolutionary
officers helped ease the pain. In the early New Order, ambassadorships were also filled with
Sukarno-era generals—and then later with out-of-favor Suharto-era generals (Gregory 1976,
325). But the New Order also tried to regulate these non-military assignments. By the early
1970s, as the critical juncture was winding down, there were structures, career patterns, and
promotional guidelines for those officers assigned to civilian agencies, ministries, businesses,
and social organizations.203 This expansion allowed politically-connected officers to benefit
from what was essentially ‘staff positions’ in their kekaryaan roles (Gregory 1976, 226).
Kekaryaan positions also gave the high command access to the political and economic power
at all societal levels (McVey 1972, 159).
Under the New Order, civic action was pertinent to transition-off older, revolutionary-
era officers with academy-trained ones. The high command found it difficult to replace
Japanese-trained battalion commanders, for example, who felt threatened by better educated
subordinates but refused to leave. The solution was to shift them to Bandung (where most
of the Army’s educational centers were) and retrain them for kekaryaan and civic action.204
But civic action was more problematic and less regulated than kekaryaan. For one thing,
many units engaged in civic action did not have enough qualified personnel in logistics,
supply and maintenance.205 For another, as these units were spread throughout the country,
203 An ABRI Functional Agency (Badan Pembina Kekaryaan or BABINKAR) was created in 1971. The
policies were codified in two guidebooks issued by the Department of Defense and Security’s Employee
Management Staff (Staf Pembinaan Karyawan Hankam): Pedoman Pembinaan Karyawan ABRI (issued
February 15, 1972) and Kumpulan Bahan-bahan Pelaksanaan Tugas Kekaryaan dan Pembinaan Karyawan
ABRI Tingkat Pusat, Wilajah, dan Daerah (issued July 5, 1970).
204 The Army high-command would even pay for their civilian degrees so they would do “less damage and
have greater backing” when they enter civilian life. This was why many kekaryaan and civic-action officers
considered personnel policies ‘sensitive’ because they felt they were ‘outcasts’. The quotes and discussion
are from an interview with Col. Hamzah by Col. Willis Ethel, then commander of the US military group
in Indonesia, October 20, 1966, 3. Kathy Kadane Indonesia Collection, Box No. 2, Civic Action folder,
National Security Archives, George Washington University.
205 These units were engaged in civic action only around 50 percent of the time. See details in CINCPAC
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the day-to-day activities depended on the discretion of the local commands.
As civic action and kekaryaan duties were more suited to the military’s requirements,
creating new career pathways for US-trained officers would have been counter-productive.
After all, previous attempts by the US to boost parts of the Army were inconsistent and came
at the expense of the Navy and Air Force. In the 1950s, when the territorial commands were
still dominant, the US focused on building the Army’s mobile strike units, for example, to
help launch offensives against communist groups.206 Western military assistance also helped
laid the foundation for the Army Special Forces.207 But by the early 1960s, the US shifted
resources to civic action (discussed above).208 Civic action encouraged the vested interests
of the territorial units, boosted the military’s local role, and paradoxically strengthened the
territorial commands at the expense of the US-trained mobile strike units (Mrázek 1978b,
143). The Navy and Air Force also felt the US favored the Army and that aid programs were
“decided unilaterally by CINCPAC rather than mutual consultation.”209 Such resentments
were unfortunate as the Indonesian Navy was interested in emulating the personnel organi-
zation and procedures of the US Navy.210 The Air Force resented the fact that US military
FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10, 1970, 6, 41. Records of the United States
Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box No. 175, NARA.
206 With US help, the Mobile Brigade of the National Police rose to 32 battalions of 28,000 men, while
the initially small Indonesian Marines grew from 400 to almost 10,000 by the 1960s. New raider battalions
were also established across the Javanese divisions and a new Strategic Reserve Command with airborne
capabilities was created. See details in Mrázek (1978b, 37–8).
207 The UK and US helped train the Army Special Forces (Resimen Pasukan Komando Angkatan Darat or
RPKAD). A single RPKAD lieutenant was accepted in late 1958 into a 3-month jungle warfare course at the
British Far East Land Forces Training Center in Malaya. Other RPKAD officers went to Fort Benning. In
April 1961, Captain Benny Moerdani, the future ABRI Commander, became the first Indonesian to graduate
from the 12-week special warfare course at Fort Bragg. Details are from Conboy (2003, 55–59).
208 Aside from the Cold War political reasons discussed in Section 4 above, Washington also thought
that the Air Force and the Navy were “quite useless for restoring law and order” and their “expansionist”
tendencies could threaten Anglo-American positions in the Southwest Pacific area (Mrázek 1975, 25).
209 Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia 1958 - 1963, Secret,
IV-1. Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies, Security Classified
Historical Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA.
210 The Navy was interested in the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Material and the line-officer/staff officers/EDP
arrangements as well as its supply system. The Navy was also interested in creating a post-graduate school
modeled over the Naval Postgraduate School after the return of an officer who obtained his PhD there. See
Senior Navy Representative Report, Historical Report, United States Military Technical Advisory Group,
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aid created a doctrine for the Army’s Flying Cavalry unit in the late 1950s.211
Taken together, the US civic action aid contributed to the reservoir of intra-military
tensions. Before the critical juncture, the rank-and-file rarely saw prominent supporters of
US military aid like Yani in a favorable manner.212 By then, some even called US-trained
officers “brown-skinned Pentagon Generals” (Mrázek 1978b, 132). Some believe the intra-
military resentment against US-trained officers played a part in the 1965 attempted coup.213
Many US-trained officers even preferred to ‘wash away’ their US connection in front of their
colleagues during the critical juncture. In short, US military assistance was inconsistent,
sowed factionalism, and was perceived as having corruptive influence.
To summarize, the low-quality career management hindered new career pathways for
US-trained officers and prevented the rise of US product champions. Instead, the military
institutionalized civic action and kekaryaan as the preferred solution to its personnel chal-
lenges. US assistance for civic action further fed into the intra-military conflicts which in
turn undermine the institutionalization of career management. Finally, informal institutions
were critical in shaping the career trajectory of Army officers. Without product champions,
organizational “resistance” to US theories of victory and corporatism increased.
Indonesia 1964, Secret, V-B-1. Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies,
Security Classified Historical Reports, 1963-65, Box 1, Entry 114, NARA.
211 One of the unit’s leaders was Lieutenant Colonel Herrawan, a Fort Knox graduate, who thought that
it was necessary to reduce the Army’s logistical dependence on the Air Force (Mrázek 1978b, 139–40).
212 Many saw Yani’s seemingly ‘corrupt behavior’ as a byproduct of his US training. To those officers, Yani
became a “golf-playing, whiskey-drinking General” after Fort Leavenworth (Mrázek 1978b, 159).
213 One US congressional report claimed that, “All the generals killed during the coup attempt...had been
trained in the United States or had friendly relations with Westerners in Djakarta.” See Military Assistance
and Training in East and Southeast Asia, Staff Report for the Sub-Committee on National Security Policy
and Scientific Development of the Commitee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Congress, Second Session, February
16, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), 18.
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4.4.2 Education and training
During the critical juncture, the Indonesian military’s education and training system was
under-developed and of low-quality. First, there was a lack of coherence, unity, and inte-
gration across the different education and training units. Second, there was a prolonged
emphasis on practical military training and ideological indoctrination at the academy level.
The academy’s military subjects were also reduced to make way for socio-political skills
development. Finally, the staff and command colleges were valued politically as their cur-
riculum reflected. In other words, officers valued higher military education for its social and
political benefits, rather than for its intellectual and professional benefits.
The critical antecedent of intra-military conflicts also shaped these trends. Nasution
as Army Chief of Staff explicitly sought to transform the education and training system
into a means of enhancing ideological unity and hierarchical discipline and to prevent offi-
cers from being drawn into civilian politics (McVey 1972, 162–3). But educational reforms
would have sidelined the PETA group and strengthened the high command at the expense
of local territorial units. Those with a “higher” education (mostly the KNIL group) would
emphasize educational qualifications in determining promotions, while those with a “lower”
education (mostly the PETA group) resented the idea. The military’s education and train-
ing system then became politically contested.214 Consequently, like the situation with career
management, the high command opted to tinker with the educational structure and curricu-
lum. Thus, power dynamics and contestations, rather than professional learning, drove the
changes—and under-institutionalization—surrounding the education and training system.
In general, the balance between military and non-military subjects was inconsistent
but favored the latter. The curriculum essentially directed officers inward (from domestic
214 Many KNIL-trained officers of the West Java-based Siliwangi Division also had close ties with the
Indonesian Socialist Party, a party filled with ‘intellectuals’ (Gregory 1976, 466).
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politics to organizational procedures) rather than outward (external environment). Indeed,
a systematic engagement with the international environment rarely happened until an officer
becomes a colonel. The military then was less likely to be incentivized to keep abreast with
current developments in technology or strategic analysis. In turn, the military’s conservative
outlook was strengthened and the ability to learn new theories of victory and corporatism
weakened. As long as this cycle persisted, the Indonesian military was unlikely to have the
organizational learning capacity to achieve a maximalist emulation.
Coherence and integrated education and training The critical antecedent affected
the education and training outlook in two ways. First, the decentralized territorial command
structure. Jakarta had to unify the various education or training units associated with
those local commands, while the various intra-military and civil-military conflicts hindered
ideological cohesion. Second, the multiple foreign role models those different education units
sought to emulate suggests a lack of conceptual coherence. The intra-military contestation
before the critical juncture led to the uneasy mix of having Japanese-trained and Dutch-
trained officers as instructors and administrators, respectively, at the different education
and training units. The influx of foreign-trained officers returning from the US and more
than a dozen other countries exacerbated the problem.
For much of the 1940s, the military had almost a dozen decentralized education and
training units.215 Around the same time, the high command created the National Military
Academy (AMN) in Jogjakarta. These units were not centrally supervised up until the 1960s,
as the critical juncture was starting. Despite the fact that in mid-1956, Jakarta decided all
local training centers should be under a single authority except for the staff and command
215 Towards the end of 1945, there were several military schools established in Malang (East Java),
Tangerang (West Java), Mojoagung (East Java), and about another half dozen across the country. These
schools mostly trained ‘young students’ rather than officer cadets.
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colleges and the AMN (McVey 1972, 167).216 The contested intra-military politics slowed
the centralizing efforts. The KNIL-dominated leadership hoped that periodic instructions
at central training institutions would orient ambitious officers away from local power bases
towards professional expertise under a firm hierarchical control (McVey 1972, 168). As many
PETA-trained officers resisted the idea, the decentralized training units persisted during the
critical juncture. The high command’s focus was, after all, on integrating the academy and
staff and command colleges (Gregory 1976, 304–5).
The intra-military power dynamic also shaped the debate over which foreign model
to emulate. The 1945 AMN was initially modeled on the basic training of the Japanese
platoon commander (shodancho) because former PETA officers were the first instructors
(Gregory 1976, 299). They focused on producing deployable soldiers with ‘fighting spirit and
revolutionary zeal’, not modern, professional officers. But the academy’s key leaders were
trained at the Dutch Military Academy. They envisioned the AMN to be more ‘conventional’
as prescribed by their own training.217 As the focus during the revolutionary era was to
produce deployable soldiers, both the KNIL-trained and PETA-trained officers agreed on
temporary training structures. But once the war was over, the contest between the Japanese
outlook of ‘fighting spirit’ and the Dutch outlook of professional education resurfaced.
In 1957, as the critical juncture was starting, the AMN was revived. The impetus
for an integrated academy was inspired by the visit of the Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Gatot Subroto to India where he witnessed its tri-service education system (Bersenjata
1978).218 But the high command instead relied on an ambivalent arrangement between
216 The local commanders provided their own instruction and each of the services operated dozens of
specialized branch schools. The Army graduated about 10,000 students per year across its 21 branch and
unit schools in the 1970s. See CINCPAC FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10,
1970, 58. Records of the United States Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box
No. 175, NARA.
217 These were Samijo, Suwardi, and Wardiman. Details are in Moehkardi (1977, 3–5).
218 This contradicted others who believe that the education reform was driven by the return of Ahmad
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Japanese and Dutch-trained officers. The former provided harsh routines that emphasized
basic combat drills, physical strength, discipline, and mental toughness. The latter wanted
to “internationalize” the academy and, as administrators, they tried to design the curriculum
to be as academic, technical, and professional as possible.219
Thus, the academy system was not coherent or well-developed by the start of the
critical juncture. Without such a system, US-trained officers came home to an “inhospitable
environment” as the younger officers they had to work with were suspicious of foreign military
ideas. This was more likely as the compromise between the KNIL and PETA-trained groups
led to the integration of physical training, intellectual development, and mental strength into
a “single source” curriculum underpinned by an “ideologically nationalist” indoctrination
(Britton 1996, 85). Consequently, during the critical juncture, senior officers underlined the
“native” rather than the foreign roots of military ideology. According to the AMN’s first
governor, Suryosularso, “We don’t need to look far and wide to emulate foreign academies
to build the ethical code for our cadets. Our own ethical codes are guaranteed in the warrior
(ksatria) figures of our shadow puppet stories (pewayangan), especially Arjuna, a kind and
noble soul but always prepared to fight hard” (cited in AKABRI 1993, 136).220
The high command nonetheless opted for a hybrid, multi-national education system.
An attempt was made in 1958 to standardize the levels of training with the comparable
institutions and opportunities abroad. The AMN was to conform to the standard of the
Dutch Military Academy, the advanced officer course was to be equal to the US company
Yani from Fort Leavenworth (McVey 1972, 166). Others claim the AMN’s doctrinal instruction was based
on US Army doctrine and West Point (Lee 2013, 43, fn. 12; Evans 1989, 39).
219 As instructors, they also taught military tactics and techniques but left the drills to their Japanese-
trained counterparts.
220 This Javanese outlook was reflected in the appropriation of the concept of jago or ‘champion’ (a
youngster to whom struggle and fighting was a constant passion, causing a strange mixture of unrest,
benevolence, fear, and pride) and the ksatria or ‘warrior’, a wandering fighter of the educated class. How
these concepts influenced the revolutionary officers are in Britton (1996, 11–36) and Mrázek (1978a, 14–16).
218
grade and basic officer training (and with the junior officer course in India), and the Army
Staff and Command College was to follow Fort Leavenworth, the Higher War College in
the Netherlands, and the Defense Services Staff College in Pakistan (McVey 1972, 170,
fn. 46). It is not clear if this plan was followed through. But while this hybrid policy
kept the peace — factions could claim their preferred model was ‘accommodated’ — the
education system produced officers with an incoherent mix of world views. Even after the
service academies were integrated into the Academy of the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia (AKABRI), the high command still sent missions to Australia, Japan, and Canada
to examine their education systems (AKABRI 1993, 363).
Thus, the education policies reflected intra-military power dynamics, rather than the
need to develop an intellectual capital or learning capacity. At the Army Staff and Command
College (established in 1951), the NMM experience contributed to the problem. The College
was supposed to give former guerrilla leaders knowledge of military science (i.e. for field grade
officers to become battalion commanders). It was originally oriented towards the European
system because of the influence of the KNIL-trained group and the NMM as the sole supplier
of instructors.221 But the bitter NMM experience taught the high command to avoid being
dependent on one country. Even with the growth in US education and training assistance,
the College sent its future instructors to multiple countries, including the Philippines, India,
Great Britain, Yugoslavia, USSR, Pakistan, and China (Fakih 2014, 79; Gregory 1976, 303).
This diversity ‘crowded out’ US influence, even though the College used translated
field manuals, lessons plans, and other materials from Fort Leavenworth (Mrázek 1978a,
221 See Karya Juang SESKOAD, 1990 - 2015 [SESKOAD Fighting Products], Markas Besar Angkatan
Darat (Bandung: Sekolah Staf and Komando, 2015), 9. The NMM provided instructors and Indonesian
officers were sent to the Netherlands to become instructors themselves. By 1953,129 officers underwent
education in the Netherlands. Nota Menteri Pertahanan A.L. tanggal 26 Djanuari 1953, ANRI, Jakarta,
Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia, Inv. Nr. 1855, cited in Fakih (2014, 79, fn. 67).
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124).222 Even the Army’s Training and Education Command admitted by 1968 that they
use and teach materials from the US Army, even if their own principles, organization, and
curriculum were Javanese in articulation.223 And yet, US-educated trainers were only visible
in some schools but not others during the critical juncture. They were a minority in the fac-
ulty composition of some (e.g. engineering) but a majority in others (e.g. naval aviation).224
During the critical juncture, the high command was still looking for useful concepts from
other nations. Translated Chinese and Yugoslavian training materials, for example, were
used at the College alongside those from Fort Leavenworth.225
After the critical juncture, General M. Jusuf (ABRI Commander 1978–1983) ac-
knowledges, “The Indonesian military education system has been a hodgepodge of mixed
vegetables (gado gado) as it has mixed American, Dutch, and Japanese systems...[some
of which were] increasingly irrelevant like studying Napoleonic battles” (cited in Harapan
1983).226 This mix reduced the coherence and consistency of the learning process during
the critical juncture. While diversifying foreign models was necessary to ‘keep the internal
peace’, the education and training system was muddied. The expansion into non-military ac-
tivities during the critical juncture exacerbated the problem. As the military needed officers
capable of running businesses, civil administration, SOEs, and others, the high command
‘de-militarized’ the education system and increased the training in economics and socio-
222 Dozens of officers who went to the US returned with training materials as ‘presents’ (Britton 1996, 85).
223 See Kepemimpinan ABRI [ABRI Leadership], Pamphlet No. B-001 (Bandung: Komando Pendidikan
dan Latihan, 1968), 4–5. The booklet goes on to argue, however, that the US Army principles were incomplete
and that Indonesians should synthesize those that were appropriate to its national ‘personalities’. In other
words, the US Army concepts were temporary supplements to the Army’s training needs.
224 CINCPAC FY70 Evaluation of the MAP, Indonesia, Secret, February 10, 1970, 56–85. Records of the
United States Army, Pacific RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files, Box No. 175, NARA.
225 Indonesian officers claim that Territorial Warfare was inspired in part by Mao’s interview with Edgar
Snow in Red Star Over China and translated Yugoslavian texts, including ‘Territorial War: the new concept
of resistance’ written by General Dushan Kveder (published in Foreign Affairs), and Vladimir Dedijer’s ‘Tito
speaks’. Some claim that the College thought of assigning officers who graduated from the Soviet Frunze
academy to doctrinal research. See details in Fakih (2014, 94, fn. 128) and Pauker (1963, 8–9, 34–7).
226 To some extent, this mix–and–match habit in appropriating foreign military concepts was rooted within
the broader Indonesian political culture See the discussion in Mrázek (1978a, 13–15).
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political affairs (Britton 1996, 99). Combat-related war-fighting concepts soon gave way to
socio-political education, as we see below.
Practical training and ideological indoctrination As noted above, the intra-military
conflicts over education led to some compromises, including that the KNIL-trained officers
ran the administration while the PETA-trained officers ran the courses and training. The
AMN consequently focused on physical training and guerrilla tactics (Moehkardi 1977, 19).
While this made sense during the revolutionary era, it was not favorable to the development of
the intellectual and learning capacity of the organization. During the critical juncture, even
after the creation of an integrated academy, the high command still focused on basic skills
training rather than a comprehensive professional education as Table 4.12 below shows. It
also shows that the academy outlook was ideological and political (only half of its curriculum
consist of military sciences and courses).
The academic component of the AKABRI curriculum by the 1970s included many
classes on socio-political affairs and ideological conditioning as well as the New Order’s ‘dual
function’ doctrine (Antara 1978).227 Some of those classified as military courses were in fact
drills and tactical training. The academy’s mandate, before and during the critical juncture,
after all, was to produce deployable platoon commanders (see Table 4.12). The need to
facilitate a speedy generational transition from the revolutionary-forged to the academy-
trained officers drove the emphasis on practical training. Senior leaders expected that if
the academy could produce hundreds of ‘ready-made’ officers each year, the military could
accelerate the transition by “moving” revolutionary-era officers into non-military posts and
make way for the new generation (Harapan 1978).
227 One senior officer claims that in practice, more than half of the academy curriculum consisted of non-
military subjects since 1960 (cited in Rinakit 2005, 123, fn. 65).
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Table 4.12: Indonesian military academy outlook














ployable soldiers and officers
to fight the revolution and
address pressing threats










ders entrusted to defend the
state ideology with loyalty
and dedication











ders with ‘patriotic warrior’
spirit, professional skills and













ders dedicated to soldiers’
oath, boost professionalism,
and other necessary skills
Professional 72% 28% 4 yrs.
Note: I exclude revolutionary-era local academies or training units. The Army shared the name and
location of the integrated academy (from AMN, AKABRI to AKMIL), while the Navy, Air Force, and
Police had their own separately located academies. The table refers to the general academy structure.
Under the AKMIL era, I only focus until the end of the Cold War (per this chapter’s scope).
Source: Basic information drawn from Kuntarti (2014, 41) and AKABRI (1994, 38)
But the military also wanted ‘ideological cohesion’ in their effort to revamp the
Academy by mid-1965 (TNI 2000d, 40). The Academy claims its goal was to mold a “revolu-
tionary Indonesian soldier with qualities as a political actor” first and then an ABRI soldier
(TNI 2000d, 42). By “political”, Army leaders officially meant a dedication to the state
ideology, constitution, and soldiers’ oath.228 But in practice, it meant officers would not be
separated from political, social, and economic activities. Intellectual development and learn-
ing capacity was not prioritized. Retired officers claim the curriculum did not “contribute
much in broadening the perspective of cadets” (Rinakit 2005, 123, fn. 65).
As the Academy focused on basic training and non-military courses (and remained a
228 The curriculum then was based on creating a ‘Godly Man, Revolutionary Man, Political Man, Social
Man, and Military Man’ (AKABRI 1993, 315). Notice that the ‘military’ element came last.
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vocational school), it could not compete with civilian universities to attract the best students.
Public interest in the academy more than tripled under the New Order.229 But many of the
applicants were ‘average students’ (Rinakit 2013, 88). Indeed, academy officials complained
of the decline in the ‘academic quality’ of applicants by the 1970s (Times 1978).230 The
inability to attract the best students during the critical juncture had long term implications
for the intellectual base of the future officer corps. As far as the diffusion process was
concerned, the military was less capable at adopting a foreign theory of victory.
Taken together, academy education focused on integration, ideology, and practical
training. Table 4.12 above shows the military studies portion of the curriculum fluctuated
and significantly declined under the New Order. The focus on producing officers capable to
execute the dual function doctrine drove such changes. Finally, the curriculum and orga-
nization was not institutionalized until the 1980s. The decline in the Indonesian military’s
learning capacity thus coincided with the decline in US military aid discussed above.
The non-military value of higher military education The higher military educa-
tion system—the staff and command colleges—were valued for their ability to provide elite
networking and cohort bonding. Education and training was undervalued as professional
qualifications to propel one to top positions. An analysis of dozens of the Indonesian mili-
tary elite during the critical juncture shows that, in general, academic achievement did not
appear to influence future assignments (Gregory 1976, 225). Instead, officers valued higher
education for its networking opportunities and patronage. Occasionally, assignments to the
229 From around 7,500 applicants on average between 1972 and 1980 to around 23,000 between 1981 and
1992. I calculate these figures from AKABRI (1993) and AKABRI (1994).
230 Academy officials acknowledge they were having trouble meeting the required number of students
demanded by the Ministry of Defense and Security. In some years, they only produced roughly 40% of the
required soldiers. See the interview of Major General Susilo Sudarman, Commander General of AKABRI
in Margana and Djalinus (1978). Based on the data in AKABRI (1993) and AKABRI (1994), I calculate
that the gap between the allocated slot and admittance was on average around 136 people between 1972 and
1979, although it subsequently declined by 1992 to around 2 people.
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staff colleges were seen as “exiles” for “troublesome” officers (Gregory 1976, 309). In any
case, promotion policies seriously accounting for the professional value of education and
training were not institutionalized by the critical juncture.
The Army Staff and Command College (renamed SESKOAD in 1961) functioned
more as a network-building hub and less an innovative learning center. For many officers
during the critical juncture, SESKOAD was their first chance to meet colleagues outside their
home territories (McVey 1972, 165). The courses deliberately organized many ‘teamwork’
activities and facilitated opportunities to create networks and patronage, which went a long
way in boosting their careers (McFetridge 1983, 95). The network was strengthened by
annual reunions. Even instructor positions were viewed an entry points to elite membership.
Thus, for much of its history, SESKOAD produced Indonesia’s military elite by virtue of
patronage not intellectual development.231
Indeed, its curriculum, particularly the balance between military and non-military
subjects, fluctuated with the intra-military power dynamics of the day. Prior to the critical
juncture, the curriculum focused on military subjects (e.g. military administration, tactics,
military history and technology), with less than 10% devoted to ‘general knowledge’ in po-
litical science, sociology, anthropology, and economics (Fakih 2014, 81). The proportion of
non-military subjects increased as the Army expanded its non-military role during the criti-
cal juncture. By the mid-1960s, there was relative parity between military and non-military
subjects. But under the New Order, the military subjects went down to 25% (Gregory 1976,
302). The non-military subjects were re-oriented towards ideological integration at the ex-
231 By the 1980s, SESKOAD alumni included President Soeharto, Vice-President Umar Wirahadikusumah,
Minister of Defense and Security Poniman, Head of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Amir Mach-
mud, Minister of Political and Security Affairs Surono, Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare Alamsyah
Prawiranegara, and dozens of other key members of the government. Over thirty SESKOAD alumni by
then had been promoted to at least a junior minister status or higher. Another 160 occupied posts of major
importance in the military. Over 85 were named secretary general, governor, or heads of national institutes
and boards. See the details in McFetridge (1983, 87).
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pense of intellectual development. As the Commander of the Joint Staff and Command
College acknowledges in the mid-1970s, “The goal of the unification of the staff and com-
mand colleges of all the services was to ensure [organizational] integration, prevent political
ideological infiltration, and unify the political strategic outlook of the officers under a single
language and value system” (cited in Antara 1976). Academic studies in military sciences
or critical courses designed to boost intellectual capacity was not high on the agenda.
Towards the end of the critical juncture, the balance between military and non-
military courses changed again, with the former pegged at around 45% (see Table 4.13). The
inconsistent balance of military and non-military subjects and the injection of political in-
doctrination hindered learning capacity. The courses were also oriented to fulfill non-military
positions within the New Order, although SESKOAD brought academics, technocrats, and
policymakers to formulate development policies.232 Even the ‘military theory’ courses were
spent on routine staff procedures, rather than critical evaluations of military thought or
history. The practical military subjects focused on civic action and territorial operations.
Further, there was a disinterest in individual analysis and original professional writing during
the courses.233 The courses also did not critically assess Indonesia’s own past operations for
‘lessons learned’ and only briefly touched on other countries’ combat missions (McFetridge
1983, 97). Taken together, SESKOAD was valued for its elite network development and its
curriculum focused on socio-political skills and ideological cohesion.
These problems were also present at the higher levels of the military education system,
as Table 4.14 below shows.234 After attending the staff and command colleges, senior officers
232 This broader focus was formalized when SESKOAD’s ‘Course C’ was added to the curriculum. This
course focused on social-political matters. See details in Gregory (1976, 302).
233 Formal written requirements were few and the scope generally limited. Professional journals were often
publishing translations of general articles appearing in Western journals (McFetridge 1983, 96).
234 A unified curriculum across the educational institutions, from the academy to the staff colleges and
LEMHANNAS, was not discussed internally and coherently until 1969 (Djamhari 1995, 129).
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Table 4.13: Army Staff and Command College curriculum under the New Order
Category Credit Share Topics/activities Notes
Administration 137 6.3% Tests, major examinations,
and administrative briefings
–
Social Science 376 17.4% Value Theory, Philosophy,
Personal Communications,
Ethics, Japanese or Chinese
language, Social Survey, etc.
Civilian guest lecturers often
involved. Subjects tied–in to
Nation Building category
Military Theory 397 18.4% Military Theory, Staff Pro-
cedures, and orientations on
the other services (Air Force,
Navy, and Police).
The bulk of the time was allo-
cated to routine staff processes
and formats, rather than stud-
ies, estimates, and analyses.
Practical Mili-
tary Subjects
706 26.8% Tactics and simulation exer-
cises, particularly civic action
and territorial operations.
Mainly based on map exercises
based on historical operations
but focused on staff procedures
rather than critical analyses.
Nation Building 798 32% State Ideology Pancasila,
1945 Constitution, Govern-
ment Five Year Development
Plan, Territorial Develop-
ment, and Operations.
Preparing Army officers for a
broader role in the state be-
yond their military duties and
strengthening ideological zeal.
Note: Credits were ‘instruction periods’ (each was equal to 40 minutes). SESKOAD did not officially
use the categories—they were inferred by Charles McFetridge participated in the course.
Source: Information drawn from McFetridge (1983, 93–4)
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Table 4.14: Outlook of military educational institutions under New Order
Name Level Focus Duration
Academy of the Armed
















twice after the academy) to help
officers better apply technical,












Basis: military strategy & ser-
vice management. Focus: na-





Staff and Command Col-
lege of the Armed Forces





Basis: military strategy & ser-
vice management. Focus: grand











Basis: grand strategy & national
resource management. Focus:
international strategic environ-
ment & defense resource man-
agement. Participants: officers,




Note: A unified and integrated joint Staff and Command College was only established in 1974. LEMHANNAS was
established in 1965 as the National Defense Institute until it became the National Resilience Institute in 1983. Both kept
the same acronym.
Source: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Stratifikasi Kurikulum Pendidikan Perwira ABRI (Jakarta: Lem-
baga Ketahanan Nasional, 1983), 11–12
could be selected for the Joint Staff and Command College as majors or lieutenants colonel
and then to the National Resilience Institute as colonels or brigadiers general. At the joint
staff level, the courses and exercises revolved around six ‘core subjects’: ‘struggle philosophy’,
science & technology, environmental assessment, strategy, administration & management,
and operations. But the overall outlook was on ensuring the sustainability and application
of the dual function doctrine as well as the ability to plan and execute joint operations to
address broadly-defined problems, from security to political (TNI 2000d, 71).235
235 See details of the curriculum and focus in Sewindu SESKOGAB 1974–1982 [Eight Years of SESKOGAB,
1974–1982], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Bagian Gabungan, 69-75,
Military Education Papers, Indonesian Military History Center Library.
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Table 4.14 also tells us that officers were generally expected to have ideological cohe-
sion and socio-political skills above mastery of military subjects. It also tells us that learned
or informed awareness of the international environment did not come until very late into an
officer’s career. The majority of an officer’s exposure for the first 20 to 25 years was broadly
domestic—from political stability, internal security, to ideological cleavages—and centered
on organizational procedures. An insular and inward-looking officer corps would have trou-
ble learning about the utility of new theories of victory or corporatism from abroad. Finally,
the table tells us that the institutionalization of the military’s educational institutions took
place after the decline in US military aid in the 1970s and 1980s (after the critical juncture).
4.5 Conclusion
4.5.1 Summary of findings
There are several key findings. First, the Indonesian military achieved a minimalist emula-
tion. Its theory of victory remained defensive and was heavily skewed towards insurgency
(vis-a-vis external threats) and counter-insurgency (vis-a-vis domestic threats), rather than
‘offensive expeditionary’ in the US mould. Only a few dozen of the thousands of US-trained
officers ever led the organization and fewer still became product champions. At best, traces
of US theories of victory were seen in some parts of the military’s doctrinal precepts and in a
few combat arms. But there was no organization-wide emulation. Consequently, the applica-
tion of US theories of victory was limited, sporadic, and inconsistent. The military’s theory
of corporatism also did not exhibit signs of Americanization. The military remained deeply
involved in non-military realms as the Territorial Command persisted and the organizational
outlook remain contested past the critical juncture.
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Second, as the cooperative model argues, the conjunction of the inhibitive properties
of a cooperative transmission and the low quality of the recipient’s personnel infrastructure
during a critical juncture produced a minimalist emulation. I define the critical juncture by:
(1) the peak transmission of US theories of victory and corporatism as seen by the high-
est number of Indonesians receiving US education and training, and (2) the organizational
autonomy of the Indonesian military to interpret and adopt US war-fighting concepts. The
former allows both the US and Indonesia to shape the diffusion process while the latter
accounts for the range of options Indonesia had.
Washington’s perception of Jakarta’s geopolitical Cold War importance became the
predominant benchmark through which military aid was measured. Despite the official
rhetoric claiming and expecting the Indonesian military to follow the US model, military-
related goals and organization-wide diffusion of US theories of victory and corporatism were
not a priority. The US funded 7,012 Indonesian military students from 1950 to 1989. Even
though the US became the prime destination, it was not the only supplier of education
and training. The sheer diversity of the courses as well as the absence of academy-level
training added to the incoherence and dilution of the transmitted US theories of victory and
corporatism. That the US had no systematic and appropriate framework to measure the
effects of its programs exacerbated the problem. The diffusion of US theories of victory and
corporatism never reached the critical mass necessary to create organization-wide effects.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian military’s personnel infrastructure was under-institutionalized;
the formal structure changed at least three times during the critical juncture. The formal
rules were not stable or predictable while informal institutions such as patronage prevailed.
The under-institutionalization of career management prevented new career pathways for US-
trained officers. Upon their return, very few of them became leaders and fewer still became
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product champions. The institutionalization of career management only began in the 1980s
(after the critical juncture). We can see the military’s under-developed education and train-
ing system in: (1) the lack of coherence and an integrated outlook across the educational
institutions, (2) the emphasis on practical training and ideological indoctrination at the
academy level, and (3) the non-military value of and curriculum at the staff and command
colleges. The system overall was focused on providing ideological cohesion and socio-political
skills, rather than a professional grasp of military subjects and strategy. Consequently, the
officers corps had a harder time interpreting, adopting, and implementing a new, foreign
ways of warfare. Taken together, the conjunction of the inhibitive properties of US military
aid and the low-quality personnel infrastructure produced a minimalist emulation.
Third, the critical antecedent shaped the interaction between the transmission path-
way and the personnel infrastructure during critical juncture. The intra-military conflicts
of the 1940s and 1950s over theories of victory and corporatism was fought between a small
number but professionally-trained Dutch-trained officers and the more numerous Japanese-
trained officers. Their rivalries hindered the development and institutionalization of person-
nel and education policies. They led to, for example, compromised institutional solutions
to organizational structure and curriculum. Bottom line, the intra-military power dynamics
shaped the inter-play between formal and informal institutions which in turn further shape
the power dynamics in an endogenous feedback loop.
Fourth, an examination of the career patterns of elite Indonesian Army officers found
no strong correlation between what we consider to be ‘professional’ career markers and a
successful retirement. Only around 16% of 677 Indonesian Army generals had some form of
US education and training. A logistic regression analysis reveals a higher proportion of an
officer’s foreign education (from his total civilian and military education) was more likely
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to lead to a command appointment before retiring. This effect can be attributed to the
pre-foreign education elite status and patronage. Only those already groomed or part of
an elite faction could afford to spend more time overseas than their fellow officers. New
career pathway for US-trained officers was unlikely to emerge under that condition. Product
champions, in turn, did not emerge, especially since the military created other influential
pathways: civic action and kekaryaan duties. There is little evidence to support the claim
that US training had a positive effect for the careers of Indonesian Army officers.
Fifth, the Indonesian military up suffered from doctrinal stagnation as evidenced by
the inability of the New Order to overhaul the Territorial Warfare doctrine. There were other
indicators of the stagnation, including the persistence of outdated strategic assumptions and
the focus on non-military roles. The New Order could have ordered a doctrinal revision
along the US model if it wanted to. Instead, it revived the 1962 Territorial Warfare doctrine
and most of its conservative, domestically-oriented precepts. The stagnation also indicated
the low-level learning capacity of the organization during the critical juncture. The US
conceptual influence on Indonesian military doctrine was thus localized and limited. In
short, there was no new theory of victory based on the US model.
4.5.2 Alternative explanations
Chapter 2 provides several alternative arguments. The first set of arguments draws from
the neo-realist literature and claims that the systemic nature of international anarchy drives
states to emulate the best military practices of others. This threat based-argument can ex-
plain Indonesia’s motivation to import arms and war-fighting concepts in two occasions in the
1960s: during the attempt to integrate West New Guinea and during the confrontation with
Malaysia. But these two episodes were a small portion of Indonesia’s more numerous inter-
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nal challenges during the Cold War. And yet Indonesia sought to import its military power
before and after those two potential wars. The neo-realist argument is unable to explain why
internal security threats drove Indonesia to seek external sources of arms, equipment, and
doctrinal concepts. Nor can the argument easily reconcile the requirement to emulate the
best model with Indonesia’s deliberate diversification of its supplier of arms and training.
Supplier diversification could dilute the coherence and operational utility of such imported
military power. The neo-realist argument also does not explain the decision-making of the
donor in providing military education and training assistance. More importantly, the threat-
based argument cannot explain the variation in military emulation since ‘convergence around
the best model’ is the predicted outcome. Compared to the cooperative model I propose, the
neo-realist argument is not better at explaining Indonesia’s minimalist military emulation.
The second set of arguments, associated with security constructivists, focuses on
trans-national military norms and claims that emulation is a function of concerns over so-
cial legitimacy. This could either lead to the emulation of the ‘most popular’ or the ‘best
suited’ model that fits pre-existing norms. By that logic, if we see a cultural match then
we should see a maximalist emulation. To some degree, the professionally-trained KNIL
group of officers in the 1950s did prefer to go to the US for military education and training
assistance. But if there was a cultural match—both the Dutch-trained officers and the US
emphasized professional military administration—why did the Indonesian military end up
with a minimalist emulation? If we assume the cultural match facilitated the socialization
of Indonesian officers to the US theories of victory and corporatism, why did we not see an
accelerated diffusion of those theories after these officers returned to Indonesia?
The constructivists cannot easily answer these questions. Their arguments also cannot
explain why the strongly anti-communist Indonesian Army turned to the Soviet Bloc for their
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education and arms in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Constructivists might argue that the
minimalist emulation is a result of a cultural mismatch. But this claim cannot account for
the fact that over 7,000 Indonesian officers were still sent to the US, nor can it explain th
popularity of US theories of victory in some sections of the military. The problem with
the constructivists then is the under-specification of their argument pertaining to military
emulation. As it stands, their argument is better at explaining the absence or presence
of emulation rather than its variation. In any case, the constructivist argument does not
provide a better explanation of Indonesia’s minimalist emulation than my cooperative model.
The third set of arguments focuses on unit-level variables, from regime type to state
extraction capacity and bureaucratic politics. Taken together, these variables argue emula-
tion is more likely when militaries have the necessary capacity and infrastructure to adopt
foreign systems. This argument is less of an alternative explanation to my argument. In
fact, a key component of my theory—organizational capacity—falls under these unit-level
arguments. In this sense, my argument complements or is a part of, rather than contradict,
the unit-level arguments. The problem with unit-level arguments, however, is that they take
the transmission pathway for granted. Arguments focusing on state capacity or regime type,
for example, would see Indonesia’s minimalist emulation as a function of its weak infras-
tructure in adopting a sophisticated and costly theory of victory. This argument, however,
ignores the fact that in some diffusion processes, the donors provide the arms and education,
thereby relieving the recipient of the burden—as the Indonesian case illustrates.
Chapter 5
Maximalist emulation: Imperial Japan
This chapter explains why and how Meiji Japan managed to successfully emulate Western
theories of victory and corporatism within a short period of time. I argue that Japan could
do so because of the interaction between: (1) the facilitative nature of the commercial trans-
mission, which diffused Western theories of victory and corporatism through commercially-
contracted Western trainers and advisers; and (2) the high-quality personnel infrastructure of
the Meiji armed forces, which created successful career pathways for Western-trained officers
and boost organizational learning capacity. This interaction was significant for the diffusion
process because it took place during the critical juncture period between 1878 (after the
Satsuma Rebellion of 1877) and 1904 (the start of the Russo-Japanese War). I support these
arguments using both causal-process and dataset observational data. I develop an original
individual-level dataset to examine the career patterns of almost 700 Meiji-era Japanese offi-
cers and I use English-language qualitative sources to examine the organizational evolution,
career management, and education and training systems of the Imperial Japanese Army
(IJA). I structure my analysis using the commercial model I develop in Chapter 3.
This chapter has five sections. The first discusses the maximalist emulation outcome
Japan had achieved by the early 1900s. I examine the operational evolution and practices
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of the Meiji armed forces after the Restoration in 1868 to highlight the gradual adoption
of Western theories of victory and corporatism by the IJA and IJN. The second examines
the critical antecedent: the absence of serious conflict within the armed forces over military
Westernization in general. It describes the conceptual, practical, and organizational prece-
dents that led to the critical antecedent. The third assesses the commercial transmission
that diffused Western theories of victory and corporatism after the Restoration. It describes
the broader Meiji era commercial Westernization and examines the activities of the French,
German, and British military training missions. The fourth examines the organizational ca-
pacity of the IJA and IJN to adopt Western theories of victory and corporatism. It integrates
statistical analyses of the Meiji military elite career patterns with qualitative assessments of
the personnel infrastructure evolution of the IJA. It also highlights the interaction between
the IJA’s career management and education quality and the activities and advice of foreign
trainers. I conclude in the final section by summarizing the key findings and considering
how well my arguments stack up against alternative explanations.
5.1 Maximalist emulation
This section demonstrates how the Meiji armed forces achieved a maximalist emulation by the
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. As chapter 2 notes, in a ‘maximalist emulation’,
we can expect to see some form of norms ‘displacement’, as existing theories of victory and
corporatism are replaced with new ones. The change would be relatively rapid, expansive,
and thorough. New doctrines will emerge across the organization. Figure 5.1 below presents
the timeline of the key events and conceptual markers I examine in this chapter.
I define the critical juncture as the period between the mid 1870s to the early 1890s
because of four permissive conditions. First, the Restoration afforded military leaders the
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of key events and conceptual markers for Japan case
opportunity to instill major structures and policies without any serious resistance. The
enactment of conscription, the abolishment of the feudal domains, and the creation of an
Imperial Guard in the early 1870s further gave the regime unprecedented central coercive
power. Second, the negotiations for foreign training missions started in the 1870s, despite
the government initially declaring that the IJA and IJN would follow the French and British
model, respectively. In fact, the government conducted due diligence and sought the best
military models in the marketplace. The domains had also adopted different foreign models
while dozens of Japanese students had travelled to and studied at various Western cities.
They could have chosen any foreign model they prefer.
Third, the government prioritized military Westernization to keep internal order
(short-term) and take on the Western powers (long-term). Finally, the organizational changes
between the mid-1870s and early 1900s were more enduring and more visibly shaped by West-
ern ideas than the early post-Restoration reforms. Indeed, foreign trainers were present in
Japan from 1873 to 1904, at which time the government thought that they were no longer
needed (Hirobumi 1904, 66). We should therefore see the interaction between the commercial
transmission and personnel infrastructure during this critical juncture period.
Before the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan’s armed forces were considered ‘primi-
tive’ and ‘backwards’ by modern standards. For roughly two centuries, the central military
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government (the bakufu) had no national, unified, and a centrally-controlled standing army
or navy. The closest approximation was the large number of samurai units that performed
guard duty and police functions as well as the locally-raised warrior bands across dozens of
feudal domains (han). The Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868) could theoretically order these
domains under the control of local lords (daimyo) to ‘contribute’ troops. While firearms were
already in use, the basic weapons were spears and swords, rather than Western artillery or
riffles which had different organizational implications.1 In the words of one Western military
observer, Japan’s pre-Restoration army “consisted of little more than hordes of imperfectly-
equipped, almost barbarously-armed fighting men” (Knollys 1887, 235).
But by World War 1, the Japanese armed forces were on par with the best Western
militaries of the day. The IJA and IJN were modern, professional organizations with battle-
tested effectiveness. They essentially achieved a maximalist emulation within a generation.
By the 1870s, Japanese soldiers were already “goose-stepping and following Prussian infantry
tactics” (Edgerton 1997, 44). Roughly two decades after the Restoration, Japanese troops
upon parade inspection were, “a facsimile of a European battalion...The men stand ready in
the ranks as well-trained English or German troops...The clothing, which is blue and bears
first cousinship to the French uniform, the arms and equipment, are all in good order, and
well-turned out in every respect” (Knollys 1887, 242). Naval officers were also behaving
like English gentlemen as they commanded British-made ships into battle. By World War
2, the Japanese command structure, weaponry, support services, conscription methods, and
educational system were based on the best Western models (Harries and Harries 1991, 3).
But the maximalist emulation did not happen overnight. Japanese military leaders
took the lessons learned from of a series of post-Restorations operations, particularly the
1 Many Japanese warriors back then scorned the new lock-step western-style drill and disdained firearms
and bayonets in favor of their swords and spears (Drea 2016, 1).
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Boshin War (1868–1869), Formosa expedition (1874), and the Satsuma Rebellion (1877),
and improve their adoption of Western theories of corporatism and victory. These ideas
would later be tested in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and Russo-Japanese War
(1904–1905). By then, the IJA and IJN achieved a maximalist military emulation.
5.1.1 Post-Restoration military operations
The Meiji Restoration ended Tokugawa rule and restored ‘practical’ Imperial rule. The
Tokugawa forces however did not go down without a fight, nor for that matter, did the many
of the samurai-dominated population spread across Japan. The first post-Restoration decade
was therefore consumed by the government’s efforts to put down rebellions and internal
challenges.The three post-Restoration conflicts below in particular allow us to assess the
state of military Westernization. These conflicts show how the armed forces learned and
gradually improved their adoption of Western military ideas.
Boshin civil war (1868–1869)
The Boshin civil war was fought between the shogunate and domain forces and was relatively
short-lived. The relatively modernized Imperial faction quickly gained control of the capital
after a series of battles. Forces loyal to the Tokugawa retreated to northern Honshu and later
to Hokkaido. Defeat at the Battle of Hakodate broke this last holdout and completed the
military phase of the Restoration. Throughout the northern campaigns lasting into 1869, the
Imperial army outnumbered (ex-shogunate) rebel forces and enjoyed overwhelming material
superiority. As the Imperial forces had some degree of military Westernization—pro-Imperial
domains had Westernized their forces preceding the Restoration (discussed below)—cannons
and rifles decided the outcome of the war (Drea 2016, 19).
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But the campaigns also reveal broader problems confronting the new armed forces.
They highlight, for example, major differences between field commanders and the central
headquarters. Army headquarters in faraway Kyoto often proposed plans at odds with local
conditions and as tensions increased, line officers ignored central direction in favor of uni-
lateral actions. Lacking a strong central staff capable of enforcing orders, the army was at
the mercy of theater commanders. Similarly, the absence of a unified tactical doctrine—let
alone a fully-developed theory of victory—and disputes between line and staff officers left
units fighting based on the tactics favored by their respective commanders. Resentments
also flared because the nobility and Choshu and Satsuma samurais monopolized senior posts
(Drea 2016, 19). In short, the Boshin war suggests that even a limited military Westerniza-
tion was good enough to defeat scattered feudal forces. But the challenges also shows the
extremely low level of emulation at the beginning of the Meiji era.
Formosa military expedition (1874)
The Japanese expedition to Taiwan in 1874 was in retaliation for the murder of Ryukyuan
sailors by the indigenous population of Taiwan (Formosa) in 1871. This was the first overseas
Meiji-era military deployment; in fact, the first overseas expedition by any Japanese forces
in more than 270 years (Buck 1959, 92). While a diplomatic solution brokered by the
British helped resolve the problem, the expedition shows the challenges of a limited military
Westernization. From that standpoint, the expedition was a failure.
For one thing, the Japanese required hands-on Western assistance in getting the
mission off the ground. By 1874, the conscription system, the Army Academy, and the
second French military mission were only in place for a year or two. The IJA had not develop
career management or tactical concepts, let alone a mobilization strategy or expeditionary
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capabilities. In fact, the government had to hire General Charles Le Gendre (1830–1899), a
French-born American officer and diplomat, as the chief adviser to the mission, even if Meiji
leaders nominally headed head of the operation. The mission also employed two American
officers as “foreign assistants”: Lieutenant Commander Douglas Cassel and Lieutenant James
R. Wasson. While many of the ships deployed belonged to the government, some of the
largest and significant ones were chartered from foreigners (House 1875, 16).
For another, the initial landing of 1,300 troops was irregular and chaotic without
a clear logistical support. Even when employing Western methods, Japanese troops were
deficient. They were not yet accustomed to the lower details of military routines; a body of
hundreds of soldiers, for example, was accompanied by nearly an equal number of “coolies”
to build shelters, cook, or dig trenches. The adoption of Western systems did not go beyond
the use of Western weapons (House 1875, 46). In short, by the early 1870s, the Japanese
had reached a maximalist emulation. If anything, the mission’s operational conduct, even
if limited in scale and scope, shows that within the IJA, personal valor and individual
accomplishments on the battlefield were the predominant goals.
Satsuma rebellion (1877)
The Satsuma Rebellion was a revolt of disaffected samurais from Satsuma, one of the do-
mains that led the Restoration wars, against the new Meiji government. The resentments
were multi-faceted, from the disenfranchisement of the samurai population to the domestic
contestations against the other domains, particularly Choshu. The rebellion lasted about
eight months with a decisive victory of the Imperial forces. From a military standpoint, it
was the first significant victory of the government’s newly-Westernized conscript army.
Some portray the rebellion as a dramatic conflict between the sword-wielding, tradition-
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wedded samurais (Satsuma) against the modern conscript army (the IJA). But in fact, the
Satsuma forces were probably superior to those of the IJA: many Satsuma officers were
members of the Imperial Guard and a significant number was extensively trained in Western
military techniques (Westney 1986, 183). Many of the rank-and-file also went through the
Shigakko, the domain private schools teaching Western military tactics along with Confucian
classics and foreign languages. They were trained in infantry and artillery combat tactics
and the students carried Snider (breech-loading) and Enfield (muzzleloading) rifles, various
carbines, and pistols as well as swords (Ravina 2011, 201).
The IJA, meanwhile, had to dispatch troops before a thorough organization was in
place without a proper system of reserves and recruits. But their forces—drilled by European
officers—were more tactically sophisticated (Mounsey 1879, 108). The IJA quickly seized
the rebel area, carried out landings behind enemy lines, and made successful amphibious
assaults under naval gunfire support. The full national resources of the government swayed
the war in the IJA’s favor.2 The only advantage the Satsuma army had was high morale.
But generally unable to recruit more men, Satsuma forces were forced to carry on the war
with the ever-diminishing number of soldiers and weapons (Buck 1973). Despite the victory,
IJA leaders recognized the limits of their military Westernization efforts by then. According
to Yamagata Aritomo, then commander of the government forces,
“Japan had no system of commissariat or land transport, and the systems adopted
in European countries were not adaptable to the topographical conditions and
customs of the country. The question arose at once as to how to supply the troops
with provisions and ammunition, and after long consideration we were forced to
employ inefficient coolies and pack-horses” (Yamagata 1910, 204).
2 The government spent more than 40 million yen (about $ 38 million) on the war (almost sixty times
as much as the rebels) (Drea 2016, 46). The IJA had more than a hundred artillery pieces and in excess of
63 million rounds of ammunition and was backed by the nascent Japanese arms industry producing nearly
half a million rounds of ammunition per day (Ravina 2011, 201). The IJN provided warships and transports
along with 38 steamships (Ono 1922, 32).
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In difficult terrain, the transport system had been poor, the artillery had been inef-
fectual, the old muzzle-loading mountain guns and field guns failed frequently. Operational
planning was in disarray without a unified a general staff (Harries and Harries 1991, 32). As
we shall discuss below, this was partially because the IJA’s French advisors had instructed
the Japanese on how to organize, train, and command units from company to brigade, not
those of the higher echelons (Drea 2013, 77). Overall, the IJA learned that it needed a better
training system and a more standardized weapons system and that command flexibility is a
prerequisite of effective operations (Buck 1959, 238). Senior leaders also realized that they
did not have an effective theory of victory. During the Rebellion, the Army had 55 infantry
battalions but they fought as “loosely-organized infantry units” without proper support or
specialized troops (Buck 1959, 240). These deficiencies would soon be remedied as Japan
was getting ready to fight major power wars.
5.1.2 Major power wars
First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895)
Japan fought the Qing dynasty in the First Sino-Japanese War over influence in Korea.
Japan decisively won the war and extracted serious concessions from the Chinese as codified
in the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in April 1895. It compelled China to pay a huge
indemnity, abandon its interests in Korea, and cede territory to Japan including Taiwan and
the Liaodong Peninsula in southern Manchuria. But Russia, Germany and France intervened
and made Japan give up the Liaodong Peninsula. In essence, Japan won its first ‘modern war’
with a centrally-conscripted army—led by professionally trained commanders—employing
modern technology and organization (Lone 1994, 4). By the early 1890s, the IJA had a
General Staff, served by an efficient intelligence organization and backed by a comprehensive
242
system of mobilization, transport, supplies, and communications. Its troops were well-trained
and equipped as Japan was moving toward self-sufficiency in arms production.3 Foreign
military observers attached to various Japanese units noted their standardized doctrine,
weapons, and equipment which complemented a well-educated officer corps versed in modern
warfare and able to maneuver division-echelon forces (Drea 2016, 83).
More importantly, the war was the first application of the Meiji military’s Western-
influenced theories of victory, from strategic planning to tactical concepts. German offensive
concepts influenced Japan’s two-phase plan of attack (Lone 1994, 33). First, the IJN was
to seize control of the major waters (i.e. the Yellow Sea between Korea’s west and China’s
east coasts and the Gulf of Chihli). This would guarantee safe passage for IJA troops.
Second, the IJA’s 5th Division was to restrain Chinese forces in Korea while other units
were preparing for departure. Once control of the seas had been assured, and Japan seized
China’s vital east-coast port of Weihaiwei, several divisions were to be landed in Chihli and
the war concluded by a decisive battle. In practice, the IJN severely crippled the Chinese
fleet at the mouth of the Yalu River in September, seized Port Arthur in November, and
destroyed the Chinese fleet at Weihaiwei in February 1895.
The IJN’s impressive victories were attributed to their British training and education
(Lone 2000, 29). But the IJA’s battle victories were influenced by German concepts. The
troops, for example, advanced in columns, preferring a frontal assault while seeking an
exposed flank to sever the enemy’s line of retreat (Drea 2016, 85). Several hundred yards
from the enemy positions, the columns would break into companies or battalions as the
skirmish line moved forward. Infantry doctrine clustered troops together at company or
battalion level to facilitate command and control and to preserve fire discipline. Troops
3 Quick-firing field guns, smokeless powder, and Murata repeating rifles were being manufactured in large
quantities. See details in Harries and Harries (1991, 57).
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advanced at close intervals in dense, disciplined ranks. Soldiers moved forward in short
rushes, threw themselves on the ground, and then arose to repeat the process. Officers led
from the front, and correspondingly suffered high losses (Drea 2013, 80). This offensive tactic
was observed in the Liaodong offensive that took Port Arthur led by General Maresuke Nogi,
who had a tour of duty in Germany in 1887. He was likely to have based the offensive as a
textbook Prussian operation (Harries and Harries 1991, 60).
As we shall discuss below, these theories of victory were among the legacies of Prus-
sian Major Jacob Meckel, an instructor at the Japanese War College and adviser to the
General Staff since 1885. The German influence was also observed in Japan’s theory of cor-
poratism, especially the military’s powerful role in civil-military relations. Since the Meiji
Constitution of 1889 had been drawn up with German advice, the position of the Japanese
military in the political structure—the monarch as Supreme Commander backed by an in-
dependent General Staff—resembled the German pattern (Saaler 2006, 29).4 The creation
of the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) as a joint staff to conduct operations during
the war was also notable. The IGHQ was inspired by the German separation of the staff
and command authority from administrative functions.
But Meiji military leaders were not satisfied. Logistics, for example, had improved
since the Satsuma rebellion but remained chaotic because the IJA had to rely on 53,000
civilian contractors, laborers, and coolies to sustain its operations. Medical support was also
substandard as the IJA had neglected thorough preparations for field hospitals, sanitation
and epidemic control measures.5 Furthermore, the fact that Western powers intervened and
undermined Japan’s war benefits suggested to Meiji leaders that the IJA and IJN needed
4 The constitution, particularly article 11, gave a special independence to the general staff, via the right
to ‘supreme command’, which specified that the military was directly responsible to the emperor.
5 About 12,000 soldiers (or almost nine times the 1,400 battlefield deaths) perished from various illnesses
(Lone 1994, 182).
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further expansion.6 Nonetheless, the successful application of Western-inspired theories of
victory and corporatism indicates the maximalist emulation outcome.
Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905)
The Russo-Japanese War was fought over ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. Russia sought
a warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean; the Port Arthur base was operational all year.
Since the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan feared Russian encroachments on its
plan to create a sphere of influence in Korea and Manchuria. Japan initially offered to
recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for Japanese dominance of Korea.
Russia refused and war ensued. Russia suffered multiple battle defeats but Japanese losses
were exceptionally high and their resources were depleting. President Theodore Roosevelt
mediated the Treaty of Portsmouth signed in September 1905. Japan gained control of
Russian railway lines in southern Manchuria and took over Russian leases in two Manchurian
ports. They also won recognition of their rights in Korea. But Japan emerged with no
outright strategic gains or financial compensations. Nonetheless, the war was the first major
victory for an Asian power over a European one in the modern era.
The IJA mobilized over a million troops and slightly more than 6% were killed in
action. Their theories of victory were almost duplicates of the ones employed during the
Sino-Japanese War. The plan essentially asked the IJN to first neutralize the enemy fleet
and secure communications with the mainland. Then one army would invade Korea and
advance overland to Manchuria, while a second would take Port Arthur. The two armies,
along with a third, would converge and advance up the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway
to Mukden. This offensive strategy, inspired by Clausewitz and Helmut von Moltke via
6 By April 1895, Yamagata had drawn up a plan to expand Japan’s forces to where they could control the
Far East. In September 1895, the navy planned a ten-year expansion to overcome either Britain or Russia
in alliance with France. See details in Lone (1994, 182).
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Meckel, was about bringing superiority to bear at a given point (Harries and Harries 1991,
81; Kuehn 2014, 156).7 The IJN’s performance also continued to reflect its British education
and training. According to a British officer, “in the Japanese navy, we find ships, officers,
and men worthy, in homogeneity of design, construction, and armament, in fighting strength,
in bravery, and professional skill, to take their place in the foremost fighting line alongside
the best ships of our own navy” (Longford 1903, 472).
Yet Japanese losses were high, which was attributed to the German offensive princi-
ple.8 The IJA leaders held on to the strategy as an imperative befitting their high morale.
But frontal infantry tactics failed to dislodge the Russians who simply held their positions as
long as they were protected by barbwires and mines (Bailey 2006a, 36–7). Japan nonetheless
improved its performance in the Russo-Japanese War.9 In any case, the Russo-Japanese War
represents the perfected maximalist military emulation that the IJA and IJN had accom-
plished by the First Sino-Japanese War.
Heading towards World War II
Japan had achieved a maximalist military emulation by the Russo-Japanese War. But the
IJA and IJN continued to build on that emulation in a path-dependent way up until World
War II. This trajectory underscores the organizational learning capacity and the effects of
conceptual ‘localization’ of Western theories of victory and corporatism. By 1909, the IJA
began to ‘revise’ the tactical principles they have drawn up from Meckel a decade earlier
to include more ‘unique elements’ of the Japanese tradition, especially the invincibility of
7 The German regulation of 1906 emphasized the importance of the frontal assault in developing the
infantry’s offensive spirit (Bailey 2006b, 174).
8 In the grinding battle for Port Arthur, General Maresuke lost 58,000 men and the Russians 31,000; in
the final battle for Mukden, Russia lost about 85,000 to Japan’s 70,000 (Jansen 2000, 440).
9 For example, the IJA organized and improved its auxiliary service corps to transport heavy baggage
and artillery (Drea 2013, 81).
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‘Yamato-damashii ’, the spirit of Japan (Peattie 1972, 4). This does not mean that the
high command wanted to abolish Prussian theories of victory. Instead, it was an effort to
improve and double-down on the offensive concepts used during the First Sino-Japanese
and Russo-Japanese Wars. If anything, those wars vindicated the Moltkean strategy of
annihilation. After all, as Japan will almost always lack the necessary depth and resources,
a short, offensive warfare was Japan’s best bet.
The IJA leaders also saw that that the heavy toll of the Russo-Japanese War was not
caused by a faulty strategy but a lack of ‘superior will’ and ‘fighting spirit’. Therefore, what
appeared as a disbandment of Westernization was in fact a ‘spiritual fix’ to strengthen the
German-inspired theories of victory. Similarly when the IJA deactivated the 14th, 15th, 17th,
and 18th divisions in 1924, it was not ‘disarming’ but rather taking advantage of a shrinking
budget space to engage in mechanization.10 The theories of victory behind the mechanization
drive centered on better, quicker, and more systematic mobilization strategies inspired the
German General Staff planning.11 In other words, what appeared to be ‘disarmament’ was
in fact a continuing reliance on Western concepts and organizational formats.
Indeed, throughout the 1920s, Japanese military colleges taught the primacy of of-
fensive tactics and the General Staff revived the concept of an all-out offensive and the
supreme importance of surprise attacks. The revised Infantry Manual of 1928, for example,
re-emphasized the spirit of the attack, morale and other intangibles as an appeal to uphold
the Japanese tradition of warfare. But the tactical doctrine still stressed the German-inspired
rapid annihilation of the enemy by envelopment or encirclement achieved by a combination
of physical and psychological concentration of superior force (Drea 2013, 83). Bottom line,
10 The savings incurred by this action were diverted to establish a tank regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment,
two regiments in the Army Air Force, and several technical schools for the signal corps.
11 The Army Ministry created a Mobilization Department headed by Colonel Nagata Tetsuzan to develop
total mobilization plans based on his studies of the German General Staff (Crowley 1962, 313).
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Japan’s strategic thinking, tactical development, and organizational trajectory after the
Russo-Japanese War continued to build on its maximalist emulation.12
5.2 Critical antecedent
As chapter 3 notes, critical antecedents are conditions preceding a critical juncture that
combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce outcome variations. I argue
that the intensity of intra-military conflicts is an important critical antecedent because they
affect the contestation between competing groups within the military and determine how
the military deals with the model. I argue that unlike in Indonesia (chapter 4), there was
little to no conflict over military Westernization before the critical juncture in Japan. This
is not to say that there were no debates over which foreign model to follow, or that there
were no political conflicts over the arrival of the West. Indeed, the Bakumatsu era (1853–
1868) was plagued with conflicts within the samurai class and between the Shogunate and
the domains over how to deal with the Western powers. But these conflicts were largely
economic, socio-cultural, and political in nature (Christopher 2009).
As far as the military was concerned, many within Japan—from the shogunate, the
southwestern domains, and the Meiji elite—agreed that some form of Westernization was
necessary. The need for a national military system utilizing modern weapons and techniques
was thus widely accepted from the outset of the Meiji era (Hackett 1965, 250). If there
were debates over the respect, rejection, or acceptance of Western ‘concepts’, they took
place within some broad parameters of agreement that Japan was could be attacked by
Western powers and that to save herself she needed to revamp her armed forces (Beasley
12 Emulation is not equivalent to combat victory. Combat depends on numerous variables that requires a
separate assessment. I posit that a maximalist military emulation improves a country’s chances in a war but
the emulation itself is not the only factor that matters. In other words, under some conditions, a maximalist
military emulation may be necessary but insufficient to win a major power war.
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1972, 87). Overall, there was a broad consensus among Meiji military leaders that they
needed a modern, Westernized system and technology (Presseisen 1965, 33). The question
then was not if Japan should engage in military Westernization, but to what extent, how
quickly, and based on which foreign model. Why? This section argues that there were
pre-Meiji precedents that minimized intra-military conflicts over military Westernization.
5.2.1 Conceptual precedent
The first important precedent is conceptual in nature. By which I mean the Tokugawa era
had “prepared” Meiji military leaders with the conceptual foundation and infrastructure to
understand what military Westernization would have entailed. This sub-section describes in
particular the development of ‘Western learning’ (yogaku) and ‘Dutch studies’ (rangaku) and
the consequent limited diffusion of Western military knowledge production and experiments
during the bakumatsu era.
Western and Dutch learning
The roots of (yogaku) and (rangaku)—the schools of thought, research, and small groups of
scholars studying, adopting, and propagating knowledge and science derived from Europe—
can be traced to Japan’s early encounters with Western civilization in the late 16th century.
Japan’s interaction with Western powers from 1542 to 1854 was limited to the Portuguese,
Spanish, English, and the Dutch.13 There were local efforts in the 16th century to obtain
Western firearms, which led to its initial diffusion among local warlords.14 European can-
13 Firearms first came through the Portuguese in 1543, although some suggest that the Ryukyu Kingdom
first introduced them some 80 years before (Conlan 2010, 146).
14 Within six months of their arrival in 1543, the local armourers had more than 600 arquebuses (Boxer
1931, 69). With the regular opening of the Dutch factory at Hirado in 1609, the commercial import of
guns and firearms grew. In 1549, Oda Nobunaga placed an order for 500 matchlocks with the gunsmiths of
Kunitomo. By 1556 there were more than 300,000 guns in Japan (Brown 1948, 238). In preparation for the
invasion of Korea (1592–98), Hideyoshi ordered the lords of Satsuma to arm 1,500 soldiers with muskets,
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nons in particular were sought after by the 1600s (Boxer 1931, 74). This diffusion was
significantly halted during the ‘closed country’ (sakoku) period (1633–1853) initiated by
Tokugawa Iemitsu which severely limited Japan’s interaction with the West and the pro-
duction and control of firearms.15 But the Portuguese and Dutch were also reluctant to
embark on a massive diffusion of their weaponry and know-how.16 Consequently, European
military influence in Japan for roughly three centuries before Perry’s arrival was confined
to the introduction and partial adoption of a few technical inventions such as muskets and
cannons, the short-lived attempt of Tokugawa leyasu (1543–1616) to lay the foundations of
a Westernized military, and the diffusion of Western sciences and knowledge.
The introduction of Western firearms in the 16th century was part of the broader
changes in the methods of warfare, including the increasing use of missile-oriented tools
(from bows to firearms).17 Such tools facilitated the familiarization of firearms. But the
diffusion of firearms led to radical developments in military techniques and organization.
By the end of the 16thcentury, Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), one of Japan’s three unifiers
along with Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537–1598) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542–1616), organized
Japan’s first rifle units and Japan was reportedly fighting battles with more firearms than any
European nation (Samuels 1994, 80). These developments suggest that Japan was familiar
with military Westernization during the early Tokugawa era. Indeed, in the Warring States
period (1467–1568), Japanese leaders cared less about the ‘foreign or native’ origins of the
1,500 with bows, and 300 with spears (Stavros 2013, 246).
15 The shogunate kept gunsmiths in ‘artisanal colonies’ where the government controlled production and
kept prices high to discourage the mass production of firearms. It also prohibited overseas voyages and
restricted arms export. Commoners were proscribed from owning weapons. Japanese shipbuilding and
navigating techniques were lost and the technical skills and knowledge of arms manufacturing were tightly
controlled. Details are from Rogers (1998, 191) and Numata (1956, 234).
16 For one thing, many of the visiting Westerners were merchants. For another, the Portuguese forces were
not well-trained and organized, while the Dutch only served in places where the East India Company waged
wars or maintained garrisons (which did not include Japan). See Boxer (1931, 68–9).
17 During the 14th century, projectiles caused 73% of all wounds. Contrary to common assumptions,
swords were rarely used in battles after 1467. Arrows inflicted 58% of all projectile wounds through 1600.
Guns did not displace bows until 1600. Details are in Conlan (2010, 130–5).
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weapons they needed (Hirakawa 1989, 444). As Yamagata (1910, 197) notes of that era,
“Japan had long been one universal field of battle, and everybody was anxious to
get the best weapon he could; the new arms, therefore, at once became the object
of both the greatest interest and the most careful investigation, and, within the
course of ten years after their first introduction, they were imitated and came
into almost general vogue...It shows that our arms men have always been very
quick in the choice and adoption of new weapons.”
But as firearms allowed for low-quality infantrymen to be ‘effective’ in battle, the
number of men required to wage war expanded, which in turn, led to broader political and
organizational changes needed to recruit and train them (Lorge 2008, 54–5; Conlan 2010,
140). During the final decades of the 16th century, three hegemonic warlords—Nobunaga,
Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu—leveraged these developments to unify Japan. By then, Japan had
adopted an almost universal adoption of firearms, developed effective tactics, changed the
organization of armies, and centralized political and institutional relationships (Stavros 2013,
244). Therefore, once sakoku came into effect, the shogunate not only controlled the firearms
diffusion but also the broader organizational knowhow underpinning them. Out of this
controlled knowledge management came the nucleus of Western learning and Dutch studies.
At the beginning of sakoku around 1640, only the Dutch had contact with Japan—
hence, the term rangaku. The Netherlands were an appropriate bridge to the West. They
were small enough to be unthreatening, squarely in the middle of European cultural ex-
changes, and quick in their response to European learning (Jansen 1989a, 91). From a
conceptual standpoint, rangaku was perhaps a superficial phenomenon limited by the Neo-
Confucian philosophical commitments on the part of educated Japanese, by the prescribed
confines imposed by the shogunate, by the unsystematic method by which information from
the West entered, and by the mercantile preoccupation who never saw themselves as cultural
intermediaries (Goodman 2013, 2). But over time, rangaku laid the groundwork for military
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Westernization by: (1) introducing conceptual familiarity, (2) creating a generation of teach-
ers, students, and product champions, (3) setting the precedent to establish Western training
missions while sending students overseas, and (4) developing the habit of hiring foreigners on
a commercial basis. Sugita Gempaku (1733–1817), one of the founders of rangaku, posited
three principal methods through which a foreign civilization could be assimilated: (1) expe-
rience, observation, and study abroad; (2) instruction by foreign or foreign-trained Japanese
teachers; and (3) books (Hirakawa 1989, 437). As we shall see below, these methods became
standard tools for military Westernization during the Meiji era.
Western military knowledge production Dutch books were central to Japan’s under-
standing of the West by the late 18th and early 19th century. As more men could read them,
a distinct tradition of rangaku emerged. Initially, rangaku grew as an adjunct to medicine
and spread to other areas, such as languages, astronomy, geography, physics, and chemistry
(Hirakawa 1989, 435). The introduction of practical Dutch medicine opened the way for
the development of military studies as rangaku stimulated language training and scientific
methods. For example, Dutch specialists in the 1700s wrote books promoting Western mili-
tary science to defend Japan against Russian encroachments; some suggested that military
reforms should include the promotion of capable men from the lower samurai class (Beasley
1972, 79). The promotion of capable—later to mean, Western-trained—men in Japan thus
had its conceptual beginning among rangaku scholars.
Rangaku prepared the Japanese to exploit Western technology by instructing them
in military studies, from gunnery to strategy (Smith 1948, 151; Lehmann 1982, 128). The
shogunate then lifted the ban on the importation of Western books in 1720, in the hope
that Western knowledge could improve domestic agriculture and commercial production
(McClain 2002, 125). As the rules for foreign books were relaxed, the shogunate’s Bureau
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Figure 5.2: Translation of Western works, 1720 -1867
Source: Author calculation from Otsuki Joden, Shinsen yogaku nenpyo (New Almanac of Western Learning)
cited in Yoshida (1985, 193)
of Astronomy began studying foreign history, institutions, and military sciences.18 Overall,
there were almost 2,000 books and journals dealing with Western subjects from the 16th
century to 1872; geography, medicine, and military subjects accounted for almost half of
them. As Figure 5.2 below shows, translated books on Western military sciences grew
throughout the Tokugawa era compared to other subjects. They grew from roughly 12% of
all translated Western books published between 1720 and 1799 to about 41% between 1861
and 1867. But overall, the diffusion of Western military knowledge was slow and confined
to state-sanctioned schools or activities. Nonetheless, they introduced elementary Western
military concepts to the the future teachers and leaders of the Meiji military elite.
Rangaku also provided ‘practical’ templates for the shogunate to experiment on mil-
18 The shogunate subsequently opened a translation bureau in 1811 and several domain lords sponsored
academies of Dutch studies (Jansen 2000, 265).
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itary Westernization.19 As Dutch military works influenced Japanese scholars and poli-
cymakers, the shogunate turned to the Dutch when they decided to engage in military
Westernization. Thus, rangaku and the Dutch provided the earliest precedent for military
Westernization through: (1) the development of an initial defense industrial base, (2) the
provision of a Dutch military mission to train the Japanese, and (3) the education and
training of Japanese men in the Netherlands. As we shall see below, the commercial trans-
mission of Western theories of victory and corporatism in the Meiji era followed these broad
parameters established with the Dutch.
After Perry’s visit, the shogunate wanted to build a modern, Westernized navy. As the
Dutch was seeking to gain a foothold in Japan, it obliged to Japanese requests for assistance.
In 1855, negotiations for the Nagasaki Ironworks were completed. The Soembing, a ship with
a 150-horsepower engine, was presented to Japan and by 1857, materials to build a naval
repair yard reached Nagasaki and the foundry was completed in 1861 (Smith 1948, 143).
In 1863, the shogunate hired 14 more Dutch engineers and began building a shipyard to
construct steam-powered warships using commercially imported equipment (Yoshida 1985,
197). As the entire project was commercially costly for the shogunate, it was only completed
under the Meiji government. Regardless, the Dutch helped set the precedent for a commercial
arrangement to develop Japan’s non-existent defense industrial base.
The need to develop a defense industry partially incentivized the Japanese to send
students overseas. In fact, despite its own foreign travel ban, the shogunate sent students
to the Netherlands to learn military and nautical arts in 1862.20 But the Tokugawa author-
ities soon realized that they should not rely exclusively on the Dutch as its navy was not
powerful enough to be the prime model for Japan (Kiyoshi 1988, 173). The shogunate then
19 Back then, native schools of musketry emphasized years of training in impractical, arcane techniques
like firing while treading water, for example. See details in Rogers (1998) and Rubinger (1982, 180).
20 The Tokugawa and other domains sent 93 students abroad (1862–1867) (Yamamura 1980, 163, fn. 49).
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sent missions to the US and Europe (seven times before 1868) to represent Japan diplomat-
ically while obtaining information on military systems (McClain 2002, 170).21 Overtime,
such overseas missions became more frequent, professional, and serious (Jansen 1989b, 336).
The Meiji government later replicated this method of information gathering. The overseas
education of young samurais, meanwhile, created the nucleus of Western-product champions
in the late Tokugawa period (discussed below).
But the Dutch was the first Western power to send group missions of military instruc-
tors to Japan. The first 22-men team led by Pels Rijcken served from 1854 to 1857 and helped
set up a naval school in Nagasaki. The shogunate sent Katsu Kaishu and 50 other students
to the school while the domains sent around 130 students.22 The two-year intensive training
course had practical and theoretical instructions (from navigation to naval architecture and
gunnery) and used translated Western textbooks (Arima 1964, 367–8). Students also had
on-board ship training. About 100 graduates formed the nucleus for a new academy in Edo
and subsequently the IJN.23 A second 36-men mission, led by Hujjssen Van Kattendyke,
taught at the school from 1857 to 1859 (Jones 1974, 308). This mission added courses on
fortification, medicine, and chemistry as well as cavalry and infantry drills (Umetani 1971,
17). In 1859 the school was closed and all but a few of the instructors left Japan.
This Tokugawa-era experience was significant. For one thing, it would later facilitate
the IJN’s transition into adopting British theories of victory and corporatism during the Meiji
era. For another, it gave the templates commercially-arranged training missions, albeit with
an informal understanding between the governments involved. In 1858, in order to remove
21 Overall, more than 260 people have visited Western powers before the Restoration. Trip details are in
Umetani (1971, 11) and Kashioka (1982, 36).
22 They included Kawamura Sumiyoshi (future IJN admiral and Navy Minister) and Nakamuta Kuranosuke
(future IJN academy commandant) (Umetani 1971, 17).
23 The naval training school, the Gunkan Kyoju-sho, became the naval sailing training centre, the Gunkan
Soren-jo in 1859 and the naval academy, the Kaigun-sho by 1866.
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a precedent which could be used by other powers, the Dutch recommended the employment
of Dutch nationals on a direct individual basis by the shogunate (Jones 1974, 310). Finally,
the schools also trained future Meiji military leaders, including, Katsu Kaishu (1823–1899)
and Enomoto Takeaki (1836-1906), two early founders of the IJN.24
5.2.2 Practical precedent
The practical experience of military Westernization familiarized the military elite of its
promises and pitfalls prior to the Restoration. Three experience were salient: (1) the limited
military Westernization efforts by the shogunate and a few powerful domains, (2) the experi-
ence of dealing with Western military training missions, and (3) the experience of specifying
capabilities required from the Western powers and using commercial means to obtain them.
Central and local military Westernization
After Perry’s arrival, the shogunate and a few powerful local domains engaged in some form
of military Westernization. Initially, the Tokugawa rulers were reluctant to allow domains
like Satsuma and Choshu to engage in military Westernization as they could challenge the
central government. But domains located at the western tip of the main island of Japan
(Choshu), the west and south coast of Kyushu (Nagasaki and Satsuma), or the southern
coast of Shikoku (Tosa)—dubbed tozama or ‘outer domains’ not part of the Tokugawa inner
vassals—had the upper-hand geographically as the entry points for Western ideas (Morishima
1984, 57). The shogunate also simply did not have the resources for a national military
response to the West. Thereafter, military Westernization was spurred by the anticipation
of internal rather than external conflicts (Westney 1986, 171).
24 Enomoto had stayed in Europe and specialized in naval engineering. He even carried two volumes of
Dutch on naval tactics home (not available in Japan then) and passed them on to the new government. See
details in Kublin (1953, 410) and Falk (1936, 81). I will discuss Katsu further below.
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Shogunate attempts The shogunate wanted to implement technological reforms and re-
constitute the military component of its bannermen. But it was not prepared to transform
its forces fully along Western lines as it would have had significant social, economic, and po-
litical consequences (Jansen 1989b, 352). But officials felt they needed to engage in military
reform to at least to counter internal challenges from Satsuma and Choshu . Any attempt
at military Westernization was thus limited at best. Nonetheless, the efforts created a foun-
dation of policy precedents, infrastructure, relationships with Western powers, and a small
but influential Western-trained officers. In other words, Tokugawa leaders paved the way for
the Meiji-era military Westernization policies. Aside from the Dutch-assisted Nagasaki naval
school (discussed above), the shogunate created a military academy in 1856, the Edo Martial
Arts School, to train vassals in the use of firearms. The shogunate ordered its bannermen
to enroll as it learned to deal with new musketry techniques (Jaundrill 2016, 31–2). But the
academy was not exclusively teaching Western techniques. It still taught, inter alia, fencing
and archery alongside Western gunnery (Arima 1964, 371).25 After all, despite the decline
in their operational value, swords were important signifiers of social standing.26
The shogunate was aware that an effective military Westernization required a com-
plete overhaul of its armed forces. This was why officials in charge of the effort sought more
knowledge of European military training methods more than a decade before the Restora-
tion.27 Officials also proposed the adoption of a Dutch-style rank hierarchy, as well as a
standardized pay scale for both officers and NCOs. The new system would have converted
existing shogunal positions into ranks similar to those of Western militaries (Jaundrill 2016,
25 Training in weapons other than firearms constituted only half of all classes and accounted for two-thirds
of the teaching staff (Rogers 1998, 205).
26 The elite guards, for example, were mounted swordsmen, while the bow, pike, and firearm followed
below in social significance (Totman 1967, 27–8).
27 In 1851, they obtained a Dutch report with extensive information on the content of Dutch regular
army and territorial militia training. It also suggested ways to abolish bow-and-arrow training, weed out
incompetent officers, reform the promotional system, and send men abroad for training (Totman 1980, 26).
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49-51). But the overall military Westernization efforts were haphazard, limited, and incon-
sistent. Many of their plans were not realized, and what they accomplished, they could not
sustain. When deployed in combat against powerful domains like Choshu, the shogunate’s
Westernized units were not impressive.
A more serious attempt at military Westernization began in the early 1860s as part of
the Bunkyu era administrative, military, and political reforms (1861–1864).28 Aside from the
plans mentioned above, the shogunate wanted to better train more men (between 13,000 to
20,000) and organize them along European lines — cavalry, infantry, and artillery — based on
German and Dutch texts.29 Translated manuals also helped the shogunate plan a dual-service
(army and navy) structure with elaborate Western-inspired tables of organization.30 But
Tokugawa leaders also viewed internal enemies, particularly Choshu, as the more immediate
threat. Army development thus took precedent over naval ones while insisting on the need
to emulate Western powers. According to Hotta Masayoshi, one of the Shogun’s advisers:
“our policy should be to stake everything on the present opportunity, to con-
clude friendly alliances, to send ships to foreign countries everywhere and conduct
trade, to copy the foreigners where they are at their best and so repair our short-
comings, to foster our national strength and complete our armaments” (Bailey
2006a, 24) (emphasis mine).
The commercial precedent of engaging in Western trainers also started in this period.
As I discuss below, the French provided preliminary training to Tokugawa forces and helped
build ironworks at Yokohama and a dockyard at Yokosuka. To pay for all this, arrangements
were made to create a Franco-Japanese trading company (backed by French and British
28 Details in this paragraph are from Jansen (1989b, 349), (Totman 1980, 24-6, 81, 185), Yamagata (1910,
201), Beasley (1972, 262), Bara (2012, 155–7), Jaundrill (2016, 53), and Porter (1911, 215).
29 Prussian General Heinrich von Brandt wrote a book in 1833 about the organization and tactics of the
three combat arms, which had been translated in 1846 and 1850. Another Prussian tactical book written
in 1834 by General Karl von Decker had been translated in 1848. Japanese scholars translated these texts
from their Dutch editions and were used in the 1850s.
30 The government completed a study by the early 1860s which showed that Japan needed to expand its
coastal and naval defense.
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capital) with special privileges in the export of Japanese products, especially silk, and to or-
ganize in return for the import of ships and weapons (Beasley 1972, 264). But the shogunate
came up short of the original plan, as Table 5.1 below shows.
Table 5.1: Westernized Tokugawa army units, 1867
Units Number
First Infantry Regiment 1,000
Fourth Infantry Regiment 800
Fifth Infantry Regiment 600
Sixth Infantry Regiment 600
Guard Corps 400
Seventh Infantry Regiment 800
Eighth Infantry Regiment 800
Eleventh Infantry Regiment 900
Training regiments (2) 1,400
Total 7,300
Source: figures are from Arima (1964, 373).
The shogunate decided to deploy what little they had against internal challenges.
The first test came in 1864 when a major uprising erupted in Mito, a Tokugawa collateral
domain, known as the Tengu Insurrection. It took four months and thousands of reinforce-
ments to put it down. The Westernized infantry units performed poorly. Military leaders
thought that they needed more training and that they did not raise enough Western-trained
troops (Jaundrill 2016, 56). They also realized that relying on translated materials and local
rangaku-trained instructors were not sufficient and that they needed to send their own men
to Europe. Senior officials then encouraged their men to study under British army soldiers
stationed at Yokohama. From 1864 onwards, the shogunate also moved away from the Dutch
model and texts. Before the reforms were completed, the shogunate forces were sent to the
Summer War of 1866 against Choshu. After two months, the better Westernized rebel forces
had beaten the government in each area of operation. Choshu and other challengers saw their
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gamble in military Westernization pay off. The conflicts thus validated the effectiveness of
Western-style organization and firepower (Jaundrill 2016, 75).
But the experience also suggests problems Meiji leaders had to confront later on.
First, Japan could not rely on purchasing weaponry from abroad. Arms were available but
“most were not the best and the best were expensive” (Totman 1980, 182). In the 19th
century, the rapid development of European military technology meant that firearms quickly
became obsolete.31 Second, the shogunate did not have the resources or willingness to have
dedicated foreign training missions. A full-scale military Westernization, after all, required
broader social, political and economic changes.32 This would have ended the Tokugawa
military structure which relied on samurais or mandatory quotas (Drea 2016, 1).
Third, there was no sustainable and coherent training program. Some men who
had studied Dutch tactics at Nagasaki or received instructions from a few foreigners were
supposed to create an entire organization based on a bare minimum understanding and a
few translated texts. It also appears that the shogunate had badly estimated the extent to
which liege vassals were willing or capable to provide the necessary manpower. Whatever
Western training they could organize was haphazard as men came as interest and desire
for pay dictated (Totman 1980, 26). Overall, the shortage of trained officers, the failure to
develop an effective command structure, and the continuing shortage of funds all hampered
the shogunate’s military Westernization (Westney 1986, 174).
Domain attempts Overall, the localized domain attempts at military Westernization
provided practical experience, initial policy templates, and a small cadre of Western-trained
31 By 1864, some 10,000 weapons had been imported at Yokohama but most of them were obsolete. The
shogunate went through two generations of weaponry in five years: it settled upon Minie-style muzzleloaders
in 1862 but moved on to Chassepot breechloaders in 1867. They also had to move on from a coastal artillery
defense in the 1850s to a warship-based defense in less than a decade (Totman 1980, 335).
32 Conservatives believed that military Westernization could transfer firearms to regime enemies while
others thought it would undermine the country’s unique traits (Totman 1980, 181).
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soldiers. The powerful domains of Satsuma and Choshu were the best Westernized local
forces during the bakumatsu era (Norman 1965, 34). I will discuss their broader military
Westernization programs below as I examine how Meiji leaders from Satsuma and Choshu
took their pre-Meiji experience into the post-Restoration era. For now, I want to note that
Satsuma and Choshu were not the only domains engaging in military Westernization.
Initially, the shogunate encouraged the domains to engage in military Westerniza-
tion to improve country-wide military readiness while compensating for its own strained
finances.33 These domains have traditionally relied on commercial means to obtain the lat-
est weaponry.34 Some domains were relatively Westernized by the 1840s when the request
came and as such were more receptive. These powerful domains were, after all, always on
the lookout for a military edge against either rival domains or the Tokugawa (Swope 2005,
19). While their efforts vary in scope, scale, and speed, they laid the foundation for a future
national military Westernization.35
In the domain of Matsushiro, the birthplace of Sakuma Shozan, one of the key pre-
Meiji Western product champions discussed below, the Lord Sanada Yukitsura wanted to
construct a navy and thus summoned Dutch strategists, gunners, and shipwrights. He be-
lieved that Western learning was the basis for a new-style military preparations. Meanwhile,
the Tosa domain organized all of its warriors into Western-style rifle companies by 1867. It
also raised 10,000 commoners as coastal defense auxiliaries and outstripped others in creat-
ing “people’s militias”.36 Such all-class units would later be a fixture of Westernized forces
33 It asked the domains, for example, to construct shore batteries, cast or buy cannons, and train their
warriors in updated gunnery techniques (Jaundrill 2016, 38–40).
34 They have invested, for example, in steam ships purchased via foreign merchants in Nagasaki. While
most of the vessels were small in size, the domains bought no less than 93 military ships between 1854 and
1868 (Kennedy 1928, 36).
35 Details in the next two paragraphs are from Goodman (2013, 151–6), Burks (1985a, 22), Arima (1964,
373), Norman (1965, 23), Jaundrill (2016, 59).
36 The leading elements in these groups were ronins (masterless samurais), village headmen, and goshi
(rustic samurai), while the rank and file were largely composed of peasants, sailors, and hunters.
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during the last years of the bakumatsu era.
The Saga domain, the birthplace of Takashima Shuhan, the founder of a powerful
Western gunnery school (discussed below), was also engaging in military Westernization
by the 1860s. It established organizations for the research of Western technologies and
launched the first Japanese steamship. Nagasaki was after all the home of the Dutch naval
school filled with Saga students. The domain also employed the so-teppo-sei, the all-gun
units, to mobilize farmers armed with percussion-capped muskets. Their ships were among
the first to deploy modern British-made cannons and their troops used modern firearms
(purchased through a British merchant). Meanwhile, the domain of Fukui sought to Western
military knowledge to build coastal defenses and improve local health conditions. It initiated
close-order drills, began manufacturing Western-style artilleries, and sent samurais to study
Western-style military science. By 1855, the domain school, the Meidokan, studied military
arts, mathematics, and Western books and had a library of foreign military books.
Finally, the Kishu domain, a collateral Tokugawa branch, adopted Dutch and Prussian
arms and organization since 1856.37 Rangaku-trained Western product champions pushed
the process and the Kishu infantry was reorganized in Dutch-model battalions and drilled
with a mixture of rifle muskets, smooth-bore muskets, and modified matchlocks. By 1866,
Kishu decided to equip its troops with Prussian needle-guns and adopted its organizational
system. I will discuss the Prussian influence below. For now, I want to note that Kishu com-
mercially negotiated an arms deal to obtain Prussian firearms and trainers. Kishu continued
its Prussian-inspired reforms before the domains were abolished in 1871.
Aside from these major domains, minor ones were also engaged in some form of mil-
itary Westernization, as Table 5.2 below shows.38 These localized efforts along with the
37 Details in this paragraph are from Bara (2012, 158–160).
38 Minor domains were roughly between 15,000 and 60,000 koku in size. Koku was a unit adopted to
determine size & wealth. One koku of rice is about 278.3 litres (73.5 gallon) or about 150 kg (330 pound),
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shogunate’s attempt suggest that there was a preliminary diffusion of information about
Western theories of victory and corporatism before the Restoration. The military Western-
ization of the Meiji period was thus less ‘revolutionary’ than many had assumed. But more
importantly, the limited experience created a pool of different foreign models to emulate.










Matsumoto Fudai 60,000 1866 — 1870*
Takato Fudai 33,000 1856 — 1870*
Ueda Fudai 53,000 1850 1869 1870
Suzaka Tozama 10,000 1854 1865 1870
Iiyama Fudai 20,000 — 1866 1870
Tanoguchi Fudai 16,000 1861 — 1865
Iwamurata Fudai 15,000 1866 — 1867
Notes:
* = change adopted prior to 1870 military standarization decree
Fudai = Tokugawa inner/hereditary vassals — Tozama = outer domains
Source: figures are from Westney (1986, 75).
Western military missions
The limited experience of commercially managing the foreign training missions (especially
from the Dutch, British, French, and Germans) during the bakumatsu era was valuable for
the Meiji leaders in two ways. First, the importance of formulating specifically what the
Japanese needed as each Western model had its own strengths and weaknesses. Second,
Japan needed to combine a temporary use of commercially-hired foreign trainers with the
promotion of Western-trained officers to teach Western theories of victory and corporatism
to ensure organizational autonomy in the long run.
enough to feed one person for one year. As a comparison, the shogunate controlled more than 2 million koku
and less than 2 dozen domains had more than 200,000 koku.
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French precedent The Dutch may have given Japan its first foreign training, but the
French mission had a more profound and enduring effect. After the defeats against Choshu,
the Tokugawa wanted to secure foreign assistance to retrain its armed forces. The idea to
turn to the French originated with a pro-France group within the government (Presseisen
1965, 4). This shows the intra-regime power dynamics that facilitated the selection. A
pro-French faction was particularly important given that there were other European powers
willing to provide training and weaponry.39 The British lackluster response to Tokugawa
overtures further swayed Japan to France, which had the best army at the time (Lehmann
1976, 6–7). The point is that initially the Japanese sought European instructors and favored
no one nation in particular (Medzini 1971, 127).
Leon Roches, the French Ambassador to Japan since 1864, was one of the key figures
behind French prominence as the purveyor of trainers and arms. While Roches worked hard
to sway the Tokugawa, the regime was eager if not desperate to obtain technology, training,
and equipment to head off serious rebellions. Roches filled a needed role in this regard, he
did not create one. Historians attribute his military aid provision to Japan as a reflection
of his personal ambitions rather than a grand design by Paris (Sims 1998, 57; Lehmann
1980, 274). France, after all, did not yet regard Japan as a vital national interest.40 In
any case, Roches cultivated a close relationship with the shogunate suggesting that France
was prepared to supply arms against Choshu. In return, Roches had hoped for a favorable
response to France’s special trade needs and that France should be the primary supplier for
arms and equipment (Medzini 1971, 87). The shogunate, meanwhile, was was willing to pay
for the military materials as they desperately needed to fend off internal threats.
39 The Dutch, for example, made the case that the shogunate had always looked to Holland for instructors,
machinery, and education and that the shogunate could obtain better training by sending students to the
Dutch East Indies (Ericson 1979, 388).
40 France had been involved in military action in Italy, Algeria, New Caledonia, Syria, Senegal, and China
since the 1840s. France only accounted for less than 3% of Japan’s foreign trade (Medzini 1971, 21).
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By 1865, the shogunate wanted a specific set of products from the French: (1) military
training missions, (2) machinery and equipment to build a naval yard and arsenal, and (3)
assistance to develop a mint.41 An officially sponsored trading company, the French Society
for Export and Import, was created to pay for these needs. It would enter into trading
relations on behalf of Japan and France (outside of official channels) and execute an exclusive
French-shogunate trading arrangements.42 A considerable amount of military equipment was
purchased through the company before it had to be shuttered in the absence of French public
support. But the commercial channels to acquire military capabilities was set.
The shogunate appointed Paul Fleury-Herard, Roches’s personal banker, as its repre-
sentative and commercial agent in Paris.43 He handled the negotiations which led to the 1865
agreement providing a 4-year plan with a $2 million budget to build a foundry and dockyards
at Yokosuka and provide some 40 French personnel to train 2,000 Japanese troops.44 The
dockyards were modeled over the Toulon Shipyards and included an engineering school as
part of a ‘localization’ plan.45 That the shogunate had to pay for everything in advance in
cash underscores the commercial nature of the military Westernization effort. The upside
was that Japan could then demand specific programs or items.
In September 1866, a group of French military advisers signed a 3-year commercial
41 Details in the next two paragraphs are from Sims (1998, 53), Ericson (1979, 386), Honjo (1935, 36, 49),
Jansen (2000, 315), Jansen (1989b, 351), Jones (1974, 317), Medzini (1971, 67–69), Sims (1998, 52), Umetani
(1971, 22), and (Totman 1980, 211).
42 In what was known as the “arms for silk” deal, the Japanese would provide a large-scale export of
silkworm egg cards to France. But for some hardware, like ships, Paris was inclined to give obsolete or
outdated ones, which the Japanese had to pay for in value.
43 He was Japan’s first diplomatic representative in a Western country. He was instructed to help any
Japanese who traveled to France or were shipwrecked there as well as acquire shipyard machinery, arms,
military instructors, and others.
44 Initially, the shogunate also secretly wanted to purchase warships and arms valued at $7,000,000 from
France. It could have also spent up to 35 million francs for the dockyards, importation of weaponry, and
provision of trainers when the project was first discussed in 1865.
45 That major ship repairs were not possible in Nagasaki prompted the Yokosuka project. Roches per-
suaded the bakufu to eventually hire Francois L. Verny, a marine engineer and French naval lieutenant, as
the project director. The French saw Yokohama and Yokosuka as the most favorable spots for the rest and
repair of the French Far Eastern Fleet.
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contract with Flury-Herard. The terms stipulated that the shogunate was to pay the fares
to Japan and back; salaries were to be paid in local currency and suitable housing was to
be provided. All members of the mission retained their rights of promotion, seniority and
pension, while Paris chose the equipment needed (Medzini 1971, 128–130). Japanese leaders
initially asked Roches to create 12 battalions of drilled infantry and asked for a group of 51
trainers, including a senior officer as the mission chief (Totman 1980, 185).46 The idea was
to eventually produce an army of roughly 10,000 French-trained men.47 If this pilot project
was successful, it would have been applied on a larger scale.
In January 1867, a group of 21 French military instructors arrived in Edo led by
Captain Chanoine, an East Asian expert with experience in China.48 Before his departure,
Chanoine was handed a detailed list of instructions: to train the Japanese army according
to French administrative and military experience; the Japanese government commanded the
mission, which must not meddle in politics; the mission should not copy slavishly what was
done in France, but to account for and improve local military aptitudes and habits. He
was also to use the same system used to train French troops, and to “transplant” to Japan
the character of the French army. Chanoine’s first memorandum to the shogunate focused
on reforming the Japanese organizational doctrine. He thought that the shogunate had a
large quantity of haphazardly bought war materiel, most of which was piled up “higgledy-
piggledy in warehouses” as they did not know how to use it.49 The mission trained a small
number of officers and NCOs.50 This small nucleus was supposed to train 800 infantry and
46 They also wanted to create one or two ‘special forces’ battalions in the mould of the Chasseurs de
Vincennes, an elite French mountain infantry unit (Ericson 1979, 390).
47 Roches only requested to Paris some 35 advisors due to funding concerns (Honjo 1935, 38).
48 Details in this paragraph are from Upton (1878, 1), Presseisen (1965, 9–12), Medzini (1971, 131),
Lehmann (1980, 291, n. 65), Kublin (1949, 25), Jaundrill (2016, 81), Jones (1974, 319), Totman (1980, 342),
and Umetani (1971, 25).
49 He thought the officers’ their lack of scientific notions and discipline were problematic. The shogunate
had ordered 40,000 French Chassepot breechloaders and some thousand other pieces.
50 These included 60 infantry officers, 20 artillery officers, and a squadron of cavalry. Chanoine decided
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200 artillery soldiers. While the mission remained in Japan about 18 months, the training
given covered about a 6-month period of drills. When the Boshin War erupted, the mission
supervised supervised 1,500 infantrymen, 230 student officers, two squadrons of cavalry, 5
artillery batteries, and a company of sappers. The mission was discharged soon after.
The training was costly and there were problems surrounding the constant need for
interpreters and the lack of trained officers (Presseisen 1965, 11). But the French school
ensured that most Japanese would be more proficient in French than other European lan-
guages. There were also nearly three times as many Frenchmen working across Japan during
the bakumatsu era as there were British (Jones 1974, 316; Lehmann 1980, 293). Language
would be one of the key considerations Meiji military leaders thought about when deciding
to keep French trainers (discussed below).
British precedent The British had more influence in the Japanese navy than the army.
The influence continued from the last years of the Tokugawa until the late Meiji era. Initially,
the British garrison in Yokohama pioneered the Westernization of the shogunate army.51
While the British did not train officers, the main troops of the Restoration government, in-
cluding the Totsugawa Imperial Guard and the Boshin Conscripted Force, may have adopted
British formations and training (Asakawa 2003, 17–20).52 The Satsuma and Saga domains
also initially adopted the British model and imported British weapons.53
During the last years of the bakumatsu era, British influence on Japanese domestic
not to instruct soldiers until the officers and NCOs were sufficiently trained.
51 Under the Kanagawa Magistrate, 60 Japanese soldiers first received British drill and training provided
by the 2nd Battalion of the 20th Foot Regiment. The training was expanded by late 1864 and included drills
based on British Infantry texts.
52 British forces in Yokohama lacked qualified staff members to train officers. They were also ambivalent
about propping up the shogunate over the powerful domains.
53 These domains and others might have modeled their drills on the ‘Field Exercise and Evolutions of
Infantry’, an 1862 British manual. At least as many as 36 domains and six corps of government soldiers had
adopted the British model by the late Tokugawa era (Asakawa 2003, 32, fn. 49).
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politics was growing.54 But its influence soon waned as the shogunate decided to engage the
French, although, as we shall see below, it kept a foothold on the navy through its Satsuma
connections. This was particularly the case since the shogunate decided that the Dutch was
no longer a suitable model. Further, Tokugawa military leaders held the Royal Navy in high
regard and naval men in Satsuma and Saga had been studying them for years (Gow 2004,
36). It should be noted that they were less concerned about which foreign model to follow
than the personal qualifications of the trainers (Perry 1966, 309).
Between 1865 and 1868, the Shogunate tried to build its navy and asked Britain for
help. While initially reluctant, London felt threatened by French inroads into the IJA. Henry
Parkes, the British Ambassador insisted the Japanese signed a written promise they would
not seek naval assistance from another nation (Perry 1966, 309). In 1866, a contract was
signed between the two governments, which made the arrangement less commercial than what
the shogunate had with the French.55 Meiji leaders later learned from this episode to rely
more on commercial contracts as government-to-government arrangements were problematic.
Commander Richard Tracey was appointed chief of the 17-men British Naval Training
Mission with all expenses paid for by the Shogunate. They were placed at the disposal of the
Japanese government for two years with their salaries pegged to the market rate (i.e. what
Japan was paying the French) (Jones 1974, 315). The mission arrived on October 1867. They
took up duties at Tsukiji and were supposed to instruct Japanese youths in naval science,
seamanship, and discipline. But British neutrality during the Restoration War made it
impossible for the mission to continue (Gow 2004, 34). The mission nonetheless laid the
54 Throughout the 1860s, British commerce constituted more than 75% of Japan’s total foreign trade.
British merchants sold arms and machinery clandestinely to powerful domains, smuggled their students
abroad, and side-stepped shogunate restrictions (Jones 1974, 312).
55 The British rejected a commercial agent go-between as paymaster, and Japanese officials were obliged
to make direct payment to the mission chief (Jones 1974, 315).
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groundwork for further British training in the Meiji era.56
5.2.3 Organizational precedent
The final pre–Tokugawa development that shaped the critical antecedent concerns the orga-
nizational precedents in which the policies taken by the IJA and IJN were shaped by: (1) the
fact that the Satsuma and Choshu domains, the most militarily Westernized locales, led the
Meiji Restoration and their leaders became Meiji leaders, (2) the Meiji-era Western product
champions who can be directly linked to Western product champions during the Tokugawa
era. The Choshu and Satsuma pre-Meiji military Westernization is significant because they:
(1) demonstrated what a professional, meritocratic organization backed by a conscription
army could do, (2) suggested the utility of commercial Westernization, and (3) gave birth to
Western product champions and battle–tested commanders.
Satsuma and Choshu Westernization and domination
Satsuma and Choshu were at the forefront of military Westernization, which gave them
distinct battlefield advantages against the Tokugawa. It was natural that upon assuming
power, their leaders would draw lessons from their domain experience to shape and boost the
national military Westernization efforts (Koyama, Moriguchi and Sng 2018, 184). After all,
their views of international politics mirror their views of the intra-Japan rivalries between
the shogunate and the domains. Just as military Westernization improved the domains’
position against the Tokugawa, Japan needed a national military Westernization to compete
in the international arena (Hackett 1965, 251).
Satsuma and Choshu could push through a national military Westernization effort
56 The mission, among others, established a naval school for nearly 100 cadets and officers and prepared
Japanese hydrographical efforts. See more in Kennedy (1928, 21, 34) and Perry (1966, 309).
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because their leaders filled the ranks of government and the officer corps in the early Meiji
years.57 That these men were from the ‘lesser’ samurai class further facilitated the promotion
of ‘men of ability and not nobility’ as a central element of the military Westernization
effort. “Ability” was soon interpreted as having Western education and training. In other
words, the rise of Satsuma and Choshu allowed the Meiji government to engage in military
Westernization by relying on and promoting Western-trained officers. Why and how Satsuma
and Choshu engaged in military Westernization during the Tokugawa era thus shaped the
policies their leaders take as Meiji leaders.
Pre-Meiji Choshu Choshu was a relative newcomer to military Westernization.58 Choshu
samurais had studied Western gunnery associated with the Takashima school (discussed
below) in the 1840s, but the domain did not adopt its methods. Choshu, after all, already had
a relatively Westernized school of military studies, known as Gobu-Santo, which combined
firearms, naval warfare, coastal defense and a concern with practical operations.59 The school
was also based on realistic assessments of the challenges associated with motivation, training,
discipline, and command and control—central issues in any military Westernization.
Military reforms nonetheless began in Choshu in the late 1850s when a pro-Westernization
faction controlled the domain government.60 Officials soon proposed that all low-ranking
warriors study Dutch drills and that local forces adopt Western military organizations. The
domain schools taught civil and military courses along with Western learning. Choshu stu-
57 From Satsuma came Okubo Toshimichi (1830–78), Saigo Takamori (1827–77), and Matsukata Masayoshi
(1835–1924). From Choshu came Kido Koin (1833–77), Inoue Kaoru (1835–1915), Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909),
and Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922).
58 Details in the next two paragraphs are from Jaundrill (2016, 41–4), Kashioka (1982, 37), Lone (2000,
6-7), Rogers (1998, 199), Smith (1948, 133), and Hackett (1971, 9).
59 For example, in practicing musketry, the school scorned the traditional 30-yard shooting ranges, and
urged leaders to train their men in the fields to shoot from five or six hundred yards away.
60 The domain sent 30 men to study under the Dutch at the Nagasaki naval school discussed above. When
the students returned in 1859, they began teaching volunteers and were promoted to key positions.
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dents were also encouraged to study Western sciences outside of the domain. In 1859 Choshu
introduced a Western-style rifle unit. A few years later, the domain secretly sent some of
their young samurais to the UK for naval training.
As noted then by Yamagata, one of Choshu’s prominent samurais, “The pressing
need of the hour is to send abroad selected men of talent who will inform themselves of the
world situation and master practical science relating to steamships and warship, artillery,
Western institutions, and governments” (Sakata 1985, 77). In the early 1860s, with the
return of Omura Masujiro from studying Western military sciences in Nagasaki and Edo,
Choshu engaged in broader military Westernization efforts. His arrival coincided with the
Shimonoseki campaign between Choshu and the joint naval forces of Great Britain, France,
the Netherlands and the US between 1863-4. Following the embarrassing defeat by the
Western powers, Omura and Choshu military leaders created auxiliary units called the shotai
that conscripted warriors and commoners.
Omura also called for a concerted effort to secure Western weapons on a large scale and
to introduce Western fighting methods. The domain invited instructors versed in Western
theories of victory and by early 1865 decided to replace as rapidly as possible all old-style
weapons with modern rifles Shotai units were reorganized into standard units of 150 men
and lower samurais were organized into rifle companies — all drilled along Western methods
(Hackett 1971, 39). Dozens of companies were formed; some supported by the domain,
others driven by enthusiastic loyalists financed by wealthy sympathizers. The units thus
varied in size (from 100 to 500 men) and were often drawn from a single locality.61 Choshu
was becoming a small-scale ‘nation in arms’ that Meiji leaders looked back to.
61 In theory, their officers were chosen by ability but in practice it meant choosing those with hereditary
standing. Many of the rank-and-file had samurai or quasi-samurai status (about 25 to 45%). Another 30 to
50% were ‘commoners’ drawn from well-to-do farmers and village officials. By 1868, there were no less than
156 shotai units. See details in Beasley (1972, 227) and Hackett (1971, 27)
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The Kiheitai (‘surprise troops’), a shotai special forces unit is worth noting.62 Taka-
sugi Shinsaku (1839–1867), the domain’s expert on Western military science, proposed and
led the Kiheitai, which included townsmen and peasants.63 Neither recruitment nor pro-
motion depended on social status. Takasugi was concerned that an all-samurai unit would
be difficult to control in battle and lack the cohesion required by European tactics.64 The
only qualifications for admission were skill, daring, and obedience to the commander, who
would punish and reward based on merits. Takasugi expanded and armed the riffle units
with modern weapons purchased from British arms dealers. Takasugi set the new force to
repair forts, study the tactics of the foreigners, and train in Western theories of victory.
In the final campaigns against the shogunate, the unit used Western theories of vic-
tory. Omura modified a European tactical flanking concept, for example, and used it as
a guerilla-style tactic.65 Choshu thus had developed a preliminary Westernized theory of
victory based on from Dutch military strategy and traditional Japanese tactics. On the
corporatism side, the units also crossed feudal lines—which Meiji leaders would later copy.
Choshu leaders also placed the units’ leaders at the top of the domain army, and reorganized
the bannermen into platoons, companies, and battalions based on Western models. Choshu
IJA leaders would implement these policies as in the Meiji era as well.
Pre-Meiji Satsuma Satsuma had developed its own school of military science, the Goden-
ryu, which blended gunnery with a strong sense of regionalism.66 The school stressed that
62 Details in the next two paragraphs are from Jaundrill (2016, 61–6), Christopher (2009, 40), Hackett
(1971, 25), Lone (2000, 7), Buck (1959, 65), Norman (1965, 29, 34), Drea (2016, 5), and Beasley (1972, 227).
63 Of the 622 men who served in the Kiheitai between 1863 and 1870, 56% were not samurais.
64 The Kiheitai, after all, was modeled over the armies of the early French republic.
65 In a June 1866 battle with bakufu forces, Omura employed flanking attacks from the rear—what he
called ‘rabbit hunting’ techniques—to drive defenders from their strongholds. Relying on mobile infantry,
his units offset their inferior numbers and employed concealed skirmishers. They sniped from rooftops, tree
lines, or undergrowth, and fled.
66 Details in this paragraph are from Rogers (1998, 202), Beasley (1972, 122), Goodman (2013, 159),
Westney (1986, 171).
272
firearms were historically not weapons for the elite and were mandatory for all ranks. By
the 1840s, Satsuma had begun experimenting with broader military Westernization. By the
1840s, the domain adopted the Takashima school of Western gunnery and a Dutch-style
drill. It reformed military administration and reorganized the riffle and artillery forces. The
domain forces also added a cavalry forced based on a French cavalry manual.67 Domain
leaders sent samurais to Nagasaki, Edo, and other schools that taught western studies.68
These activities lasted into the 1850s. The Takashima school expanded and the
domain forces were standardized along Western lines. The manufacturing of cannon and
gunpowder also grew (Goodman 2013, 158). But these trends were abruptly halted by the
Anglo-Satsuma War of August 1863. The defeat at the hands of the British enabled Satsuma
leaders to introduce sweeping organizational changes to the military. Not only was Western
drill and musketry further boosted, the domain army also created a larger core force of
volunteers (Arima 1964, 373). Satsuma was after all packed with samurais (over one-quarter
of its population) (Jansen 1989b, 347). More importantly, they started sending dozens of
samurais overseas to study Western military techniques. As the daimyo put it in 1856:
“At this time when defense against the foreign barbarians is of crucial importance
it is the urgent duty of all samurai both high and low to co-operate in learning
conditions in foreign lands so that we may adopt their good points to supplement
our deficiencies, reinforce the military might of our nation and keep the barbarian
nations under control” (Beasley 1972, 121).
But domain leaders also wanted to ensure it could adopt and ‘localize’ Western the-
ories of victory and corporatism. Satsuma then created the Kaiseijo, a military academy
to foster the development of a Western-style army and navy.69 The school gave instruction
67 Many leading Rangaku scholars were called into Satsuma to translate European military manuals,
including Genpo Mitsukuri, the famed pioneer of Western tactics and translator of the Prussian three army
branches book discussed above
68 Nagasaki-based military scholars, making use of imported books and conversations with the traders of
Deshima, produced a growing stream of books on Western military practices and strategy.
69 Details in this paragraph are from Jaundrill (2016, 66–70), Ravina (2011, 131), Drea (2016, 3), Smith
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in Dutch and English as well a full range of military studies and a broader education.70
Students studied British drills, which emphasized light infantry and dispersed formations
suited to Japan’s topography. Satsuma leaders also quietly hired British advisers to reorga-
nize and train their forces and took on British technology, from coastal batteries, riffles to
steamships.71 Satsuma saw the purchasing Western technology and tactics as acceptable for
the ‘greater good’ without sacrificing the ‘Japanese spirit’.72
Western product champions
The final but perhaps most important precedent shaping the absence of intra-military con-
flicts over military Westernization was the role of bakumatsu era Western product champions.
Some of them taught Meiji-era Western product champions, including those senior IJA and
IJN officers who led the Westernization efforts during the critical juncture. It is impor-
tant therefore that we understand how pre-Meiji Western product champions emerged—
particularly through teacher-student relations and local western teachings—and provided a
‘network effect’ that shaped the critical juncture.
Some of the early Tokugawa Western product champions were students, envoys, or
self–taught enthusiasts. They nevertheless became the “core experts” on the West in the
pre-Meiji era (Beasley 1972, 306). More importantly, they built private schools and taught
students from all over the country. As these students reached ‘critical mass’, they developed
into networks centered on charismatic Western-trained teachers. The fluid yet strong bonds
(1948, 148), Gow (2004, 36), Beasley (1972, 122–3), Falk (1936, 59), Buck (1959, 121), and Cobbing (2013b,
23–4).
70 About 60 to 70 men were chosen from the elite domain samurai school. Officers from the domain army
and rangaku adherents who wished to study in Europe were also admitted.
71 State-of-the-art British military textbooks were also available to Satsuma; its ports have been the entry
point and distribution hub for Western military science and firearms for decades.
72 During the last years of the Tokugawa era, Satsuma spent about 40 % of its income to the purchase of
arms and the development of its forces. The domain combined domestic economic reforms and international
trade to support this spending.
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of brotherhood united by common ideals—including the values of military Westernization—
underpinned these networks.73 Upon graduation from the schools, the young samurais pro-
posed ideas to their lords and gradually shaped the debate over military Westernization.
The shogunate also approved the creation of rangaku learning centers across the
domains by the late 18th century.74 This ‘decentralization’ of rangaku, coupled with the
private networks above, created a broader awareness of Western studies. Rangaku then
became more focused on the military sciences (Yoshida 1985, 192). International conditions,
particularly Russian advances from the north, further facilitated this shift.75 In 1811, the
shogunate created the Office of the Translation of Foreign Works to translate works on
naval gunnery and other military-related materials (Numata 1956, 242). This marked the
shogunate’s attempt to centralize Western learning to ensure that the powerful domains do
not become too military Westernized. The shogunate then created the Institute for the
Study of Barbarian Books (Bansho Shirabejo) in 1857 to study foreign military systems and
weapons production (Beasley 1972, 121).76
Students and leading rangaku scholars came from all over the country, including
Nishi Amane (1829–1897).77 Nishi would be among the first few Japanese to study in
the Netherlands in 1862. He was eventually in charge of the Tokugawa military school at
Numazu, which trained cadets along Western lines, from modern military arts to various
liberal arts courses (Hackett 1959, 214). After the Restoration, Nishi joined the military
bureaucracy, where he investigated Western military school systems and helped draft military
73 Many of them also became rebel groups in the late Tokugawa era. See details in Jaundrill (2016).
74 Within a decade or two, outside of the capital, there were at least 60 domains with their own rangaku
academies or schools (Lehmann 1982, 125).
75 During the 18th century, Russian explorer sand officials moved eastward, settling the great reaches of
Siberia, pushing onto the Kuril islands, and fanning out along the coast of North America. In 1806-07,
Russian naval officers led destructive attacks on Japanese settlements in Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and Etorofu
islands. See details in McClain (2002, 130) and Gordon (2003, 48).
76 Within a few years the Institute for Western Books was borne.
77 In 1866, it had dozens of instructors in Dutch, English, German, and French (Medzini 1971, 88).
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rules and regulations based on translated Western texts, including the conscription law of
1873.78. Not bounded to the shogunate, Nishi and others like him earned their place in the
Meiji bureaucracy because of their knowledge of the West (Yoshida 1985, 200).
Western product champions and their descendants There were dozens of influential
pre-Meiji Western product champions and their students became influential Meiji leaders,
as Figure 5.3 below shows. In other words, Meiji Western-trained product champions were
third or fourth generation Western product champions going back to the early 1840s.
78 Nishi also organized a staff in 1874 to compile the first dictionary of military terms giving the equivalent





































































First generation Western product champion: Takashima Shuhan79
Takashima Shuhan (1798-1866) was one of the most influential first generation ran-
gaku scholars. He founded the Takashima school of western gunnery (hereafter Takashima–
ryu) that the shogunate adopted in the 1850s. Yamagata credited Takashima as one of the
first Western military product champions. Takashima was relatively autodidactic in his im-
mersion of Western military knowledge because his family members were Nagasaki municipal
officers. As a Customs Inspector, he was able to access the comings and goings of Western
military products and books through the Dutch encampment in Dejima. He was convinced
of the superiority of Western military technology and devoted his energy and income to
study European military sciences. At his own expense, he imported from Holland hundreds
of small arms, riffles, field guns, cannons, and textbooks. He also experimented in drilling
and mobilizing small units. The Dutchmen at Dejima helped his activities.80
Takashima gradually perfected the first Western-style infantry drill exercises in Japan,
which he demonstrated to the shogunate in 1841. He led more than 100 men in a comprehen-
sive demonstration of Western-style artillery, close order drill, and mounted marksmanship.
They learned the maneuvers from Dutch books and used Dutch commands. His Western-
sourced ideas were then codified under the Takashima–ryu. The school was thus a syncretic
style of Japanese musketry that incorporated elements of Western military science, including
the organizational scheme employed by most 19th century Western armies and their combat
arms (platoons, battalions, infantry, cavalry, etc.), the practice of close-order drill, and the
reliance on Napoleonic tactical concepts.81
79 Historical details in this part are drawn from Yamagata (1910, 200), (Goodman 2013, 155), Arima
(1964, 361), Tolstoguzov (2018, 255), Rogers (1998, 194), Jansen (2000, 287), Jaundrill (2016, 14–29), and
Goodman (2013, 155).
80 He studied with Reserve Colonel Jan Willem de Sturler, Deshima station chief (1823-7), who taught
Takashima the techniques and weaponry used in the Napoleonic War. The colonel also had extensive
knowledge about armies, weapons, the military industry, and ballistic calculations.
81 Although little documentation exists about Takashima’s teachings, apparently the ‘Secret Manual of
278
His demonstration so impressed the shogunate that the government adopted Takashima–
ryu. The shogunate also commissioned Takashima to train the other domains, albeit in
different degrees and scale.82 As Takashima–ryu grew, its instructors played a central and
often contentious role in the restructuring of the Tokugawa military order. To avoid ruffling
too many feathers, especially after Takashima’s false imprisonment, his students modified
his teachings to suit local circumstances while maintaining the core of Western drills. As
Figure 5.3 above shows, Takashima’s students became teachers to future Meiji leaders.
Second generation western product champion: Sakuma Shozan83
Sakuma Shozan (1811-1864) is part of the second generation because he studied under
Egawa Tarozaemon, one of Takashima’s earliest students.84 Sakuma was at the center of the
development of rangaku in the mid 1850s because he was from the Matsushiro domain,
which the shogunate ordered to survey other domains. Matsushiro was thus concerned with
mathematics, surveying techniques, and coastal defense. Sakuma also studied and mastered
Dutch military textbooks. He eventually served as the chief military advisor to his domain
and persuaded his lord to order and boost his collection of Western military books.
Sakuma is perhaps best known for popularizing the idea that Japan should combine
Western technology with Japanese values. With his well known slogan, ‘Eastern ethics,
Western science’, he urged the Japanese to study the West because understanding Western
knowledge was the key to master them.85 Meiji leaders later embraced such ideas in their
the Takashima School’, one of the school’s early texts, was a translation of an 1807 Dutch manual.
82 Over time, Takashima taught nearly 300 local warlords and samurais.
83 Details in this part are drawn from Samuels (1994, 36), Jansen (2000, 288), Goodman (2013, 148–150),
Beasley (2001, 149–50, 81, 211), Hirakawa (1989, 442), Chang (1970, 136, 151), and Rubinger (1982, 180).
84 Egawa opened a Takashima–ryu school and forged guns for the shogunate and other domains. I consider
Egawa to be with the first generation because while he was Takashima’s student, he carried the school banner
in its formative years because Takashima was imprisoned in the early 1840s to the 1850s.
85 By 1847 Shozan concluded that the military superiority of the West was rooted in Western science. But
the ‘science’ referred to in the slogan was not ‘technology’ narrowly defined—it was the broader knowledge,
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own slogan wakon yosai, ‘Japanese spirit and Western technology’. Sakuma also focused on
the development of a Western-style navy which he believed was critical to Japan’s defense.86
More importantly, Sakuma also advocated a system of selecting and employing “men of
talent” in military strategy and administration. This idea contained the seeds of later pro-
posals, developed by his pupils and picked up by Choshu samurais discussed above: new
Western military sciences involve new forms of organization and recruitment.
As a second generation Western product champion, Sakuma’s ideas were important
because he was an adviser and consultant to many domain lords. The shogunate also fol-
lowed many of his recommendations. His influence was diffused through his writings and his
pupils. Sakuma opened his own school which taught Chinese classics and Western sciences
as well as artillery practice and fortifications. The school attracted future Meiji military
leaders, including Yoshida Shoin and Katsu Kaishu.
Third generation western product champion: Yoshida Shoin87
Yoshida Shoin (1830–1859) studied military science and rangaku in Nagasaki and Edo,
including under Sakuma Shozan. On his return to Choshu, he wrote many memorials on the
importance of upgrading education in the arts of war and peace. He became influential in
Choshu as he ran his own school in the early 1850s. The school attracted an extraordinary
group of future Meiji leaders (possibly up to 80 students during its 3-year run). One of
the Yoshida’s key arguments revolves around the principle that learning should not be seen
as an accomplishment but instead a provider of moral guidance for practical action. His
teachings combined Confucianist ideas, samurai idealism, and practical application, including
arts, and sciences underpinning them.
86 He also thought that asking the Dutch to help in that efforts would be preferable given Great Britain’s
growing aggressive colonial expansion in Asia.
87 Details in this part are drawn from Jansen (2000, 291–3), Hackett (1971, 14), Hackett (1971, 15, 24–5),
and Ryusaku, de Bary and Keene (1958, 647).
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the adoption of Western military techniques. He also deplored the superficiality of upper
samurai life and proposed that the domain ignore rank in its appointments. As we see above,
Choshu’s military westernization efforts were built around these ideas.
Yoshida’s students were influential Choshu—and later Meiji—leaders, including: Ito
Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo, Takasugi Shinsaku, Kido Takayoshi (Koin), and others (see
Figure 5.3 above). Kido was considered the ‘genius’ behind Choshu’s military Westernization
and laid the groundwork for Takasugi and Omura (discussed above) to build the all-class
military units. Kido, also a student of Egawa, helped draft the Meiji Emperor’s Five Charter
Oath and was part if the 1871 Iwakura Mission to the West. In short, Choshu’s military
westernization—and by implication, the post-Restoration military reforms—would not have
happened without Yoshida’s students and ideas.
Fourth generation western product champion: Omura Masujiro and Yamagata Aritomo
Samurais who studied rangaku during the late Tokugawa era can be considered the
fourth and transitional generation of Western product champions. They cut their teeth
during the bakumatsu but became leaders under the Meiji era. Two are worth noting (see
Figure 5.3 above): Omura Masujiro (1824–186) and Yamagata Aritomo.88 As we see above,
Omura was a relatively established rangaku scholar and official by the mid-1850s. He studied
English and read widely in the sciences and economics. In 1864 he translated a Dutch work
on strategy from the standpoint of German military theory (Harries and Harries 1991, 14).
He was a teacher and a researcher at the shogunate’s institute of western studies.89
As a Choshu military leader, he successfully commanded the all-class units using
88 There were future IJA officers younger than these two who were part of the same ‘transitional generation’
with experience and training from the Tokugawa era but directly observed Western forces (Lone 2000, 5).
These younger officers would play a crucial role during the critical juncture discussed below.
89 In 1856, under Omura’s direction, a Dutch style battalion of eight platoons was organized at the institute
using Dutch muskets (Arima 1964, 372).
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European methods by combining modern tactics with traditional combat precepts (Presseisen
1965, 25). In the new Meiji government, Omura was the first Army Vice Minister and was
known as the ‘Father of the Modern Japanese Army’. He then sought to duplicate the policies
he had previously implemented in Choshu on a larger scale, including the introduction of
conscription along with the abolition of the domain system. Omura was also known to have
favored standardizing the IJA along French lines and the new navy along British lines.
Yamagata carried on these ideas to fruition. His accomplishments in the Meiji era
were numerous and spanned the military and civilian establishments. As we shall see below,
it was under his leadership that the IJA and IJN emulated European military systems. His
pre-Meiji credentials certainly helped his Meiji-era omnipresence. In Choshu, Yamagata
helped organize an auxiliary force, drawn from all classes. Taken together, the direct line
between pre-Meiji and Meiji era Western product champions further minimized the likelihood
of intra-organizational conflicts over military Westernization.
5.3 Commercial Transmission
This section describes the diffusion of European theories of victory and corporatism to the
Meiji armed forces through commercially-contracted advisers and trainers. I focus in par-
ticular on the training missions during the critical juncture between the mid-1870s to early
1900s. The critical antecedent, and the underpinning historical precedents discussed in the
previous sections, shaped how the commercial transmission interacted with the military’s
personnel infrastructure quality. We can see this, for example, in how the limited military
Westernization efforts of the domains provided the template for Meiji leaders in crafting the
commercial contracts. As we shall see below, the commercial transmission of military knowl-
edge was also embedded within the broader commercial Westernization Japan was engaging
282
in. Overall, I aim to demonstrate the facilitative nature of the commercial transmission that
facilitated the diffusion of European theories of victory and corporatism.
5.3.1 Broader commercial westernization
Within the broader Meiji-era Westernization, there was no single foreign model for all policy
areas all the time. Some Western countries were more influential in some areas at one
time but not in other areas in another. The broader Meiji-era Westernization provided
the parameters and templates for the military knowledge transmission process, particularly:
(1) the selective logic of which model to commercially emulate, (2) the hiring of foreign
advisers, trainers, or educators without interfering with Japanese command and control,
and (3) the exposure of Imperial Japanese officers to Western military knowledge through
overseas assignments and ‘fact finding’ missions.
Pick–and–choose the best parts
How Japanese military leaders decided which Western power to emulate largely echoed the
selective logic of the broader Meiji Westernization efforts. The arguments of Ito Hirobumi
(1904, 64), one of the regime founders, is worth quoting in length:
“From the beginning we realized fully how necessary it was that the Japanese
people should not only adopt Western methods, but should also speedily become
competent to do without the aid of foreign instruction and supervision. In the
early days we brought many foreigners to Japan to help to introduce modern
methods, but we always did it in such a way as to enable the Japanese students
to take their rightful place in the nation after they had been educated. I must
say that sometimes the foreigners, and even the foreign nations themselves, en-
deavored to take advantage of the Japanese inexperience by passing men off as
experts when they really knew next to nothing of the subjects for which they
were engaged. We were, however, able to secure the services of many excellent
men whose names are still honored in Japan, although they themselves have long
since left her shores.”
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This argument consists of several salient elements. First, Japan realized early on that
they did not want to be dependent on foreign powers for too long. Second, while Japan
waited for its overseas students-officers to return, Japan had to rely on foreign trainers.
Finally, Japan was aware that it needed to choose carefully which foreign model to follow.
Meiji leaders had to develop specific Westernization requirements and assess how to best
meet them. This ‘pick–and–choose’ logic underpinned the Meiji era Westernization efforts.90
The selective logic was necessary because of two problems. First, as different domains
adopted different Western military systems (discussed above), creating a national army based
on a single Western model while integrating both central and local government forces was
challenging (Yamagata 1910, 201). Military leaders had to wait until the domain system was
abolished in 1871 to address this problem. Second, military leaders were concerned that even
if they could centralize the armed forces, adopting a single model across the organization was
prudent. A “one size fits all” approach would have increased Japan’s dependence–and its
vulnerability–on the experience and expertise of a single country (Fisher 1968, 351). In this
regard, military leaders had some flexibility as there was no single ideological literature or an
elaborate vision of the future across the entire Meiji regime (Jansen and Rozman 1986, 10).
Instead, as the Military Conscription Ordinance of 1871 noted, Japan’s selection should,
“be made after a survey of the past and the present, and adapted to the time
and circumstance. The Occidental countries established their military systems
after several hundred years of study and experience. Thus, their regulations are
exact and detailed...We should now select only what is good in them, use them
to supplement our traditional military system.” (Ryusaku, de Bary and Keene
1958, 705)
By the late Tokugawa era, Japanese military leaders were accustomed to ranking Western
nations based their relative military ‘superiority or ‘inferiority’ and to subsequently choose
90 Indeed, nothing distinguishes the Meiji period more than its disciplined search for models that would
be applicable for a Japan in the process of modernization (Jansen 2000, 355).
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the best that each had to offer (Hirakawa 1989, 464-5).91
Meiji officials, for example, initially allowed the IJN to consider the best practices
of the Americans, French, British, and the Dutch (Fox 1969, 258). But they soon believed
the British offered the best model for naval building and organization. Similarly, the IJA
adopted the French model following a study trip by its senior leaders.92 While believing the
Prussian model was best suited for Japan, Yamagata organized the Imperial Guards along
the French system. He also agreed that the IJA should be standardized along French lines
to centralize the domain armies.93 While other factors such as language were arguably at
play (discussed below), Meiji leaders nonetheless examined what the Western powers were
offering in the first place. In other words, due diligence was necessary before a selection.
The use of hired foreigners
The process of sending Japanese students-officers overseas and bringing them home might
take years. Thus, Meiji leaders resorted to ‘hired foreigners’ to teach at various institutions
and advise key ministries.94 These foreign employees were meant to be “transitional” until
the Japanese could “modernize” their own country (Umetani 1971, 85). The use of hired
foreigners particularly suggests the importance of individual commercial contracts—as well
as their limited but targeted scope and goals—in driving the Westernization effort, rather
than relying on government-to-government missions providing ‘capacity building’.
The military was the first post-Restoration institution to hire foreign advisers (West-
ney 1986, 164). But the method through which the IJA and IJN hired them were conditioned
91 When the Japanese discovered that England, France, Germany, and America were the leading Western
powers after Perry’s arrival, they discarded the Dutch language and studied English, French, and German.
92 Yamagata and Saigo Tsugimichi traveled to France, the UK, Belgium, Holland, Prussia, and Russia,
carefully studying the military systems of each country in 1869 (Hackett 1971, 51-2).
93 The October 1870 order of the Council of State noted that since the army is adopting the French system,
each domain forces should first adopt the French system (Hackett 1971, 58).
94 There was also an initial reluctance to send young samurais abroad en masse where they would be
harder to control compared to hired foreigners in Japan (Martin 2006, 22).
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by the broader Meiji Westernization efforts (which in turn was shaped by the pre-Meiji prece-
dents discussed above). The shogunate employed at least 200 foreigners from 1854 until 1868
to teach or advise on technology, medical, and language studies (Jones 1980, 1). In this pe-
riod, especially given the unequal treaties, hired foreigners were under the aegis of their
respective nations—not the Japanese government—and knowingly or not, their employment
became a means by which they exert pressure on Japan (Jones 1980, 3). The Meiji gov-
ernment learned the bitter lessons of this period and wanted to hire foreigners based on
individual commercial contracts on par with those found in the West.
Scholars have different estimations on the number of hired foreigners, where they
worked and for how long, and the extent to which they cost private and government Japanese
organizations. Some suggest that there were less than 400 foreign instructors hired by
the government from 1868 to 1872 in the domestic industries, the military, and education
(Yamamura 1980, 163, fn. 49). Others show that in any given year of the Meiji era, there
was a fairly constant use of 8,000 hired foreigners (about half were Chinese day-laborers and
about 3,000 were professionals working in government service) (Burks 1985b, 194). Another
estimates that hired foreigners gave the Meiji government roughly 9,500 man-years of service
(Jones 1980, 7). In any case, the number of hired foreigners may have peaked in 1875 (during
the critical juncture) but had declined since (Hirakawa 1989, 468).
Hired foreigners came to Japan by way of diplomatic representatives, foreign mer-
chants, or advertisements. But the quality of the early hired foreigners were not satisfactory.
Some of the problems were caused by faulty contracts. But they were also caused by the
ambivalent status of hired foreigners: were they Japanese government employees subject to
Japanese laws or were they foreign nationals subject to the their respective nations’?95 The
95 Foreign representatives, after all, viewed the employment of their nationals as a vanguard to commercial
privilege and tried to make any hiring process contingent on trade arrangements. Japanese officials thus saw
hired foreigners as part of the unequal treaty syndrome. See details in Jones (1980, 113-125).
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Meiji government started to standardize regulations governing hired foreigners in the early
1870s. By 1878, the Japanese controlled all hired foreigners and Japanese officials adminis-
tered or directed all projects. Thus, during the critical juncture period, ‘official delegations’
were replaced with well-regulated employment contracts (Jones 1980, 38–40).
But as commercial contracts became the dominant method to employ foreigners,
the cost skyrocketed; contracts and and their salary structure became more detailed and
institutionalized (Jones 1985, 241). Table 5.4 below shows the Japanese government spent
more than $600,000 annually for roughly 300 foreign trainers and advisers for the armed
forces.96 In 1875, the IJA spent almost ¥150,000 for foreign employees and overseas students
(Ono 1922, 22). The high cost of Western military trainers was emblematic of the broader
Meiji-era cost of hired foreigners in general.97
Table 5.3: Hired foreigners in the armed forces and their monthly salaries, 1868–1900
Service <$50 $50 $100 $200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $800 $1,800
Navy 3 27 90 29 23 7 3 5 1 1
Army 4 3 32 26 23 7 3 5 — —
Total
(monthly)




Source: figures calculated from Jones (1980, 153).
By the critical juncture then, the Japanese managed to hire foreign trainers in regular
and legal fashion, including in the military sphere (Smith 1976, 16). By 1886, around 20%
of all hired foreigners worked for the IJA and IJN.98 Figure 5.4 below shows the evolving
96 The salaries of hired foreigners in Japan were often double the US average for their respective ranks
and positions and more than double the European average (Jones 1980, 125).
97 Between 1876 and 1877, the government spent more than ¥1.3 million for foreign advisers and trainers
across all agencies, or about 2.3% of the annual (ordinary) national budget (Schwantes 1985, 215).
98 Two years earlier, more foreign experts worked directly for the military than the ministries of commerce,
agriculture, and communications combined (Samuels 1994, 89).
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number of hired foreigners for military throughout the Meiji era. As we can see, the IJA and
IJN hired most of them during the 1870s to the early 1890s. But the military did not use
a single country as the sole model to emulate. The Navy Ministry, for example, had British
trainers for naval subjects, while the IJA employed French instructors for cavalry, artillery,
and infantry training, and German teachers and advisers for strategy development.99
Figure 5.4: Foreigners employed by the IJA and IJN, 1868–1900
Source: Author calculation from Jones (1980, 146-7).
But the use of foreign military trainers had a limited timeframe. The government,
after all, employed foreigners to play a “subsidiary and temporary role” in Japan’s devel-
opment (Hirakawa 1989, 470). The French naval architects at Yokosuka, for example, were
dismissed in 1876 as soon as the Japanese felt they could train their own staff. By the late
1870s, the government armories were producing artillery, ammunition and other supplies in
large quantities without foreign supervisors. By then, the Japanese worked by themselves
99 Italians were employed as canon-makers, Belgians as gunsmiths, and British as English teachers. Ger-
mans were also hired for music teaching and gunpowder manufacturing, Dutch as physicians, Swiss and
Americans as language teachers. See details in Jones (1985, 231).
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based on what they learned from the instructors and backed by officers who had been sent
abroad (Kennedy 1924, 298). By 1882, all foreign instructors in naval training, except for
language teachers, were dismissed (Mizuno 1931, 430). By World War 1, the Japanese had no
more foreign advisors (Blakeney 1945, 96). These successes highlights the conscious efforts
to ‘localize’ and take ownership of Western military knowledge in general.
Japanese officers’ exposure to the West
Hiring Western trainers was a temporary solution while Japanese officers were being exposed
to the West. There were two main methods to the exposure: (1) official ‘fact finding’ missions
abroad to study foreign military systems, and (2) official assignments to Western countries,
whether as attaches, students, or travelers. These methods were part of the broader effort to
‘localize’ Western theories of victory and corporatism by promoting those Western-exposed
officers (discussed below). The methods were also carried over from the bakumatsu era
(discussed above) as well as the broader Meiji-era Westernization efforts.
After the Restoration, the government sent dozens of foreign missions. But perhaps
the most famous was the Iwakura mission to Europe and North America in 1871-73.100 Its
was mainly designed as goodwill visits to the heads of 15 countries that maintained diplo-
matic ties with Japan. But the mission was also tasked with studying their militaries and
weaponry. If possible, it should also explore the possibility for treaty renegotiations.101
Some members were assigned to study political institutions while others focused on eco-
nomics, trade, or military technology. On the military side, members were taken around
battlefields, ordnance factories, arsenals, shipyards, fleet depots, and port facilities. They
100 Details on the mission in the next 2 paragraphs are from Väyrynen (1992, 39), Nish (2009, xvi–xxiii),
Checkland (1989, 115), and Jansen (2000, 358).
101 The mission consisted of 49 officials, including central Restoration figures such as Ito Hirobumi and
Kido Takayoshi, and 58 students slated to stay overseas for several years.
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were welcomed on board battleships and introduced to the latest technology and met arms
producers. They asked to see academies and barracks and attended military parades.
The mission concluded that Japan needed broader modernization plans and that
military Westernization should be a priority. As part of the process, Japan should sent
officers to European powers to learn, observe, and report on their military systems (Cook
1987, 34). The dispatches were part of the attache or ‘foreign resident’ system where officers
were attached to the Japanese diplomatic representative.102. Meiji leaders wanted these
attaches to be qualified and well–educated. Thus, many if not most attaches since the 1890s
were graduates of the Army War College (Tachikawa 2015, 177). Katsura Taro, an IJA
officer who would later be instrumental in shifting the army outlook from the French to the
Prussians, went to Germany as Japan’s first military attache in 1875.
Japanese officers were also sent as ‘resident observers’ or ‘language officers’. The for-
mer focused on some academic discipline or research, although they had to submit detailed
reports pertaining to Japan’s national defense (Yokoyama 2001, 120). The latter spent time
studying the local culture, society, and politics, alongside their broader military intelligence
gathering activities (Nish 1984, 18). These officers were generally not given specific assign-
ments (Butow 1961, 15). Some used these designations to travel and ‘study informally’ with
prominent military theorists, while others gathered intelligence and build local networks. In
the 1880s, many IJA officers were sent to Germany while IJN officerss studied in the UK
(Harries and Harries 1991, 49).103 The difference between formal (e.g. Staff and Command
College) and informal (e.g. attache duties) Western background might not have been strictly
defined for the purposes of promotion. In the eyes of Meiji military leaders, Western exposure
102 The origins of the Japanese military attache system could be traced to Colonel Kazukatsu Fukubara,
the attache to Qing state in 1875 (Tachikawa 2015, 156). Up until World War 1, the primary countries of
assignment were Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and the US. Many of these officers also collected
important statistics on European armies (Hevia 2012, 408)
103 A posting to Germany was a sign for a distinguished army career (Nish 1984, 18–9).
290
and ‘training’ was important improve an officer’s career chances.
5.3.2 French military training mission
The IJA decided to adopt the French model in 1870. The decision was not strictly ‘rational’
in that it was not made purely out of French military prowess. In fact, the adoption was
announced a month after the fall of the French army to the Prussians. There was a de-
bate between Meiji military leaders over which foreign system to emulate.104 Some leaders,
including Omura Masujiro and Oyama Iwao, suggested that the IJA be modeled after the
French and the IJN over the British. The French supporters included Saigo Tsugimichi and
Yamada Akiyoshi. Others, including Yamagata, initially preferred the German model for its
militaristic suitability to Japan’s strategic outlook and environment.
The French was selected because: (1) the government inherited the French-modeled
shogunate army, (2) only a small number of domains was familiar with the Prussian system,
(3) more Japanese were proficient with the French language, which reduced the use of inter-
preters. There was also a small number of French-trained officers who could be the training
counter-parts of a French mission. The Prussian representative in Japan, on the other hand,
had no appetite to send a training mission; it was in the throes of unification at home and
quarreling with France abroad.105 Finally, it came down to timing as Japan had to quickly
deal with pressing internal challenges, including dozens of uprisings. The French model thus
provided a convenient and quick solution to unify and standardize the armed forces. The
selection was less about whether the French model was the ‘best’ but that Japan had the
104 Historical details on the intra-military politics over foreign models to emulate, and why the French was
chosen, in this paragraph and the next are from Lehmann (1982, 270), Kublin (1949, 28–9), Hackett (1971,
58), Cullen (2003, 197), Jones (1980, 34), Presseisen (1965, 34), and Cook (1987, 40).
105 There was another minority theory—most historians could not verify it: Japan wanted French and
British withdrawal from Yokohama but both asked that the government to emulate the French army and
British navy. See the arguments mentioned by Umetani (1971, 41) and Yamamura (1980, 169).
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autonomy to choose which model it was emulating. The pro-French faction within the Meiji
military also had the upper-hand at the time.
A corps of 428 students was organized after the French system in late 1870 and the
government sent ten officers a year to study military science in France (Yamagata 1910,
206). But to avoid increasing Japan’s dependence to France, the government preferred not
to engage a training mission on a government-to-government basis. Instead, Meiji military
leaders planned for a commercial engagement with individual instructors from France to give
them the upper-hand to dictate terms. The Japanese knew what arrangement they wanted,
which included, among others: (1) 26 instructors, (2) salaries and travel expenses were
rank-adjusted, (3) the mission chief would be responsible for its members, (4) the duration
should be 3 years, (5) Japan would provide housing and reimburse the furnishings (Presseisen
1965, 42–3). The contract also specified that the mission would focus on instruction and
organization but have no command over Japanese troops. The mission also promised not to
concern itself with political or religious affairs.
The contract was signed between members of the mission and the Japanese represen-
tative in Paris, which became the basis for the two missions headed by Lieutenants Colonel
Charles-Antoine Marquerie (1872–1875) and Munier (1874–1880), respectively. The first
team—five officers and 15 NCOs and trainers—arrived in 1872 (Upton 1878, 2). They es-
tablished immediate rapport with Japanese officers, but their duties were limited to teaching
and training (Jones 1980, 34). Yamagata made it clear he expected them to help Japanese
officers “assimilate Europe’s military teachings” while acting as “consultants to the Army
Ministry in matters of military administration and finance” (Presseisen 1965, 45). He also
expected the team to give instruction and frank opinions even though the regulations and
command would be under Japanese officers.
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For the next several years, French trainers instructed Japanese troops in tactics and
discipline, in the care of equipment and uniforms, and taught them ceremonies and courtesy.
The courses were wide-ranging, from naval architecture to gunnery. Technical classes stressed
unit-level responsibilities and tactics from the battalion level down to the company under
the command of Japanese officers (Upton 1878, 3). While the training was rudimentary, it
brought a sense of discipline and order. The French also provided a set of rules for daily
practice drawn and translated from French service regulations (Presseisen 1965, 46). In
addition, the mission taught translated military texts and studies written by Albert Charles
du Bousquet.106 His writings on the French conscription shaped the Conscription Law of
1873 as well as broader debates over the state of civil-military relations (Umetani 1971, 43).
The French training mission thus transmitted new theories of victory and corpo-
ratism. To ensure that the IJA could absorb them, a few military educational and training
institutions were established in the early to mid 1870s.107 In 1873, the Toyama school was
created to produce NCOs qualified to train the rank-and-file. A School for Musketry and
Gymnastics, a Veterinary School, and a School for Practical Engineering followed suit. An
arsenal which included workshops, arms manufacturing, and a pyrotechnical school along
with the foundations of coastal defense were also set up. The Imperial Japanese Army
Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakko) was created based on the French military academy at St.
Cyr. Despite initial delays, the Academy admitted 155 students in 1873. It taught modern
education, including drawing and design, French language, physics, mathematics, chemistry,
geography, tactics and artillery. French officers taught the military science courses.
By the Formosa expedition, the French had worked for about a year. Their operational
106 He was a member of the French team that came to Japan in 1867. He then became an adviser and
translator for the Army Ministry after that mission ended. More importantly, he wrote various studies on
comparative military systems which were read or taught by the new French training mission.
107 Details in this paragraph are from Harries and Harries (1991, 24) and Presseisen (1965, 50–2).
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record was less than satisfactory as I note above. The Satsuma rebellion further exposed
the limits of French military training that relied on detailed explanations to solve set-piece
tactical problems in exercises. The order of battle rigidly divided formations into skirmishers,
main force, and reserves. The battalion (about 800 men) was the unit for the purposes of
instruction; little attention was given to large-unit operations. They also focused on artillery
and insisted on the importance of field batteries despite topographical problems. French-
trained Japanese officers admitted that,
“their men had received little or no instruction in (brigade drill)...[instead] they
devote their attention to small units and elementary details...They have by no
means grasped the larger questions of brigade and divisions, outpost duties and
the instruction of two opposing forces, tactics and strategy; they have left compar-
atively untouched institutions connected with commissariat, transport, military
stores, and provision for the sick and wounded” (Knollys 1887, 245, 272).
The French on the other hand thought IJA officers were not ready for large-scale
command logistics (Hevia 2012, 406). In any case, the Satsuma rebellion suggested to
Meiji leaders that French instructions were irrelevant and that France was not equal to the
Germany in organizational talent and general staff (Presseisen 1965, 52). Severe budget
difficulties also made it difficult to keep the mission (Drea 2013, 78). But the government
kept it a bit longer as the academy had lost dozens of cadets during the Satsuma rebellion.
By 1879, the French mission was canceled. But the missions nonetheless established the edu-
cational foundations of the IJA, as French texts permeated basic regulations, organizational
structures, rank designation, and even uniform (Kublin 1949, 33).
5.3.3 German military training mission
The diffusion of German theories of victory and corporatism did not happen until the 1880s;
partially because of the French domination within the IJA and partially because German
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politicians were not interested in Japan (Saaler 2006, 26). The Satsuma rebellion gave an
opening to German product champions within the IJA to push through new reforms and
switch to the German model. The selective logic of the switch remained: Japan had the
agency to choose the best foreign model to provide advice, education, and training for its
military. Scholars argue, however, that broader affinities made Germany a ‘natural’ foreign
model for Japan. Both countries share similar historical paths toward modernization and
unification, similar social structures and problems due to feudalism, autocratic government
and weak democratic traditions, and similar special roles in society and politics for the
military (Saaler 2006, 22). These affinities perhaps led Japan to copy Prussian constitu-
tional monarchy with a dual line of authority between the Emperor and the legislature and
predisposed the military to trump civil authority (Paine 2017, 6). Germany’s state-driven
militarism and modernization also appealed to the Japanese samurai elite trying to stabilize
their own positions in the post-Restoration era (Martin 2006, 18). But while these affinities
provide the larger backdrop for Japan’s modernization plans, intra-military power politics
and IJA’s strategic calculus drove the creation of the German military mission.
Some argue the Prussian victory over France in 1871 led to the switch away from the
French model—indicated, for example, in the role of German supporters within the IJA in
shaping the 1873 conscription law (Lory 1943, 20; Mayo 1959, 49; Miyake 1996, 246). But
as we see above, the Meiji military stayed with the French model until after the Satsuma
rebellion. As one Japanese official noted then,
“After deciding to adopt the French system, if we changed our mind only be-
cause France was defeated, this would give a wrong impression to other countries
that the Japanese Empire has no backbone and is unreliable, and eventually it
would become a laughing stock among the nations. We must guard against this”
(Presseisen 1965, 39).
Thus, the widespread belief that the IJA switched to the German model because of the
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Franco-Prussian War may have been a “pleasant fiction” (Westney 1986, 177). Instead, the
IJA’s selection of the Germans depended on the intra-military balance of power. When the
group of French product champions held the organizational upper-hand, the French model
came out on top, as we see above. But when the German product champions grew their
power, the German model became the new model.108
The rise of the so-called ‘German school’ within the IJA also took place under Yam-
agata’s tutelage. Many officers sent to Germany or were assigned to the Japanese legation
there started to return by the late 1870s, including Katsura Taro and Nogi Maresuke.109
Many of these officers seemed impressed with the professional (even if militaristic) atti-
tude of German officers compared to their French counterparts, which they thought lacked
“discipline and military seriousness” (Saaler 2006, 24). These German-trained officers were
assigned to train troops and even took over some of the French training activities. The
German product champions within the IJA grew further.
Katsura was perhaps the most influential German product champion.110 He was
one of the architects of modern Japan’s military organization, governor-general of Taiwan,
president of a colonial development society, founder of a major political party and the only
soldier-politician to ever head three cabinets. Coming from Choshu, Katsura spent time with
the Western-modeled kiheitai. After the Restoration, he went to Germany twice and studied
military administration and theories at the Prussian military academy and war college. In
108 The French group also lost an important proponent with Omura Masujiro’s death in 1869, although sev-
eral generals such as Guro Miura, Koyata Torio, and Tateki Tani continued to oppose the “Prussianization”
of the IJA (Miyake 1977, 164).
109 Other officers who would sustain Germanic influence within the IJA also served with the Japanese
legation from the 1890s to the 1930s, including Oi Shigemoto, Ugaki Kazushige, and Ishiwara Kanji. Before
the Satsuma rebellion, General Torio Koyata, Osaka garrison commander and a German product champion,
was appointed Army Vice Minister in 1876 (Presseisen 1965, 61).
110 Historical and biographical details of Katsura in the next two paragraphs are from Shingo (1965, 199),
Drea (2016, 49), Lone (2000, 11–15), Miyake (1977, 160), Tachikawa (2015, 151), Hackett (1971, 82), and
Harries and Harries (1991, 33).
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his second tour, he was attached to the Prussian 3rd Army Corps and studied central and
local military administrations. He also attended lectures at the University of Berlin and
experienced the heyday of the German army and military science.
Katsura did not immediately become a rising star upon returning to Japan. In 1878,
Yamagata offered him a captaincy, explaining to him that everyone must pass through the
ranks. Katsura’s first duties were to assess the IJA’s performance during the Satsuma
Rebellion. Gradually, he pushed the IJA to focus on its potential enemies and address its
organizational problems by adopting German military models and hire German trainers. He
was the German military ‘product-champion-in-chief’. One of Katsura’s earlier suggestions
included a blueprint to create an independent General Staff, capable of assessing foreign
military strength, planning an effective strategy, and ensuring its implementation. As we
shall discuss below, the General Staff, under the command of the Emperor, became one of
the lynchpins of the IJA’s new German-inspired theory of corporatism.
By the 1880s (during the critical juncture), Katsura and other German product cham-
pions accelerated the shift to the German model. In 1882, the Army War College (Rikugun
Daigakko) was founded along the German model and German instructors were hired to teach
there. When it first started, the College had fewer students than the rules allowed, only three
Japanese instructors, and a study program that covered tactics but ignored organization and
logistics (Presseisen 1965, 96). Nevertheless, an institution had emerged that could justify
using foreign instructors by signing private contracts rather than government-to-government
mission. By 1888, German advisers had completely replaced the French (Saaler 2006, 24).
The ‘Prussianization’ of the IJA did not happen overnight. There was due diligence
(an overseas mission to study options) and compromises forged along the way. The mission to
Europe in 1884 was led by Army minister General Oyama Iwao (a French product champion
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who spent time at St. Cyr).111 It was supposed to provide suggestions to improve the IJA’s
efficiency and prevent political attacks on the military budget (Lone 2000, 18). Katsura was
part of this 15-men mission, which spent time in Germany, attending army trials, witnessing
arms production, and visiting schools. While Oyama had wanted French instructors for both
the IJA Academy and War College, the balance of intra-military power shifted in Tokyo.
Yamagata won the argument to hire German advisers as Japan was emulating the Germans
more broadly (Presseisen 1965, 103). But Oyama had already asked the French to send a
training mission while hinting to the Germans that they might want to send a similar team.
As a compromise, the French, whose teaching methods were suited to the untrained
and under-educated, were allowed to instruct the Academy and the rank-and-file, while
Prussian field regulations and military theories would be taught at the War College (Martin
2006, 38). The Japanese may have encouraged such dualism to benefit from the best military
knowledge of both countries (Presseisen 1965, 109). In 1885, two infantry officers, Henri
Berthaut and Etienne de Villaret, and two NCOs signed the Japanese contract. Berthaut
would teach at the Academy and Villaret at the Toyama school. The officers were engaged
for two years and had their spheres of activity carefully defined.112 The French teachings
appeared to have been too theoretical, simplistic, and elementary (Presseisen 1965, 104-7).
This was in contrast to the teaching style of the Germans (discussed below). The War
College had also replaced the Academy as the intellectual hub for the IJA officer corps.
It was at the War College that Prussian military theorist Klemens Wilhelm Jakob
Meckel made his mark from 1885 to 1888 and shaped the IJA’s theory of victory and cor-
111 It should be noted that after seeing the Franco-Prussian War from both sides, Oyama remarked that he
found Prussian frugality and discipline much more compatible with the samurai tradition than “the elegantly
dressed French officers seen in public arm in arm with their ladies” (Roggendorf 1973, 120).
112 The individual contract of Berthaut, as counselor and professor of tactics, for example, stated that he
would stay away from any political question or from the administrative organization of the academy, but he
can give indirect advice pertaining to the teaching of military science.
298
poratism.113 Meckel, a veteran of the Austrian and Franco-Prussian Wars, came highly
recommended. As a graduate of the War Academy, he had published extensively on tactics
and new technologies, and had been teaching at the Staff College for years. He was also a
practical teacher—even if he was steeped in infantry theories. Thus, Meckel’s personal qual-
ities suited the IJA’s requirements. After some difficult negotiations over salaries, expenses,
and contract terms, Meckel assumed his functions at the War College on March 1885. When
he arrived, he found a deficient system unprepared to wage major campaigns as the French
had taught theoretical proficiency but not practical war-fighting. But Meckel noted that IJA
officers were eager to boost their knowledge and had a decent learning capacity. Meckel also
served as the most important adviser to Katsura in his military reform efforts.
Among Meckel’s first initiatives was introducing Prussian field-service manuals, which
became standard across the IJA by the early 1890s (Hevia 2012, 406).114 Meckel also re-
oriented the IJA officers towards large-unit strategy and tactics. The War College then
extended its main course to three years and shifted its curriculum from a French-inspired
‘technical proficiency’ to a German-inspired ‘broad education’ in the arts of war. Except
for foreign languages, Meckel refocused the new curriculum almost exclusively on military
art and sciences, such as tactics, history, ordnance, gunnery, fortification, communications,
and health and sanitation (Drea 2016, 59). To a large extent, such reorientation could seem
‘theoretical’ for Japanese officers, especially considering the broader foundation underpinning
Prussian theories of victory.115 But Meckel’s unique blend of practical experience, grasp of
113 Meckel’s biographical details in this paragraph are from Drea (2016, 59), Lone (2000, 19), Jansen (2000,
397), Presseisen (1965, 105), Times (1904, 7), Times (1905, 7), and Miyake (1977, 163).
114 These are how-to books that describe the organization and routines of an army. They help standardize
military knowledge throughout an organization.
115 The substantive content of Meckel’s teachings was the product of the European obsession with
Napoleonic warfare: short but involving massive amounts of troops charging ahead. Moltke and the Prus-
sians believed, however, that Napoleon’s system of personal command was obsolete. Local or subordinate
commanders should now control troop movements welded into unity by a common doctrine. As we shall see
below, such ideas resonated with the Japanese See details in Nickerson (1958, 350–7).
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theory, and impressive pedagogical style minimized such concerns.
Meckel started with history, tactics, and the operation of the General Staff in the
Franco-Prussian War.116 He employed map exercises, terrain studies and field problems and
was effective at placing a student in a supreme dilemma and then showing him a way out.
He also shifted the War College orientation towards a broader conception of operational
command.117 His lectures drew senior officers from the General Staff, Army Ministry, Im-
perial Guard and others. Additionally, his regular staff rides dealt with possible invasion
sites throughout Japan. Officers thus learned early on to deal with mobilization and troop
movements.118 He also organized a month-long large-scale maneuvers involving simulated
landings and a repulsion of an invading army. Each portion of the exercise culminated in a
critique by the commanding instructor followed by discussions with the results subsequently
published. These practices not only ensured the place of Prussian theories in IJA strategic
thinking but they also improved organizational learning. More broadly, Meckel’s intellectual
synthesis of operations with martial values also appealed to the samurai officer class.119
These social capitals that Meckel developed facilitated the diffusion of German theo-
ries of victory and corporatism. First, Meckel helped create the triangular command struc-
ture between the Army Ministry, General Staff, and the Inspectorate General of Military
Education. I will discuss the changes in more detail below. For now, I want to note that
Meckel believed each command should stand in equal relationship to another and work un-
der the Emperor (Butow 1961, 5). Meckel’s theory of corporatism was thus: the conduct
116 Details in this paragraph are from Presseisen (1965, 108, 114-5), Butow (1961, 5), Hevia (2012, 407),
Drea (2016, 59), and Mail (July 14, 1906, 33).
117 He used the term ‘military command’ to stress lines of communication and the problem of supplies for
large operation on the Asiatic continent.
118 At each stage of the ride, Meckel would question his students, posing strategic and tactical problems as
the terrain unfolded before them.
119 Meckel preached that victory was not a function of weaponry. The decisive feature was psychological,
an offensive spirit, which meshed well with the IJA’s existing concept of seishin, or fighting spirit.
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of operations should be a strictly military affair under the General Staff, while the Army
Ministry focuses on administrative functions, and the Inspectorate General focuses on a com-
prehensive education system to produce expertise in command, staff, and service functions
(Crowley 1966, 276). All of these were directly under the Emperor and not any civilian
government.120 There was a match between what the Japanese wanted—an independent
general staff away from civilian control—and what Meckel was offering. Meckel also stressed
a broad education for officers to perform civilian and army duties (Mayo 1959, 52).
Second, Meckel helped the IJA transitioned from a static garrison-based posture to a
mobile division-based structure. Meckel described the division as a “self-sufficient organism
supplying all its needs”, and able to do “the work of the German Army group while requiring
a smaller staff” (Mayo 1959, 51). Assigned to the defense of a specific area, the division
controlled its own supply, recruiting and training. In peace-time, it consisted only of infantry
and cavalry units; in war, the auxiliary branches were detached from Army Headquarters
to the division (Mayo 1959, 51). Meckel also stressed that a light division was most suited
for Japan’s rugged mountainous and forested terrain (Drea 2013, 79). Meckel thus laid
the foundation for how the IJA should incorporate topography into operational planning,
weapons development and policy formulation. The division system thus paved the way for
a more mobile and offensive posture and operations.121
Third, Meckel helped remodel the military’s strategic outlook as well the IJA’s oper-
ational doctrine. He reoriented the military towards Japan’s broader strategic environment,
120 These elements matched Prussian theories of corporatism, including a centralized command under the
monarch, a training apparatus professionally organized through the General Staff, a large standing reserve
with rapid mobilization, and new weapons manufactured by private companies. Meckel diffused these ideas
to the IJA during his time in Japan. See details in Hevia (2012, 405).
121 One could argue that while the division system was operationally offensive, in terms of quick deployment
to advance an attack, the broader system was strategically defensive as it anticipated an attack coming
towards Japan rather Japan seeking to occupy another country.
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particularly Korea.122 Meckel was preparing the IJA for overseas operations. As Japan
lacked strategic depth, it needed the offensive capability to wage wars quickly and meet the
enemy ahead before it lands in Japan. This objective required the rapid concentration of
two divisions at the spot of landing to contain the invaders within their beachhead. The
divisions should then move rapidly, coordinated by telegraph and railroad, and concentrate
forces to repulse enemy landings (Drea 2013, 79). To accomplish this task, Meckel needed the
IJA to focus on large-scale operational planning. To improve mobilization capacity, Meckel
helped, for example, create an Army Service Corps in 1888 to oversee sweeping changes to
the administration, purchasing, storage, and distribution of food and equipment. Meckel
also suggested improvements to the railway systems (Harries and Harries 1991, 50).
Fourth, Meckel remodeled how the IJA planned to fight.123 The French taught the
infantry to use columns which dispersed when reaching the firing line. But Meckel advocated
for closed ranks, advancing into fire, and deliver the maximum and demoralizing “shock”
to the enemy. Such offensive logic was paradoxically facilitated by the growing use of the
Minie riffles by the Germans and Japanese. The riffles were accurate up to 650 yards, which
multiplied the ‘beaten zone’ (where assaulting troops must cross while exposed to fire) by
six times than previous firearms. And yet, Prussian theorists like Meckel preached offensive
movement by: (1) strengthening the fighting spirit, and (2) delegating mission command
to the local units rather than relying on a single supreme commander.124 The General
Staff would not command any units, but kept contact through a rotational system which
122 Meckel concluded that the security of Japan’s home islands was contingent upon the ‘independence’ of
Korea. No third country, he insisted, should be allowed to control Korea, the “dagger at the heart” of Japan
(Crowley 1966, 277). The General Staff internalized this axiom.
123 Historical details in this paragraph are from Peattie (1972, 18), Harries and Harries (1991, 50), Citino
(2017, 5), Nickerson (1958, 352), and Presseisen (1965, 76–81).
124 Meckel wrote the standard textbook on infantry tactics that favored offensive operations. He argues that
all warfare must eventually adopt a forward course: the attack would prove easier than a retreat. Although
new firepower made this approach harder, it stood a good chance with massed infantry because offensive
operations provide a stabilizing element and carry the necessary energy to march forward.
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assigned its officers from the battalion level to the army corps. Such delegated mission
command should in theory facilitate the search for ‘decisive battles’—where hard-fought
offensive operations would be strategically worthwhile. In short, the Prussian theory of
victory required brisk maneuver, high levels of offensive aggression, and a flexible system of
command that give initiatives to the local units.125
The IJA codified such theories of victory. When Yamagata became prime minister in
1890, he declared Japan’s security depended first on the protection of the ‘line of sovereignty’
and then the ‘line of advantage’, which was implicitly thought of as the Tsushima islands to
the west and Korea as the buffer zone of protection (Hackett 1965, 248). This assumption
underpinned subsequent military planning. Operationally, the infantry drill regulation of
1891 was only a slightly altered version of the 1888 German blueprint (Saaler 2006, 24).
Meckel’s tactics of deploying infantry units in heavy offensive assaults resulted in the hor-
rendous number of Japanese casualties in the battle of Mukden in the Russo-Japanese War.
Unfortunately, this way of ‘sacrificing the infantry’ fitted with the traditional fighting code
of the samurai (Martin 2006, 41). Meckel’s influence was further felt through the various
policy memoranda he submitted as well the the translation and dissemination of his lectures
and from the translations of his works that preceded his arrival in Japan.126
Hermann von Blankenburg and Ernst von Wildenbruch followed in Meckel’s foot-
steps after 1888. But they never reached Meckel’s popularity. Indeed, Meckel’s impact on
his students was considerable. There was an impressive number of War College graduates
who ascribed their success in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars to his teaching
(Roggendorf 1973, 120). Nevertheless, Germany was to retain its model function for the
125 German analysts at the time called this system ‘independence of the lower commander’ (Selbstandigkeit
der Unterfuhrer), although the term Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) has become more common today among
scholars and military professionals.
126 The subject of these memos, books, and lectures were wide-ranging, from coastline fortifications to the
complexities of the divisional system (Martin 2006, 40).
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IJA and Japanese officers continued to go Germany and the ‘German school’ remained the
most influential group within the IJA (Saaler 2006, 28). Overall, the diffusion of German
theories of victory and corporatism was facilitated by the commercial arrangement with
Meckel, initiated and backed by a powerful German School within the IJA, and sustained
by the placement of German-trained officers in key positions. This highlights the interaction
between the commercial transmission and the personnel infrastructure quality of the Meiji
armed forces during the critical juncture.
5.3.4 British military training mission
Anglo-Japanese military ties did not begin on a high-note, especially after the British bom-
bardment of Satsuma in 1863.127 But, as we see above, the British provision of Western
trainers and weaponry helped Satsuma Westernize its forces.128 The warming of military
ties with the British continued after the Restoration. There was considerable contact be-
tween the British and Japanese naval forces, for example.129 The British and the Japanese
also cooperated in coastal surveys with Russian activities in the Kurile islands in mind (Fox
1969, 270). But as far training missions or ship provisions were concerned, the military re-
lationship was largely commercial. As the Japanese student-officers paid their own way and
the government gave large contracts to British shipyards, London did not mind becoming a
reference model for the IJN to emulate. After all, there was already a precedent with the
127 Following the unequal treaty, Britain stationed its forces in Japan in 1861 to guard its legation. In 1864,
there were roughly 3,000 British and French troops. Throughout the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods
about 800 British troops were permanently stationed in Yokohama. Those numbers started to decrease after
1872 and the last were withdrawn in 1875. See details in Asakawa (2003, 17).
128 Out of 94 Western-style vessels bought or built during the 15 years of the bakumatsu, 17 belonged to
Satsuma and 15 of these were built in England. In 1865, Satsuma also sent the first mission of 17 students
to England via Thomas glover, the Nagasaki merchant (Kiyoshi 1988, 174).
129 There were royal visits, including from the Duke of Edinburgh in 1869 and later the grandsons of the
Queen. These trips were important in establishing the relationship between the respective navies as larger
Royal Navy ships made use of the Japanese repair facilities at Yokosuka and Nagasaki (Ion 2003, 9).
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Tracey Mission in 1867 (discussed above). Some in London also thought that Japan was a
potential ally against Russian expansionism in East Asia (Perry 1966, 311).
But the lynchpin was the IJN’s reliance on British ships and education. The IJN
initially required foreign assistance for all of its Westernization programs, from training to
shipbuilding. By the 1880s, their requirements became more selective. Consequently, the
IJN started to send a small but significant number of officers to the US, even if their best and
brightest still went to the UK. Even after the 1870 decree specifying the UK as the model
for the IJN, Dutchmen and an American still taught at the IJN academy for a time.130 The
IJN also gradually diversified its ship suppliers and ordered from various yards—French,
German, American, and British—to profit from the special techniques of each (Perry 1966,
314). The British remained the dominant, but not the exclusive, supplier of ships.131
As far as theories of victory and corporatism were concerned, the British was the
predominant influence. This stemmed from the ‘market reality’ that the Royal Navy was
the best naval force in the 19th century as well as the post-Restoration domination of the
IJN by Satsuma, a close friend of and product champion for the British. In other words,
market forces and intra-military power politics, especially the role of product champions,
facilitated the diffusion of British theories of corporatism and victory. We can see this, for
example, in the 1872 request for a British naval training mission. The IJN academy super-
intendent, Nakamuta Kuranosuke, made the petition based on Japan’s prior employment
of Albert Hawes, a lieutenant of the Royal Marines, who briefly trained a small marine
unit off Yokohama in 1870.132 The Japanese also employed Frank Brinkley, a British Army
130 A small number of Japanese cadets also went to the US, France, and Germany and some were placed
on German and American warships for training cruises (Evans 1978, 83).
131 In 1882, 19 out of the IJN’s 28 warships were built in Britain. In 1894, 7 of the 11 IJN battleships were
British-made and in 1904, 6 of the 7 battleships and 4 of the 8 armored cruisers (Marder 1981, 5).
132 The Hizen domain employed Hawes to organize a small, but ultimately short-lived, marine corps and
taught basic etiquette, discipline, and drill sufficient to present a decent ship and naval function to engage
in international diplomacy.The Meiji government sent them to the Saga Rebellion (1874), the Taiwan Ex-
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lieutenant, simultaneously with Hawes, to instruct in gunnery, mathematics, and foreign lan-
guages (Fox 1969, 263). These scattered hirings, however, were not satisfactory. Nakamuta’s
proposal was to create a broader training mission. Kawamura Sumiyoshi, a senior naval
ministry official, supported and pushed for the proposal (Evans 1978, 77). Both Nakamuta
and Kawamura were graduates of the Dutch-created Nagasaki naval school. Kawamura was
also one of the former students and vassals of Satsuma’s daimyo (Kiyoshi 1988, 174).
In 1873, the Japanese concluded a 3-year commercial contract with 34 men of the
Royal Navy headed by Commander Archibald Lucius Douglas.133 Douglas did not answer
to the British legation but to the Japanese Navy Minister.134 While receiving salaries from
the Japanese, the mission members were forbidden to engage in any business or to interfere
with politics in Japan. The Meiji government provided the housing as well as traveling and
furnishing allowances. These arrangements were similar to the ones Japan made with the
French and German trainers discussed above. Overall, the arrangements were commercial
because Japan had more to say about what it needed, it paid for and controlled the knowledge
transmission, and it could end the mission if it chooses to do so.
Douglas insisted on British standards. Employing Royal Navy regulations and rou-
tines, he spent two months designing the IJN Academy’s prospectus, rules, and routines in
consultation with the Navy Ministry (Kiyoshi 1988, 179). British-style uniforms, messing
schedules, and daily ceremonies were part of the cadets’ life. They imbibed the etiquette
of the Royal Navy and acquired the outward forms of courtesy common to British officers
(Evans 1978, 79). Douglas and his men also reoriented the Academy towards practical on-
the-spot training (Umetani 1971, 43-44). Outdoor training in gunnery and seamanship was
pedition (1874), the Kanghwa Affair (1875), and other operations. See details in Asakawa (2003, 23) and
Longford (1903, 482).
133 Historical details in this paragraph are from Douglas (1939, 20) and Fox (1969, 265)
134 He was not even permitted to inflict punishment on any subordinate for the violation of regulations
without the minister’s written consent.
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also increased. According to a repot written by Douglas (1939, 26), when the mission arrived,
“there were 125 cadets aged from 13 to 20 and about 50 Japanese officers and
instructors. There were about another 100 cadets attached to the Junior school of
the college under the supervision of some senior Japanese instructors. Although
the cadets had read a number of books on seamanship and gunnery, they had
not been grounded in any subject or taught to apply their knowledge.”
The most enduring legacy of the mission was the extended training cruises. These
began with the voyage of the Tsukuba to Hawaii and California in 1875 and became a
permanent feature of cadet education (Evans 1978, 80). Soon, the gunnery school and
training at Etajima was modeled over the British Gunnery School (Kennedy 1928, 35).
British influence was also evident in the setting up of an engineering school at Yokosuka and
improvements in the naval medical service. The mission also strengthened English-language
education (Asakawa 2003, 23). British shipbuilders also influenced Japanese naval architects
like Hiraga Yuzuru and Fukuda Keiji, designers of the great capital ships of the pre-World
War II period (Evans 1978, 84).
But IJN leaders wanted to ‘localize’ the Westernization efforts. Dozens of students
and apprentices were sent to England around the early 1870s.135 Members of the Imperial
Family also served in the IJN and trained on British warships. In 1872 a group of naval
students landed at Southampton, including Heihachiro Togo, the future admiral and hero
for the Russo-Japanese War.136 This cohort became the first generation of IJN admirals
and British product champions. More Japanese apprentices, cadets and engineers, as well as
high-ranking officers increasingly attended British shipyards (Checkland 1989, 148). Naval
officers tapped for key leadership roles were also sent to England and often served ten years
135 A Lieutenant Etzaki, for example, served with the Royal Navy in 1870. Historical details in this
paragraph are from Checkland (1989, 153) and Kennedy (1928, 36).
136 The cadets were registered at the Thames Nautical Training College with further instruction carried
out on HMS Worcester, permanently moored, and run according to Royal Navy service regulations. After
their initial training, the young men were then assigned to sea-going training ships.
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or more on English ships (Jansen 2000, 397). Meiji leaders expected that upon their return
to Japan, they would shape the future direction of the IJN using the knowledge they gained
of British theories of corporatism and victory.
The British influence on the IJN’s theory of corporatism was less significant however.
While British trainers molded IJN officers along their own example, the broader elements of
civil-military relations followed in the IJA’s footsteps. IJN officers, for example, were less
concerned about liberalism or philosophical engagements of the navy’s role in the state.137
Further, the Japanese Navy Ministry and Naval General Staff were all headed by active duty
officers, which differed from the board of admiralty in London with the First Sea Lord a
civilian and cabinet minister (Evans 1978, 84). The Japanese did not sharply differentiate
between the civil government and the military while the British did. The Navy Minister
also enjoyed direct access to the Emperor as did a number of other senior naval officers.
Above all, the IJN was a ‘secondary’ service to the IJA, while the British saw the fleet as
its primary strategic weapon (Perry 1966, 319).
The British influence on the IJN’s theory of victory was more profound. By the 1880s,
the IJN Academy was transferred to Etajima and the Naval War College (Kaigun Daigakko)
was set up at Tsukiji. The College became the foremost center for the development of
tactical and strategic thought. In 1886 the IJN turned to Captain John Ingles to assist
in the development of higher and technical naval education.138 He was appointed as an
instructor and adviser to the IJN—similar to Meckel’s role for the IJA. While Ingles was
satisfied with the IJN’s good order and discipline at sea and ashore, he was concerned with
137 Language barriers and a somewhat distant personal ties between Japanese and British officers may
have prevented such development. “You can admire and do business with a Jap, but you can’t like him as
a friend,” as one British naval officer put it (Marder 1981, 7).
138 Historical and empirical details on Ingles and his legacies in the next two paragraphs are from Gow
(2004, 36), Evans and Peattie (2015, 12-3, 36-49), Perry (1966, 315), and Asakawa (2003, 26).
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the fleet’s under-whelming plans and tactical proficiency.139 To remedy the problem, he
advocated for the replacement of sail-equipped vessels with steam-driven warships. He also
pushed for a more grounded and advanced training of the IJN’s line officers in modern
science, particularly mathematics and physics. The IJN adopted these ideas. In fact, the
scientific bases of steam and naval technology became an entrance requirement to the War
College and the subjects of advanced training for admitted students.
During Ingles’s tenure (1887 to 1893), he transmitted a wide-range of information from
the Royal Navy. He lectured on a wide range of naval subjects, including the organization,
formations, movements, and tactics of modern steam fleets, blockades, and counter-battery
fire. The lectures were published and became one of the standard textbooks for the College.
Equipment, training manuals, and copies of regulations also flowed from England as IJN
officers studied at Royal Navy schools. Ingles also taught that for tactical flexibility and
simplicity, he favored the line ahead (or single line) formation for the fleet.140 He further
argued that superior speed, firepower, and gunnery could compensate for weaknesses in
conventional fleet tactics. The IJN adopted many of Ingle’s tactical concepts and successfully
applied them in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. The bedrock of Japanese
tactical naval doctrine thus stemmed from British theories of victory.
The IJN’s localization efforts also produced a British-inspired theory of victory. The
IJN hired Lieutenant Commander L. P. Willan to teach gunnery, navigation, and tactics at
the Naval Academy in 1879. Willan wrote or edited several works on naval tactics which
were translated into Japanese. Some of his students, including Shimamura Hayao, Kato
Tomosaburo, and Yoshimatsu Shigetaro, became future instructors at the War College and
139 He observed that the IJN fleet maneuvers were well-performed but the ships did not keep in close enough
order. There was also a need for improvement in gunnery.
140 When visual signals — flags, lights, or semaphore — were the only system of communication, the
simplicity of the line ahead formation made it the most flexible.
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shaped the evolution of the IJN’s modern tactics (Evans and Peattie 2015, 12). These officers
became British product champions, although there were always two British instructors at
the War College from its foundation until 1938 (Lehmann 1982, 272). From time to time
British officers have also been attached to the IJN for instructional purposes (Lawton 1912,
578). Taken together, the diffusion of British theories of victory and corporatism to the
IJN was facilitated by the commercial nature of the contract arrangements with individual
officers.The high quality personnel infrastructure of Meiji armed forces ensured those ideas
could be interpreted and adopted across the organization, a subject we now turn to.
5.4 Personnel infrastructure
This section examines the personnel infrastructure quality of the military and demonstrates
the promotion of Western-trained officers into key positions as well as the organization’s
high-level learning capacity. For the first part, I provide a statistical analysis of the career
patterns of IJA and IJN officers using an original dataset I created of more than 600 officers
from the late Tokugawa era to the end of the Meiji era. The analysis shows that, compared
to any other career markers, having a Western studies background was a significant predictor
of whether an officer will retire as a three or four-star general or admiral. In the second part,
I discuss the organizational evolution of the IJA and focus on its career management and
education systems. The analyses in this second part explain the statistical findings further.
Taken together, this section shows how Japan’s high-quality personnel infrastructure allowed
the organization to understand and adopt Western theories of victory and corporatism.
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5.4.1 Statistical analyses of career pattern
This sub-section examines whether and to what extent Western studies background mattered
for the career trajectory of officers, relative to other factors. The presence and influence of
Western-educated officers within the Meiji military elite also explains the presence of Western
product champions—those advocating for and leading various military westernization efforts
within the IJA and IJN. These officers were the top military elite and represented perhaps
less than 20% of the entire officer corps from 1868 to 1912. There is also an inherent selection
bias in the data, in that the published sources only record those prominent or historically
influential officers. But such a high-level representation is important for my claim that the
promotion of Western-educated officers to key positions was necessary for the successful
diffusion of Western theories of victory and corporatism. In other words, as I focus on the
extent to which Western product champions were present at key positions to implement
military Westernization policies or changes, I need to demonstrate whether Western studies
background impacted the career of the elite (upper-rank) officers.
Hypotheses
The central question I need to answer is whether, relative to other career markers, Western
studies background (education, training, or assignments) had a significant effect for the career
trajectory of IJA and IJN officers. If there was a significant and positive effect, then it was
likely that there were new career pathways for Western-trained officers—they were also likely
to be the Western product champions inside the organization. In other words, the presence
of career pathways for Western-trained officers tells us whether Western product champions
were in the position to facilitate the diffusion of Western theories of victory and corporatism.
I focus on one central career outcome: high-ranking positions of leadership within the IJA
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and IJN. Specifically, my dependent variable is whether an Imperial Japanese officer retired
within the upper-elite rank, which I measure as a three or four-star general or admiral.141
Several possible hypotheses could explain this dependent variable:
1. Western studies background. Having more Western–trained officers led the military
corresponded to the broader Westernization of the regime. In other words, if the gov-
ernment engaged in Westernization, the military should promote Western-trained offi-
cers as well. Additionally, as the military faced imminent security challenges, looking
to the Western nations—then considered the most militarily powerful—was a logical
response. If the military needed to emulate the West to address Japan’s security chal-
lenges, it was natural for the organization to promote officers who were well-trained or
steeped in the ways of the West.
It was also likely that the longer an officer underwent a Western education
or training, the more likely he would have absorbed Western theories of victory and
corporatism. The more an officer absorbed those theories, the more capable he would
be in driving the Westernization policies in his organization. If the military leadership
accepted those policies, he will be promoted to the top ranks. After all, Japan did not
want to always rely on foreign trainers for long periods of time. Promoting Western-
trained officers was one of the primary methods to ‘localize’ those theories of victory
and corporatism. Finally, as Meiji Japan underwent the transition from feudalism to
a modern state, the military’s promotion of Western-trained officers also provided an
important symbol of professionalism. Put differently, for Japan’s armed forces to be
recognized and accepted as part of the global community of ‘civilized nations’, it was
important that the military promoted Western-trained officers.
141 The IJA classified a three-star as General and a four-star as Field Marshal. The IJN classified a
three-star as Admiral and a four-star as Admiral of the Fleet.
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• Hypothesis 1A: If an officer had a Western studies background, he was more likely
to retire within the upper general or admiral rank.
• Hypothesis 1B: The longer an officer underwent some form of Western education
or training, the more likely he would have retired within the upper general or
admiral rank.
2. Pre-Meiji Western studies background. Meiji political and military leaders were largely
groomed under the late Tokugawa era. As many of them were mid-rank samurais
and/or scholars educated and/or trained in Dutch or Western studies, the Meiji gov-
ernment privileged Western education or training. Similarly within the military, as
many Restoration leaders were Western-trained or educated, the first generation of
IJA and IJN leaders privileged Western education and training. The Meiji armed
forces therefore should have valued any pre-Meiji Western education and training.
• Hypothesis 2: If an officer had a Western studies background under the Tokugawa
era, he was more likely to retire within the upper general or admiral rank in the
Meiji era.
3. Domain affiliation. Meiji Japan was supposed to transition away from Tokugawa-era
feudalism where power resided in the balance among competing domains. But because
one group, led by Satsuma and Choshu, defeated the shogunate, many Meiji leaders
came from that group. As their foundational base was relatively narrow, factionalism
grew. Leaders from a few powerful domains were likely to trust people from their
own domains. The legacy of pre-Meiji inter-domain competition, after all, was deeply
rooted that even after seizing power, domains still competed with one another. Within
the military, this manifested in the promotion of officers from a few domains by those
from the same domains. Satsuma military leaders were likely to groom and promote
those from Satsuma as much those from Choshu would promote those from Choshu.
Having an affiliation with Satsuma or Choshu (the victors of the Restoration) was thus
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a path to a successful military career in the Meiji era.
• Hypothesis 3: If an officer had an affiliation with or came from the Satsuma or
Choshu domains, then he was more likely to retire within the upper general or
admiral rank, regardless of his professional qualifications or performance.
4. Professional education and training. One of the key foundational traits of Western
militaries was the institutionalization of professional education and training. For the
IJA and IJN, education and training reforms centered on the respective academies
and war colleges. As these institutions were affiliated with or established through
the assistance of Western nations—France and Germany for the IJA and England for
the IJN—attendance or graduation from these schools became an important career
marker. Officers who needed to rise through the ranks must meet such educational
qualifications. After all, military professionalism was important to ensure that Japan
could better meet its security challenges.
• Hypothesis 4A: If an officer graduated from the IJA or IJN Academy, then he
was more likely to retire within the upper general or admiral rank.
• Hypothesis 4B: If an officer graduated from the IJA or IJN Staff or War Colleges,
then he was more likely to retire within the upper general or admiral rank.
These hypotheses should help us understand what personal and professional charac-
teristics were correlated with a successful career in the IJA and IJN (i.e. retire within the
upper-elite rank). The hypothesis of interest is Hypothesis 1, whether having a Western
studies background improved an officer’s career. If the hypothesis is supported, then it was
likely that there were new career pathways for Western-trained officers who were also likely
to be Western product champions. Conversely, if the hypothesis is not supported, then it was
unlikely that there were new career pathways for Western-trained officers or that there were
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powerful Western product champions. Examining the career pattern of Meiji elite officers
thus allows us to estimate the organizational effects of Western education and training.
Statistical test and analysis
I translate the hypotheses and outcome into the variables listed in Table 5.5 below. Table 5.6
provides summary statistics of the variables. But I want to note first the important traits of
the Meiji military elite and look at the broader patterns of the Meiji military elite structure
in Table 5.7 below. First, despite the claims that the Satsuma and Choshu domination of the
hanbatsu (clan cliques) system dominated Meiji military politics (Humphreys 1995; Crowley
1962), the data suggests that over time, those domains only consisted of 13% and 10%,
respectively, of the military elite. The ‘nationalization’ of the IJA and IJN also ensured that
most if not all of the significant domains across Japan were represented in the officer corps.142
Further statistical analysis below shows domain affiliations were less significant in predicting
a successful military career. The analysis separately confirms the broader conclusions made
by Evans (1978) that military hanbatsu was only significant in the early Meiji era. I discuss
this evolution of the Satsuma-Choshu influence in the next subsection.
Second, many of the Meiji military elite were highly educated—nearly half (42%)
graduated from the War Colleges and almost all (86%) were Academy graduates. I dis-
cuss why and how they became highly educated—and their implications for organizational
learning—in the next section. Suffice to note that, despite the lingering legacies of feudalism,
the Meiji military elite received extensive professional education.
Third, roughly half of the Meiji military elite had some form of Western studies
background (roughly three times more than the Indonesian military in chapter 4). This
142 The IJA’s youth cadet schools (founded in 1887) dispersed the geographical representation of the officers
corps as they recruited and trained from all over the country (Humphreys 1995, 11).
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Table 5.4: Variable measurement and coding
Variable Measurement Type
Upper elite rank
Last rank as either General/Admiral (3-star) or Field Mar-




Had received formal or informal education, training, or assign-









Had received formal or informal education, training, or assign-




Had affiliations with or originated from the Satsuma or Choshu
domains
Dummy
Academy graduate Graduated from either the IJA or IJN Academy Dummy
Staff/War College
graduate
Graduated from either the IJA or IJN Staff/War Colleges Dummy
Table 5.5: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Upper elite rank 684 .211 .409 0 1
Western studies background 684 .422 .494 0 1
Western studies duration 684 1.77 2.66 0 12
Pre-Meiji Western studies background 684 .233 .151 0 1
Satsuma & Choshu origins 684 .220 .415 0 1
Academy graduate 684 .856 .350 0 1
Staff/War College graduate 684 .416 .493 0 1
suggests that there were important career pathways for Western-trained officers to climb
through the upper ranks. The more we see Western-trained officers in key positions, the more
likely there were sufficient Western product champions driving the military Westernization
efforts. In other words, there was enough of a ‘critical mass’ of Western-trained officers. I
show further below that a Western-studies background was more significant, compared to
other career markers, in predicting the successful career trajectory of IJA and IJN officers.
Fourth, there were different types of Western studies background. Some were trained
in Dutch studies and some were formally educated at Western schools. But these formally-
trained officers were only about 6% of the sample. Many Western-trained officers were
instead educated informally, including through assignments as attaches or language officers
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and ‘independent’ study travels. Such informal education gave the IJA and IJN the flexibility
to choose the information or intelligence they needed from Western nations at a cheaper
cost. The assigned officers also had liberty to learn or find the information he needed in his
own pace, time, and rhythm—without dealing with rigid class structures or the controlled
environment of a formal education. This was also perhaps why the average duration of a
Western education, training, or assignment for IJA/IJN officers was about two years to help
them gain enough understanding of their information-gathering duties. Taken together, the
formally-trained group would pass on their knowledge to younger officers and students back
home while the informally-trained group could supplement whatever information the former
group did not acquire while advising the broader military establishment.
Fifth, the Western countries represented in the sample as the provider of education
and training fitted the broader transmission process discussed above. Germany, England,
France, and the US constituted almost 60% of all Western education, training, or assignment
for IJA and IJN officers. Germany and France were influential foreign models for the IJA
and England for the IJN (with the US coming in second in the late Meiji era).
Finally, an eyeball test of the composition of the senior ranks indicates a well-
institutionalized promotion system. The pyramid structure of the senior ranks—there should
be more one-star generals than four-star ones—suggests there were no particularly problem-
atic promotional logjams within the officers corps as we witnessed in the Indonesian military
(chapter 4). Indeed, there were more Lieutenant Generals/Vice Admirals (2-stars) than Gen-
erals/Admirals (3-stars) and Field Marshals/Admirals of the Fleet (4-stars).143 I will discuss
other indicators of the institutionalized career management in the next section. For now, I
want to note the rise of Western-trained officers appear correlated with the institutionaliza-
143 By the late Meiji era, there were many Major Generals/Rear Admirals about to be promoted. The
three and four-stars were largely educated in or products of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji eras. This is
why we see one-stars reflected in about less than a third of the sample.
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tion of career management. Taken together, the descriptive statistics in Table 5.7 tells us
that: (1) there were plenty of Western-trained IJA/IJN senior officers, (2) even if many of
them received their education, training, and assignment through informal means, and (3)
that the institutionalization of the promotion policies may have facilitated the process of
placing Western-trained officers in key positions.
Inferential statistics To know whether there were new career pathways for Western-
educated officers, we should test for the significance of Western studies background for the
successful career trajectory of IJA and IJN officers. As the dependent variable is categorical
(upper elite rank membership), I use a logistic regression model to test the hypotheses:
Uppereliterank = α + β1WestEdu+ β2WestDuration+ β3WestPreMeiji
+β4SatsumaChoshu+ β5Academy + β6WarCollege+ ε
(5.1)
I run six different regressions to assess the hypotheses in two steps. First, I focus on
a combined IJA and IJN sample with two separate models (see Table 5.8 below). Model 1
consists of all IJA and IJN officers including those who did not graduate from the service
academies (i.e. officers mainly from the Tokugawa era). Model 2 focuses only on those IJA
and IJN officers who graduated from the academies. Second, I separate the sample into IJA
and IJN with four separate models (see Table 5.9 below). Model 3 and Model 5 looks at
the entire IJA and IJN samples, respectively, including those who did not graduate from the
academies. Model 4 and Model 6 only looks at the IJA and IJN officers, respectively, within
the sample of academy graduates. These separate regressions should suggest to us the extent
to which Western-studies background shaped the career trajectory of IJA and IJN officers
and whether the effects were stronger in one service or another.
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Table 5.6: Expanded descriptive statistics of Meiji Japan military elite




Satsuma 31 55 86 13% 684
Choshu 54 11 65 10% 684
Tokyo 20 43 63 9% 684
Hizen 9 39 48 7% 684
Education
Academy graduate (1870 – 1917) 328 258 586 86% 684
Staff/War College graduate (1884 – 1906) 203 82 285 42% 684
Western studies background⊕
Pre-Meiji Dutch/Western studies 10 6 16 2% 684
Formal education (civilian and/or military) 9 16 25 4% 684
Informal education (study trip/travel, attache, language
officer, training/attachment)
166 108 274 40% 684
Average duration of Western background (yrs)† 1.78 1.75
Western countries providing training/education
Germany 71 20 91 31% 289
England 22 55 77 27% 289
France 38 14 52 18% 289
United States 16 30 46 16% 289
Other European countries 82 32 114 39% 289
Senior ranks
Field Marshal/Admiral of the Fleet 16 6 22 3% 684
General/Admiral 84 39 123 18% 684
Lieutenant General/Vice Admiral 238 117 355 52% 684
Major General/Rear Admiral 31 153 184 27% 684
Notes:
? = A total 73 domains were represented, including the Imperial House
⊕ = Some officers experienced more than one type of Western-studies education, training, or assignment.
The figures count all of the types of Western studies background but do not account for those officers who
experienced more than one type.
† = N: 170 for IJA and N: 112 for IJN. These were the only officers with specific Western studies
background duration details.
 = Where officers study/train at least once in their careers, but some officers went to at least two or more
different Western countries throughout their career
319
Table 5.7: Logistic regression of IJA and IJN officers career trajectory (combined)
DV = Upper general/admiral rank upon retiring (3 and 4 stars)?
All (academy & non-academy) Academy graduates
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Western studies background (pre and post-Restoration) 1.499*** 1.467***
(4.81) (4.22)
Duration of Western studies (yrs) 0.0177 0.0379
(0.36) (0.66)
Pre-Meiji Western studies background 0.523 1.793
(0.89) (1.42)
Satsuma & Choshu origins 0.594* 0.420
(2.52) (1.51)
Academy graduate – 0.819**
(-2.62)
Staff/War College graduate 0.541* 0.548*
(2.31)
Cons. – 1.900*** -1.240
(-6.20)
N 684 586
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Notes:
? = For the Army, General (3 stars) and Field Marshal (4 stars) and for the Navy, Admiral (3 stars) and Admiral of the Fleet (4 stars)
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Table 5.8: Logistic regression of IJA and IJN officers career trajectory (per service)
DV = Upper general/admiral rank upon retiring (3 and 4 stars)?
Army (all)† Army (academy) Navy (all)† Navy (academy)
(Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6)
Western studies background 1.222** 1.275** 1.862*** 1.715**
(3.15) (3.10) (3.36) (2.62)
Duration of Western studies (yrs) 0.0391 0.0257 0.0341 0.0638
(0.56) (0.36) (0.44) (0.64)
Pre-Meiji Western studies background 0.308 1.670 0.723
(0.39) (1.30) (0.76)
Satsuma & Choshu origins 0.528 0.418 0.567 0.347
(1.77) (1.24) (1.40) (0.69)
Academy graduate – 1.392** – 0.294
(-2.62) (-0.61)
Staff/War College graduate 0.506 0.564 0.152 0.152
(1.61) (1.76) (0.36) (0.35)
Cons. 0.980* – 2.408*** – 2.871*** – 3.115***
(-2.41) (-7.58) (-5.45) (-7.77)
N 369 328 315 258
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Notes:
? = For the Army, General (3 stars) and Field Marshal (4 stars) and for the Navy, Admiral (3 stars) and Admiral of the Fleet (4 stars)
† = Officers who both went through the Academy post-Restoration as well as those who came through the Tokugawa era but became senior leaders
in the Meiji era without Academy training.
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Model 1
In this model, having a pre-Meiji Western studies background, or spending more time at
a Western military institution, did not have significant effects on whether officers retired
within the upper military elite. Instead, having a Western studies background, coming from
Satsuma and Choshu, and graduating from the academies and war colleges, all have signifi-
cant effects on whether officers retired as three or four-star generals/admirals. But having a
Western studies background was highly significant and positively correlated to retiring within
the upper military elite. The log odds magnitude of having a Western studies background
is 1.499 which corresponds to an odds ratio of 4.47. In other words, the odds of an officer
with a Western studies background retiring either as a three- or four-star general/admiral
was more than 4 times higher than if he did not have such a background.
The findings support Hypotheses 1A, 3, and 4B but not Hypotheses 1B, 2, and 4A.
These results however are less than conclusive for our primary variable of interest. While
having a Western studies background was highly significant, we cannot be sure whether its
effect was analytically diluted by the other variables. How do we know that the career path-
ways for Western-trained officers were more or less important than the career pathways for
those who graduated from the War College? That graduating from the academy was nega-
tively correlated and statistically significant is also hard to explain as academy graduation
was almost a necessary pre-requisite to be promoted. Model 1 therefore does not provide
us with the best estimation to understand the effects of Western studies background for the
career trajectory of IJA and IJN officers.
Model 2
This model focuses only on the Academy graduates. In this model, the duration of Western
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studies, having a pre-Meiji Western studies background, coming from the Satsuma-Choshu
domains, all did not have significant effects on whether an IJA/IJN officer retired as a three-
or four-star general/admiral.144 Instead, having a Western studies background and hav-
ing graduated from the War College had a positive and significant correlation with retiring
within the upper military elite. Having a Western studies background was more significant
than graduating from the War College. The log odds magnitude of having a Western stud-
ies background is 1.467 which corresponds to an odds ratio of 4.334. In other words, the
odds of an officer with a Western studies background retiring either as three or four-star
general/admiral was more than 4 times higher than if he did not have such as a background.
This result is similar to the result from Model 1 above.
Overall, the findings do not support Hypotheses 1B, 2, 3, 4A but support Hypotheses
1A and 4B. They suggest that for the combined sample of IJA and IJN officers, Model 2
provides a more specific estimation of the effects of Western studies background compared
to Model 1. Western studies background was still a highly significant predictor of a success-
ful career. The problem for our variable of interest is the fact that the War College also
provided a significant positive predictor (even if smaller in magnitude and significance). It
is likely that for those who graduated from the Academy, having both a Western studies
background and graduating from the War College provided an officer with a better chance
to retire within the upper military elite. But it is also possible that such positive effects
might be different between the IJA and IJN.
Model 3
This model focuses only on the IJA but includes both Academy and non-Academy grad-
144 For the IJA, there were some officers who had pre-Meiji Western studies background but also went
through the academy training in the Meiji era. There were no such officers for the IJN.
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uates. In this model, the duration of Western studies, having a pre-Meiji Western studies
background, coming from the Satsuma-Choshu domains, and graduating from the War Col-
lege, all did not have significant effects on whether an IJA officer retired as a three- or
four-star general. Instead, graduating from the Academy had a significant but negative
correlation with retiring within the upper elite. But having a Western studies background
had a positive and significant correlation with retiring within the upper elite. The log odds
magnitude of having a Western studies background is 1.222 which corresponds to an odds
ratio of 3.339. In other words, the odds of an IJA officer with a Western studies background
retiring either as three or four-star general was more than 3 times higher than if he did not
have such as a background.
Thus, the findings support Hypothesis 1A but do not support Hypotheses 1B, 2, 3,
4A, and 4B. Model 3 thus provides a better estimation—compared to Model 1 and Model
2—of the effects of Western studies background, although the scope only applies to the IJA.
But as Model 3 incorporated non-Academy officers, it is unclear for these officers whether
Western studies background or the fact that they were military leaders under Tokugawa
provided the heavy-lifting. That graduating from the academy is negatively correlated and
statistically significant is hard to explain as academy graduation was almost a necessary,
although not always sufficient, pre-requisite to rise through the ranks. Model 3 nonetheless
shows the positive significance of having a Western studies background for IJA officers.
Model 4
This model focuses only on the IJA’s academy-graduates. In this model, the duration of
Western studies, having a pre-Meiji Western studies background, coming from the Satsuma-
Choshu domains, and graduating from the War College, all did not have significant effects
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on whether an IJA officer retired as three- or four-star general. Instead, having a Western
studies background had a positive and significant correlation with retiring as a three- or
four-star general. The log odds magnitude of having a Western studies background is 1.275
which corresponds to an odds ratio of 3.57. In other words, the odds of an IJA officer with
a Western studies background retiring either as three or four-star general was more than 3
times higher than if he did not have such as a background.
Thus, the findings support Hypothesis 1A but do not support Hypotheses 1B, 2, 3,
4A, and 4B. Model 4 also reports similar results with Model 3 but provides a better estima-
tion of the effects of Western studies background. Model 4 suggests that within the sample
of IJA officers who graduated from the Academy, the best predictor of a successful career is
only having a Western studies background. Model 4 thus shows that for the IJA, having a
Western studies background is more important than other career markers.
Model 5
This model focuses on the IJN but includes both Academy and non-Academy graduates. In
this model, the duration of Western studies, having a pre-Meiji Western studies background,
coming from the Satsuma-Choshu domains, and graduating from the Academy and the War
College, all did not have significant effects on whether an IJN officer retired as three- or four-
star admiral. Instead, having a Western studies background had a positive and significant
correlation with retiring as a three- or four-star admiral. The log odds magnitude of having
a Western studies background is 1.862 which corresponds to an odds ratio of 6.47. In other
words, the odds of an IJN officer with a Western studies background retiring either as three or
four-star admiral was more than 6 times higher than if he did not have such as a background.
This figure is almost double compared to the IJA and suggests that the IJN might
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have been more eager to promote Western-trained officers. The findings support Hypothesis
1A but not Hypotheses 1B, 2, 3, 4A, and 4B. Model 5 provides a good estimation of the
effects of Western studies background within the IJN relative to other career markers. But
as Model 5 also incorporated non-Academy officers, it is unclear for these officers whether
Western studies background or the fact that they were military leaders under Tokugawa
provided the heavy-lifting. Model 5 nonetheless shows the positive significance of having a
Western studies background for IJN officers.
Model 6
This model focuses on the IJN’s Academy-graduates. In this model, the duration of Western
studies, having a pre-Meiji Western studies background, coming from the Satsuma-Choshu
domains, and graduating from the academy and the war college, all did not have significant
effects on whether an IJN officer retired as a three- or four-star admiral. Instead, having
a Western studies background had a positive and significant correlation with retiring as a
three- or four-star admiral. The log odds magnitude of having a Western studies background
is 1.715 which corresponds to an odds ratio of 5.55. In other words, the odds of an IJN officer
with a Western studies background retiring either as three or four-star admiral is more than
5 times higher than if he did not have such as a background. For academy graduates, the
magnitude of having a Western studies background was smaller compared to the effects for
the combined sample of Academy and non-Academy graduates.
The findings support Hypothesis 1A but not Hypotheses 1B, 2, 3, 4A, and 4B. Model
6 reports similar results with Model 5 but focuses on the sample of IJN Academy graduates.
Model 4 suggests that within the sample of IJA officers who graduated from the Academy,
the best predictor of a successful career is only having a Western studies background. Model
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6 meanwhile shows that for the IJN, having a Western studies background is more important
than other possible career markers.
The above analyses are summarized in Table 5.9 below. It shows that Western stud-
ies background provided the strongest predictor for a successful career. Across all mod-
els, Western-trained officers had higher a probability to retire as three- or four-star gen-
eral/admiral. The odds of a Western-trained officer retiring within the upper-elite rank was
roughly more than three times (for the IJA) and between five and six times (for the IJN)
more than those without such a background. One can safely argue that there were bright
career pathways for Western-trained officers in the Meiji era. The statistical findings however
could not tell us how Western-trained officers were promoted or how they became product
champions. We must now turn to the organizational evolution of the IJA.
Table 5.9: Summary of results of hypotheses (H) and models (M)
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 Overall
H1A: Western studies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Strong support
H1B : Western studies duration No No No No No No No support
H2 : Pre-Meiji Western studies No No No No No No No support
H3 : Satsuma-Choshu affiliation Yes No No No No No Weak support
H4A: Academy graduate No No No No No No No support
H4B : War College graduate Yes Yes No No No No Weak support
Notes:
Yes = Statistically significant and/or positively/negatively correlated as predicted by hypothesis
No = Not Statistically significant and/or not positively/negatively correlated as predicted by hypothesis
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5.4.2 Structural evolution of IJA
The IJA did not achieve a successful emulation overnight.145 By the time the critical juncture
started in the 1870s, the military was unified and organizationally prepared to adopt and
implement Western theories of victory and corporatism. Understanding the organizational
evolution of the IJA is important to explain the quality of personnel infrastructure that
allowed it to do so. This sub-section first discusses the structural evolution of the IJA from
the early Meiji (1868-1877) to the critical juncture period (1877–1905). It highlights key
policies and changes and how they were partly shaped by the diffusion of Western theories of
victory and corporatism. Second, it describes the evolution and structure of the IJA’s career
management and education systems. It highlights the role of intra-military power politics
and Western product champions in driving the military Westernization process.
Early Meiji reforms The Meiji government had decided early on to “emulate the train-
ing, armament, and organization of Western military forces” (Hackett 1964, 336). But during
the first post-Restoration years, the government tasked the IJA with accelerating its military
Westernization to tackle domestic security challenges, from disaffected feudal clans to rest-
less peasantries. Between 1868 and 1872, more than 160 internal revolts or peasant uprisings
erupted (Schencking 2005, 18).146 Additionally, military leaders had to address the absence
of a centralized and unified organization and that each domain and government forces had
emulated different Western models during the bakumatsu era (discussed above). Conse-
quently, many significant reforms did not start immediately after the Restoration. But some
145 I focus on the IJA and not the IJN because of time and space constraints. But the personnel infrastruc-
ture between the two services and how they evolved were broadly similar. In other words, understanding
the IJA’s personnel infrastructure is sufficient to make sense of the statistical findings above.
146 Some of the rebellions were economically-driven as leading Restoration domains, including Choshu
and Satsuma, were saddled with heavy expenses driven by military Westernization in the last years of the
Tokugawa rule (Beasley 1972, 188).
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of them were salient to the diffusion process as they ‘prepared’ the personnel infrastructure
that enabled the IJA to adopt Western theories of victory and corporatism.
First, the government created the Military Affairs Ministry in 1869 to manage a wide
range of tasks, from consolidating the domain and shogunate assets, importing arms and
equipment, to providing transport and coastal defenses (Westney 1986, 180). The ministry
consisted of the Army and Navy Bureaus (which became two separate ministries in 1872).
Yamagata’s petition when creating these two entities cited efficiency as well as standard
European practices (Presseisen 1965, 31).147 The bureaucracy helped centralize the domain
and government forces in the early Meiji years. The abolishment of the feudal domain
system and their local armies further laid the groundwork for the development of the IJA’s
personnel infrastructure.148 The government further tasked the IJA and IJN (as directed
by the Ministry) with building the infrastructure of their organizations, including internal
coordination and control, training and socialization, and information links (Westney 1986,
177). This further facilitated the institutionalization of personnel infrastructure.
Second, internal challenges forced the government to dispersed IJA units throughout
the country, which was divided into 6 districts with its own garrison and headquarters at
Tokyo, Sendai, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto.149 Drawing from both Imperial
Guard troops and conscripts, these units could marshal roughly 15,000 to 20,000 men while
serving as centers of training and administration.150 Theoretically, the IJA could muster
around 30,000 troops in peacetime up to more than 45,000 in wartime. The IJA soon ex-
147 The Military Affairs Ministry has since evolved in name and function and different scholars have
translated the names as War Ministry or Army Ministry. I will be using the Army Ministry to distinguish
it from the Navy Ministry (created in 1872) discussed in the next section.
148 An experimental juggling of borders reduced the 300-odd domains to 50. The government appointed
samurais as the new governors but they were seldom natives from their assignment area (Jansen 2000, 349).
149 Details in this paragraph are from Hackett (1971, 58, 64-7), Drea (2013, 76), and Porter (1911, 216)
150 An Imperial Guard (Goshimpei) was formed in April 1871 and complemented these districts. The
roughly 10,000-men Imperial Guard was the first ‘unified’ armed forces (drawn from troops contributed by
Choshu, Satsuma, and Tosa) under the Emperor’s command.
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Figure 5.5: IJA active duty personnel, 1871-1890
Source: Author calculation from Rikusen gakkai, eds., Kindai sensoshigaisetsu, Shiryoshii (Rikusen gakkai,
1984), 39 as cited in Drea (2016, 31)
panded; roughly tripling its active personnel within less than a decade, as Figure 5.5 below
shows. The ‘static and defensive’ dispersion of IJA troops and high operational tempo coin-
cided with the French training mission in the early 1870s that focused on tactical proficiency
rather than strategic planning (discussed above). The personnel expansion nevertheless re-
quired further bureaucratic and institutional management to ensure that the government
would not be saddled with ineffective and bloated units.
Third, the government instituted a conscription system in 1873.151 The processes
leading up to it reveals the importance of Western product champions and the parameters of
intra-organizational balance of power. On the one hand, a faction of older, more traditional
officers dominated the early IJA and they did not see a need for a professional standing army.
151 The historical details on the intra-military political dynamics over the conscription policy in the next
few paragraphs are drawn from Hiroko (2005, 83–7), Shimazu (2001, 73), Presseisen (1965, 29), Kuehn
(2014, 146), Hackett (1965, 66–7, 251–5), (Drea 2013, 77), Kitaoka (1993, 71), Crowley (1966, 268–270),
Ariga (1904, 165), Westney (1986, 179–80), (Ogawa 1921, 7), Kublin (1949, 28–31), Presseisen (1965, 26),
Cook (1987, 31), Beasley (1972, 363), Gordon (2003, 66), and Jansen (2000, 400).
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They preferred a short-term conscript force manned exclusively by samurais; both because
of their traditional military expertise and as a means of providing financial support. Many
Satsuma and Choshu samurais who fought in the Restoration wars tended to agree with this
group because they thought peasants could not become high-quality soldiers. Among this
group was Torio Koyata, a prominent Choshu General and Army Chief of Staff. He believed
that samurai-led militarism was the root of Japan’s real strength. Other IJA generals,
including Tani Kanjo and Maebara Issei shared these views.
But another faction, largely influenced by the Prusso-German army, had a more
expansive vision for the military, including fighting China and Russia. Omura and Yamagata
were powerful Western product champions in this camp, as were their proteges like Katsura.
Omura was a prominent long-time advocate of military Westernization and conscription
based on his experience in Choshu (discussed above). His ideal army was apparently modeled
after Napoleonic French and a navy modeled after the British Royal Navy. He believed that
conscription, especially based on the French model, would help unify the armed forces and
the nation by mixing all classes yet welded together by professional training and education.
After Omura’s assassination in 1869, Yamagata picked up and pushed these ideas further.
Yamagata was a prominent IJA leader because of his role in the Restoration wars and
his extensive experience with military Westernization. He advocated a universal conscription
because he thought controlling an army of privileged ex-samurais would be challenging and
expensive. Based on his experience at Choshu of leading the all-class kiheitai units (discussed
above), he saw firsthand the fallacy that only hereditary samurais could be capable fighters.
More importantly, Yamagata saw in his 1870 European tour that powerful European mili-
taries were built on universal conscriptions. He also envisioned the conscription system to
help turn the military into a ‘school for the nation’.152 Yamagata’s proteges, Katsura and
152 The military would provide a high-quality education, from middle school to the academy and beyond,
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Kawakami Soroku (deputy chief of the General Staff), further underscored the importance
of conscription if the military wish to be in step with first-class European powers.
Yamagata eventually had his way, although opposition to a large and modern national
army continued.153 In 1872, Yamagata argued in a memorial submitted to the palace that
Japan should create a modern army backed by a regular and reserve. Healthy young men,
regardless of class, should be selected from each prefecture, trained in Western drills and
tactics, and kept ready for an emergency. Yamagata then instructed a commission headed
by Nishi Amane, the Dutch-trained scholar and Army Ministry official, to study the German
conscription laws and system. The final conscription pronouncements called all males to
serve for three years upon reaching 20 years of age and an additional four years in the
reserves.154 In addition, all males between 17 and 40 were required to register as part of a
national reserve which could be mobilized in an emergency. As a sign of the importance of
merit, those who proved their superiority in training would be transferred to the Imperial
Guard. The pronouncements also reflected various compromises.
For one thing, while the Prussian and French models were ‘combined’ as the model for
the conscription framework, Meiji military leaders used Japanese sociological traits to outline
the categories for exemption.155 For another, they cited the Imperial past (where all Japanese
were direct subjects of the Emperor without peasant-soldier distinctions) while invoking the
while putting in place broader national educational reforms to ensure that high-quality students would
serve in the military. These ideas mirrored the proposals of the French military attache, Albert Charles au
Bousquet: Japan needed a professional military educational system, a literate population so that soldiers
could be efficiently taught basic military skills, and a capable industrial base.
153 For example, intra-IJA ‘study groups’ proliferated in the mid-1880s that challenged the leadership and
advocated a defensive, samurai-like militia army. The reforms proposed by Yamagata and Katsura during
the critical juncture (discussed below) were partially sparked by the need to eliminate these internal dissents.
154 The law was preceded by an Imperial rescript and an announcement from the Council of State.
155 From the Germans, the Japanese adopted the length of service and annual roll calls and the French
provided the base logic of exemptions. The Japanese traits were the categories of exemptions: the physically
unqualified; family heads and heirs of farms and family businesses; students in military schools; hardship
cases; criminals; those in certain stipulated professions; officials and all teachers and students of prescribed
schools; and, all who could pay 270 yen (more than the annual wage of a common laborer). These exemptions
were necessary to reduce the potential socio-economic shock of conscription.
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military lessons of the West. These compromises were supposed to bridge the gap between
the two opposing groups above. The conscription thus highlights the relationship between
intra-military power dynamics and the interplay between formal and informal institutions.
But while the conscription signified the government’s commitment to military West-
ernization, the organizational reality was less clear-cut as the IJA and IJN continued to
accept samurai volunteers.156 Further, the conscription was not popular and the IJA had
trouble meeting the required quotas for what the government labeled a ‘blood tax’.157 But
before the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the conscription system underwent four revisions in
1879, 1883, 1889 and 1895. With every new revision, the criteria for exemption were tight-
ened. As discussed below, some of these major changes were shaped by German influence
as well. Overall, the early Meiji conscription set the stage for the growth of a professionally
educated officer corps during the critical juncture.
Critical juncture reforms The post-Satsuma Rebellion period witnessed various orga-
nizational reforms influenced driven by the need to secure greater autonomy, more effective
coordination and control, and more secure access to needed resources (Westney 1986, 185).
Such goals helped institutionalize the IJA’s personnel infrastructure, which in turn and over
time, allowed Western-trained officers to reach key positions and boost the IJA’s capacity
to learn and adopt Western theories of victory and corporatism. Meckel’s ideas (discussed
above) could not have been implemented without German product champions within the
IJA. Generals Katsura Taro, Kawakami Soroku, and Kodama Gentaro worked closely with
156 Their exact number is uncertain, since official records made no formal distinction between volunteers
and conscripts. In these early years, moreover, the number of conscripts inducted was very small.
157 Many commoners thought the conscription was a ‘poor man’s lottery’ because it targeted the young
labour force of the lower classes in rural communities. In 1873–74 angry crowds attacked and destroyed
numerous conscription registration centers in sixteen riots, resulting in nearly 100,000 people arrested and
punished. By 1879, almost 90% of those eligible were exempted.
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Meckel and received quiet encouragements from Yamagata (Presseisen 1965, 117).158 That
these officers were in prominent positions facilitated further career pathways for Western-
trained officers, as the statistical findings above show.
In 1866, Katsura and Kawakami established the Provisional Committee to Study
Military Systems, a 19-member group headed by Kodama to asess IJA organization and
strategy. Many of the subsequent reorganization activities and policies were derived from
this committee’s deliberations (Harries and Harries 1991, 49). Meckel advised the committee
and met with Kodama on a bi-weekly basis. First, the IJA expanded in terms of manpower
(see Figure 5.5 above) and in arms and budget.159 The expansion was underpinned by
changes to the conscription system noted above, some of which were shaped by Western
theories of corporatism. In 1887 the IJA adopted the Prussian system of one-year volunteers
to build a reserve officer pool. Major changes in 1889 also followed the Prussian model to
build a large enlisted reserve to fill out the wartime divisions (Drea 2016, 67). Katsura and
Kawakami were impressed by Prussian military reformers, particularly Stein and Gneisenau
who used a conscript program to help unify Prussia (Crowley 1966, 276).
Second, the IJA shifted from a defensive, garrison-based posture to a potentially of-
fensive, division-based one. The deployment of garrison troops in the Satsuma Rebellion was
not satisfactory.160 The shift happened in two stages.161 In 1884, the garrisons were reor-
ganized into brigades (two infantry regiments). The General Staff then altered its wartime
mobilization plans to allow for the expansion of garrisons into divisions when reserves are
158 During Meckel’s time in Japan, Katsura was Army Vice Minister, Kawakami was Deputy Chief of the
General Staff, and Kodama was head of the Army War College (he would become Army Vice Minister).
159 The budget grew from 6.6 million yen in 1877 to 9.4 million yen in 1882. The 1882 budget also included
a 10-year plan to field 7 modern infantry divisions with supporting troops, improved coastal defenses, and
upgraded artillery (Drea 2016, 53).
160 Given the stationary nature of the garrison system, the IJA had to assemble composite or ‘mixed’,
ad-hoc combat brigades drawn from different garrisons to fight the rebellion.
161 Historical details in this paragraph are from Yamagata (1910, 209), Jaundrill (2016, 161), Lone (2000,
22), Paine (2017, 9), and Drea (2016, 57).
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called up. By 1888, the IJA abandoned the garrison system. They were renamed Divisional
Headquarters and each was organized for independent action in war (equipped with its own
infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, and commissariat). It would take several years before
these integrated and independent Divisions could form complete Field and Reserve Divisions
on a war basis. The IJA also created the Army Service Corps to provide logistical support
and improved the national railway network. By the time the conversion was completed in
1891, the IJA had 7 modern divisions and could mobilize a reserve force of 240,000 troops.
These changes followed Meckel’s arguments that because Japan lacks strategic depth,
individual divisions need to quickly deploy to their assigned defensive sectors in wartime and
conduct independent operations (Presseisen 1965, 117; Drea 2016, 62). Indeed, the dissolu-
tion of the garrison system coincided with the adoption of the German field manual in 1888
(Drea 2013, 79). In formulating Japan’s division system, Katsura was influenced by Prussian
strategic thinking, especially the ideas of Helmuth von Moltke and Clausewitz (Harries and
Harries 1991, 39). Katsura and Meckel were thus similarly advocating for a division-based
structure for the IJA. More importantly, Katsura’s all-class offensive-oriented military West-
ernization helped his position within the IJA as he convinced the younger officers to move
away from a samurai-only defensive army (Kitaoka 1993, 72). Taken together, the shift to the
division system demonstrates the interaction between a commercial transmission (Meckel’s
arrival and ideas) and the IJA’s personnel infrastructure during the critical juncture.
Third, the IJA separated command and administrative functions by creating the
‘big three’: War Minister, Chief of General Staff, and Inspector General for Education and
Training. The creation the General Staff in 1878 independent of the Army Ministry was
a byproduct of the Satsuma Rebellion. The General Staff controlled planning, command,
intelligence, and reported directly to the Emperor. This theory of military corporatism—
335
combining the ‘independence’ of supreme command with the Imperial institution (Iriye 1989,
731)—was Prussian-inspired.162 But the General Staff did not emerge in a vacuum. In 1871,
an Army Staff Bureau was set up in the Ministry of Military Affairs.163 When Katsura
was in charge of the Bureau after returning from Germany, he saw the need to separate
command and administrative functions. He was inspired by the Prussian general staff and
had echoed the Prussian Army’s concerns over the meddling of civilian bureaucrats and
the ambiguous wartime command (Presseisen 1965, 61-2).164 In Japan, the creation of an
independent general staff was also facilitated by the absence of an elected national assembly
to oversee the military—the Army Ministry was also already staffed with officers (Westney
1986, 186). Finally, the command and administrative separation reflected the intra-military
power dynamics as Yamagata tried to consolidate his group within the IJA (Drea 2016, 49).
Meckel strengthened the big three structure further.165 The big three collectively led
the IJA, even though each was not responsible to the other. In practice, the War Minister
was in charge of administration, from budgeting, personnel, to procurement. While in theory
he should report to the Prime Minister, the minister answered to the Emperor.166 The Chief
of General Staff had jurisdiction over the staff sections of the various IJA commands and
had responsibility over strategy and planning. This removed command and control from the
162 Some historians maintain that the idea could not have been from Prussia because an independent
general staff only materialized there in 1883. But others argue that the German influence—both within the
German-trained IJA officers and from Meckel’s teachings—pertaining to general-staff concepts have been
around since the early 1870s. See for example Drea (2013, 78).
163 This unit—initially dubbed the Sixth Bureau– was in charge staff functions (e.g. strategic and logistical
planning) as well as associated functions like map making and military history.
164 The Army Ministry was created along the French model with the Ministry as the center of gravity
for military decision-making. Indeed, the principal difference between the French and German military
systems was that in France, administrative and operational command were unified in the ministry, whereas
in Germany, command resided separately in the general staff (Lone 2000, 12).
165 Historical details on the separate duties and functions of the Big Three as well as Meckel’s influence
below are drawn from Jaundrill (2016, 159), Drea (2016, 49–65), Lory (1943, 119), Hackett (1964, 339–341),
Porter (1911, 219), Presseisen (1965, 118–120).
166 He was always in a tough spot: as part of the IJA hierarchy he was bound to represent IJA policy, but
as a member of the cabinet he was bound by legal and constitutional principles.
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cabinet. In peacetime, he would assume direct command over the Garrisons (and Divisions)
and the Imperial Guard. But as an Imperial appointee, he was the emperor’s top military
adviser. During wartime, the Chief of General Staff could issue orders in his name.
Meckel’s influence was more visible in the Inspectorate General. Initially, there were
three regional superintendents who coordinated training, standardized tactics and equip-
ment, and ensured units carried out orders and regulations.167 But they were responsible to
the Army Minister. Meckel recommended a unified and independent Inspectorate General.
In his view, the Ministry represented the IJA’s administrative authority and should control,
for example, accounting, the medical department or weapons and ammunition. The General
Staff should be responsible for national defense, military plans, communications, and trans-
portation. Finally, the Inspectorate General should supervise education and training. Meckel
also proposed inspection sections for each technical units attached to the divisions (i.e. the
cavalry, the artillery, the engineers, and the logistical services). He further recommended the
creation of a personnel section to consider promotions and the like.
The IJA leadership took many of these ideas that further institutionalized the IJA’s
personnel infrastructure. The July 1887 Imperial order standardized army-wide training by
placing it under the new Inspectorate General.168 The Inspector General reported directly
to the emperor. He controlled all military schools and training institutions (except the War
College), regulations and manuals, and technical and tactical training of different combat
arms. The majority of personnel and promotion policies were also made part of his respon-
sibility. The IJA leadership designed these changes to improve the IJA’s autonomy from
civilian control as well as to increase their operational flexibility and combat effectiveness.
167 In peacetime each superintendent was responsible for the education and training at two garrisons and
in wartime commanded a two-division corps formed by combining the garrisons’ forces.
168 The agency was the forerunner of the Inspector General of Military Education established by Imperial
order in January 1893 to enforce army-wide proficiency standards.
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The IJA also revised its theories of corporatism and victory based on Meckel’s ideas. While
the big three structure encouraged rivalries, the ability of a few dominant figures to control
key positions during the critical juncture sustained organizational cohesion.169 Overall, this
structural evolution of the IJA helped institutionalize its personnel infrastructure.
5.4.3 IJA career management
Throughout the structural evolution above, the IJA institutionalized career management to
reward professional merit and Western education. The process was not straight forward as
IJA leaders had to balance competing internal power interests. But by the late 1880s and
early 1890s (the middle and back-end of the critical juncture), many of the IJA’s career
management policies were institutionalized. This allowed Western-trained officers reach the
highest positions.
Personnel policies and structure
Meiji leaders believed that discipline and merit should be the bedrock for the new military.
But the IJA lacked competent and qualified officers in the early years. The academy system
had just started and the volunteers and tributes from the domains were the IJA’s key staff
and leaders. Senior officers and commanders were key leaders from the powerful domains
who fought the Restoration Wars. The IJA also tried to promote mid-rank officers and
NCOs, but many were subsequently degraded for incompetency. In general, for all their
accomplishments, these men did not go through professional education and training because
there was none to speak of. The early IJA officer corps were thus a hodgepodge of samurais
from the domains commanding an under-qualified rank-and-file. For much of these early
169 Yamagata, for example, served for six years as War Minister and six as Chief of General Staff. Oyama
served eight years as Chief of General Staff and almost seven years as War Minister.
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years, as Yamagata (1910, 204) argues, “there could be no settled rule for promotion”.
Subsequently, the combination of Western product champions like Katsura and Ko-
dama and the influence of Meckel ushered in important reforms during the critical juncture
(discussed above). These reforms then structured the career management system that facili-
tated the rise of Western product champions by creating career pathways for Western-trained
officers. That key IJA leaders like Yamagata (1910, 203) favored well-educated middle-class
commanders further facilitated the process. By 1876, IJA leaders issued wide-ranging regula-
tions relating to promotion, inspection, and pensions (Yamagata 1910, 204). The IJA’s first
standardized table of organization appeared the following year. Soon, the next generation
of professionally educated officers were routinely promoted based on clear benchmarks.
By the 1890s, the IJA’s career management system had stabilized.170 Major shifts
and promotions, for example, occurred three times a year. A 3-year service overseas became
the norm, as did the dispersed tour of duties inside Japan with officers attached to various
units to improve cohesion. Special schools and training programs were made mandatory for
some positions. Wartime and peacetime promotion and retirement was carefully regulated
(see Table 5.11 below). In theory, an officer should take about 8 years from 2nd Lieutenant to
Lieutenant General during wartime and 16 years during peacetime. The scaled corresponding
retirement age reduced promotional logjams. The minimum time an officer was required to
serve at a particular rank prior to his next promotion was stable and predictable since the
1880s (during critical juncture). In practice, an officer’s tenure in each rank was not too far
off from the established IJA regulations.171 In any case, promotions were institutionalized
and officers generally understood when they would likely move up the ranks and why.
170 Historical details on this paragraph are drawn from Lory (1943, 101) and Oyama (1904, 115).
171 It was normal for promotions, especially above Captains, to take considerably longer. Colonels waiting
for promotion were normally placed on the reserve list after about four years if there was little chance that
they would become Major Generals.
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Table 5.10: IJA officer promotion and retirement benchmarks (time)
Promotional time (in theory and in practice) for each rank and corresponding retirement age
Promotion† Promotion† Retirement‡ Tenure (mean)∗ Tenure (mode)∗ Tenure (range)∗ N ∗
Wartime Peacetime Peacetime Peacetime Peacetime Peacetime
(min. yrs) (min. yrs) (max. age) (yrs) (yrs) (yrs)
2nd Lieutenant .5 1 45 3.05 3 1 to 10 733
Lieutenant 1 2 45 5.24 6 1 to 13 744
Captain 2 4 48 5.52 6 1 to 10 761
Major 1 2 50 4.6 4 1 to 14 741
Lieutenant Colonel 1 2 53 3.4 4 1 to 13 672
Colonel 1 2 55 4.33 4 1 to 13 579
Major General 1.5 3 58 4.05 3 1 to 16 466
Lieutenant General Imperial? Imperial? 62 6.66 6 1 to 18 119
General Imperial? Imperial? 65 8.47 7 6 to 11 15
Source: Author calculation and information from Lory (1943, 101) and Cook (1987, 360-3)
Notes:
† = According to IJA regulations, duration of minimum time (years) required to be promoted to the next rank (listed subsequently in the table).
‡ = According to IJA regulations, maximum age for retirement in a given rank
? = Promotion to the next rank requires Imperial Approval
∗ = Actual length of stay (in practice) at a given rank based on the sample examined by Cook (1987, 360-3). The sample represented what he calls
the ‘Army Leaders Group’, which corresponds to the upper-elite of the officer corps similar to my own sample in the sub-section above.
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Another indication of an institutionalized career management was the stable pyra-
midical structure of the officer corps, which I briefly note above.172 Despite the rapid ex-
pansion of personnel, the pyramid form—with the upper-elite (generals) at about 1-2% and
about 80% company grade officers—was relatively intact during the critical juncture and
after.173 At the bottom of the pyramid, the balance between seniority and merit was still
relatively equal.174 But above the rank of Captain, promotion by merit, especially education
and Western training, largely prevailed. As Table 5.11 above shows, mandatory retirement
age also kicked in if an officer stayed in a rank too long than his peers. This was, in effect,
an ‘up–or–out’ system the IJA had institutionalized by the 1890s.
The stable pyramid structure at least suggests the IJA was careful in its career man-
agement. This was partially because of the direct link between the Imperial House and
the military. In principle, the Emperor was the ultimate authority in personnel matters.
But in practice, he delegated personnel management to the collective IJA leadership of the
Army Ministry, the General Staff, and the Inspectorate General of Military Education. The
Inspectorate General helped formulate the basis of assessments and enforce existing regula-
tions, while the General Staff provided the requirement lists based on operational needs. The
IJA thus developed meticulous procedures to ensure that personnel decisions were carefully
deliberated so as not to “embarrass’ the Imperial House.
The IJA also ensured that promotion procedures were made internally transparent.
The Personnel Bureau within the Army Ministry assessed promotion decisions affecting com-
172 The pyramid is essentially a broad base of hundreds of thousands of privates and NCOs tapering to a
peak represented by a few dozen generals. Details in the next two paragraphs on the officer corps’ composition
are drawn from Lory (1943, 103), Cook (1987, 351–366), and McGovern (1920, 217).
173 After the Russo-Japanese war personnel expansion, the IJA made sure that the greatest increase were
in the company grade. By 1907, the General and the company grade officers were about 1% and 86% of the
officer corps, respectively.
174 Seniority implies that an officer should be promoted to some positions based on how long he has held
on to some previous postings and how long he has been in the structure.
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pany and field grade officers (2nd lieutenants through colonels). Promotion to general-rank
received additional scrutiny because they required an Imperial Seal of approval. Personnel
reports and assessments started from an officer’s unit commander all the way up through the
chain of command.175 The report would pass through several stages at headquarters with
each reviewer leaving comments. The original reports were kept by the reporting officer and
passed on to his successors—making them the official records of both the reviewer and the
reviewed. Decisions concerning promotions were then published in the official gazette.
The IJA further publicly noted the importance of three career markers. First, pro-
fessional merit and competitive examinations as the basis for promotions. While the Army
Ministry provided ‘last stop’ assessments, the Inspectorate General developed and enforced
the regulations and procedures that stabilized promotion based on merit. It focused, for ex-
ample, on preparing the competitive examinations for entrance into educational and training
institutions. By 1886, the IJA dropped the requirement for wartime command for flag-rank
promotions, made selection to full general a matter of Imperial appointment, and replaced
promotion by seniority with competitive examinations. These measures were designed to
get rid of ‘deadwood’ in the officer corps and promote outstanding younger officers based
on individual talent (Drea 2016, 62). Merit thus affected the intra-military power balance
in favor of the professionally-trained younger officers, which further gave them a stake in
keeping the system alive. The merit system thus become more institutionalized.
Second, professional education and training as important qualifications for higher
command positions. In general, promotions at the upper level were determined by military
school records (Lory 1943, 101). As the statistical analysis above shows, graduation from
the War College was a significant predictor for a successful career in the IJA. This finding
175 Infantry officers were reviewed directly by their commanders, but artillery, engineering, and cavalry and
transport officers were reviewed by the inspectors of their branch.
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confirms previous studies that noted the significant advantage War College graduates had
compared to those who did not come through the institution (Butow 1961, 14). Conversely,
the top five graduates of the War College were almost assured to attain a general rank
(Peattie 1972, 18). Another study noted that more than three quarters of the IJA leadership
during the Meiji era had attended the War college (Cook 1987, 351–366). In essence, the
College was the first ‘selector’ of future IJA leaders.
Every year, only the most promising lieutenants were sent to the College.176 They
were selected based on their Academy record, the recommendations of commanding officers,
and preliminary examinations.177 Only half of the initial divisional applicants would take
these tests. Successful applicants would be recommended to the General Staff and Army
Ministry. This competitive system signaled to IJA officers that education, performance, and
ability — not social or clan origin — would be the major criteria for advancement.
Finally, from those who passed the earlier merit and educational benchmarks, West-
ern studies background gave an additional ‘edge’ for the upper-most leadership positions.
During the early Meiji years, many IJA leaders, including former domain commanders, had
a background in Western studies as we discussed above. They subsequently focused on pro-
ducing and distributing a new type of officers familiar with Western military sciences to
ameliorate the feudal legacies of favoring personal valor or honor over military organization
and training (Sonoda 1990, 88). In other words, the promotion of Western-trained officers
became an organizational necessity if the military Westernization efforts were to continue.178
This was way the best graduates of the War College were sent to Western nations for further
176 Details in this paragraph arr from McGovern (1920, 217), Lory (1943, 104), and Crowley (1962, 312-3)
177 The tests covered tactics, weapons, fortifications, topography, communications, transportation, orga-
nization, mathematics, history, and one foreign language. The final examination included discipline and
general military knowledge.
178 This was apart of a broader trend within the Meiji government to promote Western-trained officials or
civil servants. See details in Silberman (1964, 59).
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education, training, or assignment (Kono 1931, 391). Such exposure was especially impor-
tant for officers who would lead and staff the new Western-modeled IJA divisions (Drea 2016,
56). In other words, as the IJA consciously sent its best and brightest to Western nations,
it was logical then that their return they would be promoted to key positions.
Appendix 1 provides a sample of some of the most prominent Western-trained IJA
officers drawn from my data. Overall, the IJA’s career management was institutionalized by
the critical juncture and was favorable to Western-trained officers. There was an ideal path of
progress and the stages of an officer’s professional career were bound together and externally
determined. An officer’s rank became the main benchmark to measure achievements and
rewards along with command and staff responsibilities. Performance in wartime also provided
an important marker. Thus, the career system was predictable (officers knew what to expect),
transparent (assessments published), multi-layered (not just dependent on one person or
office), and selective (criteria and guidelines were set to choose the best officer). But how
these policies became institutionalized depended on the intra-army balance of power between
different IJA generations, as we shall see below.
Intra-military balance of power
The inter-generational power balance facilitated the institutionalization of career manage-
ment because the professionally-educated younger generation (most of the officer corps dur-
ing the critical juncture) had a stake in the system. The first generation of IJA officers did
not enter the military through education and training.179 They became senior officers and
commanders through: (1) their roles in the Restoration wars and in the Imperial Guard,
and (2) their experience with or knowledge of Western forces and concepts.180 Many of the
179 Historical details on the generational gap in this paragraph are drawn from Westney (1986, 178–190).
180 The first group provided the bulk of the first generation of commanders and line officers, while the
second became staff officers or instructors.
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first generation also shared a ‘feudal’ culture of personal valor, patronage, and domain loy-
alty as well as a hard-drinking, anti-intellectual life style. Conversely, the second generation
graduated from the Academy before the critical juncture and from the War College during
the critical juncture. These men were oriented to formal training, professionalism, personal
discipline, academic study, and technical expertise. There was a regional as well as a cultural
gap between the two generations: the first generation was overwhelmingly from Satsuma and
Choshu while the second came from all over Japan.
These generational fault lines were widespread in the 1870s. The various reforms of
the 1880s discussed above were partially a consequence of and policies to address the gaps.
The creation of new specialized units or structures (including the Big Three), for example,
created new positions to fill. The first generation had the opportunity and space to protect
their cohort interests by filling them. The first generation also used the reforms to boost
organizational professionalism while getting rid of their intra-generation rival groups, as we
saw with Yamagata and Katsura above. By institutionalizing career management, the early
IJA leaders also sought the support of the incoming second generation of officers.
Most of the second generation came from the middle and lower-rank samurais and
commoners. Table 5.12 below shows, for example, the more than 210% increase in the
number of generals coming from commoner backgrounds within a decade. It also shows that
both the samurais and commoners increased their representation within the officer corps
while the royal and upper class either declined or stagnated during the critical juncture.
Indeed, officers entering the Academy from samurai (shizoku) backgrounds declined while
the proportion of commoners (heimin) rose (Cook 1987, 244). It should also be noted that the
conscription discussed above was biased towards to the lower strata of society. The growth
in the ‘middle and lower class’ within the IJA signaled the growing stake for the second
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generation to institutionalize professional career management at the expense of hereditary
or regional patronage. Thus, during the critical juncture, the career management policies
discussed above reflected and caused the changing intra-IJA balance of demographics.
Table 5.11: Changes in IJA officer social class background, 1897–1907
Rank Social class 1897 1907 change
General officers? Imperial (Kozoku) 2 2 0%
Peerage (Kazoku) 27 17 -37%
Samurai (Shizoku) 46 84 83%
Commoner (Heimin) 10 31 210%
Field grade officers† Imperial (Kozoku) 1 2 100%
Peerage (Kazoku) 2 21 950%
Samurai (Shizoku) 644 891 38%
Commoner (Heimin) 169 609 260%
Company grade officers‡ Imperial (Kozoku) 2 1 -50%
Peerage (Kazoku) 53 80 51%
Samurai (Shizoku) 3,173 4,780 51%
Commoner (Heimin) 2,175 5,578 156%
Source: Author calculation from Rikugunsho tokei nempo, 1897, 44-45 cited in Cook (1987, 239).
? = Combined figures for General, Lieutenant General, and Major General
† = Combined figures for Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major
‡ = Combined figures for Captain, 1st Lieutenant, 2nd Lieutenant
But in the early Meiji years, domain and personal patronage, especially from Satsuma
and Choshu, still dominated senior appointments (Shingo 1965, 200). Between 1873 and
1912, the Emperor approved the promotion of 28 non-Imperial House men to the rank of
General: 11 were from Choshu and 9 from Satsuma. In the same period, the IJA promoted
153 officers to Lieutenant General, with 36 coming from Choshu and 25 from Satsuma
(Humphreys 1995, 6). But many of these appointments were made in the early Meiji years.181
181 From the 18 generals in the first post-Restoration decade, 8 were from Satsuma and 5 from Choshu.
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Also, while some Satsuma and Choshu men were influential, their representation at the
highest levels of the officer corps declined as the other domains rose.
Figure 5.6 below shows the decline of the Satsuma-Choshu representation. It further
confirms the findings from the statistical analysis above that domain affiliations did not signif-
icantly determine a successful career. Choshu was dominant in the IJA’s early days because
of key individuals like Yamagata.182 But Yamata’s followers were not all under-qualified. In
fact, most of them were Western-trained and championed military Westernization efforts.
After the reforms discussed above and the rise of the second generation, a Choshu affiliation
was less salient. In other words, patronage may have helped select the early IJA leaders but
did not prevent the institutionalization of the career management nor did it stop military
Westernization. The institutionalized career management, along with education reforms,
in turn further undermined the informal hanbatsu system (Crowley 1962, 326). By 1888,
Choshu only provided around 10% of the officer corps and its share of Academy entrants
dropped to about 7% between 1877 and 1932 (see Figure 5.6).
Overall, the IJA’s institutionalized career structure provided a social ‘equalizer’ and
upward mobility for the middle and lower samurais and commoners. Professional qualifi-
cations and education as well as Western studies background were more important career
determinants than hereditary status or domain patronage alone. In turn, the system gave the
upcoming (and more numerous) second generation of officers a critical stake in maintaining
the system. This highlights how the intra-military balance of power shaped the interplay
between formal and informal institutions.
By 1879, out of 22 generals, 7 were from Satsuma and 6 from Choshu (Hackett 1964, 341).
182 Yamagata was credited with the appointments of about a third of IJA generals in the 1880s (Drea 2016,
22). His proteges like Katsura, Kawakami, and Kodama also led the IJA’s second generation.
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Figure 5.6: IJA generals and their domain origins†
† = Generals (3-stars) and Lieutenant Generals (2-stars) combined, excluding the Imperial House
Source: Author calculation from Cook (1987, 179)
5.4.4 IJA education and learning
In 1868, military education was neither centralized or standardized. Although there were
shogunal military schools, different domains had their own schools with different Western
instructors (Dingman 1998, 158). Meiji leaders realized early on that any successful military
Westernization depended on professional education and training. This was why one of the
earliest priorities of the new government was to train future leaders of the military, using
“the newest techniques of arms and tactics imported from the West” (Cook 1987, 38). As
Yamagata (1910, 207) claims,
“The Meiji government took greatest possible care in the education of young
officers, encouraged them in the study of foreign languages, and particularly
trained them in skeleton drill, in staff riding, and in the practice of tactics. Many
military books were translated and distributed among them. An inspection officer
was specially sent out each year to overlook the military drill of every corps as
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well as to examine the competence of company officers”.
For the IJA, education and training was paramount and that “no effort was spared to provide
the most practical and most modern methods which could be found either at home or in
foreign countries” (Oyama 1904, 118). The structural reforms discussed above also helped
move educational reforms forward. The various but limited military Westernization efforts
of the Tokugawa era discussed in Section 3 above also provided an initial foundation for
the focus on education.183 In other words, the Meiji military leaders did not start with an
entirely blank canvas as far as Western military education and training was concerned.
But hiring foreign trainers was insufficient. Meiji military leaders wanted the IJA to
independently teach their men using ‘localized’ Western theories of victory and corporatism.
Foreign-trained staff officers, returning one after another from 1870s onwards, were instructed
to teach European tactics and discipline in cooperation with foreign teachers.184 As the
localization process appeared to be successful, the government scaled back its foreign student
expenditure and invested more in sending officers as attaches or language officers in foreign
embassies (discussed above). As Figure 5.7 below shows, the Army and Navy Ministries
spent the most, and presumably send the most number of students to foreign countries,
during the early part of the critical juncture. The figures declined gradually a decade later,
as I will discuss below, coinciding with the establishment of the War College.
Finally, the Inspectorate General for Military Education and Training under the Em-
peror sealed the crucial role of education and training. That the career management system
placed a premium on education and training provided incentives for aspiring officers to focus
on their studies. In fact, the reforms discussed above ensured that “educational credentials”
183 The bakufu schools that incorporated Western military concepts, for example, provided a group of
trained men familiar with the institutional system and the language of the Western instructors (Westney
1986, 177).
184 During the critical juncture, the Government sent 22 new students abroad in 1880 (making 44 who were
studying in Europe at the time) (Yamagata 1910, 206).
349
Figure 5.7: Army & Navy Ministry expenditure for overseas students (thousand ¥)
Source: Author calculation from Jones (1980, 153-4)
became the sine qua non for officers and NCOs to rise through the ranks by the 1880s (Jaun-
drill 2016, 167).185 As education became a centerpiece for promotions, the IJA’s learning
capacity increased. Officers were more likely to try and get the best Western knowledge
possible and adapt them to the IJA context. IJA leaders were more likely to reward officers
for such Western-inspired ideas or policies. The organization was also invested in developing
educational and training structures, curriculum, and specialized units to ensure that the
IJA could adopt Western theories of victory and corporatism. Taken together, we see the
interaction between career management and education (i.e. personnel infrastructure) with
Western theories of victory and corporatism commercially transmitted by Western advisors.
185 Such valuation of education and training also tracked with the deeper Japanese inclination that education
was the primary path to elite status, which the Westernization process further reinforced (Burks 1985b, 198).
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Basic education
An integrated Army Academy was established more than five years after the Restoration.
The early IJA leaders needed to time to unify and centralize the various schools and spe-
cialized institutions in the capital and the domains.186 The Academy went through several
iterations from the first post-Restoration training institution, the Western-oriented Kyoto
Soldiers School founded by Omura Masujiro in 1868.187 After the schools were centralized,
the IJA created three schools: (1) the Cadet School (Yonen gakko), a preparatory mid-
dle school plus instruction in Western languages; (2) the Officer School (Shikan Gakko)
for branch (infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineering) technical skills; (3) the Educational
Leadership Group (Kyododan), an NCO school. The French training mission discussed above
worked with students from these schools, particularly the Officer School. By October 1875,
these schools became the Army Officer School, or Army Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakko)
and relocated to Ichigaya under the Army Ministry.188
Initially, the pre-Academy schools were home to a small instructional cadre, about
100-150 officer candidates, 80 NCO candidates about a 600-men training battalion (Jaundrill
2016, 98). These early schools nonetheless produced men who were knowledgeable of the
latest Westernization trends and were more professionally trained compared to the feudal
retainers manning the garrison forces. The French were among the core teaching staff at
the first Academy class in 1875 (Drea 2016, 26). More than 150 students were enrolled
in either a 2-year (for the infantry and cavalry) or a 3-year course (for the artillery and
186 Historical details of the evolution of the early Meiji schools and academy in this paragraph are drawn
from Cook (1987, 38, 40-4), (Westney 1986, 178), and Drea (2016, 21).
187 While the Kyoto school had a Western-oriented curriculum, it was staffed by Japanese. It was replaced
on September 1869 with the Osaka Military Science School. This was after the government converted the
former shogunate’s Yokohama Foreign Language School and the Tokugawa-created Numazu military school
into a French-style academy. Osaka was strategically located to allow rapid mobilization in any direction to
suppress internal challenges. The Osaka school was renamed the Army Military Science School in November
1871 and moved to Tokyo in early 1872.
188 The cadet school would be separated in 1875 and re-integrated in 1877 under the Army Academy.
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engineering).189 The competitive examinations for entrance placed a premium on intelligence
and academic proficiency (Hackett 1964, 347). Candidates for the Academy also came from
the cadet preparatory schools.190 In general, this system provided a common base for all
officer candidates at the Academy other than the examination route.
The Sino-Japanese War expanded the IJA and reorganized the preparatory system.191
A more integrated and expanded District Cadet School system started in 1897 and created
a two-track path to the Academy: (1) post-elementary school students (ages 13-15) applied
to one of the six District Cadet Schools, advanced to the Central Cadet School in Tokyo
after a 3-year middle-school coursework and special ‘Moral Training’ classes, and entered the
Academy after 2 years of academic study and ‘spiritual and moral’ training; (2) students at
their fourth and fifth years of middle school took examinations for the Academy and reviewed
to be assigned to IJA regiments. In either case, the Academy was a ‘finishing school’ for the
completion of an IJA officer’s basic training.192
These schools taught a wide range of subjects, from ethics, geography to history
and mathematics. They also taught foreign languages along with military drills, rules, and
regulations. Foreign language was important as students’ language choice carried over to
the academy and beyond. The subsequent decade-long foreign language training allowed
officers to better learn and adopt Western theories of victory and corporatism they would
be exposed to after earning their commissions.193 Those who studied German was at a
189 The first class graduated in 1877 and were commissioned as 2nd lieutenants. Since then the Academy
admitted about 150 per year and graduated about 140.
190 Initially, these schools became regular feeders of students to the Academy, but shared this role with
civilian middle schools. Graduates of the NCO academy or selected NCO volunteers under 27 years of age
were also eligible but they were few and far between (Drea 2016, 25).
191 Details in the next two paragraphs are from Cook (1987, 51–8, 67–110) and Lory (1943, 96).
192 Indeed, Yamagata intended the schools to provide the ‘main trunk’ for the officer corps. The new
district schools provided almost 40% of all Academy graduate classes of 1903 to 1942.
193 At the cadet schools, foreign language was the single largest block of time (6-7 hours a week for three
years) of any academic subject. This was why students tended to stick with the language they chose.
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particular advantage because during the critical juncture the Prussian Army was the model
to emulate.194 Student life in general was also dominated by graded performance, from
tests, exercises, to essay writing and examinations. Class rankings established measurable
benchmarks preparing them for the officer corps’ system of advancement and promotion.195
Overall, the cadet schools boosted the intellectual edge of future Academy entrants.
The Academy system was reformed in 1887 (Presseisen 1965, 112). Since then, cadet
candidates must serve for a year before being considered for the Academy. The study pe-
riod was shortened from 3 years to 18 months by eliminating the first-year course (general
subjects). After finishing, the candidates returned to the army for another 6 months before
receiving his commission. This model followed the German system and relied on the IJA’s
regionally-based regimental and divisional districts (Cook 1987, 44–46). The system was de-
signed to give practical experience to cadets and fitted the transition from a garrison-based
to a division-based posture (discussed above). The curriculum was designed to be as close as
possible with the best military schools in Europe (Upton 1878, 4). The Academy organized
its core curriculum around military science, mathematics, and natural sciences.196
Overall, the Academy emphasized military sciences and practices. Students learned
the elements of command and officership and were educated in their own specialties. His
achievements were monitored and measured at each step. The IJA’s ‘basic level’ education,
both at the academy and cadet school levels, also transitioned from being modeled over
the French system to the German one. Specialized schools were required to provide the
194 At the very least, those with German language training had a better chance to go to the War College
where German language was emphasized along with German military history and theory.
195 At the preparatory schools, about one out of sixty of those taking the final examination for the Academy
in peacetime was accepted.
196 The theoretical courses included tactics, military organization, fortifications, communication, topogra-
phy, engineering, and foreign language. The practical courses included drills, field service, musketry, fencing,
and horsemanship along with camp exercises, tactical tours, maneuvers and topographical surveys (Lory
1943, 98).
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appropriate skills to IJA officers.197 Some of these schools shaped the organizational learning
and operational planning. The Toyama Infantry School, for example, taught minor tactics,
marksmanship, bayonet practice, and physical education but gradually standardized broader
infantry doctrine and officer training (Drea 2016, 25). The schools’ research division was
also regarded as among the best in investigating and evaluating newer weapons, tactics, and
methods of warfare (Lory 1943, 100). In essence, the schools boosted the IJA’s learning
capacity to adopt Western theories of victory.
War College
One year after the IJA discontinued foreign educators in 1882, the Army War College (Riku-
gun Daigakko) was established (Porter 1911, 217). Many IJA officers studying abroad have
returned and ready to teach their fellow officers (Yamagata 1910, 207). The College pro-
vided advanced training in the management of the Army and prepared officers for vital staff
tasks and higher command in strategy and operations (Cook 1987, 46). Patterned after the
German model, the College overshadowed the French-developed Academy because only Col-
lege graduates could advance to the IJA’s upper elite (Drea 2013, 79). As discussed above,
entrance into the College was highly competitive, ensuring the highest quality of the IJA’s
future leaders. The best graduates of the College also went overseas—mostly to Germany.198
This provided an ‘interaction effect’ between War College graduation and Western training
in shaping the successful careers of IJA officers discussed above.
The College lasted roughly three years. The first year was remedial and concentrated
on foreign languages, mathematics, and drafting for engineering and map-making purposes.
197 The IJA organized sixteen military schools—covering from ordnance to equestrian—attended by more
than 2,600 students by 1893 (Porter 1911, 217).
198 Up to 1914, the War College graduated 792 students of whom 81 were sent to study in Germany, 33
to France, 29 to Russia, 24 to Britain, and only 13 to China (Lone 2000, 17). The officers sent to Germany
after the War College tend to be “more brilliant” compared to those going to France (Butow 1961, 15).
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For their second and third years, they studied organization, mobilization, tactics, and road
march formations as well as reconnaissance, strategy, and history (Drea 2016, 50). Within
the College, just as in the cadet schools and Academy, European languages were preferred.199
Before the Russo-Japanese War, the College reorganized its curriculum to prepare officers
for large-unit commands (brigade and higher echelon) as Meckel had taught. Given the
importance of the College for the IJA, class rankings were critical for an officer’s future
assignments and promotions. Battlefield valor and practical experience also increasingly
became a more significant factor (Drea 2016, 60).
Overall, the College provided the ‘last’ classroom intellectual sharpening for IJA
officers. As Meckel was teaching at the College soon after it was established, many of
the foundational thinking of IJA officers who passed through the system reflected Prussian
strategic theories. Many officers were in a better position to understand, learn, and adapt
Meckel’s teachings because: (1) the promotion system put them in the best position to move
up the ranks, including going to the College in the first place, (2) the rigorous education
system from the cadet schools to Academy ensured that College students were the best the
IJA had to offer, and (3) the strong and prolonged strategic education at the College ensured
the students could keep up with Meckel. As College graduates further went to European
states and reached top IJA positions upon returning, the system also increased the value of
Western education.200 In turn, these officers in key positions were more likely to continue
promoting Western theories of victory and corporatism.
199 In 1885, out of 40 War College students, 25 studied French and 15 German(Lone 2000, 17).
200 Those who passed through the College often received accelerated promotion (Kennedy 1924, 134). More
than 70% of War College graduates from 1885 to 1911 became major generals (Cook 1987, 381). This figure
separately confirms my statistical analysis in the above.
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5.5 Conclusion
5.5.1 Summary of findings and arguments
The chapter explains why and how the Meiji military achieved a maximalist emulation within
a short period of time. I argue that this outcome is the result of the interaction between
two institutions during critical juncture: (1) the transmission pathway diffusing Western
theories of victory and corporatism through commercially-contracted training missions, and
(2) the military’s high-quality personnel infrastructure that facilitated the rise of Western
product champions and boosted the organization’s learning capacity. I examine qualitative
and quantitive data and offer several findings.
First, the Meiji military achieved a maximalist emulation by the Sino-Japanese (1893-
4) and Russo-Japanese (1904-5) Wars. Their theories of victory and corporatism reflected
those found among the most powerful Western militaries at the time. The IJA and IJN had
more than one single model to emulate but of those they adopted, they came close to the
original model (high faithfulness). The IJA’s theories of victory and corporatism, while ini-
tially developed over the French model, resembled those of the Germans. The role of Meckel
and the presence of the German school within the IJA facilitated the diffusion of German
theories of victory and corporatism. The IJA adopted Prussian-inspired theories of victory
(from strategic outlook, military planning to infantry doctrine) and corporatism (from a
division-based structure to monarchical militarism as the basis of civil-military relations).
Second, the absence of severe intra-military conflicts over military Westernization
before the critical juncture was an important critical antecedent. Most of the Meiji military
elite had agreed that some form of emulation was necessary. There were pre-Meiji precedents
that facilitated such elite convergence. These were: the presence of ‘Western studies’ or
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‘Dutch learning’ (rangaku); the limited military Westernization efforts of the shogunate and
the domains, particularly the use of commercially hired Western trainers; the rise of Satsuma
and Choshu, the most militarily Westernized domains in the Tokugawa era, facilitated the
role and influence of the Western product champions in the early Meiji era.
Third, the Meiji-era transmission of Western theories of victory and corporatism
was embedded within the broader commercial Westernization that Japan was engaging in.
This structured the commercial contracts and arrangements the Meiji armed forces made
with trainers and advisers from France, Germany, and Britain. The selective logic, the use
of hired foreigners as contractors, and the development of a ‘localization’ framework were
important facilitative properties that diffused Western theories of victory and corporatism.
Fourth, Western studies background was a significant predictor of whether IJA and
IJN officers retired as three or four-star generals or admirals. I ran six statistical models to
test different hypotheses and found that compared to other career markers, having a Western
studies background (education, training, or attache assignments) was a significant predictor
for a successful career. The analysis further shows that there were new career pathways for
Western-trained officers who became Western product champions as well. Roughly half of
the Meiji military elite had some form of Western studies background (three times more
than the Indonesian military in chapter 4). Germany, England, and France were the top
providers (almost 60%) of professional education and training.
Fiinally, the institutionalized career management allowed Western-trained officers to
collaborate with Western trainers to drive the military Westernization process. Western-
trained officers were, after all, rewarded and promoted to key positions. The centrality of
education and training as professional qualifications—and the fact that the Academy and
War College emphasized military sciences, competitive examinations, and academic focus—
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boosted the organization’s learning capacity. When foreign trainers worked with Western-
trained officers, the broader student body and officer corps were capable of understanding
and adopting Western theories of victory and corporatism.
5.5.2 Alternative explanations
Chapter 2 provides alternative arguments. The first set of arguments draws from the neo-
realist literature and claims that international anarchy drives them to emulate the best
military practices of others. This argument partially explains Japan’s motivation to engage
in military Westernization. While the neo-realists could explain the motivation for military
emulation in the 1890s, it cannot account for how domestic threats shape the early Meiji
leaders’ Westernization efforts. Compared to the commercial model I develop, the neo-realist
argument is not better at explaining why and how Japan achieved a maximalist emulation.
The second set of arguments, associated with security constructivists, focuses on
trans-national military norms and claim that emulation is a function of concerns over social
legitimacy. This could either lead to the emulation of the ‘most popular’ or the ‘best suited’
model that fits pre-existing norms and values. This argument perhaps provides the strongest
challenge to my commercial model. As we see above, the IJA’s ability to adopt Prusso-
German theories of victory appeared to have been based in part by shared cultural (e.g.
militarism) and political (e.g. monarchical absolutism) affinities. French republican values
may have also been a less suitable match for Japan’s samurai-driven organizational values.
But the norms argument is under-specified. A cultural match in itself cannot explain
the diffusion of Western theories of victory and corporatism to Japan. The intra-military
power dynamics shaped the parameters under which some norms become localized or in-
stitutionalized. My commercial model further specifies how norms transplantation occurs.
358
My model accounts for intra-military power politics, the role of personnel infrastructure,
and the facilitative diffusion properties underpinning norms localization. In this sense, the
constructivist argument does not provide a better explanation than my commercial model.
The third set of arguments focuses on unit-level variables, from regime type to state
extraction capacity and bureaucratic politics. In short, emulation is more likely when states
and their militaries have the necessary capacity to adopt foreign systems. My argument
complements these unit-level arguments; my commercial model specifically contributes to
the organizational capacity literature. But my model focuses on operationalizing personnel
infrastructure, rather than material resources, as way to measure ‘organizational capacity’. It
underscores the importance of intra-military power dynamics and institutionalized policies
pertaining to career management and education. In this sense, I provide an alternative
argument to the organizational capacity literature.
But unit-level arguments tend to take the method of diffusion for granted. The focus
on the emulator’s logic and characteristics (e.g. regime type or state capacity) ignores the
manner through which potential emulators receive knowledge about new theories of victory
and corporatism. My model shows the interaction between the transmission pathway with
the military’s personnel infrastructure in producing emulation outcomes. Extant unit-level
arguments do not account for the transmission pathways and thus only provide partial expla-
nations for military emulation—they maybe necessary but not always sufficient. The inter-
action of two institutions—transmission pathway and personnel infrastructure—my model
outlines provides a necessary and sufficient condition to explain military emulation. Over-




6.1 Overview and key findings
The dissertation seeks to explain why and how some militaries are better than others at
emulating the organizational system and doctrinal concepts of others. It proposes a new
institutional theory outlining middle-range causal mechanisms that lead to different military
emulation outcomes. To assess the analytical utility of the theory, I provide a systematic
and methodologically-conscious plausibility probe through comparative process tracing. The
research design combines within-case analyses and a cross-case comparison of Cold War
Indonesia (1950–1991) and Meiji Japan (1868–1912). I examine and integrate qualitative
(archival material, organizational documents, and secondary sources) and quantitative (two
original officer-level datasets) data. The dissertation consists of four primary chapters.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the extant literature on social diffusion in general and
military diffusion in particular. It also provides a multi-level structural and a taxonomic
concept analysis on the term ‘military diffusion’ and ‘military emulation’. Drawing from
the literature review and concept analyses, I define military diffusion as the process through
which military knowledge, concepts, or ideas are transmitted from one polity to another.
Military emulation, I argue, is the outcome of the diffusion process: the observable changes
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to one military’s organization, operational methods, or doctrine resulting from the imitation
of another military’s organization, operational methods, or doctrine. I also formulate theo-
ries of victory and corporatism as the conceptual containers for the military knowledge or
ideas transmitted from the model to the emulator. The theory of corporatism captures the
essence of how the internal institutions of the military and their raison d’tres are designed,
maintained, and defended in their relationship with the state and society. The theory of
victory focuses on what the next mission or war a military needs to fight and how to win.
Taken together, the extent to which these theories are replaced or supplanted should tell us
the extent of organization-wide military emulation.
To explain military emulation, chapter 3 develops a nested argument consisting of:
(1) a power-based institutional framework; (2) a theory based on the interaction between the
transmission pathway diffusing new theories of victory and corporatism and the emulator’s
personnel infrastructure; and (3) two transmission models—cooperative and commercial—
that specify how the interaction of those two institutions leads to variations in military
emulation. These components are nested in and operationalized with one another. The
framework explains how the power dynamics between groups competing for resources and
control shapes the interplay between formal and informal institutions. As the power dynam-
ics reproduces institutions, they place the organization on a path-dependent trajectory. The
salient power dynamics initially emerges during critical junctures and are driven by critical
antecedents. I argue that the level of intra-military conflict over military Westernization is
an important critical antecedent condition.
The theory argues that the interaction between the transmission pathway and the
emulator’s personnel infrastructure explains the variation of military emulation. The former
provides the ‘supply’ of information on new theories of victory and corporatism and the
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latter determines whether officers could understand and adopt them. As embodiments of the
donor-emulator relationship, some pathways have more accelerative properties than others.
The cooperative transmission is more inhibitive than the commercial. Meanwhile, the higher
the quality of its personnel infrastructure, the more likely a military would be receptive to
new theories of victory and corporatism. Thus, a maximalist emulation is more likely in a
commercial transmission and when the emulator has a high-quality personnel infrastructure.
A minimalist emulation is more likely in a cooperative transmission and when the emulator
has a low-quality personnel infrastructure. The two transmission models operationalize this
theory and guide the empirical analysis.
Chapter 4 applies and provides a plausibility probe for the cooperative model by
explaining why and how the Indonesian military did not become ‘Americanized’ by the
end of the Cold War, despite employing thousands of US-trained officers. It shows the
diffusion of US theories of victory and corporatism was hindered by: (1) the contradictory and
contending interests from both the US (model) and Indonesia (emulator), (2) the paramount
importance of bilateral goals at the expense of emulation-related goals, and (3) the lack of
ownership from Indonesia as the emulator of the diffusion process. Washington viewed
military education and training aid as a political tool to combat communism rather than a
method to modernize the Indonesian military over its own image. The lack of appropriate
tools to measure the organizational effects of US military education and training assistance
exacerbated the problem.
Statistical analyses of the Indonesian Army’s career patterns show there was no strong
correlation between a ‘professional’ career trajectory and successful retirement. Indeed, only
around 16% of 677 Indonesian Army generals had some form of US education or train-
ing. The regression analyses suggest informal institutions like patronage may have allowed
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some officers to spend more time overseas, which in turn, was significantly correlated with
a successful career. Meanwhile, the military’s learning capacity was of low quality. Its edu-
cational institutions focused on ideological coherence and non-military duties while officers
valued higher-level education like staff colleges for its political and patronage effects, rather
than for their intellectual development.
Taken together, the interaction between the inhibitive properties of the US-Indonesia
cooperative transmission with the Indonesian military’s low-quality personnel infrastructure
during the critical juncture (1960s to 1970s) led to a path-dependent minimalist emula-
tion. The intense intra-military conflicts over military Westernization in the 1940s and
1950s became the critical antecedent that shaped and shoved this interaction. The con-
flicts were fought between a small-number but professionally-trained Dutch-trained officers
and the more numerous Japanese-trained officers who were also influential local figures.
Consequently, we see the doctrinal stagnation the 1960s and the limited and inconsistent ap-
plication of some elements of US theories of victory in military’s major operations. The lack
of fundamental changes across the Indonesian military organization based on US theories of
victory and corporatism indicate it achieved only a minimalist emulation.
Finally, chapter 5 applies and provides a plausibility probe for the commercial model
by explaining why and how the Imperial Japanese armed forces could transition from a
feudal-era structure to a world-class military power within a few decades. It shows the
commercial contracts Meiji leaders signed with individual Western military trainers allowed
the armed forces to: (1) maintain control and agency of the diffusion process, (2) obtain
the best ideas offered by the market based on specific requirements, and (3) ‘localize’ the
diffusion process as ‘ownership’ of the activities grew, ensuring that (4) there was coherence
and consistency in the diffusible theories of victory and corporatism. Japan’s contracts with
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French, German, and British military trainers—based on templates partly derived from the
Tokugawa-era experience and partly from the broader Meiji-era commercial Westernization—
provided a targeted and rapid means to diffuse Western theories of victory and corporatism.
The process was further facilitated by Japan’s well-developed and institutionalized
career management as well as education and training systems. The relatively stable per-
sonnel infrastructure since the 1880s ensured that formal, professional, merit-based systems
created successful career pathways for Western-trained officers, which then became West-
ern product champions. The statistical analyses of the Meiji elite officers’ career patterns
show that, compared to other career markers like domain affiliation, Western studies back-
ground was a significant predictor of whether they will retire as three or four-star generals
and admirals. In total, roughly half of the Meiji military elite had some form of Western
studies background (roughly three times more than the Indonesian military). The centrality
of education and training as professional qualifications—and the fact that the Academy and
War College emphasized military sciences, competitive examinations, and academic focus—
helped facilitate the organization’s learning capacity. When foreign trainers worked with
Western-trained officers and product champions, the broader officer corps was capable of
understanding and adopting Western theories of victory and corporatism.
Taken together, the interaction between the accelerative properties of the commercial
transmission with the Imperial Japanese forces’ high-quality personnel infrastructure during
the critical juncture (1870s to 1890s) led to a path-dependent maximalist emulation. The ab-
sence of intra-military conflicts over military Westernization became the critical antecedent
that shaped and shoved this interaction. There were historical precedents — conceptual,
practical, political, and organizational — that facilitated the elite consensus over military
Westernization. Consequently, we see the extensive use German and British theories of vic-
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tory and corporatism within the IJA and IJN, respectively, by the Sino-Japanese (1893–1894)
and Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) wars. The organization-wide changes, from strategic out-
look to infantry tactics, based on Western theories of victory and corporatism demonstrates
Meiji Japan’s maximalist emulation.
The analysis presented in these four core chapters suggests that my new institutional
theory of military emulation is sufficiently plausible and valid to explain the empirical puzzles
of Cold War Indonesia and Meiji Japan relatively well. My theory therefore merits further
testing using different data and methods. As an added measure to the methodological plau-
sibility probe, I consider how well my transmission model hold up against the alternative
explanations—the neo-realist, security constructivist, and unit-level theories. In general,
my models complement and could contribute to the better specifications of these theories.
While the neo-realist argument provides a partial explanation to why states engage in mili-
tary Westernization, my models provide the mechanisms through which the process may lead
to different emulation outcomes. The arguments of security constructivists based on social
legitimacy and cultural match were also under-specified as they ignore the power dynamics
between the donor and the recipient as well as between competing groups within the emu-
lator’s military. Finally, domestic or unit-level arguments focus too much on the emulator
at the expense of the relationship between the model and the emulator. My transmission
pathway element rectifies this problem.
6.2 Contributions and broader implications
Aside from the successful plausibility probe of my institutional theory of military emulation,
there are broader contributions and implications from this dissertation.
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6.2.1 Methodological
This dissertation does not provide or propose new methodological tools to be further tested.
I certainly do not pretend to propose path-breaking qualitative or quantitative techniques.
But as I try to address the multitude of challenges in explaining a real-world puzzle and
policy problem not easily located with the established research programs in political science,
I employ a few unconventional but methodologically-conscious solutions that might be worth
revisiting in the future. These solutions seem particularly useful for under-developed research
programs that do not sit well within an established literature or discipline.
First, I provide a systematic concept analysis as a way to both clarify the conceptual
ambiguities within the literature that examines military diffusion and emulation and provide
a baseline measure to check whether we have truly general or simply partial theories of mil-
itary diffusion. I apply the multi-level structural analysis Goertz (2006) develops to unpack
the term ‘military diffusion’ and clarify the conflation between process and outcome that
plagues the diffusion studies literature. Far too often, concept analysis is provided as part
of our graduate training but scholars rarely apply it in their substantive work. Indeed, there
are very few studies applying systematic concept analysis to examine an under-developed
research program. Among the best scholarly works that engage in concept analysis, the
focus has been on well-established research programs like classifying democracies (Collier
and Levitsky 1997; Collier and Adcock 1999). Others focused on refining central concepts in
comparative politics (Collier and Mahon 1993), rather than demonstrating how a systematic
concept analysis could be “put to work” in practical research or theory development. Sys-
tematic concept analysis should be among the first tasks scholars engage in when working
within an under-developed research program. One should not wait until the research pro-
gram has become too large and unwieldy with different scholars proposing different theories
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to explain different outcomes. In other words, we should not wait until an important research
program becomes too theoretically messy before we engage in concept analysis.
Second, as I propose a new and untested theory of military emulation, I provide
a systematic plausibility probe research design. As Levy (2008) notes, political scientists
often employ the term ‘plausibility probe’ loosely for their exploratory or illustrative case
studies. This practice makes it seem that plausibility probes are simply “cop-outs” when
qualitative-oriented scholars examine case studies. I hope to elevate the utility of plausibility
probes by grounding the design not just in well-established tool kits like process tracing
or comparative-historical analysis, but also within deeper ontological and epistemological
foundations. I provide a coherent sequence from ontological choices to theory and empirical
examination. By “elevating” plausibility probes in this manner, I demonstrate that the
verdict “the new theory deserves further testing because it is plausible and valid” is not
based on some loosely-defined benchmark. A strong plausibility probe research design, in
my view, is preferable to a weak hypothesis testing exercise.
Finally, as far multi-method strategy of inquiry is concerned, my empirical research
design departs from the conventional nested analysis that integrates qualitative and quan-
titative data. Rather than following either the regression-based or case study-based nested
analysis where the tools drive the research design, I employ what I call a mechanism-based
nested analysis. In this design, different parts of the causal mechanism may employ different
data (qualitative or quantitative) to verify the strength of each step within the overall chain.
This allows us to combine two or more methods to support a single, unified causal infer-
ence. This design of course assumes that one is interested in causal mechanisms. I concede
that the mechanism-based design is not fully developed and tested. But I try to ground
its foundation within the recent advances of multi-method inquiry as much as possible and
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demonstrate its utility by applying it to my within-case analyses. The larger point here is
that more work needs to be done to develop practical templates of multi-method inquiry
that do not constrain our research by letting the tools drive the research design. Instead,
if we truly believe that our research puzzle should drive our research enterprise than the
proposed theory or mechanism should drive the empirical research design.
6.2.2 Theoretical
This dissertation proposes a new theory of military emulation and provides a preliminary
but systematic plausibility probe to assess its analytical purchase. While I do not provide
a direct or exhaustive test of the theory against contending explanations, I provide a brief
discussion of how well the theory holds up against the extant literature in the conclusion
of each empirical chapters. The analysis suggests that the alternative explanations are less
“contending” in that they are under-specified and under-developed compared to my theory.
Put it simply, the extant literature only provides partial theories of military diffusion and
emulation. As the concept analysis demonstrates, a full general theory of military diffusion
should account for the diffusible item, diffusion medium, and diffusion outcome (emulation).
The neo-realist literature provides a good explanation for the stimulus or reasons to engage
in military Westernization in the first place but is largely silent or under-specified when it
comes to the diffusion medium or diffusible item. The security constructivist provides a good
account of one of the key diffusion mediums but largely silent on the diffusible item. The
domestic unit-level theories are essentially an umbrella framework for a variety of possible
“filters” of the diffusion medium and outcomes.
Taken together, my institutional theory provides a more complete explanation for
military diffusion because it accounts for all the constitutive elements of what ‘diffusion’
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is. It does not overturn alternative explanations and instead complements them, especially
the unit-level theories. My personnel infrastructure arguments, for example, contributes to
the growing literature highlighting the role of organizational capacity in predicting military
innovation and emulation. More broadly, my nested argument draws from a variety of
research programs in social science to develop a theory of military diffusion. I also explicitly
design my theory around middle-range causal mechanisms. In other words, it brings concepts
and arguments to the international security field that is traditionally skewed towards military
history and heavily shaped by paradigmatic grand theories of International Relations.
More specifically, my theoretical analysis contributes to broader debates over the na-
ture and mechanisms of military change. For one thing, by highlighting the contingent nature
of power dynamics and institutional development as well as the agency of the emulator, I try
to address some of the ‘pro-innovation’ and ‘Western-centric’ biases in the literature. There
was nothing inherently or absolutely ‘superior’ in Western theories of victory and corpo-
ratism that Asian militaries should adopt. When and how they chose to engage in military
Westernization—and their success or failure—depends on a wide range of contingent factors
and historical legacies. For another, I complement existing theoretical arguments seeking
to explain military change. Military emulation and Westernization provide different scope
conditions and mechanisms that could illuminate why and how militaries change in general.
My theoretical analysis also speaks to broader questions surrounding the generation
of military power. While emulation may seem like the quickest and easiest way to generate
military power, the processes leading up to it are highly contingent. A successful emulation
also does not guarantee victory in battle. A maximalist emulation is perhaps be the best out-
come to achieve if one wants to get closer to generating combat effectiveness against a more
advanced or superior enemy. But the specific conditions under which a successful emulation
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transpires are generally rare. The nature of transmission and the personnel infrastructure
required are often more subtle and complex than what policymakers envision. Acquiring
and reverse-engineering sophisticated weapons is certainly insufficient in this regard. The
discussion also underscores the importance of fully understanding the nature of operational
challenges that emulator’s face. Adopting an externally-oriented offensive posture, for ex-
ample, would be incongruent for a military faced with constant internal security challenges.
Furthermore, the relationship between emulation and combat outcomes is also contingent on
numerous variables that are both unique to the emulator as well as to the relationship with
the ‘enemy’. In short, emulation may seem simple but it is never easy.
Finally, my arguments contributes to the understanding of power dynamics behind
norms transplantation and organizational change. The analyses show, for example, that
any effective effort to socialize a non-Western military with Western theories of victory and
corporatism—i.e. a transmission effort—ultimately depends on the agency of the emulator.
The more empowered the emulator feels in managing the transmission process, and the
more ‘buy-in’ the military could get from the officer corps as foreign-trained officers return,
the more likely we will see a successful emulation outcome. The centrality of personnel
infrastructure—in terms of career management and education system—also contributes to
the small, but growing research on ‘micro military politics’ within the security and strategic
studies literature. Overall, I try to bring “power back in” into the discussion of norms
diffusion and organizational change.
6.2.3 Empirical
I want to first note the importance of a conceptual organization-wide change rather than
the adoption of military technology in the process of military Westernization. While I do
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not focus on technological diffusion, it is worth noting that the Meiji government’s arms
localization requirements facilitated the employment of Western trainers and the expansion
of overseas students programs. These developments, in turn, facilitated the diffusion of
Western theories of victory and corporatism. Among the earlier problems of capability
development in the Meiji era was the lack of standardization in arms and equipment as well
as the reliance on foreign suppliers amidst language and financial difficulties (Smith 1976,
14). These challenges were legacies of the Tokugawa who haphazardly acquired all kinds of
firearms they could get their hands on.1 By the early Meiji era, weapons import—alongside
the foreign experts to operate them—became widespread as arms production and military
ship-building grew.2 Overall, the Meiji Japan case suggests how technological diffusion
eventually facilitated conceptual diffusion. But in and of themselves, arms import from the
West did not fundamentally help Japan won the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars
nor did it cause the maximalist emulation outcome.
Conversely for the Indonesia case, arms transfer from the US did not facilitate the
diffusion of US theories of victory and corporatism. US arms assistance in that era (1)
was deliberately ‘minimized’ so as not to enhance external military capabilities, (2) focused
instead on defensive arms and equipment to assist with domestic security threats and lo-
cal development, (3) avoided giving sophisticated lethal weaponry in large scale, (4) and
encouraged the diversity of suppliers. Some in Washington thought that the US should
be the primary supplier to prevent Soviet domination.3 But others argued that providing
1 In the 19th century arms market, Western countries were eager to dispose of their old smoothbore
flintlocks, for example, as they continually engage in technological innovation. By the 1850s, some in Japan
were aware that they were getting obsolete goods and that newer, better weapons like the Minie riffle were
available in the market. See details in Totman (1980, 25).
2 By the 1870s, about 18% of Japanese warships were domestically produced (with 52% being British
and 22% American-built) (Krause 1995, 69).
3 This was the National Security Council’s position since 1955, for example. U.S. Policy on Indonesia,
National Security Council Report, May 3, 1955, 9, Digital National Security Archives, Presidential directives
on national security. Part I. From Truman to Clinton.
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what Jakarta wanted would have been wasteful as it did not have the capacity to absorb
sophisticated weaponry.4 In this view, supporting a full-fledged modernization would have
led to either the provision of “modern equipment too soon and watch it become quickly un-
serviceable” or “hundreds of American trainers and advisers”.5 Both of these were deemed
untenable. Many were also concerned that conventional modernization would encourage
Jakarta’s regional ambitions. The solution was to provide either the tools and equipment
for domestic needs or the occasional ‘status items’.6 The US, for example, was willing to
provide military aid for internal security, civic action, and economic development projects.7
Even after the arrival of the New Order, the US did not prioritize large-scale transfers of
sophisticated weaponry. According to one senior official,
“It was our aim to strengthen the Indonesian government’s emphasis on internal
economic reform and encourage the Armed Forces to use their manpower for the
rehabilitation of the country’s sadly deteriorated roads, ports, and irrigation sys-
tems. We also bore in mind that Indonesia had received from Eastern European
sources sufficient combat equipment to meet its internal security needs. Finally,
we felt that the military’s concentration on civil tasks would help allay certain
fears on the part of Indonesia’s smaller neighbors, who had fresh memories of the
hostile confrontation of the Sukarno regime.”8
4 Even in the post-1965 era, US officials believed that the Indonesian military could not absorb the
already limited US arms and equipment without significant improvement in logistics and management. See
Embassy Telegram from Jakarta to Secretary of State, Follow-Up on President’s Talks with Suharto, Top
Secret, June 8, 1970. Digital National Security Archives Collection, Vietnam War II, 1969–1975.
5 See Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 10, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol.
20, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, 676. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-76v20/d311 (last accessed on March 2, 2017).
6 These status items, include, for example, several new patrol gunboats, PGMs, and amphibious crafts
for the Navy and a few T-37 jet trainers for the Air Force. See Plan of Action for Indonesia: Response to
NSAM 179, Secret, Department of State, dated October 8, 1962, 13, Enclosure 11. Digital National Security
Archives collection; Presidential Directives.
7 Some US officials thought this could be accomplished by providing arms and equipment for a lightly
armed, mobile, and possibly smaller army, expanding the police, providing additional patrol crafts, and
others. See Draft repot on Indonesia for the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee, The Presidents Com-
mittee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee), Privileged Information,
February 27, 1959, 2. Edward G. Lansdale Papers, Box No. 42, Hoover Institution Archives.
8 Statement by Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 30, 1970, 17. Marshall Green Papers, Box No. 5, Hoover
Institution Archives
372
Figure 6.1: Foreign supplier of Indonesian arms (1950–1990)
Source: Author calculation based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Trans-
fer Database (generated May 1, 2016)
Note: The Non-US Western states include Australia, Canada, France, West Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Israel,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Malaysia. The non-Soviet Eastern states include Poland,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.
Indonesia consequently diversified its arms import portfolio for much of the Cold War.
As Nasution explained, “After having failed to get heavy military aid from the West, we went
to the East. The Western Bloc countries won’t give us destroyers and submarines, while the
Eastern bloc is prepared to do so. It [was] a logical issue and [not a] cold war issue.” (cited
in Mrázek 1978b, 60). By the 1970s and 1980s, Jakarta had more than 15 different foreign
arms supplier.9 Figure 6.1 above depicts Indonesia’s arms supplier diversity.
This brief analysis suggests the empirical conditions under which an arms import
could have facilitatef broader organization-wide emulation were absent in Cold War Indone-
9 See details in Indonesia: New Focus on External Security Threats, Intelligence Assessment, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Secret, September 1982, 4, General CIA Records. Available at CIA Freedom
of Information Act Electronic Reading Room https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/
cia-rdp03t02547r000100930001-9 (last accessed January 3, 2018).
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sia. The Indonesian military had a ‘hodgepodge’ structure of imported arms with different
design features, reliability, and sustainability. But as the US never became the single domi-
nant supplier, the military never felt the urgency to adopt an organization-wide set of reforms
to emulate US theory of victory. Because there would be different groups trained to operate
different arms and equipment, there was no incentive to create new career pathways for a
single-country foreign-trained officers. Overall, the Cold War Indonesia and Meiji Japan
cases suggest military technology alone was not critical for the diffusion of Western theories
of victory and corporatism.
The findings in chapter 4 also challenge several conventional wisdoms in the study
of Indonesian politics, particularly about the US influence on the military. The influence
appear to be limited to a few combat arms at a particular moment and was not absolute (in
that there were no other foreign models that shaped the organization). The brief analysis of
US arms transfer above also suggests the US did not support Indonesia’s conventional mod-
ernization drive and gave less than what was requested. This has long-term implications for
the Indonesian military today. Similarly, the military’s low-quality personnel infrastructure
that started during the 1950s persisted. The strong role of informal institutions, the constant
organizational tinkering, and the almost cyclical promotional logjams can still be observed
today. Meanwhile, chapter 5 contributes to the rich literature on Japan’s Meiji Restoration.
Many of the existing literature focuses on Japan’s modernization more broadly. But there
are few studies that examine the processes under which military Westernization transpired.
My focus on understanding the intra-military power dynamics and the statistical analyses
of the career patterns of the officer corps enriches our understanding of the evolution of
Imperial Japanese forces before World War 2.
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6.2.4 Policy
My empirical findings suggest several steps potential emulators should consider. Aside from
having the material resources and political will to engage in military Westernization in the
first place, a potential emulator should also first prepare the military personnel infrastructure.
The centrality of a well-developed and institutionalized career management and education
system may seem less pressing compared to arms procurements. But without a professional
officer corps to manage or operate new arms, technological modernization is rarely sufficient
to generate a sustainable military power. The Meiji Japan case also suggests the importance
of developing a localization framework to ensure that organizational stakeholders and power-
holders could claim ownership of foreign (Western) theories of victory and corporatism. In
this regard, how similar the emulation outcome is to the original model is less relevant than
to the extent to which military leaders could claim the ’new’ doctrines as their ‘product’.
More broadly, the analysis contribute to broader policy debates over the promises
and pitfalls of contemporary military assistance programs. Military emulation is, of course,
not the only outcome by which we should measure the successes or failures of education
and training assistance programs. Policymakers in Western countries, for example, may
have broader political or strategic outcomes in mind (e.g. democracy promotion) or they
may simply have short-term goals (e.g. collaboration in counter-terrorism). But ultimately,
emulation-related goals are the ultimate benchmark if we are to understand the broader
organizational effects of such programs. Donors like NATO and the US, should be clear in
expressing their goals and consider ways to help recipients ‘localize’ and take ‘ownership’ of
the diffusion processes. Without the emulator having agency and taking ownership of the
process, efforts to ‘remodel’ partner militaries are unlikely to be sustainable. For that matter,
donors should also invest tailoring its transmission methods to better suit the recipients,
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rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all benchmark.
The comparison between Indonesia and Japan also suggests we should not expect a
maximalist emulation in a cooperative transmission fraught with structural challenges. This
helps us manage our policy expectations when providing military education and training
assistance. For a successful diffusion in a cooperative transmission to transpire, we need
to ensure that the challenges on both the donor (model) and recipient (emulator) sides are
addressed. The donor should provide consistency and coherence in providing military educa-
tion programs or activities, preferably backed by a systematic and appropriate measurement
framework. The donor should also prioritize military-related goals rather than bilateral ones.
Finally, the donor should better engage the recipient to understand what it needs, rather
than imposing upon them what the donor thinks the recipients should have.
The recipient meanwhile should focus on long-term plans to improve its personnel
infrastructure above anything else before engaging in the transmission process of a new
war-fighting concept. The institutionalization of career management as well as education
and training are central to the organization’s capacity to emulate. As these areas require
long-term policy development, the military should strive to eliminate informal institutions
such as patronage if it hopes to stabilize its officers’ career expectations. The high command
should also focus on building formal procedures for learning and prevent the decentralization
of training and education. Finally, the recipient should separate intra-military dynamics and
civil-military dynamics to avoid the politicization of organizational development policies.
Finally, they contribute to the understanding of various empirical puzzles surround-
ing Asian military development and strategic history. Japan’s case is not unique as other
Asian militaries have tried to commercial import their military power as well, from China,
Singapore to Thailand. Indonesia is also not unique as various Asian militaries have engaged
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in bilateral cooperative military arrangements to transfer Western arms and theories of vic-
tory and corporatism, from South Korea to Australia. Some of the puzzles are historically
related to the processes of colonization and decolonization. Unfortunately, the dissertation
does not discuss the coercive methods of diffusion through colonialism. India, Pakistan, and
others would have provided a better understanding of the challenges associated with coercive
diffusion. Nonetheless, my findings seek to enrich the small but growing number of studies
that examines Asian military history and development.
6.3 Limitations and future research
The dissertation suffers from several limitations that future research could address. First
of all, the within-case analysis did not employ systematic process-tracing tests to examine
competing explanations at the same time. I try as much as possible to focus on demon-
strating the analytical utility of my nested argument and discuss the overall claims vis-a-vis
existing theories. But as I focus on mid-level mechanisms, the process tracing tests were
harder to apply. Furthermore, the existing theories were not on the same level of conceptual
development as my nested argument. A tit-for-tat process tracing test would be difficult,
for example, when the neo-realist argument only provides the motivation for Westernization
but not the methods to do so. Future research should develop micro-level mechanisms to
test against competing explanations.
Second, the comparison of two cases and their within-case mechanism may not have
strong external validity. The empirical analyses provide a preliminary support for my nested
argument because they explain Cold War Indonesia and Meiji Japan well. It is unclear
how my argument would explain other cases beyond these two. Future research should
consider how the nested argument and models could explain other cases, whether in Asia,
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Africa, or Latin America. Military emulation and Westernization, after all, is not a unique
phenomenon. It is also worthwhile to consider creating a new variable of ‘military emulation
variation’ to test in existing datasets tracking wars across history like the Correlates of
War data. Military emulation may or may not have significant effects for various battle or
combat-related outcomes.
Third, aside from the testing of different theoretical explanations of military emula-
tion, it is also worth examining contending empirical explanations to the puzzles of Cold War
Indonesia and Meiji Japan. There might be other case-specific empirical explanations for the
Indonesian military’s minimalist emulation and Japan’s maximalist emulation. My use of
the cooperative and commercial models were aligned with my research goals of providing a
plausibility probe. But historians of Indonesia and Japan might be able to offer more precise
and nuanced, even if less theoretical, explanations to the empirical puzzles. This problem
highlights the broader tension between historically-informed political science research and
historical work in general.
Finally, the research relies on English-language sources (for Japan) and information
on high-profile officers. There are inherent selection biases to the data in this regard. While
the limitations to the officer-level dataset is inevitable and perhaps methodologically jus-
tifiable given the theoretical goals, the lack of Japanese sources is harder to defend. It is
likely that Japanese-language sources on the Meiji era military Westernization provide more
nuanced assessments of the process than English-language sources. In the future, it would be
worthwhile considering various options to get access to Japanese-language sources. Overall,
the sample for both the Indonesian and Japanese officer-level data could be improved and
expanded. As they stand now, the datasets give us relatively good estimations of the career
patterns but the representativeness of the samples leave quite a bit to be desired.
Appendix A
Senior IJA officers with Western-studies background (selected)
Name Last rank Key positions
Yamagata Aritomo Field Marshal Army & War Minister, Chief of General Staff, Home
Minister, Prime Minister, Justice Minister, Privy
Council President
Oyama Iwao Field Marshal 2nd Army Commander, War Minister, Chief of Gen-
eral Staff, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal
Nozu Michitsura Field Marshal Inspector General of Military Education, Imperial
Guard Commander, 4th Army Commander, House
of Peers Member
Kan’in Kotohito Field Marshal 1st Division Commander, Supreme War Councilor,
Chief of Army General Staff
Terauchi Hisaichi Field Marshal Army Minister, Japanese Taiwan Army Comman-
der, Southern Expeditionary Army Group Com-
mander
Hata Shunroku Field Marshal Inspector General of Military Education, Comman-
der, China Expeditionary Army, Army Minister
Uehara Yusaku Field Marshal Army Minister, Army General Staff Chief, Inspector
General of Military Training
Hasegawa Yoshimichi Field Marshal Army General Staff Chief, Korea Governor General
Katsura Taro General Army Minister, Prime Minister, Taiwan Governor
General, Ministers of: Education, Home Affairs, Fi-
nance, Lord Keeper of Privy Seal
Kawakami Soroku General Chief, Army General Staff
Kodama Gentaro General Head, Army War College, Chief of General Staff,
Governor General of Taiwan, Ministers of: Army,
Home Affairs, Education
Nogi Maresuke General 3rd Division Commander, Governor-General of Tai-
wan, 3rd Army Commander
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Tanaka Giichi General Director, Military Affairs Bureau, Army Minister,
Prime Minister and Ministers of: Foreign Affairs,
Home Affairs, Colonial Affairs
Tatsumi, Naofumi General Head, Army War College, Commander, Taiwan
Army
Inoue Hikaru General Commander, 4th Division
Akiyama Yoshifuru General Imperial Guard Commander, Inspector General of
Military Education
Kamio Mitsuomi General Tsingtao Governor General, Commander, 18th Di-
vision
MatsukawaToshitane General Korean Army Commander, Supreme War Council
Kuroda Kiyotaka Lt. General Director, Hokkaido Colonization Office, Prime Min-
ister, Minister of Agriculture & Commerce
Soga Sukenori Lt. General Vice Chief, General Staff, Commander, Osaka Gar-
rison
Yukihiko Kusunose Lt. General Army Minister, Yura Fortress Commander
Kigoshi Yasutsuna Lt. General Army Minister, Commander, 6th Division, House of
Peers Member
Ijichi Suekiyo Maj. General Yura Fortress Commander
Tsunoda Koreshige Maj. General 11th Infantry Brigade Commander, Diet Member
Mizoguchi Naosuke Maj. General 3rd Heavy Field Artillery Commander, Diet Mem-
ber
Appendix B
Primary and archival sources
B.1 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
Records consulted
Office of the Chief of Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, RG 334, Records of
Interservice Agencies, Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box No. 2,
Entry 115.
Military Technical Advisory Group, RG 334, Records of Interservice Agencies, Security
Classified, Historical Reports, 1963-65. Box 1, Entry 114.; Box 2, Entry 115.
Military Technical Advisory Group, Indonesia, RG 334 Records of Interservice Agencies,
Security Classified, General Correspondence, 1958-65, Box No. 2, Entry 115
Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Central Decimal File 1957. Box No. 5;
Box No. 7.
Records of the United States Army, Pacific, RG 550, Classified Organizational History Files.
Box No. 175; Box No. 308.
Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, Geographic File 1948–50, Box No. 28.
General Records of the Department of State, RG 59 , Box No. 1.
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B.2 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)
Records consulted
FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1976).
FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 17, Indonesia (online)
FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. 17, edited by Robert J. McMahon and Glenn W. LaFantasie (Wash-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994)
FRUS 1961–1963, Vol. 23, Southeast Asia (online)
FRUS 1964–1968, Vol. 26, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines (online)
FRUS 1969–1976, Vol. 20, Southeast Asia (online)
B.3 Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University
Records consulted
Edward G. Lansdale Papers, Box No. 42.
Marshall Green Papers, Box No. 7; Box No. 5
B.4 National Security Archives
Records consulted
Digital National Security Archives Collection, Presidential directives on national security.
Part I. From Truman to Clinton
Digital National Security Archive Collection, Presidential directives on national security.
Part II. From Truman to George W. Bush.
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Digital National Security Archives Collection, Vietnam War II, 1969–1975
Kathy Kadane Indonesia Collection, Box No. 2
Kissinger Transcripts, 1968–1977, Digital National Security Archives Collection
B.5 Other primary sources on US foreign policy
Records consulted
Hearings on H.R. 5490, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th
Congress, 1st Session, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, May 13, 1963 (Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1963)
Intelligence Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, Secret, September 1982, General CIA
Records (via CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room)
The White House Conversation Memorandum, July 10, 1970. Library of Congress Collection
(via CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room)
B.6 Indonesian military documents
Records consulted
Buku Petunjuk Dasar tentang Pembinaan Prajurit ABRI [Basic Guidebook on ABRI Soldier
Management], Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Surat Keputusan
Panglima ABRI (PANGAB) No. Kep/06/X/1991, dated October 5, 1991.
Buku Induk Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI Tri Ubaya Cakti [Principal Book of TNI Fighting
Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti], Departemen Angkatan Darat, April 1965
Buku Induk Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI–AD Tri Ubaya Cakti [Principal Book of TNI Fighting
Doctrine Tri Ubaya Cakti], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, December 1966,
Second Printing.
Doktrin Perang Wilajah [Doctrine of Territorial Warfare], Departemen Angkatan Darat,
Sekolah Staf dan Komando, March 1962.
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Karya Juang SESKOAD, 1990 - 2015 [SESKOAD Fighting Products], Markas Besar Angkatan
Darat. Bandung: Sekolah Staf and Komando, 2015.
Petunjuk Operasi Gabungan ABRI tentang Koordinasi Bantuan Tembakan antar Angkatan
[ABRI Joint Operations Guidelines for Inter-Service Fire Support Coordination], Surat
Keputusan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata No. SKEP/265/V/1985, 15 Mei 1985, Markas
Besar, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
Petunjuk Operasi Gabungan ABRI tentang Staf Gabungan [ABRI Joint Operations Guide-
lines on Joint Staff], Surat Keputusan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata No. SKEP/265/V/1985,
Mei 15, 1985, Markas Besar, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia.
Pokok-pokok Pikiran tentang Kebijaksanaan dan Strategi Pertahanan Keamanan Negara
[Fundamentals of State Defense Strategy and Policy], 1989–1993. Jakarta: Departemen
Pertahanan dan Keamanan, 1988.
Sejarah Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata RI [History of the Academy of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia], Book 1 (1945 –1971). Jakarta: Markas Komando AKABRI,
1993.
Sejarah Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata RI [History of the Academy of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Indonesia], Book 2 (1972 –1993). Jakarta: Markas Komando AKABRI,
1994.
Sejarah TNI [TNI History] Vols. 1–4. Jakarta: TNI History Tradition Center, 2000
Sejarah Organisasi TNI (1945–1965) [TNI Organizational History]. Jakarta: TNI History
Center, 2014.
Sewindu SESKOGAB 1974–1982 [Eight Years of SESKOGAB, 1974–1982], Sekolah Staf dan
Komando Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Bagian Gabungan, 69-75, Military
Education Papers, Indonesian Military History Center Library
The Indonesian Army’s Doctrine of War, Speech by Minister/Commander of the Indonesian
Army, Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pak-
istan. Indonesian Army Information Service Papers, Indonesian Military History Center.
Tjeramah Umum Menteri/PANGAD MAJDJEN A. Jani pada Dies Natalis AKMIL 1962
[General Lecture of Major General Ahmad Jani, Minister/Commander of the Army at
the anniversary of the Military Academy in 1962], Pusat Penerangan Angkatan Darat.
Vademecum Pengetahuan Pertahanan dan Keamanan, [Vademecum of Defense and Security
Knowledge], Sekolah Staf dan Komando Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat,
1982.
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Mrázek, Rudolf. 1978a. The United States and the Indonesian Military, 1945 to 1965: A
Study of an Intervention, Vol. 1. Prague: The Oriental Institute in Academia.
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